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1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 20, 2003, American forces launched their second attack on Iraq in 12 years, 
this time to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime and end its alleged nuclear threat 
(Gordon/Trainor 2007; Cordesman 2003). Within three weeks, the US-led coalition 
dealt the Iraqi forces a crushing defeat and occupied Baghdad with only half the troops 
of Desert Storm and suffering few casualties (Boot 2003). The accelerated buildup of 
US armed forces since 2001 and the effort to transform them into a faster and more 
lethal information-age force seemed to have borne fruits. Yet President Bush’s famous 
declaration of “mission accomplished” proved premature (Sammon 2003): The coalition 
was rapidly confronted by a bitter insurgency, which caused troublesome postwar 
instability and rising casualties (Cordesman 2008; Packer 2005). Besides many political 
mistakes in preparation for the war, the military had its fair share in this negative turn of 
events. In their effort to maintain conventional superiority after the end of the Cold War, 
the generals had turned a blind eye to the requirements of asymmetric operations and 
were taken aback by the eruption of the insurgency (Dobbins 2007, 146-147). 
Transformation, the celebrated innovation in warfare, was of limited use against the 
opponent’s shift to asymmetric strategy and the US troops were forced to a new round 
of innovation. 
This often told story provides a good illustration of the promises and pitfalls of military 
innovation broadly defined as a significant qualitative change in the armed forces, 
which affects their functioning in the field (Grissom 2006, 906-907).
 1
 Innovative force 
structure, military technology, doctrine etc. can dramatically shift the balance of power 
and are therefore pivotal for military success or failure in the long run (Borghard 2010; 
Sapolsky 2000). Unfortunately, there is no objective measure to guarantee the success 
of innovation as war is always characterized by uncertainty and surprise. Hence, 
innovations and qualitative changes are quite risky and imply great military costs if 
misplaced or unsuccessful.  
Numerous students from various academic backgrounds have taken efforts to uncover 
the causes and consequences of innovation. Since Barry Posen (1984) initiated the field 
of military innovation studies, four major areas have been discussed (Grissom 2006; 
                                                             
1 According to this definition, innovation does not necessarily result in greater effectiveness. History 
offers numerous examples of military innovations, which proved misplaced or inferior in conflict. 
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Sapolsky 2000): (1) Innovation as a consequence of the international balance of power 
or of military success or defeat (Borghard 2010, 10-15); (2) Innovation caused by inter- 
or intraservice competition (Coté 1995; Rosen 1991); (3) Innovation as an expression of 
cultural factors usually within the military organization or the wider military 
establishment (Kier 1997; Farrell 1996); (4) Innovation as the result of domestic 
institutional or structural characteristics (Avant 1994; Evangelista 1988). 
Yet, no research focuses on the relationship between the content and representation of 
societal preferences and military innovation thus far. This gap is surprising, since 
military innovation is not only of military, but also of great domestic relevance: 
Innovations provide opportunities for societal actors to realize social, political or 
economic gains and pose a challenge to individuals and organizations which carry the 
costs of change. Hence, they are more than a technical or mechanical task and involve 
numerous societal interests, which seek to drive military policy
2
 in very different 
directions (Huntington 1961, 287). Long-standing research on the relationship between 
defense economy and military policy has repeatedly stressed this relationship: Domestic 
economic interests influence the military policy process especially with regard to the 
acquisition of military equipment (Kaldor 1981; Kurth 1971; Weidenbaum 1969). 
Moreover, since the democratic peace debate gained momentum in the 1980s, students 
have placed growing attention on the role of democratic participation in security policy 
and also found evidence for its relevance in military policy 
(Evangelista/Müller/Schörnig 2008; Geis/Wagner 2006; Maoz 1998; Chan 1997; Ray 
1997). Studies on arms control, alliance behavior, warfare and military effectiveness, 
and weapons acquisition have revealed various democracy-specific patterns indicating 
that research on the nexus between  democratic societies and military innovation is 
worthwhile (e.g. Schörnig 2008; Petrova 2008; Altmann/Reppy 2008).  
This claim is further backed by a growing consensus that public attitudes on military 
policy are not only consistent and rational, but also influential at least with regard to the 
defense budget (Page/Bouton 2006, 17-37; Knopf 1998; Page/Shapiro 1992; Graham 
1988; Verba et al. 1967).
3
 Wlezien (2004; 1995; see also Eichenberg/Stoll 2003; 
                                                             
2
 Military policy is used here to refer to the preparation for war and does not involve intervention policy. 
3 In contrast, the earlier Almond-Lippmann consensus argued that public attitudes in foreign and security 
policy are highly volatile, lack structure and coherence, and have therefore a very limited impact on 
policy decisions (for an overview see Holsti 1992; see also Miller/Stokes 1963; Kriesberg 1949). 
Lippmann (1961; 1925) stresses: “[H]e, the voter, the citizen, the sovereign, is apparently expected to 
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Stimson 1999) prominently introduced the thermostat metaphor to describe the close 
relationship between public opinion and defense spending: “If the level of policy differs 
from the level the public prefers, the public favors a corresponding change in policy, 
either more or less.” (Wlezien 1995, 982) Thus, there is evidence from various 
directions indicating that studying the interaction of different domestic factors and 
military innovation is worthwhile.  
The study at hand takes on the challenge by connecting the literature on military 
innovations with the debate on the democratic factor in security policy. It is driven by 
two questions: First, are there patterns of innovation in US military policy during 
periods of military transition? And if yes, what influence had societal demands on these 
patterns in US military policy? Periods of military transition are defined as a distinct 
subset of military dynamics characterized by disproportionally strong upward or 
downward budgetary dynamics over a short time span.
4
 These periods are predestined 
for innovation, since they inevitably imply qualitative decisions in military policy 
(Huntington 1961, 291). In order to maintain a sound military establishment against the 
backdrop of changing budgets, coherent political action is required. This demand 
increases the likelihood for innovations, although it makes them not inevitable. There 
remain various answers to the question where to place the additional efforts during 
buildups or where to create the savings during builddowns. Four periods of military 
transition in US defense policy are analyzed in detail: The demobilization after World 
War II 1945-1949, the Korean War/Cold War buildup 1950-1953, the Post-Cold War 
drawdown 1990-1998 and the renewed buildup for the War on Terror 2001-2007. 
Since the study on societal factors in military innovation is an unexplored field, 
studying American periods of military transition is a particularly promising first step. 
By 1945, the US emerged as sole nuclear power with an edge in strategic airpower and 
naval power, which enabled it to significantly increase its zone of influence. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
yield an unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curiosity and effort.” (Lippmann 1925, 24) Almond 
(1956) adds that information gathering and democratic participation are particularly difficult in the field 
of military policy, due to its highly technical character, the demand for secrecy, and the enormous stakes 
which are involved. 
4 Students of military affairs have pointed at the striking ups and downs in the US military budget for a 
long time (e.g. Jones/McCaffery 2008, 79; Wildavsky 1988, 369). While these periods are not limited to 
the occurrence of wars, major military conflicts provide their most common backdrop. Snider (1993a) 
uses the transition terminology to describe the demobilization after World War II and the Cold War. Yet, 
he does not give a clear-cut definition and offers no plausible explanation for reserving ‘transition’ to 
builddown episodes. 
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subsequent decisions to enhance the military innovations from the war during the late 
1940s and early 1950s established the US as the permanent leader of the West, enabling 
Washington to assume various international security commitments and to militarily act 
on a global scale (Grimmett 2008; Stewart 2005). Equipped with the most advanced 
military technologies, American armed forces provided a material pillar for the creation 
of the political and economic world order and became the standard to be met for 
declared or self-ascribed rivals since 1945. But these well documented international 
implications are only one side of the Janus-faced military policy (Huntington 1961). 
The permanent military establishment after the war also became an important aspect of 
the American economy and society. Millions of people, regions, and states, slowly 
started to directly or indirectly depend on or at least strongly benefit from Pentagon 
money.  
Military power remained an important means in the US foreign policy and a domestic 
factor of economic and social relevance up until today.
5
 After the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the US started to command the commons virtually unchecked and no other state 
has comparable means to intervene on a global scale (Posen 2003).  This did not 
guarantee national security for long, however, and the US armed forces started 
transitioning into a new posture to back a more proactive international security policy 
for the war on terror by the end of first post-Cold War decade. Again, US military 
preparations contributed to international military dynamics as states and non-state actors 
continued their efforts to counter US military power after 1990 (Ikenberry 2003). 
Hence, Beijing, which is in a permanent political conflict with Washington over 
Taiwan, is working on conventional anti-access and area denial capabilities in response 
to America’s command of the commons (DOD 2009). Other states, such as North 
Korea, are seeking nuclear weapons to raise the costs of an attack by the superior South 
Korean-American coalition (Harrison 2000). Finally, Al Qaeda and the Taliban, like the 
Vietcong before them, have decided to resort to asymmetric tactics to defeat an enemy 
they cannot risk to face in conventional battle (Liotta 2002). Even American allies are 
affected by the dynamic US military development. NATO partners struggle to keep up 
with the American armed forces and interoperability of forces is seen as an increasing 
problem (Daniel 2004).  
                                                             
5 Some observers have warned that the vast military means push politicians to more easily favor military 
solutions (Butfoy 2006; Feaver/Gelpi 2004). 
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Against this backdrop, the exploration of factors leading to military innovation during 
periods of transition contributes to an improved understanding of an essential parameter 
in international relations and US foreign and domestic policy. The findings of this study 
show that the international and domestic requirements related to military policy do not 
easily go together. Indeed, the growing domestic relevance of military policy created 
societal demands for relative stability which make military innovation increasingly 
difficult even in the face of changing military requirements from an international 
perspective. In more pointed words, the domestic and international levels of US military 
policy increasingly follow conflicting logics which reduce the likelihood of innovation.  
To be sure, there is a public majority with no vested stakes in military policy which is 
willing to adjust military policy in accordance with the changing international 
requirements. This majority has a general interest in innovation as a means to increase 
military efficiency during all periods of transition. But their common preferences 
remain latent and unspecific most of the time. Other issues with more relevance for their 
personal welfare dominate these individuals’ political participation. Only in the face of 
imminent or apparent military failure such as in Korea 1952 or Iraq 2006 does the 
public actively engage in military policy through elections and trigger reform. The 
predominant weakness of this group’s commitment strongly reduces the incentive for 
political actors to pick up the positions of this majority and implement innovation even 
against organizational inertia and other resistance. The slack in the relationship between 
the general public and the political representatives offer special interest groups the 
opportunity to exercise asymmetrical influence most of the time. In contrast to the 
public majority, groups such as defense companies or reserve associations have a 
specific benefit most often tied to the status quo of military policy and therefore actively 
push for stability. Hence, not the content or strength of the general public’s preferences, 
but the growing weight of special interest groups most importantly affects the 
decreasing likelihood of military innovation.  
In the following two chapters, the theoretical and methodical foundations for this 
argument are developed. The successive chapter gives an answer to the first question 
and assesses the military innovativeness of the four periods of military transition with 
regard to military organization, weapons acquisition and doctrine. In Chapter 5 and 6, 
the main body of the study, an in-depth analysis of the factors leading to the variance in 
military innovations is presented. While the former shows the preference formations 
18 
 
and military policy dynamics during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the latter discusses 
the same factors for the 1990s and the early years of the new century. Chapter 7 sums 
up the results and critically discusses the findings, the theoretical approach and its 
implications for further research.  
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2. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS – A LIBERAL MILITARY POLICY THEORY 
2.1. Literature review 
Students of military innovation and US military policy can build on a rich and diverse 
literature mainly in political science, economics, and history (Grissom 2006; Sagan 
1996; Kurth 1971).
6
 However, the relevance of domestic factors within the international 
context which are central for this study are not easily designed despite Huntington’s 
(1961, 2) early conclusion that “[m]ilitary policy cuts clearly across the usual distinction 
between foreign policy and domestic policy”.7  
The effort to find a theoretical place for the domestic level is already clearly apparent in 
Barry Posen’s (1984) conclusion to his seminal study on doctrinal innovation: “The 
analysis does not show that organizational factors are unimportant, but rather that they 
are more often than not overridden by constraints and incentives that lie at the level of 
the international political system.” (Posen 1984, 39; see also his conclusion 220-244) 
Evangelista (1988, 9) correctly points out that Posen’s study inevitably requires the 
incorporation of bureaucratic politics to explain innovation and thus moves from the 
international level to the actors’ perception of the international realm at the domestic 
level (Evangelista 1988, 9). The international strategic and domestic structural 
incentives and constraints have to be seen as two sides of the same coin.
8
 But if both 
                                                             
6 For a broad chronological overview see Walt 1991. Theories on long economic waves are not discussed 
here (Väyrynen 1990; Modelski 1980; for a critique see Krell 1981a). 
7 Some approaches challenged this perspective. The Action-Reaction-Theorem, realism and the currently 
most sophisticated neorealism emphasize the crucial impact of the international environment 
(Müller/Schörnig 2006, 39-40; Brito/Intriligator 1995; McGuire 1977). According to these approaches, 
the measure for military efforts is the potential and factual force posture of other units within the 
international system: “‘Enough’ depends on how much an opponent has.” (Schelling 1966, 1) Although 
neorealism has produced various derivates, all approaches share the assumption that military preparations 
are largely determined by incentives external to the state (Mearsheimer 2003; Mastanduno 1997; 
Glaser/Kaufmann 1998; Walt 1997; Lynn-Jones 1995; Walt 1985; Waltz 1979, 126). To be sure, 
neorealism was developed as a systemic theory and its assumptions are therefore incomplete for an 
explanation of foreign or military policy (Zakaria 1992, 179-180; but see Elman 1996). The most recent 
neoclassical realism has responded to the limited utility of realist thinking for foreign policy questions 
and systematically opened up the state for various intervening domestic variables (Ripsman 2009; Rose 
1998). 
The so-called theorem on the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) strongly emphasizes the role of 
economic and political elites for military policy (Hartung 2001; Senghaas 1974; 1972a; 1972b; Rosen 
1973; Medick 1973). Its proponents claim that strategic arguments serve to publicly legitimize the 
parochial interests of the powerful MIC within economy and state. The most extreme variants of the MIC-
theorem even deny the genuineness of security considerations for military policy. Yet, these far-reaching 
assumptions were strongly criticized and its proponents largely failed to deliver empirical evidence to 
prove their often normatively biased claims (Müller 1985; Krell 1981b, 11-12; Levine 1973; 
Slater/Nardin 1973). 
8 Evangelista (1986, 199) and Risse-Kappen (1986, 207) characterized the early debate between external 
and internal explanations as too simplistic, unproductive and outdated. Risse-Kappen (1986, 208) argued 
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levels are related, how does the domestic level affect military policy? The follow-on 
imperative and the extended democratic peace debate are the most important 
contributions to this discussion on security-embedded domestic impacts on military 
policy. While following the same general logic, they highlight different aspects and thus 
produce departing assumptions. 
Emerging from the early research on the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) during the 
late 1960s and 1970s, the follow-on imperative highlights strong parochial economic 
and political interests in stable armament as a consequence of the creation of a 
permanent defense industrial base. Kurth (1993; 1973; 1971) was the first to identify a 
follow-on imperative within US weapons acquisition. He argued that expiring armament 
projects are usually immediately succeeded by new contracts regardless of their 
strategic necessity. This causes continuity in armament products as well as producers.
9
 
The underlying logic is twofold: On the one hand, political and military leaders try to 
avoid the closure of construction lines since their existence may be crucial in the 
unexpected case of war. On the other hand, the highly specialized military industry 
strongly depends on defense dollars and is willing to use its political weight as 
employer and contributor to the welfare of constituencies. According to economists, 
every $1 billion in defense dollars creates between 25,000 and 50,000 jobs, depending 
on whether indirect employment effects are included (Mayer 1992, 17). The relationship 
between the state and military industry is clearly symbiotic here (Weidenbaum 1969, 
30). Therefore, a strong lobby of lawmakers, industry and labor oppose negative 
changes in the respective military production. The results are path dependencies in 
acquisition and often gold-plated products, which provide only little additional military 
value (Kaldor 1981).  
The extended democratic peace debate broadens the scope from narrow economic 
interests towards the political representation of the risk-averse and cost-sensitive general 
public. If democratic societies are unwilling to carry the costs of war, it is logically 
consistent to assume that they are also reluctant to carry the costs of military 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
that the external-internal debate “cannot be decided empirically because a clear-cut distinction between 
the two determinants is not possible.” 
9
 Some authors highlighted a similar mechanism explicitly for the R&D sector (Thee 1990; 1989; 
Albrecht 1990; Buzan 1987, 96; York 1976, 11; Brooks 1975). In contrast to the weapon producers, the 
R&D community is strongly biased towards innovation, since this is what keeps them relevant and 
funded. But since most R&D is done by weapons producers (Väyrynen 1983, 64), the status-quo 
orientation of the latter constraints the scope of innovations (Müller 1991, 32). 
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preparations. Yet, both claims must be further specified: As democratic societies are 
willing to fight wars in self-defense, they are also willing to accept military force as a 
means of protection. But they “prefer to purchase protection at the lowest sustainable 
price.” (Lake 1992, 25) Thus, democratic decision-makers face a permanent dilemma: 
They are forced to continuously balance the level of military spending against other 
state activities – “the proverbial guns versus butter tradeoff.” (Reiter/Stam 2002, 121) 
Too much defense spending may strangle the economy or dwarf welfare efforts which 
affect office-seekers’ public support (Garfinkel 1994).10 Democratic decision-makers 
therefore prefer systems which provide ‘more bang for a buck’ to keep the costs of 
security and potential war in check (Schörnig 2007). The societal preference for military 
efficiency thus creates a political incentive for military innovation. In this vein, Müller 
and Schörnig (2001) argue that the low acceptance of war casualties was a major reason 
for the US government to innovate during the 1990s. 
The approaches clearly disagree on the mechanism by which the demand for security, 
which is strongly affected by the international situation, is translated into military 
policy: In a changing strategic environment, the follow-on imperative expects stability 
caused by special interest groups, which were established to meet another strategic 
environment. In contrast, the democratic peace theory expects change – potentially 
innovation – caused by cost-minimizing individuals in a democratic process.   
Another third thread often subsumed under the label of ‘military culture’, strongly 
differs from both of these fundamentally economic considerations. It highlights the 
importance of immaterial influences, societal and organizational ideas, which direct or 
constrain military innovation. According to its proponents, military culture “is an 
elaborate social construction, an exercise of creative intelligence, through which we 
come to imagine war in a particular way and to embrace certain rationalizations about 
                                                             
10 The evidence for the existence of a trade-off between defense and welfare is not as straightforward as 
the guns-versus-butter-phrase suggests. On government expenditure, Russett (1982) and Mintz and Huang 
(1991) find no evidence for short-term trade-off effects between defense spending and welfare policy 
represented by education and health expenditure. But Mintz and Huang (1991) show that there is indeed a 
negative long-term effect on education which correlates with defense budgets and Peroff and Podolak-
Warren (1979) find some evidence for a trade-off between defense and health expenditures. Focusing on 
the economic impact of defense spending, the findings by Smith (1977) and Ward and Davis (1992) 
reveal a negative correlation between defense spending and economic growth, investment, and 
employment. Yet, a study by Gold (1993) casts doubt on the trade-off between defense spending and 
investment. 
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how war should be conducted and for what purposes.” (Burk 1999a, 448)11 Views on 
the characteristics of an ideal soldier, the causes and conduct of war, or the organization 
of armed forces within a political system are exchanged within the military branches 
and between the military and society. As Terriff and Farrell (2002, 273) argue: “The 
culturalist approach reveals that states adopt military practices not only for the purpose 
of defeating enemies but also to reproduce identities of themselves as, for example, 
modern or Western.“ Indeed, prior research has revealed cultural impacts on most 
aspects of US military policy (Lynn 2003, xviii-xix; Burk 1999a, 455; Kier 1997; 
Brown 1991; Applegate/Moore 1990; Snyder 1984, 210; Head 1973).
12
 While military 
culture is generally biased towards continuity, it is not fixed over time as the experience 
of organizational failure or a growing mismatch between ideas and observed realities 
can lead to innovation (Collins 2005, 296-301; Dunivin 1994). 
 
Attempts of integration – The political process 
The review above has presented three potentially influential domestic factors, which are 
embedded in an international strategic environment (see figure 2.1.). 
 
                                                             
11
 Authors use many different terms such as ‘organizational ideology’ (Snyder 1984), ‘military essence’ 
(Halperin 1971, 76), or ‘Service personalities’ (Builder 1989), but they all emphasize immaterial 
influences on military policy. 
12 Students of the US military have also discussed the existence of a particular American or Western Way 
of War (Gray 2005, 27-34; Echevarria 2004; Hanson 2003; Weigley 1973). 
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Chart 2.1: Approaches on the relationship between societal factors and military policy 
 
The question resulting from this review is how to deal with the various explanations 
when studying the societal influences on military innovation. Most students thus far 
have selected competitive theory designs against various empirical materials in order to 
eliminate or weaken some factors.
 
But these studies lead to the conclusion that a 
competitive approach produces only limited progress as none of the major explanatory 
factors was significantly discredited.
13
 Therefore, this study suggests an alternative 
approach: In order to give a plausible answer to the question on the relationship society 
and military innovation the explanatory factors are incorporated into one consistent 
model.
14
 Rather than bringing the theories in competition, their causal interaction is 
emphasized.
15
 The effort can build on a rich theory-guided literature on mostly US 
                                                             
13 For example, Holland (1997; 1993) tested several variables to explain weapons acquisition. Instead of 
finding evidence to strengthen one explanation over others, she concludes that all variables are important 
during different stages of the process. And Njølstad (1990), comparing four single case studies on the US 
decision to develop hydrogen bombs, comes to the conclusion that the different explanations in these 
analyses are not only caused by empirical inconsistencies. Rather, he argues that the studies provide 
alternative interpretations of the same evidence which cannot be rejected on empirical grounds alone. 
14 Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003, 19-24) suggest four options for theoretical dialogue of which 
theory integration is the most plausible choice next to a competitive designs here. Sequencing and the 
assignment of different domains of application are of little use for the study at hand. 
15 Other students of foreign and military policy have highlighted the relevance of this approach. While 
Evangelista himself suggests a competitive design, he admits that “[t]he important task is to identify 
which factors come into play at which stage.” (Evangelista 1986, 199) In the same vein, Hudson (2007, 
165-184) makes a strong case for the incorporation of different levels of analysis in foreign policy 
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foreign and military policy which highlights the political process as the central 
transmission belt bringing different domestic factors together. 
Already during the 1950s and 1960s, Warner Schilling, Samuel Huntington, and Roger 
Hilsman among others, prominently studied the process through which different 
influences are translated into policy (e.g. Hilsman 1987, vii; Schilling 1962; 
Snyder/Bruck/Sapin 1962; Huntington 1961; on weapons acquisition see Sapolsky 
1972). In a second wave, Graham Allison (Allison/Zelikow 1999; Allison 1971; 1969; 
Art 1973) introduced the Governmental Politics paradigm, which became a standard 
work on inner-governmental processes leading to foreign policy.
16
 Although critics have 
repeatedly pointed out lacking theoretical specification and inconsistencies (Rhodes 
1994; Bendor/Hammond 1992; Welch 1992; Freedman 1976; Art 1973; Krasner 1972; 
for an overview see Smith 1989), the paradigm remains a prominent approach to 
explain state action (e.g. Holland 1999; Mitchell 1999; Rosati 1981). Proponents of 
Governmental Politics theories abandon the black box of a rational acting unitary state 
and stress instead: “[T]he ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating decision-
maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ 
substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who 
compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their 
government.” (Allison/Halperin 1972, 42) Thus, policy results from the bargaining 
among state actors with various interests in national security.
17
  
Governmental Politics rests on two basic assumptions: First, despite a common interest 
in national security, actors’ preferences differ due to the impact of special interests 
closely related to their positions. Thus, Governmental Politics especially highlights the 
impact of institutional or organizational interests that stem from their desire to secure or 
increase resources, autonomy, importance and culture (Halperin 1971, 76; Niskanen 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
decision-making theory. Theoretical dialogue can improve theory, explanation and prediction power by 
taking interaction of variables into consideration. 
16 The authors of this approach usually speak of a model which indicates a paradigm or conceptual 
framework instead of a theory (Allison/Halperin 1972). Yet, theories have been derived from this 
approach and hypotheses empirically tested. 
17 The focus here is on policy and decision games and less on action games. “Action games” refers to the 
bargaining process which implements decisions and policies or processes which lead to action in the 
absence of explicit policy guidelines (Allison/Halperin 1972, 51-53).   
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1971, 38-41).
18
 Second, actors differ in their sources of power and channels of influence 
(Allison/Zelikow 1999, 271-275).  
Many military innovation studies were strongly inspired by this approach. Deborah 
Avant (1996; 1994) made an important contribution for the understanding of innovation 
by highlighting the importance of the institutional structure of civil-military relations. 
The separation of responsibilities between executive and legislative in the field of US 
military policy complicates the achievement of a coherent position on demands and 
rewards and thus weakens the political actors’ ability to exercise civil control. Coté 
(1995) further combined the civil-military principal-agent relationship with Service 
interests (see also Sapolsky 2000). He argues that the civilian decision to pursue one 
strategy over another and the inter- and inner-Service competition for a role in this 
strategy determines innovation and thus the overall defense policy. This is in line with 
Lacquement (2000), who rests his explanation for the lacking change in US doctrine 
and force structure during the 1990s on the military organizations’ interest in stability 
and the absence of a strong civil actor’s position.  
Yet Governmental Politics has important limitations for the purpose at hand as it does 
not provide a clear mechanism connecting the identified societal factors with the 
political process. Generally, Allison and Zelikow (1999, 298) stress the importance of 
national security interests, domestic political interests, organizational interests, and 
personal interests. It is therefore compatible with the factors of military policy identified 
in prior research. But Governmental Politics states no theoretical propositions on the 
conditions that determine the significance of different incentives for involved actors’ 
preferences in any given situation (Rosati 2001; Smith 1984). Most Governmental 
Politics theories and many students of military innovation treat actor preferences as 
highly correlative with organizational interests. Allison paraphrases an often used 
expression: “Where you sit influences what you see as well as where you stand (on any 
issue).” (Allison 1971, 178) This does only relocate the problem, however, as 
governmental institutions and organizations are not detached from their domestic 
environment.  Governmental Politics still lacks an explicit theoretical link on how 
                                                             
18
 Hilsman (1987, 77-78) argues that the focus on large bureaucracies underestimates the inner-
organizational conflicts as well as the impact of actors outside the executive. He therefore suggests a 
political-process model which includes more actors and puts more emphasis on the process character of 
politics. Yet, this concept adds additional complexity to an arguably already overloaded model 
(Bendoer/Hammond 1992). 
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societal interests and ideas affect these organizational interests and therefore the 
preferences of state actors.
19
  
This is unsatisfactory as all three identified theories on societal influences show that 
state and society or parts of the society are connected. One side ensures security and the 
other side provides the means and carries the costs for this security. The connection is 
particularly strong in a democratic system in which state actors are closely tied to 
political support of large parts of society. In order to offset the limitations of 
Governmental Politics and provide consistent assumptions linking society and state, this 
study suggests a bottom-up framework drawn from the liberal foreign policy paradigm 
(Moravcsik 2008; 2003; 1997; Narizny 2003a; 2003b; Freund/Rittberger 2001).
20
  
   
2.2. Liberal military policy theory  
2.2.1. A framework for analysis 
Despite Doyle’s (1986, 1152) assessment that “[t]here is no canonical description of 
liberalism”, Moravcsik deserves credit for having merged central liberal threads into a 
coherent framework based on a very parsimonious liberal paradigm (Carlsnaes 2002, 
339). Other authors, especially Narizny (2003b; see also Freund/Rittberger 2001), have 
                                                             
19 Governmental Politics implicitly places emphasis on security considerations arguing that these interests 
outreach other desires, are more consensual, and ease disagreements (Halperin 1971). Yet, even if the 
implicit primacy of systemic imperatives is accepted, the vagueness with regard to the resulting military 
policy preferences remains unsolved. 
20 This approach has several advantages over possible alternatives: (1) As argued earlier, military policy 
has an effect on and is affected by the international and domestic environments alike. While policy-
oriented perspectives provide adequate models for domestic mechanisms of political problem-solving, 
they do not systematically account for the relationship between the international system and national 
defense. Thus, foreign policy perspectives are superior tools for military policy analysis. (2) The liberal 
bottom-up orientation makes it the most suitable candidate for a theoretical connection between society 
and security policy. Narizny (2003b, 6) argues that the liberal paradigm’s major distinction from other 
approaches is its microfoundation: “[I]t begins with individuals’ preferences and then works its way up 
the chain of interest aggregation and policymaking constraints.” (3) The incorporation advances the 
military policy debate and the liberal theory formulation alike. According to Moravcsik (2008, 249), 
“[p]erhaps the most attractive characteristic of liberal theory is that it suggests a simple and conceptually 
coherent way of combining theories.” Thus, the conflicting assumptions of the democratic peace theory 
and the follow-on imperatives have already been considered in the liberal proposition on competing 
societal demands and interest representation by the state. The liberal framework is even open for ideas, 
which allows for a partial incorporation of non-material influence on actors’ behavior as claimed by 
culture based innovation theories. Although the positivist foundation of liberalism prevents an integration 
of the mostly constructivist cultural arguments, it takes the guiding effect of ideas into account. 
Moreover, Allison’s state-centered perspective is expanded by a theoretical perspective on “state-society 
relations” (Moravcsik 1993, 6; 1997, 514). At the same time, especially Moravcsik’s liberal foreign 
policy framework can benefit from Governmental Politics to gain further specification and differentiation 
on the causal treatment of the state. 
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critically examined Moravcsik’s assumptions and subsequently improved the theoretical 
framework. Its core assumptions and their consequences for this analysis can be stated 
as follows:  
(1) Rooted in the tradition of methodological individualism (Kunz 2004, 10), liberals 
treat rational, risk-averse individuals and groups who organize to promote their interests 
as primary actors (Kydd 2008; Zacher/Matthew 1995). Liberalism asserts that 
individuals hold and pursue stable interests which they rationally arrange in preference 
orders depending on structural and contextual circumstances (Freund/Rittberger 2001, 
70-71).
21
 Incentives and constraints affecting the societal actor’s preferences result from 
the domestic and international environment. Due to the scarcity of material goods, the 
existence of divergent fundamental beliefs, and unequal distributions of political power, 
the resulting process of human interaction is most often characterized by interest 
competition rather than harmony.
22
  
(2) From the liberal bottom-up perspective derives an understanding of states as 
representative institutions, whose interests are determined by societal preference 
formations. Formal and informal mechanisms such as elections and lobbying constitute 
the “critical ‘transmission belt’” (Moravcsik 1997, 518), which transfers societal 
preferences onto the state level. Since dominant preferences within the state can change 
either through contextual changes or through shifts in bargaining power, liberals assume 
that there are no fix state interests. Moravcsik treats states and their agencies as purely 
representative institutions which pursue changing subsets of societal preferences in the 
international system. In other words, state representatives are perfect agents which act in 
full accordance with the changing demands of their societal principal.  
Governmental Politics shows that this treatment of the state as a homogenous 
representative of societal actors’ preferences is a problematic oversimplification. The 
state is far from a homogenous entity with clear hierarchies and a unified will. In 
                                                             
21 Elster (1989, 13-21) stresses that individual action is determined by constant desire and variable 
opportunity. Additionally, Moravcsik’s theory and this study assume bounded rationality taking 
incomplete information, cognitive limitations, and the ability to learn into account (Gigerenzer/Selten 
2001; Rosati 2000; Simon 1956). To order options rationally under these conditions, “individuals use 
rules of thumb – simple procedures – to guide their action.” (Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992, 17)   
22
 The public as an aggregate of individuals constitutes no actor, due to its lacking ability to act 
intentionally and to strategically adjust positions (Scharpf 2000, 98-100). This does not mean that public 
opinion is no expression of preferences. Nor is it generally impossible that many individuals act 
according to a shared preference as evident in elections or spontaneous group dynamics. But the 
analytical unit in these events remains the individual and not any aggregate. 
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contrast, states are heterogeneous entities in which institutions create actors with often 
competing preferences. Following liberalism’s first assumption, these actors must be 
treated like other social actors as individuals or groups which pursue preferences based 
on incentives within their environment. Thus, the principal-agent relationship between 
society and representatives is more complex than assumed by Moravcsik. For an 
analysis of military policy, it is plausible to distinguish between political and military 
actors (Freund/Rittberger 2001, 85; Avant 1994). Political actors are elected state 
officials such as the President and members of Congress which directly depend on 
electoral support. The group of political actors also includes the White House staff and 
the President’s cabinet-rank secretaries. While they are not elected, they are most 
closely related to and dependent on the President. Instead, military actors, including the 
secretaries of the military departments and the military chiefs of staff, are independent 
of direct public approval and can more strongly factor in the interests of their respective 
organization. With this differentiation, political actors function as proxies of domestic 
demands within the state. Thus, the principal-agent relationship between electorate and 
state actors is in fact a double principal-agent relation, connecting the public to political 
actors and political actors to military actors (Avant 2007).
23
 Considering that principal-
agent relationships are never perfect under conditions of bounded rationality, there is a 
good chance for a double deviation from the ideal model of perfect representation.
24
 
Accordingly, Moravcsik’s assumption needs adjustment: The state represents societal 
preferences as well as preferences of state actors who compete for influence and engage 
in cooperation and competition. 
(3) While the liberal concept of policy interdependence mostly serves as an explanation 
of state interaction, which is not at the heart of this study, it adds some additional 
insights on the impact of the international environment on the domestic preference 
formation. Policy interdependence refers to “the set of costs and benefits for dominant 
social groups in foreign societies (…) that arise when dominant social groups in a given 
                                                             
23 Broz and Brewster Hawes (2006) suggest a similar chain of delegation for the international monetary 
fund policy. 
24 Theories on principal-agent relations emphasize the incomplete control caused by two problems related 
to asymmetrical information (Laffont/Martimort 2002; Laffont 2003; Avant 1996, 54-61). The first 
problem is usually called “adverse selection” or “hidden knowledge”: Since the agent has more 
information concerning his task than the principal, he can exploit this situation of hidden knowledge by 
misrepresenting his performance. Furthermore, he can try to set the agenda in his favor. The second 
problem concerns “hidden action” and “moral hazard”: Since the utility function of different problem 
solutions and the actions itself are hidden from the principal, the agent can select the solution which 
maximizes his utility. Yet, this solution may be inefficient with respect to the principal’s objectives. 
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society seek to realize their own preferences internationally.” (Moravcsik 2003, 165) 
The concept of policy interdependence is an important analytical link, since the 
preferences of other states contribute to the international environment which has in turn 
a major impact on the individual’s utility function. How this translates into a military 
policy is dependent on the functioning of the double-principle-agent-relationship. For 
example, international zero-sum formations in which a society can only benefit at the 
expense of others can yield societal preferences for more military efforts to increase 
protection. When political actors react responsive to this societal preference shift and 
military actors respond to the political demand in turn, military policy is changing and 
in turn shaping the international policy interdependence. The overall framework is 
presented in chart 2.2.   
 
Chart 2.2: Liberal framework for analysis 
 
 
 
State interest competition
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Individual
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2.2.2. Substantial theoretical assumptions 
With an analytical framework in place, substantial theoretical assumptions concerning 
the social demands and the process by which they affect military innovation can be 
specified.  
 
Preference choice 
Two factors shaping societal preferences stand out from the literature review: Economic 
considerations and ideas. To be sure, security interests are the most important factors in 
driving military policy in the first place and in explaining the occurrence of military 
transitions.
25
 Yet, this study is not interested in the occurrence of transitions, but rather 
in their impact on military policy beyond the changing resources. In other words, this 
study is not concerned with the question why a state decides to improve its security by 
military means, but rather why it decides to continue its path rather than innovate. 
Economic preferences, expressions of the actors’ desire for commercial or political 
benefits, have central importance here. Actors pressure the government to create or 
maintain an economic structure which is most beneficial for them. This can result in 
very different preferences.  
On the one hand, as argued by the follow-on imperative and Governmental Politics, the 
welfare of special interest groups directly depends on the course of military policy in a 
particular area. Their preferences for military innovation or stability therefore result 
                                                             
25 In liberal theory, survival or security from physical harm is usually considered a fundamental desire 
rendering further reference unnecessary. Yet, this is insufficient for a study on military policy in which 
interests in security are of central concern. Indeed, individuals and groups react to the emergence of a 
threat to their security by demands to provide means to meet this threat. But the acknowledgement of 
a security interest in a liberal framework differs in important ways from other approaches. Liberalism 
especially differs from neorealism which considers the security interest as continuously dominating the 
actors’ preferences caused permanent uncertainty. In contrast to this emphasis on the stable impact of 
anarchy, liberals argue that the question ‘What threatens my security?’ is not predetermined but 
strongly differs with regard to the individual’s environment and the level of information (Rathbun 2007, 
536; Ikenberry/Moravcsik 2004). Security preferences are thus a function of the available information 
and the patterns of policy interdependence which pervade the international anarchy. Hence, security is 
not always dominating actors’ utility functions and the dominant preferences driving the state’s action 
are not necessarily based on the interest in security. As Moravcsik (2007, 238) argues: “Few modern 
states are Sparta: Most compromise security or sovereignty in order to achieve other ends, or, indeed, 
just to save money.” 
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from group specific pay-offs concerning the course of national defense policy. In this 
context, the defense economy including defense industry and labor and the military 
establishment itself are the most notable status quo groups, since changes cause 
potentially high adaption costs. Independent R&D communities are the most important 
innovation groups, since their relevance depends on permanent demand for innovation. 
Many other groups with various incentives are plausible between these poles. On the 
other hand, the overwhelming majority of individuals in society have no specific gains 
from defense spending. This group has a common interest in a most efficient military 
posture, i.e. the posture that can meet their desire for security at the least costs. Against 
this backdrop, two incentives cause individuals with common economic interests to 
prefer innovation over stability: First, the emergence of new technologies, which 
promise less costs in acquiring military goals
26
; second, the emergence of new military 
challenges and threats, which cannot be treated with the same efficiency by the current 
military preparations optimized for prior challenges (Posen 1984, 30). This is especially 
relevant in an actual military conflict, when societal actors come to the conclusion that 
military action with the current means is unsuccessful or increasingly expensive.    
Kurth and the democratic peace debate make an additional assumption, which is 
relevant for this analysis. They emphasize not only the “plenty” but also the “power” 
side of economic interests (e.g. Katzenstein 1978). This is particularly important for 
state actors’ utility functions, as power is the major resource for influence and 
autonomy. Thus, for democratic mechanisms to work, lawmakers must act responsively 
to demands from their constituencies. This potential responsiveness is driven by an 
interest in political, i.e. office-seeking, rather than monetary gains. Therefore, a broader 
reading of economic interests encompasses the desire for welfare as well as power. This 
can be summed in the following propositions: 
 
 
 
                                                             
26 Innovation must not be confused with invention (Tomes 2004, 46-47). The emergence of technology 
itself constitutes no innovation. Only the active embracement of new technologies causes innovation. 
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1. Preferences with regard to military innovation differ with the individuals’ and 
groups’ economic incentives. 
o Actors with special interests prefer military innovation if it translates 
into benefits specific to the actor. 
o Individuals with common economic preferences prefer military 
innovation if a) new means, which promise more efficiency, are 
available, or b) if the emergence of new challenges and threats reduces 
the efficiency of prior preparations. 
 
(3) In accordance with Goldstein and Keohane (1993), interests as well as ideas have 
causal weight. Thus, ideas, causing ideational constraints and roadmaps, are a third 
factor to be considered in a liberal framework.
27
 They are intervening variables, 
defining the actors’ universe of possibilities in which desires can be pursued: “Insofar as 
ideas put blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they 
serve as invisible switchmen, not only turning action onto certain tracks rather than 
others, (…) but also by obscuring the other tracks from the agent’s view.” 
(Goldstein/Keohane 1993, 12)
28
 From the literature on military culture, two central sets 
of ideas emerge. On a small scale, cultural approaches argue that military organizations 
hold institutionalized ideas about the ideal soldier, war and the like. For example, Army 
representatives differ in their view concerning the role of ground forces for the goal of 
security from Air Force officials and thus prefer different solutions for similar 
problems. On a larger scale, actors hold ideas about the place, posture and purpose of 
military force within a democracy.  
To structure the latter ideas, this analysis draws on Huntington (1954a), who suggests a 
three-dimensional concept to map major political positions in military policy (see Table 
2.1). While his third dimension of diplomacy, concerned with the conditions of war 
                                                             
27 It is important to draw a clear line between the rationalist concept of ideas and constructivist 
approaches. While constructivism assumes that ideas are intersubjectively held within social groups, 
rational choice approaches treat ideas as properties of the individual and reject the claim of 
intersubjectivity. Furthermore, constructivism holds that ideas have constitutive effects. Thus, actors 
pursue changing interests and act according to what they consider appropriate. Instead, rationalist 
approaches assume that individuals have more or less narrow and stable interests and ideas constrain the 
range of choices concerning behavior. 
28 This is in contrast to Moravcsik’s (1996, 525) notion of a direct influence of ideational preferences 
according to which actors can be motivated “by an effort to realize social views about legitimate borders, 
political institutions, and modes of socioeconomic regulation.” 
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involvement, is irrelevant here, the other two dimensions help to structure the ideas 
involved in military policy. First, Huntington’s budget dimension reflects a basic idea 
on the position of defense among state functions. It covers different perspectives on the 
classical guns-versus-butter question. The requirement approach, at the one end of this 
continuum represents the gun side of the trade-off. It emphasizes the priority of defense 
over other fields of state activity and the need for resourcing the military according to 
its requirements. The opposite ceiling approach considers defense as equal or 
subordinate to other state activities. According to this perspective the military funding 
must be a normal part of the trade-offs which states make in distributing its resources. 
In a deeper sense, this dimension also implies an understanding of the civil-military 
relations: Is the military one of the regular state activities or is it distinct and more or 
less important? Second, the strategic dimension deals with the distribution of resources 
within the military establishment. Based on a more concerned and careful worldview, 
strategic pluralism wants to prepare broad capabilities, able to deal with a range of 
possible contingencies. In contrast, strategic monism wants to concentrate resources 
upon a single strategy and related capabilities. 
The position in one dimension is thereby logically related to a position in the other 
dimension: Seeing national defense as only one activity among equally important ones 
implies limited resources and therefore limited strategic options. And seeing a narrow 
preparation for the most likely threat as sufficient for defense reduces the relative 
importance of defense as a state goal. Huntington uses the ideal type of ‘military 
radicalism’ to describe this pole of the spectrum. The ideal type of ‘military 
conservatism’ describes instead a position, which wants to be prepared for all kinds of 
contingencies and considers the national defense as the most important state goal. 
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Table 2.1: Alternative positions on defense policy (Huntington 1954a) 
 
Military conservatism and military radicalism define the poles of a continuum of 
numerous more or less strong positions on both dimensions. Even logically inconsistent 
positions are possible, but will turn into one of the consistent positions when the 
individual encounters unclear alternatives and inconsistent results. Moreover, Keohane 
and Goldstein (1993, 13) argue that ideas change when the idea-based policy fails. In 
the realm of military policy, wars are the final arbiter of military preparations. Thus, 
victory keeps prior ideas constant whereas defeat or stalemate puts ideas in question.
29
 
The impact of ideas can be summed up as follows: 
2. Ideas between the poles of military conservatism and radicalism constrain the 
scope of feasible preferences with regard to military innovation.  
 
Societal interest competition and societal demands 
With the individuals’ motivations defined, the nexus between preference formations and 
state action must be specified. For this purpose, the republican strand of liberalism 
provides assumptions regarding the way societal preferences are transferred onto the 
state level through mechanisms of representation (Moravcsik 1997, 530-533; Narizny 
2003a): If modes of representation are biased in favor of particular groups or segments 
                                                             
29 Since ideas are roadmaps and not substantial preferences, their stability does not mean that military 
policy after the war returns to the policy prior to the war. Rather, it means that individuals continue to see 
the way military policy should be made through the same lenses. 
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of society, they have significantly higher chances to employ the state for their ends. 
Biased representation offers the opportunity for the dominant groups to maximize their 
benefits by passing on the costs to the underrepresented parts of society. This may lead 
to state actions such as war, which are beneficial for a small group but costly or 
suboptimal for the society as a whole. Liberalism assumes that broader representation 
leads to more moderate state interests, whereas highly unequal access to the political 
system furthers risky policy options. Since democracies provide broad – although not 
perfect – representation for their citizens, they tend to pursue policies which avoid high 
costs for the aggregate society. Elections crucially link society to the state. They tie the 
political actors’ chances to satisfy their office-seeking interests to public approval and 
thus create a strong incentive to be responsive to dominant societal demands. But there 
is good reason to expect that even these actors have to make trade-offs in pursuing their 
office-seeking interest.
30
 It is therefore plausible to argue that the chances of societal 
demands to impact on the political actors’ preferences depends on the existence, 
strength and consistency of societal demands in military policy holding them 
accountable (Hils 2007, 42; Lindsay 1994, 34-52). The societal demand is composed of 
a mixture of common and special economic preferences.  
(1) The majority of the public is not directly affected by military policy and thus holds 
common economic preferences as highlighted by the democratic peace theory. To be 
sure, the public is no group or actor that intentionally pursues its interests, but an 
aggregate of individuals which remain the acting units.
31
 Yet, if individuals within the 
public articulate similar and strong preferences in numbers, they constitute a relevant 
demand, since political actors must expect these individual preferences to result in 
parallel voting behavior. Elections are the central mechanism which transfers relevant 
individual preferences into an aggregate, more or less clear-cut political influence. 
Against this backdrop, public majorities have to consider military policy sufficiently 
relevant to inform their political participation and thus binds political actors.
32
 Since the 
                                                             
30 For example, in a study on congressmen, Fenno (1973, 1; see also Deering 1993, 163) identifies re-
election as only one among other goals of lawmakers. 
31 Scharpf (2000, 95-110) makes a convincing argument that it is analytically sensible to treat only those 
groups as complex actors whose preferences reflect the common goals of their included individuals. The 
individuals’ preference homogeneity and institutional conflict resolution mechanisms within groups are 
crucial in assessing the group’s boundaries and whether it is reasonable to treat the group position as a 
representation of the individual position and vice versa.  
32 This problem is well established for the impact of foreign policy on elections: While domestic issues, 
especially the economy, are almost always salient since they permanently affect most people, the “precise 
impact of foreign policy on electoral choice does appear to wax and wane with the flow of current 
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benefits and costs of military policy decisions are for most individuals rather abstract, 
military policy permanently competes with other policy issues for relevance. Referring 
to the metaphor of the public as a thermostat, Franklin and Wlezien (1997, 349) argue: 
“Quite simply, the thermostat sometimes is not switched on, and salience may play an 
important structuring role. For the public to be responsive to policy, after all, people 
must acquire and process reasonably accurate information about what policymakers do, 
and this is most likely in policy domains that people consider important.” For military 
policy, strong security concerns resulting from perceived international threats are the 
major leverage to raise its salience.  
It is not enough to care about military policy in order to create a strong demand, 
however. One must know about the issue and have information to derive a certain 
position. Thus, the formulation of common preferences is dependent on the level of 
available information and the public knowledge on the issues under consideration. The 
preferences are expected to be most specific in the budget dimension, since this 
dimension is most easily accessible for the layman, most visible in the political process 
and best covered by the media. The military doctrine & Service mission statement 
dimension is the furthest detached from the public eyes and thus no specific knowledge 
is expected here.  
 
Dimensions of military policy 
Public 
Information 
Specificity of 
preferences 
Budget +++ Strong 
Organization ++ Medium 
Weapons acquisition + Weak 
Doctrine & Service mission statement - None 
 
Table 2.2: Specificity of common preferences along dimensions of military policy (own illustration). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
events.” (Gelpi/Feaver/Reifler 2009, 15-18; see also RePass 1971) Since the attention for foreign policy 
questions by an otherwise only indirectly affected actor is most often a function of external security 
threats, this logic should also hold for military policy, which provides central means for national security. 
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Taken together, the salience and the specificity determine the strength of common 
preferences. Growing strength of common preferences reduces the corridor of policy 
options from which a political actor can chose in response to public demands.  
(2) Special interest groups’ parochial preferences stem from distinct beneficial impacts 
of military policy and therefore can depart from common preferences. Special interests 
groups are directly affected by military policy and they try to directly affect it according 
to their specific preferences. Yet, special interest groups are usually not large enough to 
directly affect politics through elections and the strength of their demands depends on 
their available resources to influence the political process. Thus, special interest groups’ 
demands depend on the social, economic or military weight of the respective group. For 
example, without the existence of a defense industry and defense-related labor, which 
are dependent on or at least strongly benefiting from the status quo, economic 
preferences are marginal. In turn, defense producers that are large employers or have a 
significant regional economic impact, have higher chances to push their preferences. 
The same holds true, if the national defense strongly depends on the product of a 
manufacturer or on the expertise of scientists. Special economic actors have in both 
cases strong blackmailing potential and therefore good chances to succeed with their 
demands. The variance of special interest demands describes the continuum between a 
static triangle (Heclo 1978) with one or few groups dominating the course of transitions 
on the high end and no special interests on the low end.  
(3) The interplay of common and parochial preferences can create more or less 
consistent societal demands for innovation or stability. For example, if common 
preferences point at a strong demand for innovation and the defense industry articulates 
a strong demand for stability in the weapons acquisition dimension, societal demands 
are inconsistent. Like the strength of the demands, inconsistencies weaken the chances 
of their implementation. These inconsistencies are most likely when preferences for 
status quo and innovation are both either weak or strong. Both situations are not 
completely similar, however. Since common preferences are always existent, there is 
higher chance of at least a moderate level of consistency in a situation where both 
positions are weak. Thus, if society is biased in favor of innovation, the chances of 
innovation are higher in a situation in which preferences are both weak than in a 
situation in which both positions are strong. 
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In sum the following proposition can be stated: 
3. The interplay of common and parochial preferences creates distinct societal 
demands for periods of military transition 
4. The strength of societal demands for military innovation depends on the strength 
of common and parochial preferences for innovation and their consistency in the 
dimensions of military policy 
 
State interest competition 
Societal demands do not immediately translate into military policy positions, since the 
principal-agent relationship with civilians on the one side and military actors on the 
other side is as incomplete as the principal-agent relation between the public and the 
state.
33
 As the military actors are not directly dependent on public approval and at the 
same time the recipient of military policy, there is good reason to expect them to pursue 
specific and special preferences towards quantitative growth and qualitative stability. 
Since qualitative changes result in adaption costs for the military organization, military 
actors will autonomously push for innovation only in cases of obvious organizational 
failure. As Rosen (1991, 2; emphasis in the original) argued: “Bureaucracies were not 
supposed to innovate, by their very nature. Military bureaucracies, moreover, are 
especially resistant to change.” Foresighted innovation requires intervention by 
‘outsiders’ either coming from the military or civil authorities (Huntington 1961, 288). 
Even in the case of military innovation through a military outsider, political actors’ 
positions are vital, since they provide the military maverick with the necessary backing 
and leverage.  
The chances that societal demands indeed trigger innovation in military policy depend 
on their strength and consistency, since the economic incentive for office-seeking 
political actors to act responsive varies with the risk of punishment. This is not to say, 
that political actors will ignore society if no strong demands on military policy are 
                                                             
33 With the state actors’ preference selection is more or less constrained, they also have more or less 
power and chances to influence policy outcomes. In contrast to societal preference competition, the 
distribution of power within the state is more formal and asymmetric. State actors are embedded in an 
institutional framework which assigns competencies and responsibilities. While Governmental Politics 
shows that the formal authority is not equal to the power to influence an outcome, it certainly increases 
asymmetry. Hence, political actors with veto powers in the political process have a higher chance to 
influence outcomes than political-administrative actors with only an advisory role. 
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articulated. Even in dimensions were no explicit societal demands are formulated, 
political actors can try to formulate preferences in accordance with societal demands. 
Ideas are crucial here, since they provide a heuristic shortcut for political actors to 
extent societal demands in areas where no explicit preferences are articulated (in the 
same vein see Aldrich/Sullican/Borgida 1989). For example, if societal demands in the 
budget and organization dimension point at a military radicalism, the political actor can 
assume that this pattern should also hold for weapons acquisition and doctrine & 
Service mission statement formulation. But if societal demands are inconsistent, a 
heuristic extension is difficult. Moreover, political actors are hardly willing to take great 
political risk or costs in order to implement only assumed societal demands.  
Moreover, the likelihood of a split within the government increases with decreasing 
strength and consistency of societal demands. Avant’s work (1994) shows that unity 
between Congress and President is vital to successfully overcome military actors’ status 
quo bias.
34
 When the legislative and the civil executive actively disagree on the future 
course, there is always the possibility for military actors to trade the political actors off 
against each other and thus evade the costs of change. Based on the prior discussion, 
preference inconsistencies are the result of two constellations. Either they are the result 
of conflicting societal demands, as political actors actively serve different constituencies 
(e.g. Trubowitz 1998). For example, if Congress responds to parochial preferences and 
the administration to common preferences in the dimension of weapons acquisition, the 
likelihood for change decreases. Or they result from different assumptions in 
dimensions where societal constituencies fail to express a clear mandate. For example, 
if lawmakers extend societal demands by a heuristic of military conservatism and the 
President extends these demands by a heuristic of military radicalism, influence of 
societal demands decreases. Thus, it is central for the political actors’ preference 
consistency that they agree on the course of transition, either based on specific societal 
demands or on a shared mindset. The final propositions can be stated as follows: 
                                                             
34 The constitution makes sure, that Congress and the President are involved in military policy. Article I, 
Section 8, assigns the power of the purse to Congress: “The Congress shall have the power 1. To lay and 
collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and 
general welfare of the United States. (…) 12. To raise and support armies (…). 13. To provide and 
maintain a navy. 14. To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces. (…) 
16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia.” In contrast, Article II, Section 2, 
makes the President “Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia 
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.”  
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5. Political actors pick up societal demands for innovation if they are strong and 
consistent 
6. The unity of political actors increases with the strength and consistency of 
societal demands  
 
Policy selection and action 
The link between societal demands on a policy of military stability or innovation in any 
dimension of military policy can generally be classified along two dimensions of 
influence. The combination of the direct-indirect and active-passive dimensions 
provides four types of influence.  
 
 Active Passive 
Direct Direct influence Passive influence 
Indirect Indirect influence General influence 
 
Table 2.3: Dimensions of societal influence 
 
Direct influence refers to a situation in which societal demands for stability or 
innovation are picked up by political actors and actively implemented even against 
potential military actors’ opposition. Societal demands have indirect influence when 
societal demands are picked up by political actors and create a strong positive or 
negative incentive for military actors to innovate or maintain the status quo. This can be 
the result of spill-over effects from one dimension of military policy into another, e.g. a 
direct influence in the budget dimension may create a strong incentive to innovate in the 
weapons acquisition dimension. Passive influence results from the political and military 
actors’ anticipation of societal reactions within the field in which the policy decision is 
taken (Arnold 1979, 73). General influence is evident when a military policy is the 
result of an anticipation of a general direction of societal position with regard to military 
policy, although this position is neither actively demanded nor related to a specific 
issue.  
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Beyond these four forms of influence which are consistent with the bottom-up 
framework, there is an additional form of influence, which is called ‘responsive 
influence’ here. State actors can address a society in order to gain support for an 
innovation, which societal actors do not actively demand, and thus create a responsive 
influence. They can address the public for strategic reasons, e.g. to overcome political 
opposition, or they seek a feedback in order to prevent later negative domestic 
responses. Regardless of the motivation, the responsive form of influence is based on a 
top-down mechanism. Nonetheless, all forms of influence are generally possible and 
will be considered in order to allow for an informed theoretical reflection.  
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analysis employs a qualitative structured, focused comparison of a small number of 
cases based on suggestions by George and Bennett (2005; see also Snyder 1984).
35
 This 
requires two major steps. First, it is necessary to select a sample of cases from a clearly 
defined population. Second, questions must be stated that structure and focus the 
successive case analysis. In this context, the sources and methods for data gathering 
must be identified and justified. 
 
3.1. Case selection 
The scope of the analysis is limited to cases of US military policy. This diachronic 
design keeps geography, culture and other country related variables constant and thus 
reduces the problem of confounding variables.
36
 It is further restricted to the time after 
World War II, which constitutes a watershed in US foreign policy and international 
relations far beyond military policy. Hence, this study does not have to account for 
America’s turn towards an active international role backed by a permanent military 
establishment. More specifically, the restriction makes sure that all observed military 
planning takes place against the background of modern warfare. In order to gain a 
comprehensive perspective on military innovation, four dimensions are considered (see 
chart 3.1) for every period of military transition.  
 
                                                             
35 Ideally, a ‘case’ is “a unit in which each variable takes on only one value or is classified in only one 
category.” (Geddes 2003, 137; see also Gerring 2007, 19). Additionally, Bennett (2004, 20-21) 
distinguishes a case from its environment by defining it “as an instance of a class of events of interest to 
the investigator (…). A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical happening that the 
investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical happening itself.” 
36 The assumption that variables such as culture remain constant over time is certainly problematic. 
Lijphart (1971, 689) correctly points out that “the same country is not really the same at different times.” 
Nonetheless, diachronical comparisons are still the most plausible way to reduce variables in small-n 
studies.  
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Chart 3.1: Central Dimensions of military transitions (own illustration) 
 
The selection of periods of transition is based on the development of military budget as 
necessary condition that triggers the transition in the first place.37 This is hardly trivial 
as various stories can be told and arguments made, depending on the measure.  For the 
purpose at hand, the annual budget authority and outlays are used, since they arguably 
provide the most unbiased indicator of defense efforts. It is furthermore sensible to use 
inflation-adjusted data to account for inflation effects in a chronological comparison. 
Within the given limitation, eight cases meet the characteristics of periods of military 
transition: The builddowns after World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and 
the Cold War and the buildups for the Korean/Cold War, the Vietnam War, the Global 
War on Terror as well as the Reagan buildup. Among many minor peaks and valleys 
during the last 70 years in US military funding, these cases stand out with regard to their 
budgetary dynamics, showing significant downward or upward trends (Donley 1994; 
Korb 1993; Snider 1993a). 
                                                             
37 Military transition is a concept in which only the change in the military budget is considered a 
necessary dimension (on concepts see Goertz 2006, 27-67). But ideally, budget decreases and increases 
should correlate with changes in the other dimensions. The impact of the military budget on force 
structure and acquisition is only the most obvious of many interdependencies. Posen (1984, 14) stresses, 
for example, that the organization and capabilities can be seen as a material expression of doctrine and 
Sheehan (1988, 93) argues: “In essence, organizational change and doctrinal change are natural twins.” In 
addition, the kind of weapons a branch deploys has an important influence on its organizational outline. 
Hence, in a sound military policy, all dimensions are closely correlated. 
Military 
Transition
Change in Military Budget
Change in Military 
Organization
Change in  Weapons 
Acquisition
Change in Military Doctrine & 
Service Mission Statements
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Chart 3.2: Department of Defense (051) budget authority and outlays, FY 1948-2008 (OSD 1995; 
2008)
38
 
 
Four cases are examined in detail: Post-World War II (1945-1949); Korean War/Cold 
War (1950-1953); Post-Cold War (1990-1998); War on Terror (2001-2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Previous years are omitted for reasons of presentation. 
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Builddowns 
 Peak FY  Through  Difference 
Average 
change / 
year 
WW II 
1945 907.7 1948 108.8 -798.9 266.3 
1944 37.8% 1948 3.5% -34.3  
Korean 
War 
1953 515.1 1956 369.4 -145.7 48.6 
1953 14.2% 1956 10% -4.2  
Vietnam 
War 
1968 518.2 1977 311.4 -206.8 23 
1968 9.4% 1978 4.7% -4.7  
Reagan/ 
Cold War 
1989 481.6 1998 346.1 -135.5 15.1 
1989
39
 5.6% 1999 3% -2.6  
 
Buildups 
 From  Peak FY  Difference 
Average 
change / 
year 
Korean 
War 
1950 164.8 1953 515.1 350.3 116.7 
1950 5% 1953 14.2% 9.2  
Vietnam 
War 
1965 360.8 1968 518 157.2 52.4 
1965 7.4% 1968 9.4% 2  
Reagan 
buildup 
1981 348.2 1989 481.6 133.4 16.7 
1981 5.2% 1986 6.2% 1  
War on 
Terror 
2001 363.1 2009
40
 580.2 217.1 27.14 
2001 3% 2009 4.6% 1.6  
 
Table 3.1: Periods of transition in comparison by national defense outlays in billion constant FY 
2005 US dollars and percent of GDP (table based on Gholz/Sapolsky 1999, 15; data in OMB 2010) 
This case selection is based on several considerations.  
(1) Since there is little comparative research on periods of military transitions in general 
and on military innovation within these periods in particular, the sample includes cases 
which are important and relevant breaking points with significant leverage. In other 
words, all cases have a strong empirical relevance. This is immediately evident for the 
post-World War II phase which succeeded the most devastating and total war during the 
20
th
 Century. During the war, the US was forced to devote massive economic and 
military resources to the war effort. The transition from this encompassing war effort to 
a sustainable postwar military force was an enormous administrative challenge and 
                                                             
39
 1989 marks the end of the Cold War rather than the turning point after the Reagan buildup.  
40 The outlays for national defense continued to increase after FY 2007 and are expected to decrease for 
the first time in 2011. The budget authority for the DOD (051) started to decrease and the DOD outlays 
leveled off already after FY 2007 in real terms. The discrepancy is largely caused by supplemental 
funding for the war on terror, which is not part of the regular budget process (OSD 2008). 
46 
 
marked by major political conflicts. The qualitative decisions in this period proved 
crucial for the Cold War and beyond.
41
 By the end of the 1940s, the post-World War II 
transition came to an end and a buildup period took over. The US military policy 
underwent a transition marked by a massive expansion of defense resources for the 
Korean War effort but also for the Cold War, which defined the international security 
for the subsequent decades. Given the structural impact of the Cold War, the military 
transition after its end proved highly consequential for the new world order. The short 
phase of relative peace ended with the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which initiated another 
buildup period. While the significance and long-term consequences of this latest 
transition are subject to scientific discussion, its importance stems from the actuality 
and the related lack of theory-guided and comparative research. 
(2) George and Bennett (2005, 83) advise students, however, to select cases for their 
contribution to the research objectives rather than for their empirical value. It would 
take significantly more cases than are feasible in a structured, focused comparison, to 
test all possible theoretical constellations. Therefore, this study focuses on variance in 
the societal demand patterns, which are most directly related to the research question, 
and tries to control for other factors. With reference to the debate between the follow-on 
imperative and democratic peace, the selection focuses on a variance in the strength of 
the preferences of the defense economy and the public as most important societal forces. 
Thus, it includes two periods with only a small established military industrial base after 
World War II and two cases with a large industrial base after the Cold War. Since the 
strength of common preferences concerning military policy is expected to vary with the 
salience of security concerns, the case selection includes two cases with low threat 
environments as well as two cases with high threat environments. 
At the same time, the case selection keeps the innovation bias of common economic 
preferences constant. All cases are closely related to a shift in the strategic environment. 
The most drastic changes happened with the end of World War II and the Cold War. 
But the outbreak of the Korean War and War on Terror also marked largely unexpected 
changes in the strategic environment. Moreover, the beginning of each pair of cases 
coincides with the advent of new technologies, which were widely considered 
                                                             
41 There is good reason to treat the Cold War like other wars with regard to the required military 
preparations. As Gray (1999, 182) argues: “Notwithstanding the obvious differences between the actual 
global wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-45 and the global virtual war of 1947-1989, it is sensible to treat the 
East-West Cold War as a surrogate for hot war.” 
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revolutionary (Krepinevich 1994). The advent of nuclear bombs and long-range aviation 
during World War II strongly changed the parameters for military preparations. After 
the Cold War, it was the stealth technology, precision-guided munitions, and especially 
information age C
4
ISR capabilities, which opened new roads for innovation. In both 
cases, the public was aware of these new technologies, since they were used prior or 
very early into the transition periods: Atomic bombs were dropped only weeks before 
the end of the Pacific War and therefore immediately before the postwar transition 
began. For the post-Cold War periods, Operation Just Cause in 1989 and Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991 showed the potential of information age technologies at very early 
stages of the transitions. 
Taken together, the following pattern is expected: 
Cases 
Strength of  
status quo 
interests 
(defense 
economy) 
Strength of 
innovation 
interests 
(general 
public) 
Expected societal 
demand 
Post-World War II - - Minor innovation bias 
Korean War/Cold War - + Innovation bias 
Post-Cold War + - Stability bias 
War on Terror + + Minor stability bias 
 
Table 3.2: Case variance at the societal level 
 
3.2. Data analysis 
To allow for a structured, focused comparison, standardized questions based on the 
theoretical perspective must be formulated. The first sequence of questions is used in 
order to describe the dependent variable. The second and third sequences are asked to 
test the validity of the theoretical model. They are directed towards the societal 
preference formation and the state actors’ preferences as well as the political process.  
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Military innovations during periods of transition 
7. Is a quantitative change indicating innovation in the budget dimension of 
military policy traceable? 
o Is a change in the distribution of the defense budget among the Services 
or among defense programs indicating new funding priorities traceable? 
8. Is a qualitative change indicating innovation in the organizational dimension of 
military policy traceable? 
o Is a significant change in the distribution of personnel among the 
Services traceable? 
o Is a significant change in the geographical distribution of personnel 
traceable? 
o Is a significant change in force structure priorities traceable? 
9. Is qualitative change indicating innovation in the weapons acquisition dimension 
of military policy traceable? 
o Is a significant change with regard to the weapons acquired traceable? 
10. Is innovation in the doctrinal dimensions of military policy traceable? 
o Is a significant change in the military doctrine / Service mission 
statement traceable? 
 
Societal demands 
- Are there strong and specific common preferences for military innovation? 
o Is there a strong salience for military policy? 
 Is there a pattern of security interdependencies considered 
threatening? 
 What are the most important problems in society? 
o Are there specific demands in the dimension of military budgets / 
military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
o Is there an apparent idea connecting the explicit preferences? 
- Are there strong special interests? 
o Is there a strong military industrial base? 
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 How large is the economy dependent on defense 
investments? 
 How large is the labor force dependent on defense 
investments? 
 Is there a strong economic or military dependence on the military 
industrial base? 
 How is the defense industry spread over the country? 
 How much competition is in the defense market? 
o Are there any other relevant special interests? 
o What preferences do actors with special interests pursue in the dimension 
of military budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / 
military doctrine & Service mission statement? 
- Are there weak or strong societal demands for innovation in the dimension of 
military budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine 
& Service mission statement? 
 
State actor preference formation 
- Do political actors pick up public demands in their positions on military policy?  
o What preferences do Members of Congress pursue in the dimension of 
military budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / military 
doctrine & Service mission statement? 
 Do these preferences represent societal demands? 
 Are these preferences consistent with the dominant societal idea 
underlying the course of military transition? 
o What preferences do political actors within the administration pursue in 
the dimension of military budgets / military organization / weapons 
acquisition / military doctrine & Service mission statement? 
 Do these preferences represent societal demands? 
 Are these preferences consistent with the dominant societal idea 
underlying the course of military transition? 
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o Are political actors’ preferences consistent in the dimension of military 
budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine 
& Service mission statement? 
 Do political actors share ideas on the course of military policy? 
- What preferences do military actors pursue in the dimension of military budgets 
/ military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
 
Political process 
- Who is dominating the political process in the dimension of military budgets / 
military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Whose preferences most strongly affect the outcome in the dimension of 
military budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / military doctrine 
& Service mission statement most? 
- What is the influence of societal demands on military stability or innovation in 
the dimension of military budgets / military organization / weapons acquisition / 
military doctrine & Service mission statement? 
 
3.3. Data sources 
The analysis of the dependent variable relies on various data on military policy. While 
questions concerning the budget or force levels can be answered by quantitative 
measures, especially questions on the acquisition and doctrinal trends and force 
structure require a qualitative description. The necessary data is available from 
governmental sources, especially from congressional hearings and debates, DOD and 
Service documents, and the rich literature in political and military science as well as 
history. 
The successive test of the theoretical model employs numerous different data sources. 
While many confounding variables can be eliminated by the case selection, there are 
still numerous potential influences on the dependent variable and covariance between 
the variables of interest must not be confused with causality. For example, whether a 
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political actor is indeed acting responsive to his constituency or is pursuing a preference 
for other reasons is never fully knowable without asking him directly. In order to 
provide plausibility for the causal mechanism despite the empirical limitations in case 
study analyses, this study employs the method of process tracing (Gerring 2007, 172-
185; George/Bennett 2005, 205-232). According to Gerring (2007, 173), “[t]he 
hallmark of process tracing (…) is that multiple types of evidence are employed for the 
verification of a single inference - bits and pieces of evidence that embody different 
units of analysis.” Thus, evidence for the causal mechanism is provided by a number of 
qualitative and quantitative observations, which are noncomparable, but point to the 
central argument. 
Four sets of sources are used in order to create a fairly accurate picture of societal 
demands: (1) Public opinion polls are central for the exploration of common 
preferences. They give an idea about the salience of national security in contrast to other 
political issues. Moreover, polls reveal the existence of specific common preferences on 
important policy decisions. While representative polls also include respondents with 
special interests in military policy, the resulting interference is marginal, since the vast 
majority of the population has no direct benefit from military policy. A more important 
problem is the limited availability of polls with regard to military policy, which allow 
only for a more or less thick description of public preferences. Other sources were used 
to compensate for the lack of polls, but some restrictions remain nonetheless. (2) An 
extensive use of newspaper articles complements the evidence on societal positions and 
the general mood with regard to military policy decisions. To offset for potential biases 
in the reporting, the analysis uses a range of different newspapers, chief among them the 
New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Wall Street Journal, 
and Washington Times. (3) Special interest groups occasionally articulate their 
preferences during congressional hearings. Their statements can be treated as direct 
articulations of preferences. Yet, the number of societal actors which participate 
actively in the political process on military policy is rather limited, since it is a 
delimited policy area with a high demand for expert knowledge. Thus, only 25 percent 
of the witnesses represent societal interests, whereas the vast majority of witnesses 
testifying before the armed services committees are from the Pentagon and the broader 
administration (Deering 1993, 161). (4) Literature from various scientific sources can be 
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used to gain additional insight. For example, the strength of the defense industry can be 
drawn from the literature on the defense industrial base, various federal statistics, etc. 
The description of the state actors’ preferences as well as the political process is based 
on governmental sources, biographies of central actors, newspaper articles and the 
available literature mostly from history and political science. Especially for the most 
recent cases, in which detailed description cannot rely on extensive research and is 
complicated by the administration’s nondisclosure rules, the press is a vital source of 
information. Party documents provide further evidence for the political actors’ 
preferences. Since it is highly impracticable and indeed unnecessary to collect the 
preference of each political actor, the analysis focuses on central actors and positions. 
Especially for Congress, a selective analysis is necessary. Both chambers practice 
division of labor and only a limited group of congressmen is actively taking part in the 
military policy process. Thus, members of the armed services committees and the 
subcommittees on appropriation for the armed forces are more central than other 
committees. Furthermore, the levels of seniority provide a good indicator for the 
relevance of actors. Committee chairmen and party or congressional leaders usually 
have a higher chance to influence armament policy than junior members of Congress. 
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4. MILITARY INNOVATIONS DURING PERIODS OF TRANSITION IN COMPARISON 
In the following section, the dimensions of military innovation are defined and 
compared across the periods of interest in order to collect evidence for innovation. 
 
4.1. Military budget 
4.1.1. Definition and description 
The military budget provides the most fundamental and most often used indicator for 
military policy. Broadly defined, the US military or defense budget encompasses all 
budget items under the National Defense Budget Function 050, which is used by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to structure the budget (Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 
1998).
42
 It includes the expenses of the DOD (sub-function 051), defense-related 
activities administered by the Department of Energy (sub-function 053) or other 
agencies such as the Coast Guard or the FBI (sub-function 054). Accounting for an 
average 95 percent of the 050 function between FY 1993 and FY 1999, DOD funding is 
by far the largest part of the national defense budget. The defense budget can be further 
specified by components, i.e. Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense-Wide, or by 
appropriation titles, which is used by Congress during the budget process 
(Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998; Jones/McCaffery 2008, 103-105). While these titles can 
change over time, some are commonly used and account for the lion’s share of the 
budget: Military personnel; Operation and Maintenance (O&M); Procurement; 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (R&D). 
In theory, the defense budget connects the US national security policy with a force 
posture. In practice, the connection is only more or less accurate and affected by 
political conflict, which naturally accompanies the distribution of scarce resources.
43
 
The budgetary procedures, which regulate these conflicts, have changed numerous times 
(Schick 2007, 5). While the President is still obligated to submit a budget to Congress 
                                                             
42 Although the budget function structure was developed for the FY 1948 budget and did only partially 
exist before, it is possible and reasonable to structure earlier budgets also according to these functions (on 
the history of budget functions see GAO 1998). The current budget functions are based on the 
congressional budget act of 1974 which established 19 of today’s 21 functions (Adams/Williams 2010, 
165). 
43 In fact, as the defense budget is larger than any other appropriation bill and considered veto proof, the 
incentive for members of Congress to attach defense unrelated items, so-called riders, to the bill is high. 
Therefore, the defense appropriation bill is also referred to as a “Christmas tree” bill (Jones/McCaffery 
2008, 78). 
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by the first week of February of each year (Potvin 2009, 8), the preceding executive 
budget process and subsequent legislative budget process underwent considerable 
change.  
During the early postwar years, the executive budget process started approximately a 
year before the request was to be submitted to Congress (Hitch 1967, 23-26; Korb 1977, 
334-336; Joint DOD/GAO Working Group 1984, 17-18). The first step was the 
imposition of a ceiling on DOD funding by the President in cooperation with the Budget 
Bureau. The defense secretary would then allocate available funds to the branches 
which in turn prepared their budgets. Yet, policy planning, the budget process, and 
military programming were largely detached from each other and the Services 
developed their requests with little guidance: “DOD ‘budgeteers’ talked one language 
while planners talked another.” (Feltes 1976) In October of each year, the Services 
submitted their requests to the Defense Secretary including so-called B-lists. The B-lists 
contained items which were considered of high importance but could not be included 
under the regular ceiling. In order to bring the budget in line and achieve a balance 
among the branches, the Defense Secretary finally reviewed and cut the requests. The 
executive process ended with the annual transmission of the budget request to Congress.  
Having the sole power of taxing and spending under the constitution, Congress is 
heavily involved in the budget process. In contrast to large proportions of mandatory 
spending in domestic budget functions, the defense spending is mostly discretionary, 
which allows Congress close scrutiny. The annual program and budget authority 
legislation is therefore the major means by which the legislative branch controls and 
influences the executive’s defense activities.44 The core aspects of the legislative 
                                                             
44 Despite annual budget legislation, appropriation bills can provide budget authority for a time frame 
which exceeds a year. Since the early 1950s, Congress practices in many cases full funding, which 
provides the funds for the completion of multi-year projects within one FY (Potvin 2009, 64; Jones/Bixler 
1992, 14). Hence, the budget authorized for a FY year is not necessarily spent or even obligated within 
the same year. And not all money available to the DOD in any given FY was necessarily appropriated in 
the respective FY’s bill. Although the spent-out rates differ over time and projects, a general pattern is 
noteworthy: Annual appropriations on titles such as personnel have usually much faster outlay or 
expenditure rates than investment appropriations such as procurement or R&D (Potvin 2009, 134). Titles, 
in which funds are mostly spent within the year of their appropriation, have significant short-term effects 
on the force posture and the defense outlays (Wildavsky 1988, 391-392). Thus, if decision-makers seek 
quick savings, the operating accounts O&M and personnel are more attractive targets than investment 
accounts such as procurement or construction projects. Multi-year project funding is not without pitfalls, 
as conditions under which a project was initially funded can change, resulting in under- or overfunding 
(Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998, 7). If acquisition projects turn out more expensive than initially estimated, 
additional appropriations or economizations, e.g. a reduction in procurement quantities, become 
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process are still in place in spite of some important changes. Two sets of committees are 
crucial for the legislative process. The armed services committees prepare substantial 
legislation by authorizing programs, usually prior to the appropriation legislation. The 
latter is prepared by the subcommittees on defense appropriations.
45
 Until the late 
1950s, defense authorization committees played only a minor control function (Deering 
1993; Dawson 1962; Gordon 1961).
46
 They practiced generalized authorization, setting 
permanent ceilings for procurement and personnel.
47
 As these ceilings were far above 
actual demands, authorizations were usually inconsequential for the administration’s 
defense planning. Indeed, the Armed Services committees were considered more as 
“defense cheerleaders” than as controllers (Deering 1993, 178). Therefore, the annual 
Defense Appropriation Act was seen as major hurdle by the Services and constituted the 
most important and contentious confrontation between Congress and the administration 
on military matters. Considering that the full houses usually approved appropriation 
bills as reported, the importance of the subcommittee members was even more 
significant.
48
 After each house debated the committees’ reports and passed legislation, 
differences are settled in conference.  
In 1961, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara introduced the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting System (PPBS), whose central characteristics are still in place 
(Jones/McCaffery 2008, 138-147; Feltes 1976). A PPBS term starts about 18 months 
before a budget request is submitted to Congress. Its initial six-month planning phase 
serves to integrate assessments of potential threats, overall national strategy and defense 
policy, and ongoing defense plans and programs into an overall statement of policy 
(Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998, 27). Based on policy directions from the White House, the 
NSC, the OSD, various other departments, and Congress, the military branches 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
necessary. In contrast, if future years’ inflation is overestimated, not all authorized funds are necessary to 
accomplish a project. 
45
 The Legislative Reorganization Act in 1946 merged the naval affairs committees and military affairs 
committees into armed services committees. The changes became effective at the beginning of the 80th 
Congress. The appropriation subcommittees were merged in a similar way two years later. 
46 This was amplified by a different treatment of the authorization and appropriation bills 
(Jones/McCaffery 2008, 209-210). Without appropriation legislation the administration was not allowed 
to spend money for projects even if the programs were authorized. Yet, the administration could start 
budget execution with only an appropriation act, since appropriation was treated as an implicit 
authorization. After the Vietnam War, Congress resolved that explicit program authorization is required 
and thus both acts are necessary for budget execution. 
47
 Military construction was annually authorized, instead.  
48 Among the appropriation subcommittees, the House’s subcommittee proved most important, since all 
appropriation bills originated in the House (Huzar 1950, 36-39). Furthermore, the lower house’s 
subcommittee members had less additional legislative duties than their Senate colleagues and could pay 
closer attention to defense appropriation. 
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independently review the prior years’ planning, assess threats and commitments in the 
coming years and estimate required resources (Jones/Bixler 1992, 21-23).
49
 In this 
stage, actors largely focus on requirements rather than budget realities. The separate 
assessments are combined by the OSD into the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 
which provides official direction for subsequent phases. The following six months are 
occupied by the programming phase, in which each military Service prepares a Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) (Jones/Bixler 1992, 23-24). POMs detail “the specific 
forces and programs that the service proposes over the FYDP period to meet the 
military requirements identified in the DPG within the financial limits that are mandated 
by the Secretary of Defense.” (Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998, 27)50 The Defense Planning 
and Resource Board, chaired by the Secretary of Defense, serves as final decision point 
for Service programs as outlined in the POMs: Within a small round, Service secretaries 
and other senior officials have a final opportunity to defend their programs. In the end, 
the board creates Program Decision Memoranda (PDMs) which officially set 
programming and provide the framework for the concluding budgeting phase. 
Approximately from August to late December the DOD, in close cooperation with the 
OMB, prepares the final budget request for submission to Congress 
(Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998, 28; Jones/Bixler 1992, 24-26).  
Since the late 1980s, Congress requires the submission of biennial budget requests 
(Tyszkiewicz/Daggett 1998, 26). Thus, the executive goes only through a minor PPBS 
process during the second year, the so-called off-year, which is always an odd-
numbered year. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld further reformed the system to 
more fully embrace the biennial budget cycle and renamed it by adding the word 
‘execution’ (PPBES) (Adams/Williams 2010, 93-119). Jones and McCaffery (2008, 
153) identify three important changes from the previous system: (1) The programming 
and budgeting were merged into a single, parallel phase, which allows the OMB to get 
involved in the process early on; (2) The biennial budget process was fully 
incorporated; (3) The OSD was no longer required to issue a DPG annually but only 
every other year. The reform effectively tightened not only the biennial process, but 
                                                             
49 Relevant documents include the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and Joint 
Strategic Planning Document prepared by the JCS, prior Defense Planning Guidance, and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (Jones/McCaffery 2008, 148-150). 
50 The PPBS produces not only the next budget request, but also the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), 
which provides a six year perspective. It is updated three times a year and serves as the Pentagon’s 
foundation for long-term defense planning. The FYDP is central for stable planning in the long run, since 
it constitutes an organizational memory and reduces uncertainty. 
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created a clear 4-year framework, thereby matching the budget process with the 
electoral cycle. The first year of a new President, an off-year, includes only minor 
changes on the current defense budget prepared by the prior administration. This year is 
rather characterized by the preparations of the National Security Strategy and the 
Quadrennial Defense Review, issued early into the second year, which frame the on-
year DPG. The second year includes full programming and budgeting and a new FYDP. 
The third year is used for adjustments and a close examination of budget execution by 
the OSD. A new DPG and budget is prepared during the fourth year. 
The scrutiny and oversight of Congress has also increased since the 1950s.
51
 The 
Budget Reform Act in 1974 created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a source 
for independent budget analysis, as counterpart to the OMB. Together with the 
strengthened General Accounting Office (GAO), the CBO provides the defense 
committees with additional analytical capabilities. Especially the Armed Services 
Committees are placed more prominently in the military policy process because of an 
extended scope of annual authorization (Deering 1993; Art 1985). Starting with the 
Russell amendment, which extended required authorization to the procurement of 
aircraft, missiles, and naval vessels in 1959, the armed services committees have 
successively put components of the force posture under closer oversight. By the end of 
the Cold War, almost 100 percent of the budget authority needed annual defense 
authorization (Blechman 1990, 31). Hence, the committees gained more prominence 
and caught up with the appropriation subcommittees. In contrast, the latter have lost 
major powers to the budget committees, which set budget ceilings since annual Budget 
Resolutions were introduced in 1974 (Adams/Williams 2010, 193-220).
52
 Thus, 
appropriators are limited to redistributing money under the given caps. 
 
 
                                                             
51 The significantly larger committee staff is one indicator for the increased activity of the defense related 
committees. The HASC’s staff went up from nine in 1969 to forty in 1988 (Blechman 1990, 12, 40-41). 
Other indicators are the increased length of hearings and committee reports.  
52 A Budget Resolution represents “an agreement between the House and Senate on a budget plan for the 
upcoming fiscal year and at least the following four fiscal years.” (Heniff/Murray 2010, 1) It does not 
become law, but is used as a framework or guidance for the successive budget negotiations, by setting a 
prospective total amount of spending, the so-called 302a target, and a specific amount for each 
appropriation bill, the so-called 302b targets (Jones/McCaffery 2008, 201-202, 229). While the Budget 
Resolution is supposed to be passed by April 15th under the 1985 Balanced Budget Act, actual passage 
typically occurs not before May or June. 
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4.1.2. Evidence for innovation 
While the budget in sum is a quantitative indicator, which by itself does not reveal force 
posture changes, its various distributions can help to show evidence for innovation.
53
 
Two indicators are used here to identify innovative changes in the budget dimension.
54
  
(1) A breakdown of the budget into Service distributions gives a first hint on potential 
innovation during the periods of transition. Thus, the military policy can maintain 
stability by distributing the decreases or increases evenly across the Services or foster 
change by down- or upgrading one branch over others.  
 
Chart 4.1: Service distribution of budget authority, FY 1946-1955 (calculations based on OSD 
2008; OSD 1995)
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53 Classified funding within the defense budget hinders a fully comprehensive analysis. Kosiak (2008, 3) 
estimates that the FY 1987 to FY 2009 weapons acquisition budgets included between 13 and 19 percent 
classified funding. The classified share of the overall budget is approximately 4 to 6 percent. This implies 
two limitations for this analysis: (1) A significant share of the classified DOD funding actually provides 
funds for intelligence agencies such as the CIA and NSA and does not benefit the Services (Kosiak 2008). 
Since most of this classified funding is channeled through the Air Force budget, the Air Force share in 
relation to the other Services is slightly exaggerated. (2) The classified funding prevents a fully 
comprehensive assessment of the weapons acquisition, since it conceals some development trends and 
activities. As the classified funding is still a small proportion, both limitations have only a minor impact. 
54
 A third commonly used indicator, the distribution along budget titles, is less revealing with regard to 
the periods of transition. All titles are affected by the general budget trends with the R&D and Personnel 
accounts clearly more stable than funding for Procurement and O&M. Since war efforts, including the 
replacement of equipment, are financed by these latter accounts, this finding was to be expected. 
55 Budget authority for defense wide allocations was excluded.  
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The Service shares underwent considerable changes during the post-World War II 
transition. But there is hardly a clear direction evident between FY 1946 and FY 1950. 
Each Service leads the budget for at least one year and no Service leads for more than 
one year in a row. Since FY 1946 started before V-P Day and was only adjusted later, 
its significance for an analysis of the postwar transition is limited. When FY 1946 is 
taken out, the Navy is relatively constant whereas the Army and the Air Force annually 
swap places with each other. A clear winner is not apparent, however. For the buildup 
of the early 1950s, only minor changes to this general pattern become evident. The 
Navy dropped to a clear third place, which did not change before FY 1955. And the 
Army-Air Force-seesaw turned moderately in favor of the Air Force. There is good 
reason to argue that the budget shares even hide the full extent of the relative turn to the 
Air Force, since the Army disproportionally benefited from war-related funding 
between FY 1951 and 1953, which does not reflect a political reorientation in military 
preparations.
56
 
 
Chart 4.2: Service distribution of budget authority FY 1990-1998, FY 2001-2008 (own calculations 
based on OSD 2008) 
 
 
                                                             
56 Rising O&M funding is the most straightforward indicator for war-related funding. But O&M is only 
an incomplete indicator, since the personnel and procurement titles also include war funding. 
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The budget shares of the Services during both periods after the Cold War are 
significantly more stable with regard to the annual changes as well as the amplitude of 
the shares. Especially between 1990 and 1998, the budget distribution remains virtually 
constant with the Navy and Air Force at about 35 percent and the Army at 
approximately 30 percent. Only FY 1991 varies from this pattern largely caused by the 
additional O&M funding for Desert Storm. The stability continued into the War on 
Terror until the Army shares started to rise by 2003. While the Air Force and the Navy 
lose relative to the Army, the differences between the former two remained marginal. 
When the war-related funding is taken out, which arguably explains most of the Army’s 
relative growth,
57
 the stability becomes even more striking. Excluding war funding, 
Kaplan (2005) argues that the budget distribution formula of 35 percent for the Navy, 
35 percent for the Air Force and 30 percent for the Army was not varied by more than 1 
percent during the time after the Cold War and far into the War on Terror.  
 
Chart 4.3: Service distribution of budget authority for acquisition (own calculations based on OSD 
2008; 1995) 
 
                                                             
57 Expressed in constant FY 2009 dollars, the Army’s O&M funding increased from $35 billion in FY 
2001 to almost $100 billion in FY 2007 (OSD 2008, 145-146). Other Army titles did not grow alike and 
the share of O&M in the total Army budget increased from 35 percent in FY 2001 to more than 42 
percent in FY 2007.  
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The Service distribution of acquisition funding further underlines the identified pattern: 
The Service shares during the post-World War II periods are significantly more versatile 
than in later periods. The Air Force is in tendency the strongest gainer followed by the 
Navy. Given the Services’ different reliance on complex weapon systems, this is an 
expected hierarchy. But the strong amplitude is in stark contrast to the stability after the 
Cold War. The distribution of acquisition funding remains almost unchanged until the 
occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan put more focus on ground force equipment. 
(2) The distribution of the defense budget along major national security functions and 
major force programs provides additional evidence for qualitative changes. A shift in 
emphasis here can reveal innovative preparations for future war. Unfortunately, the 
indicator is problematic for two reasons. First, no data is available for the first period of 
transition. Second, the distribution of national security functions, which is available for 
the early 1950s, is not directly comparable to the major force programs, which the DOD 
uses since 1962. Major force programs organize the budget along aggregate force 
packages necessary for the fulfillment of a mission (Jones/McCaffery 2008, 97-102).
58
 
Hence, major force programs make the purpose of spending in terms of missions more 
evident, while for example the ratio between procurement and personnel is obfuscated. 
The Census Bureau’s breakdown of the defense budget in major national security 
functions arguably comes closest to these program elements. While the national security 
functions are less systematically related to missions, they can reveal significant 
qualitative changes in funding which point at particular mission priorities. 
                                                             
58 They include the force activity programs ‘Strategic Forces’, ‘General Purpose Forces’, ‘Mobility 
Forces’, and ‘Guard & Reserve’ and the support force programs such as ‘Central Supply and 
Maintenance’ or ‘R&D’. 
62 
 
 
Chart 4.4: Federal expenditures on Major National Security Functions, FY 1951-1955 (based on 
U.S. Bureau of the Census 1956, 234) 
 
The moderate emphasis on the Air Force during the early 1950s finds a clearer 
expression in the major national security functions. Besides personnel, particular 
emphasis is placed on aircraft funding, which most decisively increased after 1951. To 
be sure, the aircraft acquisition function includes Air Force and naval aviators alike, but 
it underlines a general trend to air power during the early 1950s. This indicates a 
growing emphasis on large ground forces combined with air power, enhanced by 
nuclear means, which follow in third place. Although funding for ships and guided 
missiles modestly increase during the transition, their relevance remained small. 
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Chart 4.5: DOD budget for relevant Major Force Programs, FY 1988-2008 (OSD 2008) 
 
There is hardly any change in the Service distribution after the Cold War. A closer look 
reveals, however, that the distribution of the budget was not as stable as the Service 
shares suggest. During the 1990s most savings were created from the Strategic Forces 
and General Purpose Forces programs. At the same time, the Mobility Forces program, 
including most of the transportation capabilities, slightly increased, although its share of 
the total budget was never more than 4 percent (own calculations based on OSD 2008). 
After 2001, the General Purpose Forces program was in turn the largest beneficiary of 
the additional defense dollars, whereas the Strategic Forces program, including funding 
for active strategic nuclear forces, remained small. Instead, the C3, Intel & Space 
program and the Special Ops Forces program benefited disproportionally from the 
buildup. While the funding for Special Ops remained below 2 percent of the overall 
budget, the C3, Intel & Space program reached a peak of more than 13 percent of the 
overall budget by FY 2006. These changes indicate at least a moderate change, which 
might point at a moderate innovation. 
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4.2. Military organization 
4.2.1. Definition and description 
Over the years, the US has established a huge organization to perform its military tasks. 
Although there are many definitions of organization, a rather narrow definition serves 
best here: “Organization is the process that provides a military activity with a 
methodical structure and then transforms the structure into full working order.” (Skinner 
1993, 2061) Military Services are strongly organized bodies from combat and service 
units at the bottom to administrative staff and commanders at the top. Organization 
defines thereby not only size and function of a unit but also its relation to other units 
and its position in its organizational environment. Furthermore, it assigns purpose and 
the way to accomplish that purpose. The most fundamental aspect of military 
organization is the supply of manpower, which fundamentally defines the scope, 
options, and organizational needs of a military force. Besides the overall personnel 
available to the Services, force structure is a central element of military organizations. It 
encompasses “numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise US defense 
forces” (DOD 2001, 338; see also Brinkerhoff 1993, 978). In other words, force 
structure describes how the available resources are broken down into hierarchical and 
functional sub-units such as divisions, wings, carrier battle groups and the like. 
Together, personnel and force structure frame manpower procurement which “involves 
both devising an appropriate force structure and supplying the quantity and quality of 
manpower required, all to the end of making the armed forces effective instruments for 
national security.” (Gerhardt 1971, xvi)59 While full effectiveness of military 
organizations is not naturally given and arguably never reached, organization is 
considered a decisive criterion for the military potency of a force. Therefore, all 
elements of US defense organization are under constant scrutiny resulting in continuous 
and numerous adjustments and reforms (e.g. Kintner 1958). 
 
 
                                                             
59 A third vital element of military organizations is the military superstructure which describes the 
organization of the military leadership and its ties to the civil principals. As the military superstructure is 
translating political purpose in military action, it is of particular importance for the effectiveness of the 
armed forces. A well organized leadership is crucial for civil-military relations and a smooth interaction 
of different branches. It is not analyzed here, due to its limited impact on the armed forces functioning in 
the field. 
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4.2.2. Evidence for innovation 
As in the budget dimension, the overall active duty troop level provides no evidence for 
qualitative changes during the periods under investigation.
60
 Three indicators are used 
to identify innovation in the organizational dimension. 
(1) It is again the Service distribution of personnel, which is more telling with regard to 
possible innovation. The pattern here largely resembles the budget distribution, 
although the differences are less striking. After strong relative changes during the 
1940s, especially the immediate post-Cold War period is very stable. The Korean War 
period is clearly less significant than the preceding phase, but still stronger than both 
post-Cold War periods. During the post-World War II periods, the Air Force initially 
experienced the largest growth, underlining the turn to air power. But with the Korean 
War, the Army expanded far more strongly than the other branches. Again, the Navy is 
the most stable Service. 
    Average 
share 
Lowest (Year) Highest (Year) Range 
(hi-lo) 
1
9
4
5
-1
9
4
9
 Army 43.93% 38.34% (1948) 49.64% (1945) 11.3 
Navy 34.84% 37.49% (1946) 31.44% (1945) 6.05 
Air Force 21.23% 15.07% (1946) 26.85% (1948) 11.78 
1
9
5
0
-1
9
5
3
 Army 43.71% 40.64 (1950) 47.14% (1951) 6.49 
Navy 29.55% 28.62% (1951) 31.19% (1950) 2.57 
Air Force 26.74% 24.25% (1951) 28.17% (1950) 3.92 
1
9
8
9
-1
9
9
8
 Army 33.16% 31.92% (1996) 35.03% (1990) 3.1 
Navy 37.75% 35.86% (1989) 38.76% (1993) 2.9 
Air Force 25.17% 24.6% (1991) 25.39% (1994) 0.78 
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
8
 Army 34.28% 32.95% (2002) 36.91% (2008) 3.96 
Navy 36.96% 36.02% (2008) 37.97% (2001) 1.95 
Air Force 24.1% 22.18% (2008) 25.23% (2004) 3.05 
 
Table 4.1: Service shares of personnel in comparison (own calculations based on OSD 2008; 1995)
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60 There is a strong trend to reduce personnel since the 1970s, however, which arguably reflects the 
qualitative decision to increasingly replace manpower by advanced technologies (data in OSD 2008). 
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(2) Since forward deployment requires different means and preparations than long-
distance force projection, the geographical distribution of military personnel is an 
interesting measure. The major distinction is the number of troops stationed abroad and 
at home. 
 
Chart 4.6: US troops abroad in thousands and as percentage of total US troops (Kane 2006) 
 
The geographic pattern shows that both demobilizations are accompanied by a strong 
reduction of personnel abroad. In contrast, especially the early 1950s are marked by a 
significant buildup of forces in East Asia and Europe. While the deployments to East 
Asia are closely related to the war efforts, the buildup of European forces constitutes a 
significant innovation for US military policy and remained a constant feature for the rest 
of the Cold War. After the Cold War the forward deployments especially in Europe 
were sharply reduced to a level even below the post-World War II period. The hike in 
the deployment to the Middle East after 2003 is closely related to the Iraq war and only 
of temporary nature. 
(3) While the overall force structure strongly follows the dynamics in personnel and 
reveals little with regard to qualitative changes, the relative emphasis of different 
components within a Service can indicate further changes. In fact, force structure is 
considered a good indicator with regard to the real capabilities of a military force, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
61 Budget authority for defense wide allocations was excluded.  
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because it places the forces in the context of their functions and equipment (CBO 1993, 
5).
62
  
The force structure patterns reveal only some modest changes during all periods of 
transition, however. For the periods after World War II, only two noteworthy changes 
occurred with regard to force structure: first, while the regular Army organization 
hardly changed,
63
 a significant buildup of reserve components followed after the war 
and by 1949, the reserve components were three times larger than prior to the war, 
together reaching almost 900,000 (Doubler 2003, 192, 249; Crossland/Currie 1984, 
296-297).
64
 During the subsequent buildup, the reserve forces decreased, since many of 
its members were called to active duty. But after the Korean War, the Army reserve was 
again extended to more than 1.3 million by 1954. A second change, which spanned 
across both periods after 1945, occurred with regard to the Navy’s force structure. The 
Navy put weight on aircraft carriers whereas the battleship almost completely 
disappeared (Polmar 2001, 629). By the end of FY 1945, the fleet included 20 major 
aircraft carriers and 25 battleships. In 1953, the situation had significantly changed and 
only 4 battleships were still in commission whereas the fleet was organized around 17 
aircraft carriers. In contrast to these changes, the Air Force’s force structure remained 
largely stable. The ratio between fighter and bomber wings was hardly altered during 
both post-World War II periods (Air Force Historical Research Agency 2010).  
After the Cold War, the Army and Navy underwent significant changes. During the 
1990s, the Army got lighter in relative terms, since many of the heavy divisions were 
deactivated or moved to the reserve (Perry 1995). And by 2003, the division as the 
major building block was replaced by the smaller brigade (Feickert 2007). The new 
brigades gained organic command and reconnaissance units to increase their autonomy, 
                                                             
62 Data on force structure developments can be found in Cohen (1998) and Perry (1995). For the Navy see 
Saunders (2007, 873; 2001, 788), Labs (2006, 2), Polmar (2001, 629), Jones, W. (1999, 349) and Sharpe 
(1991, 710). For the Army see Feickert (2007), Millett/Maslowski (1984, 491) and Taylor (1959, 14). A 
particular problem for a comparison over time is the changing arrangements of force structure elements. 
For example, the Air Force repeatedly changed the number of bombers attached or the number of 
squadrons assigned to a wing. Thus, a smaller force structure on a higher level may conceal more or less 
personnel and equipment on a lower level. Only few sources offset for these difficulties and provide a 
reliable long-term account. Thus, the Air Force Historical Research Agency (2010) has developed a 
database to specifically analyze changes in the Air Force’s force structure over time. O’Rourke (2009a, 
38) provides a database on the total number of the Navy’s battle force ships. 
63
 Divisions got slightly heavier after World War II, including more mechanized and armored 
components, but the relation between armored, airborne, and infantry divisions remained roughly the 
same (Wilson 1998, 207-256). 
64 The other Services also built up reserve components, but the increases were most significant for the 
Army. 
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which significantly changed the Army’s organizational options in operations. For the 
Navy, only a moderate relative reduction of its submarine fleet is evident during the 
1990s (Polmar 2001, 629). But the Navy significant reorganized its forces after 2002 
(Labs 2006, 1-3). Its previously 19 strike groups were reorganized in 37 strike groups, 
consisting of 12 carrier strike groups, 11 expeditionary strike groups, 9 surface action 
groups, and 4 single guided missile submarine strike forces. This larger force structure 
allowed the Navy to spread capabilities over a larger area. Furthermore, while the 
carrier groups became smaller, including only 3 rather than 6 surface combatants, the 
Navy’s amphibious component and thus its expeditionary ability became much more 
robust. Amphibious ships, which previously operated without support of surface 
combatants, were integrated in expeditionary strike groups each including 3 surface 
combatants and an attack submarine. The Air Force reveals again the least changes in 
both periods. The fighter wings continuously outnumbered the bomber wings, although 
the ratio moved from approximately 2 to 1 in 1990 to more than 3 to 1 during all years 
after 1995 (Air Force Historical Research Agency 2010).  
 
4.3. Weapons acquisition 
4.3.1. Definition and description 
The state’s defense acquisition which includes all “activities to provide military 
capabilities for the defense of the nation” (Chadwick 2007, Summary) is a central aspect 
of military policy (Fox 1988). It involves the conception, research, development, 
evaluation and procurement of weapons and equipment (Peck/Scherer 1962, 3). 
Especially the acquisition of major weapons system
65
 accounts for a strong part of the 
overall defense acquisition budget. These large acquisition projects can last for many 
years and have often far-reaching consequences for the armed forces and the national 
force posture.  
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 The DOD (2001) defines a weapon system as a “combination of one or more weapons with all related 
equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required 
for self-sufficiency.” Yet, Ehrhard (2000, 5) convincingly argues that the term has “achieved a generic 
meaning beyond whether or not the platform bombs, shoots, or otherwise delivers lethal force, and has 
come to encompass any large, expensive combat platform.” 
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According to McNaugher (1989, 3-12; 1987, 65, 102), weapons acquisition can be seen 
from a technical, a military and a political perspective which overlap at times.
66
 For 
weapon producers, which are usually private companies, the development and 
production of sophisticated weaponry is first of all a technical challenge.
67
 From a 
military perspective, the goal of acquisition is the improvement or extension of 
capabilities. Thus, for military planners the major challenge is the development and 
procurement of systems which meet anticipated requirements or deficiencies with 
regard to the accomplishment of missions. In this context, competing outlooks on the 
most effective ways to provide national security, e.g. whether to focus on quantity or 
quality, are closely related to weapons acquisition (McNaugher 1987, 64). Limited 
resources and rising unit costs often demand decisions on either better quality or larger 
quantities (Reppy 1980, 166). These technical and military tasks are embedded in a 
political process, which directs public money to contribute to the national security.  
A quantitative comparison of acquisition funding shows that the procurement 
appropriations title is the most heavily affected during military transitions (OSD 2008; 
1995; Korb 1993). Thus, little equipment is procured during periods of little funding. 
This seems self-evident and is what one would expect from the terms ‘builddown’ and 
‘buildup’ respectively. More interesting is the R&D account’s long-term developments. 
Until the early 1950s, R&D followed the procurement account: It sharply dropped after 
World War II and grew again during the early 1950s. But it departed from the 
procurement account after the Truman buildup ended in 1953 and grew steadily over 
time. Even when the budget dropped after the Cold War, the R&D account was “locked 
in time” for most of the 1990s (Leebaert 2003, 615). The Global War on Terror resulted 
in a renewed increase in R&D spending after 2001. This is in line with the generally 
observation that technology increasingly replaces personnel, a trend which is not limited 
to periods of transition, however. 
 
 
                                                             
66 Weapon acquisition programs contain a numerous uncertainties, which make those projects a difficult 
task with often unexpected outcomes (Peck/Scherer 1968; Klein 1968). 
67
 One may add that weapons acquisition is also an organizational problem, since the DOD, the prime 
contractor and usually many subcontractors have to work in sync. To achieve effective program planning 
and implementation, the acquisition structure consists of complex arrangements and processes. Since this 
study is concerned with the weapons acquisition input and outcome, defense acquisition structure, process 
and its reforms over time are considered only in cases where this is necessary background. 
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4.3.2. Evidence for innovation 
Important contributions to the research on military innovation have used the acquisition 
of specific systems to test their assumptions (e.g. Sapolsky 1972; Armacost 1969). And 
many studies have provided highly valuable insights on the acquisition process by 
focusing on a limited number of weapon programs or different phases of it (e.g. Else 
2008; Peck/Scherer 1962; Marshall/Meckling 1959). But a micro description of 
acquisition activities at program level seems unsuitable for a diachronic comparison of 
periods of transition. It provides only few additional insights while adding unnecessary 
length and complexity. Hence, a comparison of weapons acquisition at a more aggregate 
level is a more plausible but also a more difficult task. Since the quality and purpose of 
weapons systems differ greatly, their qualitative or quantitative comparison is always at 
risk of becoming meaningless. An analysis of weapon programs based on their number, 
duration or costs is hardly a more promising approach. Each program has its own 
history and clear start and end points often cannot be identified, as statistical 
information is fragmentary (Peck/Scherer 1962, 6). Furthermore, many programs reach 
into or even across the periods under investigation. Thus, the number of programs 
started during a period says relatively little on the acquisition activities in it. Therefore, 
the analysis resorts to a qualitative description of the main acquisition trends at a 
medium level. The central criteria for the assessment are whether acquisitions during 
the transition followed existing trends or changed their focus significantly and whether 
the Services embraced new technologies or remained largely focused on narrow tracks.  
 
Post-World War II period 
Weapons acquisition has been a permanent aspect of US state activity throughout its 
history, but the size and prominence of acquisition as a political and military problem 
has increased over the years (Jones, W. 1999; Bair 1994). Until World War II neither 
the public nor its representatives in Congress devoted significant attention to the 
acquisition of weapons except for times of military crises. The resulting system was 
based on a small peace-time militia and ad hoc solutions in the face of war. This 
changed only after World War II when a permanent, although initially small acquisition 
structure became a crucial part of the US military establishment. During the war, the US 
had become the “great arsenal of democracy” (Roosevelt 1940) with its industry 
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producing massive amounts of military equipment. Moreover, its scientists achieved the 
most significant weapon breakthrough of the war: the atomic bomb, “a weapon of 
unparalleled power that would not only revolutionize war but could alter the course of 
history and civilization.” (Cagle 1964, 2) Together with other wartime inventions, 
including the German jet engine and rocket technology and American radar technology, 
the bomb had strongly affected the war’s outcome and provided a broad foundation for 
weapons acquisition after the war (Campbell 1947, 36). While postwar demobilization 
was imperative and strongly hit procurement and R&D, there was widespread 
agreement that the technological edge should be maintained through at least some 
military acquisition. 
Against this backdrop, the immediate post-World War II period was characterized by an 
evident willingness to exploit new technologies and push into new areas despite fiscal 
limitations. New York Times journalist Hanson W. Baldwin (1951b) describes the 
immediate postwar period in strong words: “We are passing through a period of 
technological revolution in warfare.” Aviation became the major theme of the 
immediate postwar period. The Air Force pushed for bombers with increased range, 
load and speed for strategic bombing early on. After some initial confusion with regard 
to the future of atomic bombs, the bomber acquisition gained additional weight by its 
relevance for nuclear bombing after 1948, although the control over nuclear acquisition 
had been moved to the civil Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) two years earlier. As 
the initially only means to deliver nuclear ordnance, heavy bombers and supporting 
platforms advanced to the first and most prominent pillar of postwar acquisition.
68
 By 
1948, the Air Force still relied on about 35 modified B-29s to deliver nuclear bombs 
(Rosenberg 1978, 255). Yet, the bomber, which had dropped the first atomic bombs 
over Japan, had limited range and load capacity and the Air Force pushed for the B-36 
Peacemaker, an intercontinental aircraft capable of carrying the heavy first generation 
nuclear bombs (Knaack 1988). Moreover, the jet bombers B-45 Tornado and B-47 
Stratojet were in the acquisition process, the latter to replace an advanced version of the 
B-29.
69
 By 1950, the number of nuclear capable airplanes at the Strategic Air 
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 The following discussion of weapon systems draws from various descriptions on the Global Security 
(2010) and FAS (2010) webpages. 
69 The advanced version of the B-29 was designated B-50 and completed the first non-stop flight around 
the world in 1949. The plane was refueled four times during its flight, proofing the potential of aerial 
refueling. 
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Command’s (SAC) disposal reached 300 (Jones, W. 1999, 334).70 And plans to replace 
the B-36, which encountered numerous performance problems, with the B-52 
Stratofortress during the 1950s were already under way. Since air superiority was 
crucial for strategic air operations, the Air Force also improved its fighter air fleet by 
introducing jet engines (Knaack 1978). After the F-80 Fighting Star, the Army Air 
Force’s first jet fighter, joint the air fleet soon after the war, the F-8471 Thunderjet and 
F-86 Sabre followed by the late 1940s (Alach 2008, 9). Yet, due to limited funding, the 
conversion to jet aircrafts made only slow progress prior to 1950. 
The Air Force’s efforts in manned aviation were complemented by the Navy, which also 
focused – besides anti-submarine warfare72 – on bombing capabilities. By the end of the 
war, the aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the fleet’s capital ship and the 
admirals sought to further build up aviation capabilities. The Navy therefore developed 
the heavy bomber AJ Savage, the first carrier-based bomber able to deliver large 
conventional and nuclear bombs, after 1946. Yet, its most important postwar program, 
the next generation supercarrier, capable of deploying heavy airplanes in numbers, 
suffered a major setback when construction was canceled for lack of funding in 1949.  
The development of missiles became a second major pillar of early postwar weapons 
acquisition. While the first US steps in missile development during the war produced 
only insufficient results, the German rocket technology inspired all Services to press 
ahead with missile development (Neufeld 1990, 2). Since the feasibility of ballistic 
missiles was uncertain and only seen as a long-term prospect, most early missile 
developments focused on cruise missiles. By the war’s end, the armed forces had 
already 19 different guided missile projects in progress and extended the number to 47 
                                                             
70 Despite the development activity, the Air Force fell short of its desired aircraft procurement. In fact, the 
Air Force considered an annual procurement of 3,000 planes as necessary in order to establish 70 air 
groups and to maintain the industrial base for aviation. Yet, the budget authority in FY 1946 allowed only 
for the purchase of 662 planes, including 60 upgraded B-50 and 141 F-84. The number increased slightly 
to 769 aircraft in FY 1947, including the purchase of 33 new F-86 Sabrejets. In FY 1948, the Air Force 
requested funds for 1,844 aircraft and received enough to purchase 965 planes in the end.  
71 The plane was originally designated P-84. ‘P’ was the type prefix for aircrafts with the basic mission 
‘Pursuit’ until a new designation system was established in the course of the Air Force independence. In 
1948, ‘P’ and ‘A’ (Attack & light bombardment) designations were replaced by ‘F’ for ‘Fighter’ 
(Andrade 1979, 6). 
72 Anti-submarine warfare was regarded a vital aspect of a future East-West confrontation. The Red Army 
had captured some advanced German submarines by the end of the war and there were concerns that an 
exploitation of these technologies could jeopardize the US high sea dominance (Rosenberg 1978, 250). 
Navy intelligence predicted that by the 1960s it was possible for the Soviet Navy to have up to 2,000 
submarines of all types (Polmar/Moore 2004, 14). Therefore, the Navy started a major program to 
improve anti-submarine warfare. 
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by mid-1946 (Werrell 1985, 81; Cagle 1964, 13). The small budgets caused a sharp 
subsequent reduction by the decade’s end, but missile development remained a vivid 
domain. By 1950, the Air Force had three surface-to-surface cruise missiles in 
development: The subsonic medium-range Matador, intercontinental Snark and the 
supersonic intercontinental Navaho (Neufeld 1990, 37).
73
 The Navy placed most of its 
hopes in the submarine-launched Regulus missile, which strongly equaled the Air 
Force’s Matador. The Army was developing the Corporal and Hermes A-3 for tactical 
surface-to-surface fire and was in the early stages of a ballistic medium-range missile, 
later called Redstone. Besides the surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air systems, 
such as the Army’s Nike and the Navy’s Terrier, air-to-air systems, such as the Air 
Force’s Falcon, and air-to surface systems, such as the Air Force’s Rascal, were in 
development. 
 
Korean War period 
Despite the ambitious efforts, the budget ceilings limited real progress during the late 
1940s. This changed with the Soviet Union’s detonation of a nuclear device in 1949, 
NSC-68 and especially the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. After a year of 
preparations and slow growth, the production of weapon systems expanded significantly 
in 1952. Aircraft production reached a rate of 800 planes a month by July 1952 and 
even 1000 a month by January 1953 (Vawter 1983, 23). During the war’s first year, the 
Navy expanded its fleet by almost two thirds to a total of 1,100 ships, including the 
reactivation of over 300 mothballed ships. By 1952, more than 100 shipyards were at 
work and numerous ships entered the fleet during the 1950s (Vawter 1983, 23). A 
crucial step for the Navy was the construction of the USS Forrestal, the lead ship of a 
class of scaled-down versions of the previously canceled supercarrier (Jones, W. 1999, 
342-343; Allard 1984, 300-301; Kennedy 1984, 305-306). Yet, the acquisition process 
of the early 1950s was not only harvesting the developments of preceding years. Rather, 
the prospect of a war with the Soviet Union and the Korean War promoted a broad 
development activity and the 1950s “became an especially creative period in the 
exploration of military technology.” (McNaugher 1989, 18; see also Cagle 1964, 14) 
                                                             
73 Since ICBMs proved more promising, the Snark and Navaho programs were canceled for obsolescence 
in the late 1950s.  
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Nuclear technology increasingly found its way into many areas of the weapon arsenals. 
Already in January 1950, Truman ordered the development of thermonuclear 
capabilities, the construction of a facility for increased production of A-bomb and H-
bomb material, and a push for the development of tactical nuclear weapons (Feaver 
1992, 128). The first successful thermonuclear bomb explosion test MIKE was achieved 
less than three years later on October 31, 1952 (Condit 1988, 480).
74
 Already five 
months prior to this breakthrough, the Army announced that it was developing the first 
atomic howitzer to deliver tactical nuclear shells (Dougthy 1979, 13). The 280mm 
howitzer had been under development since World War II but did not come into 
existence until the early 1950s. As the production of comparatively light and small 
atomic shells became possible due to progress in nuclear technology, the Army gained 
tactical nuclear striking power.
75
 Thus, with the Navy’s new capability in nuclear 
bombing based on the new aircraft carriers and the delivery of the atomic-capable AJ-1 
Savages, all three Services acquired means to deliver nuclear warheads by the early 
1950s. Moreover, the Navy launched the USS Nautilus, the first nuclear-powered 
submarine, after three years of construction in 1954.
76
  
Lessons from the Korean War further spurred the development of conventional means. 
Initial success of the Russian T34 tanks led to a new emphasis on tank development 
within the US Army. The light M41 Walker Bulldog, the medium M47 Patton and M48 
Patton II were all developed in the early 1950s.
77
 Especially the M48 was based on a 
completely new design and therefore constituted a significant progress in tank 
development. In addition, the Air Force rapidly expanded its fighter capabilities to 
match the Soviet type MiG-15 fighters. It launched the F-104 Starfighter, a new design, 
and the F-100 Super Sabre, succeeding the F-86, during the early 1950s.
78
 By 1955, all 
                                                             
74 The USSR accomplished its first thermonuclear explosion in August 1953. 
75 The atomic howitzer constituted the first Army nuclear capabilities together with the Corporal surface-
to-surface missile system which was approved as the Army’s first atomic weapon carrier already in 1950 
and the later Honest John rocket system (Midgley 1986, 13). Although the atomic howitzer was already 
obsolescent for the Army needs when it introduced and overall only 10 systems were deployed, it 
constituted an important prestige project and provided the Army with a continuous access to atomic 
materials. 
76 The USS Nautilus cleared the way for the nuclear-powered Skipjack-class submarines authorized in 
1956. The first nuclear powered surface ship was the guided missile cruiser USS Long Beach in 1955. 
The USS Enterprise became the first nuclear-powered carrier and entered the fleet in 1961 (Jones, W. 
1999, 342-343). 
77 For a description of the development of armored transport vehicles see Haworth (1999, 21-28). 
78 Although the acquisition process of the F-104 was fast, the new aircraft was not employed earlier than 
three years after the war in 1956. It was soon succeeded by the F-4 Phantom for which planning started in 
1953. The Phantom entered service in 1961 (Alach 2008, 9). 
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fighter aircrafts in the regular Air Force were jets (Jones, W. 1999, 340). In 1954, the 
Air Force started preparations for the B-70, a new bomber to succeed the B-52. The 
Navy initiated new construction programs including the Dealey class antisubmarine 
destroyers and the Forrest Sherman class destroyers, which succeeded the experimental 
Mitscher class of the late 1940s. Finally, the additional funding and the prospect of a 
nuclear showdown clearly accelerated missile development. Under Eisenhower 
especially anti-air systems as part of an emerging continental defense system gained 
importance. Thus, the Army launched the surface-to-air program Hawk in 1952 in 
addition to its Nike system. Furthermore, while still in the early stages, the development 
of ballistic missiles became more dynamic. Since 1950, the Army undertook more 
serious efforts to develop the medium-range Redstone missile. The same is true for the 
Air Force’s ICBM Atlas program which was accelerated in 1954 after it had languished 
for eight years. 
 
Post-Cold War period 
The end of the Cold War arguably resembled many characteristics of the post-World 
War II situation with regard to weapons acquisition. Again, the procurement accounts 
dropped sharply. And technological inventions, which were developed during the long 
Cold War, became available by its end. Thus, technologies from the offset strategy of 
the 1970s had reached maturity and proved their significance during the superior 
performance of US forces in the Gulf War 1991.
79
 Not unlike the situation after the 
atomic attack on Japan, many defense experts argued that Desert Storm marked a 
watershed in the conduct of warfare and a starting point for a strongly altered US force. 
The concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) reflected this belief in a new age 
of warfare (Tomes 2009; Van Atta et al. 2003).
80
 Andrew Krepinevich, one of the 
                                                             
79 The offset strategy sought to develop weapons systems based on latest technologies to offset for the 
quantitative superiority of the Red Army in a battle for Europe (Tomes 2009). Central initiatives were the 
development of stealth aircraft, the assault breaker program, and advanced battlefield intelligence. The 
latter aimed at stopping a Soviet attack by a combination of command, control, intelligence systems, 
advanced communications and precision-guided weapons. The offset strategy was a shift away from the 
sole reliance on nuclear weapons towards technology-based conventional superiority.  
80 The intellectual foundations for the RMA concept were laid by the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) 
and its notorious director Andrew W. Marshall. ONA was established in 1973 to provide assessments of 
the Soviet threat and strategic analysis. Marshall had directed the ONA since its establishment and 
achieved an almost mythical reputation as gray eminence of defense. Der Derian (2001, 28) refers to 
Marshall as „officially known as the director of the Office of Net Assessment, but unofficially, ‚St. 
Andrew‘, the Yoda of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs.”Initially, the ONA adapted a concept 
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concept’s early advocates, defined it as follows: “It is what occurs when the application 
of new technology into a significant number of military systems combines with 
innovative operational concepts and organizational adaption in a way that 
fundamentally alters the character and conduct of war.” (Krepinevich 1994, 30) Hence, 
the realization of a RMA causes not only short-term predominance over an immediate 
opponent, but the revolutionized capabilities become “the necessary foundation for any 
future military activities in that area of conflict.” (Galdi 1995, 2) In this reading, 
inventions in command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, reconnaissance (C
4
ISR), stealth, and precision technologies were not only 
decisive for the overwhelming victory in Iraq, but offered a preview on a new quality in 
warfare. Desert Storm marked the “the rise of information over mass.” (Friedman 2009, 
73) The interplay of advanced ISR capabilities with better data processing and 
communication would allow connecting platforms to a system-of-systems multiplying 
the individual systems’ battlespace knowledge and thus lifting the fog of war (Owens 
2000). Long-range precision weapon systems would enable the armed forces to make 
best use of this information superiority by hitting the opponent with maximum 
efficiency and minimal risk. 
Given the RMA vision and the strategic pause after the Cold War, there was an 
incentive to modernize – maybe even revolutionize – the US weapon systems. But the 
decreasing budgets made a separation effort necessary: Start or keep next-generation 
programs and sort out so-called legacy programs, i.e. programs designed for 
deployment in a Cold War environment without further strategic relevance. Moreover, 
only a clear commitment to revolutionary programs rather than the evolutionary 
modernization programs would allow for the realization of a RMA.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
from Russian military experts who had referred to the US progress in military technology after the 
Vietnam War as “military-technical revolution” (Krepinevich 1992). To deemphasize the importance of 
technology over other aspects of warfare, the ONA used the term ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’. Since 
1989, the ONA was advocating the advent of a revolution in warfare inside and outside the Pentagon. 
Despite some conceptual vagueness and disagreement, military experts quickly picked up the RMA or 
aspects of it after the Iraq War (e.g. Morgan 2000; Gongora/Riekhoff 2000; McIntyre 1999; Hundley 
1999; Blaker 1997a; Pfaltzgraff/Shultz 1997; Arquilla/Ronfeldt 1997; FitzSimonds/Van Tol 1994). They 
searched for historical analogies to gain a better understanding of revolutionary developments in warfare 
and credibility for the concept (Murray/Knox 2001; Murray 1997; Krepinevich, 1994). This historical 
turn linked the RMA debate to a debate among historians on military revolutions (Parker 1996; Roberts 
1995; for a critique see Lynn 2001). RMA soon became a buzzword in post-Cold War discussions over 
the future course of the US armed forces. In fact, the RMA concept became so popular among defense 
analysts that O’Hanlon (1998) warned of an “RMA’nia.” 
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Indeed, some strategic and conventional programs were reduced or terminated. Thus, 
funding for nuclear forces, including modernization programs, was reduced by 40 
percent from 1990 to 2000 (Mosher 2001). And the strategic missile defense, going 
back to Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), suffered severe budget cuts. With a 
reduced need for nuclear delivery means, the procurement of the B-2 strategic stealth 
bomber was successively reduced from an initial 132 bombers in 1987 to a total of 21 
bombers including a test plane in 1992 (Alic 2007, 3). And the Navy’s SSN-21 Seawolf 
attack submarine, designed to chase Soviet ballistic submarines, was terminated after 
the construction of only three vessels. Moreover, the airplane acquisition was 
streamlined. Thus, the Navy’s F-14 production was selected to phase out and the 
development of its A-12 stealth plane was canceled.
81
 The Air Force’s multi-role fighter 
program, which was to replace the F-16 after 2015, shared the latter’s fate.  
But while the termination wave hit some programs, it did not bring about a new course 
in acquisition. Major Cold War programs with a decisive impact on the shrinking 
budgets were continued, constituting some modernization but no real turn to RMA 
thinking. Thus, the Army’s RAH-66 Comanche, a stealth helicopter largely designed for 
reconnaissance missions, and the Advanced Field Artillery System Crusader were 
maintained (Morrison 1994, 2130). The Navy continued construction of its Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyers and the 8
th
 and 9
th
 Nimitz-class aircraft carriers as well as the 
development of the F-18E/F and the Marine Corps’ V-22 tilt-roter aircraft. The Air 
Force’s most prestigious project, the F-22 Raptor, also remained in the acquisition 
process. Indeed, even the central new programs showed little RMA thinking. The 
Virginia-class submarines and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
82
 did not depart from 
prior patterns in terms of operational scope and platform complexity. A RMA-inspired 
departure from prior acquisition trends largely failed. Although the Services conducted 
studies and projects, such as the Air Force 2025 study and the Army’s Force XXI 
project, to improve their understanding of the effect of information technologies on 
                                                             
81 The A/F-X program, which the Navy launched to replace the A-12, was terminated only two years later 
(Scarborough 1993). 
82 The Joint Strike Fighter program resulted from the joint advanced strike technology program which 
was launched early in the first Clinton term. The program, which entered the final contract bidding round 
in 1996 (Goldreich 1996), should acquire a relatively cheap next-generation fighters to amend the Navy’s 
F/A-18 fleet and replace the Air Force’s A-10 and F-16 and the Marine Corps’ AV-8B and F/A-18. Initial 
planning aimed at more than 3000 planes including 60 for Britain’s Royal Navy (Gertler 2009, 8). While 
the F-35 Strike Fighter was to be delivered in three different versions reflecting branch specific 
requirements, central elements were developed in a joint effort to save costs and avoid unnecessary 
duplications. 
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future warfare, the impact on weapons acquisition was small.
83
 Innovative systems 
favored by RMA proponents, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or the Arsenal 
Ship, made only slow progress or no progress at all.
84
 
 
Global War on Terror period 
By the century’s turn, many observers argued that the procurement holiday under the 
Clinton administration had to end. They warned that the equipment largely purchased 
during the Reagan buildup was worn out and ripe for replacement (O’Hanlon 2002).  
Selected Weapon Systems Number in service Average age in years 
A
ir
 F
o
rc
e 
A-10 368 21 
B-1 B 93 17 
B-52 H 94 38 
F-15 C / F-15 D 403 16 
F-15 E 201 9 
F-16 C/D 1428 7-20 
N
av
y
 
AV-8 170 9 
F-14 A 136 19 
F-14 D 46 12 
 
Table 4.2: Average age of selected aircraft by 1999 (Freeberg 1999, 3549) 
                                                             
83 The Air Force 2025 study aimed at defining the Air Force’s future requirements based on various 
operational scenarios (Tirpak 1996) Force XXI was an Army force design project to develop a more 
flexible, lethal, sustainable, and fast Army by the first decade of the 21st Century. While Force XXI also 
touched doctrine and organizational structure, its emphasis rested clearly on the exploitation of 
information and communication technology within the existing force (Rose et al. 1997). The Force XXI 
program, which promised incremental adaption of new information technology rather than revolutionary 
change, was unsatisfying from a RMA perspective (Jackson 2009, 47-48). While Force XXI had some 
impact on Army transformation after 2000, a substantial reorientation in the Pentagon’s acquisition did 
not materialize: “There was minimal adaptation to the electronic age – tailoring task forces, recasting US 
military power into new joint forces, and calibrating war plans minute by minute instead of just adopting 
electronics for traditional force structures.” (Leebaert 2003, 614) 
84 The arguably most progress was achieved with regard to precision guided munitions (PGM). After 
Desert Storm, the Air Force sought to increase the share of precision guided munitions for future 
conflicts. Although PGMs amounted to only 10 percent of the total munitions used in the Gulf War, they 
accounted for 60 percent of the reported target damage (Weiner 2009, 103). Therefore, the Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions (JDAM) program was started (Burbach et al. 2009, 27-28). The program aimed at 
providing a comparatively cheap upgrade, turning dumb bombs into all-weather PGMs for Air Force and 
Navy flyers. JDAMs made their first successful appearance in the air war against Serbia in 1999. 
79 
 
The increasing O&M costs for running older systems combined with the expected cost 
growth for the procurement of numerous new platforms threatened to cause a “so-called 
death spiral of procurement.” (Wilson 2000a, 56) Thus, besides a new priority on an 
accelerated deployment of a national missile defense system, state actors had the 
difficult task to strike a balance between short-term maintenance and replacement of the 
aging equipment.  
Yet, instead of continuing modernization along the patterns of the 1990s, military 
transformation became the new defense vision by 2001.
85
 Transformation was defined 
as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation 
through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that 
exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to 
sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.” 
(DOD 2003a, 3; DOA 2003, 2) Network Centric Warfare (NCW) became the dominant 
supporting concept for guiding weapons acquisition for transformation. Initially 
developed by the Navy, NCW was soon considered the military’s general response to 
the information age (Office of Force Transformation 2005, 3). Closely related to the 
system-of-systems approach, it holds that the harnessing of advanced ISR capabilities 
would allow for a shift from platform-centric to network-centric operations, thereby 
greatly enhancing combat power. NCW postulates the departure from attrition 
engagements to maneuver warfare based on almost real-time synchronization of 
information leading to information superiority and dominant battlespace knowledge 
(Cebrowski/Garstka 1998). Static, massive fire-heavy platforms and troop 
concentrations on the ground should be replaced by light, mobile and increasingly 
unmanned units contributing information to the network. Overall, the complexity should 
be shifted from highly sophisticated multi-purpose legacy platforms to the network as a 
whole, from the single nods to the web (Dombrowski/Gholz 2006, 9-12). 
                                                             
85 The term ‘transformation’ had already been used during the 1990s to describe the process leading to a 
RMA (e.g. Krepinevich 1992; National Defense Panel 1997a). But it was not only a new emphasis on the 
process dimension, which led to the sole use of transformation after 2001. As the extensive debates over 
RMA during the 1990s had yielded little substantial defense reform, the term was worn out. Buchan 
(2000, 143) arguably reflected the experts mood at the time by reasoning: „In an important sense, it 
probably should not matter too much whether a particular set of technical and operational innovations are 
‘revolutionary’ or not: good ideas should be of interest however they are labeled.” Blaker (2007, 16) goes 
further, claiming that ‘revolution’ had too many unwanted connotations such as radicalism and lack of 
control. Transformation indicates less creative destruction than RMA. 
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This network approach promises numerous advantages: First, a reduction in the risk of 
one’s own forces, since “troops would be wrapped in a protective layer of information 
dominance.” (Tomes 2009, 167) Second, the whole force would become more robust, as 
the destruction of one nod could easily be compensated by other nods within the 
network. The underlying logic is roughly comparable to a shoal of fish, which is more 
flexible and harder to catch than a few big fish. Third, the force would become more 
lethal, as each nod would have access not only to the platform inherent capabilities, but 
also the capabilities of the whole network. Thus, the lost fire power on the ground 
would be compensated by precise, long-distance strike capabilities from airplanes and 
ships, which could exploit the information from the field for asymmetric attacks. The 
related concept of effect-based operations describes the ideal translation of the 
information advantage into an efficient use of force. Rather than destroying the 
adversary’s flesh and muscles in an attrition effort, effect-based operations aim at 
destroying his nerve center, the so-called center of gravity, with precise strikes. For this 
purpose, NCW demanded improved capabilities in the fields of long-range precision 
fire and stealth technologies (Blaker 2007, 120-121; Ricks 2001d). 
As the budgets started to rise after 9/11, transformation became possible. But only the 
Army acquisition program experienced a significant departure from prior patterns. The 
Army’s Crusader and Comanche programs, which had survived the 1990s, were 
terminated early into the new century. Instead, the Army fully focused on two major 
transformation programs which it had launched in 1999. With the medium-weight, 
Interim Armed Vehicle, named Stryker in 2002, the Army tried to strike a good balance 
between requirements for high mobility and operational sustainability and lethality. 
While the Stryker’s transformational quality was questioned, the Army’s second new 
platform, the Future Combat System (FCS), clearly met the requirements of NCW. It 
was planned to become the center of the Army’s transformed force replacing central 
systems such as the M1 Abrams and the M2 Bradley (Dunn 2002). Rather than a 
complex platform, the FCS was designed as a system of systems, consisting of up to 18 
light, interacting modules, including manned and unmanned, aerial and ground 
components.  
The other Services continued to modernize their forces largely along conventional 
patterns. The Navy continued to put most resources in the acquisition of the V-22, the 
F-18E/F, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and the Virginia-class submarines. 
81 
 
Additionally, the 10
th
 Nimitz-class carrier was ordered in January 2001, weeks before 
the 9
th
 carrier was launched and a year after the development of the new, but hardly 
revolutionary Gerald-R.-Ford-class carrier was initiated.
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 Of the Navy’s two new major 
programs with substantive innovative potential only one can be considered a success 
with some relevance for transformation. The development of the DDG-1000 Zumwalt-
class destroyer program, a remnant of the Navy’s broad and ambitious Future Surface 
Combatant Program DD-21 of the late 1990s, became a failure. Because of its advanced 
stealth characteristics and electronics as well as massive fire power for ground support, 
the Navy placed the Zumwalt-class in the NCW context. Yet, due to growing costs and 
technological difficulties, the procurement was ended after only 3 ships in 2008 
(Kaeser/Cordesman 2008, 18-19; Drew 2009b). While the acquisition of littoral combat 
ships, arguably the Navy’s most transformational system, was not without difficulties, it 
proved more successful. But the flexible and small high-tech ship, based on the model 
of high-speed commercial ferries, turned out larger and less innovative than hoped for. 
The Air Force acquisition experienced the least changes. Although the procurement 
numbers were reduced, the F-22, which gained additional ground attack capabilities in 
2002, and the JSF tied the largest part of its acquisition budget. Only the acquisition of 
UAVs is indeed a significant departure from prior pattern. Since the war on terror 
started in 2001, Air Force and CIA drones have been heavily used for surveillance and 
reconnaissance as well as hunt and kill missions (Drew 2009a; Schmitt 2003).
87
 The 
other Services soon joined the efforts and developed their own UAVs as well as 
unmanned ground and underwater vehicles. Yet, while funding for UAV’s substantially 
increased after 2002, the major manned weapon system programs continued to clearly 
dominate the acquisition budgets.  
In sum, the overall stability of acquisition after the Cold War is, except for a few 
noteworthy innovations, quite striking. Although alternative visions of future warfare 
were available through the RMA and transformation debates, the lion’s share of 
acquisition resources during the 1990s and the GWOT went to a limited number of 
permanent programs. In the 1980s, Augustine (1986, 111), looking at the US aircraft 
acquisition since 1910, drafted the well-known law indicating that the number of 
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 The Navy estimates the overall acquisition costs for the CVN-78, the first Ford class carrier, at over 
$13.7 billion. Yet, the CBO expects a cost overrun of at least $1 billion (Kaeser/Cordesman 2008, 15-16). 
87 The Predator was successfully upgraded to carry and launch Hellfire missiles in 2001. CIA operators 
prominently proved the UAV’s combat utility in the war on terror by killing Al-Harethi, a leading Al-
Qaeda member, with a missile fired from a Predator in Yemen in November 2002 (Adams 2006, 135). 
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procured weapon systems decreases despite increasing defense budgets, due to 
exponentially rising unit costs for ever more complex systems. RMA and 
transformation called for a reversal of this trend: Increase numbers by reducing unit 
costs. Yet, both concepts left few marks and Augustine concluded in 2010: “We are 
right on target. Unfortunately nothing has changed.” (in The Economist 2010, 19) 
Legacy programs continued to dominate the Services’ efforts during both post-Cold 
War periods and the trend towards fewer acquisition programs with less units procured 
continued.
88
 While these programs undoubtedly resemble a modernization step, they are 
hardly innovative. In the words of the RMA: They are evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary. In contrast, a push by all Services to broadly exploit the new technologies 
was clearly evident after World War II despite numerous uncertainties. To be sure, 
budget constraints limited progress during the 1940s, but the armed forces’ attempt to 
push into new domains is nonetheless evident. A strong buildup towards the Cold War 
in qualitative and quantitative terms occurred when ambition and resources came 
together during the early 1950s.  
 
4.4. Military doctrine & Service mission statement 
4.4.1. Definition and description 
With national and military strategies connecting national goals and national means 
including military instruments, the terms ‘role’, ‘function’, ‘mission’, and ‘basic 
doctrine’ describe the position of each Service within this relationship. All terms 
describe “what the services do”, but there is considerable confusion with regard to their 
specific meaning (Kuehl/Miller 1994, 103). Like strategy, roles, functions and missions 
are important context factors for doctrine and mission statements. Despite their often 
synonymous use, all three concepts differ with regard to their authors and scope (Correll 
2008, 50). Roles are based on a statutory act by Congress and broadly define the 
purpose of the Services. Without a role in defense policy, a Service’s reason to exist 
expires.
89
 In contrast, functions are assigned to Services by the President and Defense 
                                                             
88 The GAO (2009, 8) estimated that the initially planned unit quantities had been reduced by almost one-
third across the ten largest DOD acquisition programs. 
89 The assignment of roles is strikingly stable across all periods of transition. To be sure, the late 1940s 
saw great activity to create clear-cut assignments of roles and functions. The rise of air power as a cross-
cutting branch and the increased deployment of Marines in land warfare during the war had blurred the 
earlier divisions along the medium of operations. Thus, the National Security Act in 1947 assigned 
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Secretary within the framework of roles and are thus more specific and less 
permanent.
90
 In a strict reading, the term ‘missions’ was introduced by the Eisenhower 
administration in 1958 to describe the broad operational tasks of the unified or specified 
combatant commands established by the Defense Secretary.
91
 Thus, while functions are 
the “tasks of preparing and maintaining forces for particular types of combat action or 
military activity” assigned to the Services, missions are operational military tasks 
assigned to the combatant commanders (Blechman et al. 1993, 1). Yet, the latter 
terminology is hardly used in its narrow meaning within the military establishment. 
Thus, Services often speak of their doctrinal missions or – if placed into context – their 
strategic concepts when referring to missions (Kuehl/Miller 1994, 104). Indeed, Service 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
explicit roles to the Services (Sec. 205-209): The Army’s was primarily responsible “for prompt and 
sustained combat incident to operations on land”; the Navy was primarily responsible “for prompt and 
sustained combat incident to operations at sea”; the Marine Corps was responsible “for service with the 
fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may 
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign”; and the Air Force was primarily responsible “for 
prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.” (primary sources on roles and missions are 
compiled by Cole et al. 1979) After the legislation in 1947, the roles remained unchanged over the years, 
currently included in Title 10, US Code (Kuehl/Miller 1994, 103). In 1986, Congress mandated the CJCS 
to submit a report on roles and missions every three years as part of the Goldwater-Nichols-Act. 
Lawmakers hoped that regular reviews would foster so-called jointness and reduce duplications. The 
resulting reports did not identify substantial waste or cause significant changes in the existing roles or 
missions, however (Correll 2008, 53). 
90 Functions, like roles, did hardly change during the years, but remained a permanent source of 
interservice conflict. On the day Truman signed the National Security Act in 1947, he also issued 
Executive Order 9877, specifying functions for the Services. While the executive order strongly 
resembled the role descriptions, the wording left important questions with regard to air and land power 
responsibilities unanswered (Trest 1998, 120). Therefore, the Service Chiefs suggested canceling the 
order and replacing it by a statement prepared by the JCS. Under the direction of Defense Secretary 
Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs subsequently produced the so-called Key West agreements in April 1948. The 
agreements provided a more detailed allocation of overlapping functions: Each branch retained the 
primary responsibility for its medium of operations, but gained collateral functions reaching into other 
domains. The latter were assigned to support and supplement the Service with primary responsibility in 
the respective area. Although new technologies opened new areas with unclear responsibilities and critics 
continuously pointed at duplications and inconsistencies, the functions as specified at Key West and in 
the follow-up Newport conference remained essentially unchanged throughout all periods under 
consideration. In 1954, they became part of the DOD directive 5100.1, which has been reissued eight 
times, the most recently in 2002, without noteworthy changes. Only small further differentiations and 
specifications were made such as assignments on the development and deployment of missiles in the late 
1950s or the responsibility for space systems in 1970. 
91 The organization of unified commands, i.e. a single commander exercising command over all assigned 
units regardless of their Service, predates the 1958 reorganization (Cole et al. 2003). Unified commands 
were first practiced during World War II and the JCS soon decided to maintain the system after the war’s 
end. Thus, soon after V-E Day, Eisenhower was appointed Commanding General of US Forces, European 
Theater. In the Pacific, two commanders directed the US forces: The CINC Army Forces, Pacific, and the 
CINC, Pacific Fleet. Unsatisfied with the divided command, the Navy Department suggested the 
consolidation of these commands into one unified command for the Pacific region in early 1946. The War 
Department, fearing a loss of control over ground and air forces under General MacArthur’s command, 
opposed the area based approach. It favored commands on the basis of missions and force assignments. 
The final compromise in late 1946 created seven regional commands, including two for the Pacific 
theater, and two functional commands. The major innovation in 1958 was the new chain of command, 
which bypassed the Services and thus detached the Services from control over the operational missions 
(Correll 2008, 52). 
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mission statements and doctrine are closely connected to roles, functions, and missions, 
by outlining the Service’s “description of how, when, and where the military service 
expects to protect the nation.” (Huntington 1954b, 483)  
Military doctrine is a product of the Services that defies easy definition. The armed 
forces did and arguably still do not share a common understanding of military doctrine 
and its purposes (Lovelace/Young 1996). In the DOD’s Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms ‘doctrine’ is defined as the “[f]undamental principles by which the 
military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. 
It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” (DOD 2001, 166) In other 
words, doctrine describes how the armed forces intend to do their job if called into 
action regardless of the larger strategic context.
92
 It is the non-material input which 
makes the military machine run by putting its elements into context: “Tactics, 
techniques, procedures, organizations, support structures, equipment, and training must 
all derive from it.” (Tsouras/Watson/Watson 1991, 219) The scope of doctrine 
encompasses all military action from the behavior of the individual soldier to the 
interaction within a whole branch or a joint force. Ideally, doctrine serves as a common 
memory for successfully tested military concepts and a vehicle for innovation adjusting 
to new circumstances and lessons learned (Marshall 1993, 774). Yet especially the 
doctrinal publications on the most general level are more than just lessons learned. 
Jones (1997, vi) is right in arguing that these doctrines often “reflect more the 
influences of individuals, budgets, and emerging technological changes than the 
evidence of experience, critical analysis, and study.” In this reading, doctrines provide 
Services with an obvious tool for interservice battles by ascribing roles, missions, and 
functions for themselves (Drew 1995).  
 
 
                                                             
92 To be sure, strategy and doctrine interact and are in parts influenced by common factors, but whereas 
strategy is often formulated to pursue a particular policy, doctrine is a more general body of knowledge 
based on empirical and theoretical insights (Johnson 1997, 2). Doctrine provides “a coherent and 
consistent framework of concepts, tenets, and principles that are applicable in planning and conducting 
operations.” (Chapman 2009, 2) It builds the basic guidance during military training and education. Every 
member of the military forces is familiar with a common set of principles characterizing his 
organization’s identity and his individual role in it. Doctrine provides a common reference point and 
language (Marshall 1993, 773) and “soldiers theoretically ‘see’ the next war in terms of their doctrine.” 
(Sheehan 1988, 3)  
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4.4.2. Evidence for innovation 
Navy doctrine & mission statements 
The Navy traditionally treated doctrine, especially for the tactical and operational level, 
with suspicion. Thus, it lacked a system of explicit doctrine formulation and review 
until the early 1990s and its principles were only observable in military practice (but see 
Hattendorf 2000, 241-251; Tritten 1995b; 1994). The absence of systematic 
publications on doctrine does not indicate a lack of dynamic thought prior to 1990, 
however. Indeed, the continuous statements on broad doctrinal missions reaching into 
the area of strategy show strong changes over the years. Prior to World War II, the Navy 
pursued a command of the sea doctrine, based on Alfred T. Mahan’s writings 
(Hattendorf 2000, 59-77; Huntington 1954b). The doctrine rested on the premise that 
command of the sea should be acquired through the destruction of opposing fleets in 
decisive open sea battles. For this purpose, the Navy focused on the acquisition of a 
large and concentrated fleet around battleships with heavy fire power (Davis 1966, 185). 
After the war, this maritime strategy was largely obsolete, since the last capable 
adversary at sea, the Japanese Navy, had been defeated and the most likely new 
opponent, the USSR, had few naval capabilities. Hence, the Navy adjusted its focus 
towards forward, offensive operations based on anti-submarine warfare and aviation, 
with aircraft carrier task forces as major combat organizations (Palmer 1988; Rosenberg 
1978). Complementing the Navy’s prior high sea mission, amphibious forces and 
especially air power should provide the Navy with inland capabilities. According to the 
Navy’s vision, naval forces would early on not only secure the sea ways in case of a 
Soviet attack, but make use of its command of the sea and engage in offensive 
operations including the use of nuclear weapons. In its first general doctrinal statement 
‘US Fleet Publication Number One, Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare’, 
published in early 1947, the Navy consequently emphasized the Navy’s strategic 
capabilities. It argued that the destruction of the opposing will to resist could be 
achieved by attacking the enemy’s actual and potential means of resistance (Rosenberg 
1978, 250-251). These means included naval and air forces as well as industry and 
infrastructure. The focus on forward, offensive operations remained throughout the 
Korean War and changed only after the Eisenhower administration took a new look at 
the defense policy and embraced a deterrence strategy. Naval thinking turned to an 
86 
 
increasingly defensive, nuclear doctrine based on dispersed carrier group formations, 
nuclear retaliation, and submarine warfare during the following years.  
By 1990, the admirals faced a situation largely similar to 1945 (Rhodes 1999; Fisher 
1995, 73). During the 1980s, the Navy’s Maritime Strategy focused on war with the 
Warsaw Pact and outlined a forward, offensive approach not unlike the concepts of the 
late 1940s (Palmer 1988, 94). After the demise of the Soviet Union, the widely 
circulated Navy/Marine Corps white paper ‘…From the Sea’, published in fall 1992, 
argued that the new environment required “a fundamental shift away from open-ocean 
warfighting on the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea.” (Hattendorf 
2005, 90; emphasis in the original) The traditional missions of deterrence and high sea 
control were not abandoned, but the Navy’s focus turned from the undisputed high seas 
to the disputed littoral areas, which were vital for global force projection. Hence, 
expeditionary capabilities for littoral warfare and joint Navy and Marine Corps 
maneuvers from the sea became central. In this context, the unique contribution to 
stability by the mere forward presence of naval forces in unstable regions was newly 
emphasized. ‘…From the Sea’ also announced the creation of a Naval Doctrine 
Command to translate this reorientation into sophisticated doctrine. Within two years, 
the newly established naval command published the ‘Naval Doctrine Publication 1, 
Naval Warfare’ (DON 1994a). As the Navy’s first explicit capstone doctrine, the 
doctrine included extensive discussions on the naval forces’ self-understanding and 
principles of war enhanced by numerous historical examples. It outlined the naval 
forces’ enduring and new operations including deterrence, forward presence, military 
operations other than war (MOOTW)
93
, sealift, war operations, and joint operations. 
And a final section discussed the capabilities, which naval forces could provide for 
these operations: Command, Control, and Surveillance; Battlespace Dominance; Power 
Projection; Force Sustainment. During the same year, the Navy published the white 
paper ‘Forward …From the Sea’ (DON 1994b), which went slightly farther than 
‘…From the Sea’ by further specifying its operational concepts. Especially forward 
                                                             
93 MOOTW replaced the term ‘low-intensity conflicts’ during the 1990s (Metz 2005, 287). According to 
the JCS (2001, xiv), MOOTW “encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of 
national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with 
war.” Hence, MOOTW subsumed a broad spectrum of operations such as disaster relief, peacekeeping, 
counterterrorism, or counterinsurgency. The use of MOOTW was discontinued in 2006, because it 
obfuscated the heterogeneity of operations subsumed under it (JCS 2006). ‘Irregular warfare’ became the 
new general term to sum the latter two challenges.  
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presence became more profound by conceptualizing US vessels as mobile sea bases 
from which naval forces could influence events ashore.  
This doctrine remained in place during most of the buildup of the new century. Thus, 
the naval forces promised in its vision for the new century, Naval Power 21, to assure 
“seabased access worldwide for military operations, diplomatic interaction, and 
humanitarian relief efforts.” (DON 2002, 1) Only the most recent documents indicate a 
turn from regional to global stability and a stronger commitment to proactive crises 
prevention (Work/Tol 2008). Much more defensive and cooperative in nature, the 2007 
document ‘A cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ identifies common 
defense of the global system of trade and security as cohesive thread for naval activities 
(DON/U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Coast Guard 2007; Rubel 2008). The document 
identifies two deployment hubs, one in the Arabian Gulf and one in northeast Asia, in 
which naval presence is vital to keep the sea ways open and save. With regard to 
regional stability, winning and preventing wars are treated as equally weighted 
objectives. To achieve these goals, the Navy prepares not only for the missions of sea 
control, deterrence, forward presence, and power projection, but also explicitly includes 
humanitarian assistance, disaster response and maritime security. The latter indicates a 
stronger focus on non-state actors including piracy and terrorism and the insight that 
conflicts “are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular 
tactics.” (DON/U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Coast Guard 2007) At the same time, the 
strategy refrains from offering a conclusive threat assessment with clear priorities 
(Pendley 2008). 
In sum, the Navy adjusted its doctrinal mission especially during the builddown periods 
under investigation. Drawing from Huntington’s distinction (1954b; see also Work/Tol 
2008), the emphasis moved from an oceanic pole, a largely defensive mission based on 
high sea control, to a transoceanic pole, a more offensive mission based on strategic 
capabilities, during the post-World War II periods. After the Cold War, the Navy moved 
to a second and more conventional transoceanic pole, in which forward presence and 
expeditionary capabilities are central. Towards the end of the last period under 
investigation, the Navy seems to move to a global pole, in which the regional 
expeditionary focus is equally weighted with high sea control and security. 
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Army doctrine & mission statements 
In contrast to the Navy, the Army has a long tradition of formalized doctrinal thinking 
in various manuals and training circulars (Linn 2007; Kretchik 2001; Doughty 1979). 
Among the numerous publications, keystone doctrines are most important as they serve 
as foundation for all other documents. Revisited on a regular basis, they are central to 
any troop deployment and constitute “the basis of instruction of all arms and services 
for field service.” (DOA 1949, v; see also Sheehan 1988, 2) Among these doctrines, the 
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations series and the more recent FM 3-0 
Operations
94
, are the best indicators for the Army’s changing mission statements, since 
they most explicitly connect Army purpose and practice.  
A comparison of the 1944, 1949 and 1954 editions of FM 100-5 reveals a high degree 
of continuity in the Army’s doctrinal thinking during the early postwar period (War 
Department 1944; DOA 1949; 1954). In its first postwar operations manual in 1949, the 
Army codified World War II lessons in preparation of another global conventional war 
fought in various environments. Offensive maneuvers of infantry divisions remained the 
vital means to defeat the enemy. In this context, the decisive role of tanks and fire 
support from artillery and air forces were stressed as war lessons. Thus, while 
underlining the continuous indispensible role of infantry, the Army became more 
mechanized during the postwar years. Neither the total war perspective nor the stronger 
use of mechanized units met the requirements of the Korean War experience, forcing 
the Army commanders to go beyond formalized doctrine. Yet, the 1954 FM 100-5 
hardly departed from prior doctrine (Craig 2004, 221). It paid lip service to the 
requirements of limited war, but little new operational thinking stemmed from this. 
Only an increased emphasis on indirect fire support and defense tactics was a 
noteworthy change. 
At the same time, the Army’s acknowledgement of the impact of nuclear weapons 
remained limited. Despite the demonstration of nuclear power in 1945, the 1949 FM 
100-5 had only discussed the dangers of radiation and said nothing about ground force 
tactics on a nuclear battlefield. The 1954 manual fared hardly only slightly better: While 
it spent more time on discussing nuclear weapons and the atomic battlefield, ground 
                                                             
94 In 2001, the operations manual was designated FM 3-0 to match Army doctrine with the joint doctrine 
numbering system. 
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force tactics were not adjusted to this scenario. Only after the end of the buildup period, 
a radically nuclear doctrine, which had been slowly taking shape since the late 1940s, 
took over the Army thinking (Gavin 1958; Bacevich 1986).
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The reluctant approach to the reality of nuclear weapons after World War II has some 
similarities with the post-Cold War Army’s slow doctrinal adjustments with regard to 
operational and technological realities. Since the Vietnam War, the Army’s doctrinal 
thinking under guidance from the newly established Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) had returned to a conventional showdown with the Red Army in Europe 
including nuclear weapons. The AirLand Battle doctrine, outlined in manuals in 1982 
and 1986, provided the template for this war on an operational level (DOA 1986; 
Romjue 1996, 7). The doctrine saw ground forces built around heavy, technologically 
advanced divisions as central element of warfare, integrating air and naval capabilities 
in a supporting role. Based on maneuver and firepower, ground forces would 
offensively engage the enemy’s first echelon in actual combat. Air power would support 
the efforts by targeting the enemy’s second echelon forces by deep battle and deep 
attack tactics (Linn 2007, 210). The 1993 FM 100-5, the first capstone after the end of 
the Cold War, was shaped in many ways by the AirLand Battle doctrine. It announced 
the removal of the Army’s tactical nuclear weapons, but reinforced the Army’s primary 
purpose of deterrence (Craig 2004, 226). The manual tried to strike a balance between 
prior doctrine and a new international environment, which demanded a broader and 
more expeditionary approach. Especially force projection became a major issue 
discussed in the manual to account for the new requirements of rapid response to 
regional contingencies on a global scale. On the balance, conventional warfighting 
remained at the center and low-intensity operations, the Army’s major occupation 
during the 1990s, were treated with less attention.  
To be sure, the 1993 doctrine went beyond AirLand Battle by speaking of full-
dimensional operations, arguing that the Army must be capable to accomplish “any 
given mission (…) across the full range of possible operations in war and in operations 
                                                             
95 The so-called pentomic concept, which was finally approved in 1956, constituted a major innovation by 
shifting the Army’s focus from a conventional to nuclear environment. It assumed a cellular battlefield, 
significantly larger than in prior conventional wars. In order to provide few targets for tactical nuclear 
strikes, ground forces should organize in dispersed and highly mobile groups, which only temporarily 
mass for attacks and then quickly disperse again. Each group should be able to operate, sustain and 
defend itself. While the pentomic concept strongly affected the Army organization during the late 1950s, 
it was soon found to be flawed and did not find its way into official doctrine. 
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other than war.” (DOA 1993, 1-4; Franks 1997)96 Already in late 1990, the Army and 
the Air Force had published a joint operation manual on low-intensity conflicts, 
covering all operations below conventional war (DOA/DOAF 1990; Metz 2005). In 
1994, the DOA (1994) added a manual on peace operations. Yet, the 1993 capstone 
doctrine put a clear emphasis on rapid, decisive conventional operations with large 
forces using offensive tactics, while other operations, obscured by the broad concept of 
MOOTW, remained a subordinated issue. While this manual was seen by some as a 
transition doctrine and preparations for a new manual were on the way in 1995, a 
successor emerged not until 2001 (Linn 2007; Romjue 1996, 131).  
The final 2001 operational manual FM 3-0 was designed as a response to two trends 
(Burke 2002). On the one hand, the doctrine accounted for the transformation process 
within the Army’s preparations for expeditionary operations by outlining operation 
concepts suitable for current and/or future capabilities. On the other hand, FM 3-0 took 
a further step towards a truly comprehensive view on the Army’s mission spectrum by 
introducing the notion of full-spectrum operations, abandoning its predecessor’s either-
or view of war and MOOTW for a more interlocked perspective. It acknowledges that 
mission success requires a mixture of offensive, defensive, stability and support 
operations. But FM 3-0 directed commanders to focus their training time and resources 
on combat tasks unless directed otherwise and made clear that the “Army organizes, 
trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation’s wars and achieve directed 
national objectives.” (DOA 2001b, 1-2, 1-17) Other operations remained unspecific and 
were largely discussed as extensions of high-intensity operations. The complexity of 
operations subsumed under the categories of stability and support was hardly 
acknowledged. 
The 2008 FM 3-0 elevated stability operations to coequal status to offensive and 
defensive operations (DOA 2008; Wallace 2008). This shift in emphasis is also 
reflected in a more sophisticated concept of full-spectrum operations: “Army forces 
combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as 
part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting 
prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” (DOA 2008, 3-1) To 
                                                             
96 The 1986 FM 100-5 also included a brief discussion of unconventional warfare and low-intensity 
conflicts (Ucko 2009, 32-36). But rather than treating them as distinct operations, they were discussed on 
the basis of AirLand Battle. Thus, the distinction between low and high intensity conflicts was largely a 
distinction between war against the Soviet Union and other contingencies. 
91 
 
structure this intertwined perspective on operations, the spectrum of conflict, describing 
the level of violence in an operational environment, and the operational theme, 
describing the currently predominant operation within an area of operations, are 
introduced. Tactics for stability operations and civil support operations, the latter 
encompassing support for domestic emergencies and law enforcement, are discussed at 
some length. Together with the widely circulated 2006 counterinsurgency manual, FM 
3-24, the Army has developed a solid doctrinal foundation for irregular challenges. 
In sum, the Army only slowly adjusted to the new technological realities and 
operational requirements after World War II and the Cold War. Thus, changes were 
marginal during the late 1940s and at least limited during the post-Cold War period. In 
contrast, an adjustment of doctrine with regard to the operational requirements is 
evident in both mobilization periods. During the early 1950s, this adjustment to the 
Korean War experience was moderate. The Army’s radical doctrinal innovation 
occurred only after the buildup period and was focused on the technological 
requirements of nuclear weapons rather than operational lessons. Instead, the doctrinal 
changes with regard to operational requirements were quite substantial during the war 
on terror, whereas the technological promises of RMA and transformation have not 
resulted in decisive change yet. 
 
Air Force doctrine & mission statements 
The aviators used to be a rather small group with a small officer staff and codifying of 
doctrine was considered secondary during the flyers’ early years.97 After its 
independence, the Air Force maintained a tradition of little formalized doctrinal efforts 
and published its first official doctrine not before 1953 (Futrell 1989; Jones 1997). Prior 
to the 1953 publication, its doctrine can arguably be described as a schizophrenic 
merging of two different mission outlines. In 1943, the leading airmen of the Army Air 
Force had guided doctrinal development based on their experiences during the North 
African campaign (Mowbray 1995, 5). The resulting doctrine, which remained the 
flyers’ official doctrine for the next ten years, became part of the War Department’s 
series of field manuals and designated FM 100-20. Resting on air-ground 
interdependence, the manual focused on tactical air power for the support of theater 
                                                             
97 For an account of doctrine development prior to World War II see Futrell (1989) and Copp (1980). 
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combat operations. In this context, it made an important contribution by explicitly 
establishing an order for tactical missions from air superiority over interdiction to close 
air support.  
Besides this official doctrine, however, the aviators increasingly turned to an unofficial 
doctrine based on strategic bombing after the war. Going back to the first air power 
prophets such as Bill Mitchell, Hugh Trenchard and Giulio Douhet, the strategic 
bombing doctrine aimed at winning wars independently by destroying the war-making 
capacity of the enemy through air power (Builder 1994). Right from the start, this 
doctrine asserted the primacy of the strategic offensive based on long-range bomber 
fleets. The 1953 ‘Air Force Manual 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine’, 
published by the Air University after years of preparation and discussion, ended the 
division between official and informal doctrine. The short and broad manual brought the 
tactical and strategic threads together, but put a clear emphasis on the latter (Craig 2004, 
224). It confidently argued that air power could contribute to the armed forces’ purposes 
of deterrence and repel forces of aggression more flexible than the other Services. In 
war, the Air Force would contribute to military victory by directly and offensively 
dealing with the enemy’s actual and potential warmaking capacity. After achieving air 
control, air forces could engage in peripheral action, reducing the actual enemy efforts, 
or more importantly in heartland operations, attacking the vital elements of the enemy’s 
war making capacity. With regard to the strategic mission, AFM 1-2 also acknowledged 
the physical and psychological impact of nuclear weapons, which had found its way 
into Air Force thinking since 1948. The successors of the 1953AFM 1-2 version in 1954 
and 1955 largely perpetuated these ideas.   
In contrast to the slow doctrinal production after World War II, the Air Force responded 
quickly to the end of the Cold War by broadening its perspective. Already in 1990, it 
published the white paper ‘Global Reach – Global Power’, which outlined how the 
characteristics of the Air Force, speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality, could 
contribute to national defense beyond the Soviet deterrence (DOAF 1990). Central to 
the new approach was the Air Force’s ability for rapid global force projection. This 
theme as well as the major strengths were reinforced in the AFM 1-1 basic doctrine, 
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which was published in 1992 (DOAF 1992; Mowbray 1995, 10-11).
98
 While the manual 
included very few references to atomic war and deterrence, it specified a range of other 
Air Force missions in the aerospace environment, including control missions, strategic 
attack, close air support, airlift, or surveillance and reconnaissance (Craig 2004, 229; 
DOAF 1992, 7). The later Air Force doctrines included little further changes, despite 
efforts to grasp future requirements for the Air Force, such as Air Force 2025 study in 
1995 (Tirpak 1996). Thus, the versatile contribution of air power to the full range of 
operations from strategic attack to MOOTW and the “unique capability to project 
national influence anywhere in the world on very short notice” remained the major 
themes in the successive manuals in 1997 and 2003 (DOAF 2003, ix; DOAF 1997). 
Despite the variety of capabilities, the Air Force considered means to rapidly intervene, 
hit hard if necessary, and terminate quickly as premium assets. The recent experiences 
with counterinsurgency (COIN) operations had only minor effects on the Air Force’s 
doctrinal thinking. It remains to be seen, however, whether the extensive use of drones 
affects doctrinal thinking within the Air Force. 
In sum, the Air Force doctrine shows little change during the periods of transition. Thus, 
although the Air Force’s first official doctrine was released in 1953, its emphasis on 
strategic bombing had dominated the flyers’ thinking at least since the 1930s. The most 
decisive changes during all four periods are occurring during the 1990s. The early shift 
from the East-West-Conflict and strategic deterrence to rapid long-range power 
projection in the aerospace environment during this period remained valid for the new 
century’s first decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
98 Responding to criticism of its 1984 basic doctrine for lacking historical and theoretical foundation, the 
new Basic Aerospace Doctrine came with a second volume, which contained a set of essays to back up 
the doctrinal statements. 
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4.5. Summary: Stability and innovation during periods of military transition 
The detailed analysis of the periods of transition reveals some important findings.  
(1) There is considerable variance with regard to changes indicating innovation during 
the periods of transition, which escape easy explanation. Assumptions derived from the 
democratic peace theory would expect a more or less stable push for innovation, since 
all periods offer new technologies and/or a changing threat environment. This is clearly 
not the case.  
At the same time, no obvious trend separates buildup and builddown periods and 
variance is not related to the direction of the budget changes. This discredits two further 
straight-forward explanations for innovation. First, innovation is not solely a function of 
the international threat environment. While this does certainly not indicate the 
insignificance of international factors, it lends credence to the argument that 
international threats are filtered through domestic processes. Second, innovation is no 
function of resource endowment. One may either argue that innovation is the 
consequence of Service competition caused by fiscal scarcity or hold that innovation is 
a matter of large funding, since the push in new areas requires resources. Neither 
argument is confirmed by the findings as the analysis shows that innovations occur 
under conditions of small funding as well as strong funding.  
Assumptions from the follow-on imperative get much closer in predicting the correct 
outcome. Indeed, the stability increases with the growth of the defense economy and the 
more recent periods of military transition show fewer innovations than during the earlier 
periods. But the follow-on imperative does not provide an explanation for the variance 
between the proximate cases.   
(2) The suggested theory fares quite well in predicting the outcome for three of four 
dimensions. Thus, the two transitions after the Cold War significantly differ from the 
earlier periods in the budget, organization, and weapons acquisition dimensions. Yet, 
going beyond the follow-on imperative, the theory comes close in predicting the 
variance within the proximate cases. The match is especially good for the post-Cold 
War periods. The builddown during the late 1940s is also close to the theoretical 
expectation, although the results are less clear than expected. The predictions are least 
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accurate for the Korean War/Cold War case. While a strong innovativeness was 
expected, the empirical results show that the innovative push is only fairly strong.  
 
Indicator 1945-1949 1950-1953 1989-1998 2001-2007 
Service distribution of 
budget 
+ + - - 
Program distribution of 
budget 
N/A ++ + + 
Service distribution of 
personnel  
+ + - + 
Geographic distribution 
of personnel 
+ ++ ++ - 
Force structure patterns + + + ++ 
Acquisition patterns ++ ++ - + 
Quality of transition 
Moderately 
innovative 
Moderately 
innovative 
Stable 
Moderately 
stable 
Theoretical likelihood of 
innovation 
Minor 
innovation 
bias 
Innovation 
bias 
Stability bias 
Minor 
stability bias 
 
Table 4.3: Comparison of periods of transition for the budget, organization and weapons 
acquisition dimensions
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(3) The doctrinal & Service mission statement dimension shows no apparent systematic 
pattern. Neither any correlation with the budget changes nor a chronological pattern is 
apparent. Since societal demands do not reach into this dimension, this observation does 
not run counter to the theoretical expectations. But the absence of a clear pattern is still 
in need of an explanation. 
 
                                                             
99 Evidence for innovation ++ = strong, + = moderate, - = small. 
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Indicator 1945-1949 1950-1953 1989-1998 2001-2007 
Doctrine & 
Service mission 
statements 
Navy ++ - ++ - 
Army - + + ++ 
Air Force + - ++ - 
 
Table 4.4: Comparison of periods of transition for the doctrine & Service mission statement 
dimension 
 
The following analysis of the causal mechanism can help to shed further light on the 
validity of the theoretical framework and its lack of accuracy. 
  
97 
 
5. FROM TOTAL TO COLD WAR: US MILITARY POLICY 1945-1949 AND 1950-1953 
Even prior to the end of World War II, the US started the largest demobilization in its 
history. Defense budgets were cut drastically, millions of men were discharged and war 
plants converted at a rapid pace. Armed forces were, however, not fully reduced to 
military insignificance as during prior demobilizations, since the US position in and 
outlook on the international system had fundamentally changed. While the power 
centers in Europe and Asia lay in ruins, the United States had emerged as an economic 
and military power, which had the means and the intention to actively shape the postwar 
order.
100
 Drawing on lessons from the interwar years, the US got decisively engaged in 
the creation of an economic and political international system in order to bond power 
politics and avoid a renewed breakdown of stability.  
The final breakthrough of US internationalism after the war included a demand for 
strong means of national defense early on. Not only were American occupation forces 
deployed in Europe and Asia to provide stability and security, but US capabilities also 
lent credence to the policy of containment, which developed during the early postwar 
years. Indeed, signs of a division within the victorious war alliance could not be ignored 
for long. The Soviet Union soon emerged as an antagonist to the intended US’ new 
international order and a threat to American security. The deteriorating East-West-
relations were all the more severe, since the advent of advanced military technologies, 
especially the atomic bomb, had made the US homeland more vulnerable to outside 
aggression than ever before. The oceans, the protective barrier for centuries, had lost is 
importance, as wartime innovation shrank time and space. Thus, the transition after 
World War II was characterized by the unprecedented effort to transition from full war 
mobilization to a permanent and sustainable military establishment in a precarious 
world order. After initial ambiguity, two possible roads for the transition emerged: A 
return to a traditional wartime mobilization system but strongly reliant on nuclear air 
power as first line of defense competed with a balanced system based on permanent 
forward deployed forces and nuclear as well as conventional air and sea power. 
While no conclusive answer with regard to the military policy was achieved during the 
late 1940s, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 ended all hopes for peace and 
                                                             
100 For a comprehensive account of the early foreign policy situation see Gaddis (2005), Leffler (1992), 
and Maddox (1988). 
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marked the beginning of a strong American rearmament. After the successful nuclear 
test by the Soviet Union and the communist takeover in China during the previous year, 
the Korean War dispelled the last doubts with regard to communist aggression and 
triggered a far-reaching call to arms. Since most Americans suspected the Soviet Union 
behind the North Korean attack, the buildup went far beyond the immediate 
requirements for the Korean War. It prepared the US forces for an early showdown with 
the Soviet Union and shaped the industrial base for a permanent readiness.
101
 Although 
a direct confrontation was avoided, containment gained a military face and the US was 
fully engaged in the long Cold War by the middle of the 1950s.  
After the chaotic situation during the immediate post-World War II years, military 
policy turned to air atomic power and nuclear deterrence as major means to defend the 
nation by the end of the buildup. Missiles and jet airplanes were developed at a rapid 
pace. At the same time, the occupation forces became permanent deployments to 
guarantee European and Asian security. Hence, the transition included innovative 
elements from both potential military force structure options. This course was far from 
inevitable and other potential innovations were not realized. The following case studis 
shows how the preferences of society, political actors and military actors shaped this 
outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
101 Readiness is a category with “a fair amount of arbitrariness.” (O’Hanlon 1995, 19) Together with force 
structure, modernization, and sustainability, readiness is one of four components of military preparedness 
(Korb 1995). The DOD dictionary defines readiness as the “ability of US military forces to fight and meet 
the demands of the national military strategy.” (DOD 2001, 449) In the words of Admiral Joseph W. 
Prueher, Pacific Command CINC, readiness encompasses several elements: (1) Qualified people with 
high morale; (2) Combat capable equipment (3) Appropriate levels of supply and maintenance for this 
equipment; (3) Appropriate levels of training to use the gear; (4) Tactics to capitalize on the talents of the 
people and the capabilities of modern equipment; (5) Ability to move the people, hardware, and support 
to the right place at the right time (HNSC 1998, 150).  
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5.1. Actors and preferences 
5.1.1. Societal preferences 
5.1.1.1. Common interests 
Public opinion data on military policy is especially limited for the period after World 
War II (Cohen 1966; Abt 1965). Polling agencies have continuously gathered data, but 
time-series data has been produced for relatively few military policy issues. Despite 
limited data availability, however, there is enough evidence to obtain a plausible picture 
of the public’s preferences on military policy.102  
 
Salience of preferences 
After World War II, the public expressed strong commitment to an active international 
role (Richman 1993; Shapiro/Page 1988). Isolationism was largely discredited after the 
failure to stop Nazi Germany at an early stage, Pearl Harbor, and the inevitable 
involvement of American forces in World War II. The resulting perspective included a 
military dimension almost right from the start. In contrast to earlier postwar situations, 
the public, while still skeptical, had stopped to regard the military as distant, un-
American and unnecessary for times of peace. Indeed, military leaders were seen as war 
heroes and ranked high in polls on the most admired living persons (e.g. AIPO 03/1947, 
12/1948). As central figures during the war, the public held especially George C. 
Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight D. Eisenhower in high regard and 
continuously treated the latter two as potential future presidential candidates during the 
late 1940s. In the words of Baldwin (1949a, 98-99): “One cannot easily in a few months 
of history forget the high moments of yesterday, nor is it possible to turn at once – after 
a war so vast and so ‘total’ as World War II – to other forces, other figures, other men 
than those who led us to victory.”  
The international outlook and the positive attitudes towards the armed forces did not 
translate into a raised interest in military issues, however. By the end for the war, most 
Americans were aware of difficulties with the Soviet Union, but for a while they were 
                                                             
102 Data is drawn from Gallup (1972a), Niemi, Mueller and Smith (1989), Smith (1985), Abolfathi 
(1980), Erskine (1963), and The Quarter’s Polls in Public Opinion Quarterly (1944-1949), edited by 
Mildred Strunk 1947-1949. If not indicated in the text, the polling organization and polling date is named 
in parentheses. 
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hopeful that those difficulties could be worked out and they placed great hopes in the 
newly created UN (Boettcher 1992, 5). Instead, domestic problems dominated the 
public agenda for the larger part of the late 1940s. The conversion from a war to a peace 
economy after World War I had caused severe economic problems and there was 
widespread fear of a renewed economic downturn and personal hardships after World 
War II. Accordingly, federal deficits,
103
 employment, inflation, housing and labor 
strikes were the most often named problems between 1945 and 1948.  
 
Chart 5.1: Share of international problems (Aboldfathi 1980) / problems in foreign affairs (Smith 
1985) among most important problems, 1945-1955 
 
By 1948, the public turned again outwards as the fear of war became an increasing 
concern matching the importance of domestic problems. The postwar optimism had 
rapidly vanished and the share of respondents expecting America to become engaged in 
war within the next ten had increased from 28 percent in fall 1946 to 62 percent in 1948 
(NORC 11/1946, 11/1948 in Niemi/Mueller/Smith 1989, 52).  
Opinion polls left little doubt that the difficult relationship with the Soviet Union was 
the reason for these fears. While 55 percent thought that Russia could be trusted to 
                                                             
103
 The federal budget deficits after the war were seen as a potential cause of inflation or economic crisis. 
In 1946, 71 percent of the persons asked in an AIPO poll preferred to keep the income tax at present rates 
to balance the budget rather than cutting income taxes. In another poll in 1949, more than two-thirds of 
the respondents wanted the government to cut expenses to balance the budget (Gallup 1972a, 596; Gallup 
1972b, 824). 
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cooperate with the United States in August 1945, only 32 percent still believed in 
cooperation in October 1946 (AIPO).
104
 In May 1949, 70 percent believed that Russian 
military efforts aimed at becoming the ruling world power, whereas only 14 percent 
considered them as an attempt to protect itself (AIPO). This increasing anticommunism 
had clear implications for military policy: When asked which of three options would 
give the US the best chance to avoid war with Russia, a clear majority of 59 percent 
recommended strengthening the own military forces (NORC 09/1948). Baldwin (1947) 
captures the general mood quite accurately: “We alone may be able to avert the decline 
of Western civilization, and a reversion to nihilism and the Dark Ages.” Preferences for 
an active international involvement and a militarily firm posture on communism became 
fundamental guidelines for postwar politics. As Hodgson (1976, 24) argues: “For the 
next twenty years, it would always be safer for a politician to demand higher defense 
appropriations than to propose cutting them, and the tougher the stance a President took 
against the Communists, the more popular he would be.” 
When the Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear device, anticommunism 
paired with fears of a nuclear world war. In a December 1949 AIPO poll, three months 
after Truman had publically announced the nuclear test of the USSR, a large relative 
majority of 45 percent thought that the successful test had made war more likely. This is 
in stark contrast to a poll only six months earlier, in which a relative majority of 48 
percent had expected the advent of nuclear weapons to decrease the likelihood of war 
(AIPO, 03/1949). The polls indicated that the public believed nuclear weapons in 
American hands served a defensive purpose, whereas the distrusted Soviet Union would 
use the atomic bomb in an aggressive manner.  
The sense of crisis and fear of a world war further increased with the North Korean 
attack in summer 1950. Three quarters of the public approved Truman’s military 
response to the attack with most respondents basing their support on the need to stop the 
Soviet Union and the ‘Reds’ sooner or later (Mueller 1971). In fact, most people 
thought that the fighting on the Korean peninsula heralded the next total war. Four out 
of five expected a world war within the next 10 years in fall 1950 (NORC, 11/1950). 
And 55 percent believed that the US was already in World War III (AIPO, 12/1950). 
                                                             
104 Until 1950, the public mood also reached a considerable level of paranoia with regard to communist 
intentions and actions at home. Controversies over Alger Hiss’ potential engagement in communist spy 
activities and his trial had further advanced believes in a global communist plot. 
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Considering that a vast majority believed that the Soviet Union would use atom bombs 
against US cities in case of war (AIPO, 8/1950), total war became indeed an existential 
threat. Against this backdrop, international issues remained salient during the early 
1950s and dropped only moderately after the Korean War turned into a stalemate and 
finally ended without further escalation.  
 
Specificity of preferences 
As expected, the specificity of public preferences varies strongly with the dimension 
under consideration.  
(1) There is a relatively clear-cut political corridor with regard to the quantity and 
quality of military spending. The data shows that the public was supportive of defense 
spending, although the available polls most likely exaggerate the amount of support 
(Abolfathi 1980, 98; Russett 1975, 3).
105
 Even if confronted with some trade-offs, the 
public remained in favor of defense. Thus, against the backdrop of a preference for 
balanced budgets, 70 percent were willing to abstain from tax reductions in order to 
maintain the current military in December 1946 (AIPO). With increasing concerns over 
the international situation, majorities were even willing to pay more tax in order to 
support the military branches (AIPO 02/1948). 
                                                             
105 The early surveys asked questions especially on issues which currently seemed particularly salient. 
Thus, defense spending questions were often in close temporal approximation to either political 
developments regarding defense, e.g. Truman’s announcement of help to Greece and Turkey 1947 (AIPO 
poll in March 1947), or international crises, such as the Berlin crisis in 1948 (Fortune poll in June 1948). 
Since these events were related to emergency situations with extensive publicity, the likelihood of a bias 
for increased defense spending is high. Furthermore, since the questions were based on different 
wordings, there is considerable doubt with regard to their equivalence. 
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Chart 5.2: Net support
106
 for defense spending, 1946-1955 (Abolfathi 1980, 98)
107
 
 
Since the public expressed support for domestic and defense spending as well as 
balanced budgets, it is implausible to read the defense support as a preference for an all-
out buildup and a one-sided spending policy. It would be inconsistent to assume that 
people were most concerned with jobs, inflation and other domestic issues and at the 
same time supported an unlimited defense if asked directly. Rather, the support for 
defense spending is most plausibly explained as a call for defense spending increases, 
which were limited by equally strong preferences for balanced budgets and domestic 
goals. This reading of a spending corridor for defense gains further persuasiveness when 
looking at the early 1950s. During late 1950 and 1951, public majorities strongly 
backed a high level of military expenditure and mobilization. For example, a majority of 
66 percent in July and still a relative majority of 49 percent in November thought that 
the US industry should begin to produce planes, tanks and other war equipment on a full 
war-time basis and cut out making autos, refrigerators and other items people may want 
or need (Huntington 1961, 237; AIPO 11/1950). Yet, after the support for defense 
spending peaked in 1951, it sharply decreased thereafter.  
                                                             
106 Net support is commonly used to express the preference for defense spending (e.g. Wlezien 1995, 
985). It is calculated by subtracting the percentage of people who think the US spent too much or the US 
spending should be decreased from the percentage of people who think the US spent too little or the US 
spending should be increased. Thus, a positive (negative) number indicates net support for more (less) 
spending.  
107 Data for 1951 is based on a survey in 12/1950. Data for 1954 is missing. 
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On the one hand, this indicates a sobering effect of the slow progress of the war effort, 
especially after China entered the conflict in fall (Shapiro/Page 1988, 226-227). Indeed, 
the war support strongly dropped in late 1951 and remained low during the coming year 
(Mueller 1971). On the other hand, on a more general level, the decrease can be read as 
a public response to the extensive federal defense spending and the heightened sense of 
sacrifice in accordance with Wlezien’s metaphor of the public as thermostat (Wlezien 
1995). In July 1950, 70 percent of the people were willing to pay more taxes to support 
the military branches (AIPO). Seven months later, the share of persons supporting 
increased defense spending even if taxes had to be raised decreased to 38 percent 
(AIPO, 01/1951). Moreover, the share of persons thinking that the American people had 
been asked for too many sacrifices in order to support the defense program strongly 
increased during the winter 1950-1951 (Russett 1974, 73).  
Evidently, defense spending hit the ceiling of the corridor that was considered 
appropriate for defense by the public during the early 1950s. While the decreasing 
support for defense spending implies that additional spending was not welcome, it does 
not imply a preference for a spending decrease. A number of polls after the Korean War 
show that most people preferred to maintain a force at high level over a return to prewar 
strength. In fact, the proportion of persons preferring to maintain the current level of 
defense spending doubled from 36 percent in 1950 to 72 percent in 1955 (Abolfathi 
1980). Furthermore, already in July 1951, 82 percent wanted the planned defense 
program to continue even if the war would end soon (AIPO). And in April 1953, three 
quarters opposed the reduction of the military’s size after the war. At the same time, 
when the incoming Eisenhower administration moderately decreased the military 
budget in 1953, only 17 percent felt that this threatened their safety (Gallup 1953). 
The data also reveals a partisan pattern in defense preferences. While the evidence is 
thin, the polls show that Democratic voters were slightly more supportive of defense 
spending than Republican voters throughout the postwar period (Karol 2009, 160-
161).
108
 The Democrats’ more supportive stance on defense policy is in line with 
generally more hawkish foreign policy opinions among them during the early postwar 
years (Belknap/Campbell 1951). After bipartisan support for a Korean involvement, 
Republican voters grew much more critical on US troop deployments to Korea and 
                                                             
108 This pattern continued into the Eisenhower era and is independent of the party in power (e.g. AIPO 
9/1953). 
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Europe in late 1951. And when Eisenhower reduced the defense spending in 1953, 
Democrats (26 percent) were much more likely to consider the cuts as a safety problem 
than Republicans (7 percent). 
With regard to distributional patterns, the public’s clear favorite was the Air Force, 
whereas the Army was the least supported branch throughout all years. Even prior to the 
emergence of the first nuclear bombs, a relative majority wanted to spend most money 
for the air services in order for the US to continue to act as a great power (Fortune 
06/1945). In the following years, the Air Force remained the branch, for which the 
public was most willing to spend money (AIPO 02/1948, 07/1950). Hence, Gallup 
(1949) asserts that “airpower became a major ‘love’ of the American people even before 
military experts were willing to admit the importance of its role in warfare.” In a 
Fortune poll in January 1946, almost 40 percent believed that the Air Force had done 
the most toward winning the war against Germany. For the Pacific theater of war, the 
Air Force (16.6 percent) ranked equal to the Navy flyers and second to the Navy (17.8 
percent). And opinion polls leave no doubt that the public expected an even greater role 
for the Air Force in future wars. In 1949, striking 74 percent expected the Air Force to 
play the most important part in winning another world war (AIPO, 07/1949). This 
overwhelming belief in the significance of the Air Force continued into the 1950s 
despite the Korean War (AIPO 10/1953, 3/1955). When asked in 1952, which branch 
should be built up to a greater extent, 54 percent named the Air Force, 11 percent named 
the Army, and 8 percent named the Navy (AIPO 11/1952). 
(2) In the organization dimension, rapid demobilization after the war proved the single 
strongest public demand after the war. Especially families of soldiers pushed for a rapid 
discharge of forces after victory in order to return to normal life. Although the demand 
was carried only by a minority, this arguably was the strongest public demand during 
the postwar transition, since millions of separated families with strong preferences 
provided a powerful societal base. Representative Goodwin (D-MA) expressed in fall 
1945: “‘Bring the boys back home’ is a cry that wells up from the heart of America 
today.” (91 Cong. Rec., September 17, 1945, H8628)  
In spite of calls for demobilization, majorities generally wanted to maintain forces at 
significantly higher levels than afer earlier periods of almost total demobilization. More 
than 60 percent permanently supported both politically discussed mechanisms of 
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military personnel procurement during the late 1940s and early 1950s: The Selective 
Service Law, which provided the executive with the power to draft men for military 
service, and universal military training (UMT) for every able-bodied young man.
109
 
After the size of the armed forces was rapidly doubled during the summer and fall of 
1950, 50 percent considered this strength of 3 million troops as appropriate, whereas 
one-third of the respondents still regarded it as to low (AIPO 11/1950). 
With regard to a distributional pattern, the public suggested deeper cuts for the Army 
than for the Navy and the Air Force right from the start.
110
 When asked in January 1945 
how many men the Army should have after the war, 12 percent answered 4 million, 17 
percent wanted 2 million and 15 percent 1 million (AIPO). In late 1945 and 1946, most 
respondents recommended a force of only 1 million, which equates one-eighth of the 
Army’s war strength (AIPO 10/1945, 09/1946). In contrast, people considered a number 
between 500,000 and 1.5 million as appropriate for the Navy postwar personnel with 1 
million – one-third of the wartime personnel – as most frequent figure. After the Air 
Force became independent, the public clearly favored an increase of this branch. In 
1949, 70 percent argued that the US should increase the size of its Air Force. This was 
almost 15 percent points higher than for the other Services. And as argued above, when 
asked during the Korean War which branch should be built up to a greater extent, a 
clear majority named the Air Force (AIPO 11/1952). Considering that the war burden 
rested mostly on ground forces, this is a strong statement. 
When the issue of permanent forward deployment of troops to Europe became an issue 
in 1951, the public proved surprisingly ambivalent despite the relative dislike for 
ground forces. Thus, in an AIPO poll in January 1951, 55 percent argued that the US 
should send more troops to Europe to be ready to fight communism there, with 
Democrats moderately more favorable than Republicans. Yet in a NORC poll in the 
same month, only 36 approved the idea of sending large numbers of American troops to 
                                                             
109 See public opinion polls by AIPO (01/1945, 03/1946, 02/1947, 10/1950, 12/1951, 2/1952, 1/1953, 
8/1954) and NORC (03/1946, 07/1947, 09/1948). While the support for Selective Service decreased by 
the late 1940s, the military training program was permanently in public favor. Support was particularly 
strong among Democratic voters. More than three quarters of Democratic voters favored military training 
according to polls in 1945 and 1947. During the more optimistic early postwar months, the opportunity 
for physical training was named as main reason for support. In later polls, the policy was mostly seen as a 
means to strengthening national defense. 
110 Despite preferences for a strong force, the system by which the Services released their men 
immediately after the war came under heavy public fire. While 72 percent considered the Army’s 
releasing system as fair prior to V-J day, the support plumped by 20 percent points until November 1945 
(AIPO).  
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help the defense of Western Europe. Further NORC questions reveal the public’s 
approval was strongly conditional on the European efforts. Thus, more than half of the 
56 percent of respondents, who had disapproved deployments to Europe, approved 
sending troops if European states increased their forces. Even during the Korean War, 
relative majorities considered the defense of Europe more important than the defense of 
Asia (e.g. AIPO 09/1950, 01/1951), but 64 percent of the full NORC sample in January 
1951 thought that Western Europe was not doing all they should to build up their own 
defense. This pattern remained constant. In April 1951, 33 percent opposed sending 
troops, whereas 53 percent supported troops for Europe including 15 percent, who 
favored sending troops but had qualifications (AIPO 04/1951).  
(3) The public preference specificity becomes significantly thinner with regard to the 
weapons acquisition. Only the strong preference for atomic weapons provides some 
guidance. Atomic bombs were widely considered a panacea after the war against Japan 
ended shortly after their use (Boettcher 1992, 49; Erskine 1963). Only two weeks after 
the bombs were dropped, a large minority of 35 percent even believed that the atomic 
bomb made a large army and navy unnecessary (AIPO 08/1945). Although the 
expectations with regard to the impact of atomic bombs returned to a more realistic 
position during the subsequent months, the hopes related to the weapons remained high 
(Erskine 1963, 162). Since atomic bombs provided the means to ultimately punish any 
warmonger, the US held the potential in its hands to avert war in the future and fulfill its 
ambition to become a force for good in the world (Parrish 1968, 103). At the same time, 
the indiscriminate destructive power of atomic bombs raised important moral questions 
which were publically discussed at length during the late 1940s. For a short time, the 
international control of the new technology under the newly established UN or the 
outlawing of nuclear weapons was favored by majorities (Erskine 1963, 167-168). Yet, 
since the public expected the monopoly of the US to last only shortly (Fortune 
11/1945), it remained skeptical with regard to the chances of a successful international 
control and the majority assumed that the bomb would be used in future warfare by the 
US and its opponents (NORC 05/1946; AIPO 08/1950).  
After the Soviet Union’s atomic test triggered the fear of nuclear war, international 
control was largely out of question and the public was willing to make the next step in 
nuclear technology. Hence, the people who were aware of the decision to develop 
hydrogen bombs in 1949 strongly sided with the program’s proponents (AIPO 2/1950, 
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3/1950). Since there was great uncertainty with regard to the Soviet Union’s 
capabilities, keeping the edge in nuclear technology was widely regarded as best 
insurance policy. The public was not only supporting the development of nuclear 
capabilities, but also willing to use them. In December 1950, public majorities 
supported the use of atomic bombs against Chinese cities if the US got into a war with 
Communist China (AIPO 12/1950). 
Along with the preference for atomic bombs came a preference for technological 
solutions in warfare. When given the choice, a majority favored to spend most of the 
budget in developing special military weapons and maintain only a small but highly 
skilled force rather than spending most on a large permanent force (AIPO 5/1952). 
Especially the technologies to deliver nuclear weapons were central. Since bombers 
remained for some time the only means to deliver nuclear ordnance, the support for the 
Air Force in the budget and organization dimension was closely related to the 
preference for nuclear weapons. And the public considered only missiles as promising 
alternative technology. In March 1946, NORC asked in a survey what other ways 
besides atomic bombing by airplanes would be used in a future nuclear attack. The 
largest group of 27 percent named guided missiles, whereas only 11 percent named 
water projections and even less named long-range guns or other means.  
(4) There is no evidence with regard to the military doctrine & mission statement 
dimension. Only the strong preferences for air power and nuclear weapons provide 
some guidance here. Taken together, the public preferences point at a military 
radicalism that organizes the military preparations around air atomic power during both 
periods of transition. This military radicalism is slightly stronger among the 
Republicans than among Democrats. 
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
IS THERE A STRONG SALIENCE FOR MILITARY POLICY? 
Is there a pattern of security 
interdependencies considered 
threatening? 
- East-West-conflict 
- Nuclear East-West-
conflict 
What are the most important 
problems in society? 
- Economic problems 
until 1948, thereafter 
economic and 
international problems 
- Economic and 
international problems 
ARE THERE SPECIFIC DEMANDS IN THE DIMENSION OF …? 
…military budgets? 
- Actual spending below 
preferred budget corridor 
- Budget distribution in 
favor of Army Air 
Force/Air Force 
- Actual spending below 
preferred budget 
corridor until 1951, 
thereafter actual 
spending at budget 
corridor ceiling 
- Budget distribution in 
favor of Air Force 
…military organization? 
- Rapid and far-reaching 
demobilization 
- Personnel distribution 
in moderate favor of Air 
Force 
- Support for UMT 
- Personnel distribution 
in favor of Air Force 
- Support for UMT 
- Conditional support for 
troops to Europe 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Preference for aviation 
and nuclear weapons 
- Preference for aviation 
and nuclear weapons 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
-  - 
Is there an apparent idea 
connecting the explicit 
preferences? 
- Military radicalism  
(air atomic power) 
- Military radicalism 
(air atomic power) 
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5.1.1.2. Special interests 
World War II marked the transition from mostly in-house production especially by the 
Army, to reliance on private industry for weapons acquisition (Peck/Scherer 1962, 98-
99). Prior to the war, business leaders had regarded the armed forces as neither an 
important nor a desirable partner. The almost symbiotic and lucrative war cooperation 
transformed this relationship, as businessmen realized that the government and 
especially the armed forces were promising customers and soft-hearted bankers (Barnet 
1972, 37, 140-142). Yet, although the war laid the foundation for a successive 
establishment of a permanent privately-owned defense industry, the immediate postwar 
years saw most major defense contractors returning to the civil sector. The backbone of 
the war production had been provided by civilian companies converted for the time of 
war. These companies, largely based in the industrial centers of the Midwest and Mid-
Atlantic, neither considered military production as their main business nor were they 
dependent on defense dollars. As the Office of Technology Assessment (1992, 7) 
argues: “Civilian production and civilian jobs were the norm for nearly everyone, and 
people couldn’t wait to get back to them.”  
Thus, large wartime manufacturers such as General Motors and General Electric rapidly 
resumed commercial production. High amounts of private wartime savings promised a 
prosperous market and provided a particular incentive for manufacturers to return to the 
production of consumer goods (Office of Technology Assessment 1992, 6-7). The 
numbers of employees in the defense related industry reveal the extent of the conversion 
after the war. The conversion caused little economic hardships, since the majority of the 
former defense industry employees were absorbed by the civil industry and the 
unemployment rates – one of the major concerns during the postwar transition – 
remained small. 
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Chart 5.3: Number of employees in defense related industry and unemployed persons, FY 1940-
1955 (OSD 2008; 2005a) 
 
While most mass production in the North-East smoothly returned to civil production, 
the new aircraft industry, mostly located at the West Coast, had high stakes in the 
defense sector. In order to keep up with the rapid development of aircraft technology 
after World War I, the military departments had turned to commercial companies rather 
than the slow federal agencies early on (McNaugher 1989, 17-22). As federal 
expenditures for aircraft production amounted to almost one-third of the military 
procurement during the war, these private aviation firms rose to important industrial 
players (Peck/Scherer 1962, 108). For example, North American Aviation, producing 
14 percent of the wartime planes, expanded from 6,000 employees in one factory in 
1940 to 92,000 workers in five plants by 1943 (Markusen et al. 1991, 29). And 
Lockheed, the biggest single aircraft company after the war, expanded from 2,500 
employees to 60,000 during the war. Consequently, the aviation industry’s home states, 
Washington (Boeing) and more importantly California (General Dynamics, Douglas, 
Lockheed, Rockwell, Hughes), experienced a massive inflow of military funding. This 
war-grown industry had only a limited civil market and was strongly dependent on 
defense production. Therefore, the postwar procurement cuts hit them hard. For 
example, Boeing’s workforce in Seattle dropped from its wartime peak of 45,000 to 
15,000 by November 1945 (Markusen et al. 1991, 155). In their fight to keep the 
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military connection alive, the aircraft industry was early on a potent lobbying force 
(Donovan 1977, 144). 
Yet, its economic and strategic weight must not be overrated. To be sure, the Air Policy 
Commission in 1948 made clear that the permanent aviation industrial base was vital for 
national security and should be actively maintained even during peacetimes (Air Policy 
Commission 1948, 45-52). But the commission still counted 15 major airframe 
companies competing for contracts in the same year. Hence, the government’s 
dependence on manufacturers was limited. In fact, the concentration of the defense 
industry was limited during both periods and turnovers among the top military 
producers, including the aviation industry, were common (Peck/Scherer 1962, 117-126). 
Forty companies disappeared from the list of the top 100 defense contractors between 
World War II and the Korean War. 
Although the Korean War accelerated military production, the defense industry 
remained of minor political weight. The buildup was again mostly accomplished by the 
large companies in the industrial heartlands and the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions 
received more than 60 percent of all DOD prime contract awards with New York and 
Michigan accounting for 30 percent in 1952 (Markusen et al. 1991, 11-13).  
 
 
Chart 5.4: Distribution of DOD contract awards during the first six months of FY 1954 by division 
(Senate Select Committee on Small Business 1954) 
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For these companies, military production remained only a small part of their production 
(Huntington 1969, 7). In fact, many of them strongly criticized the renewed demand for 
rapid conversion and military buildup. While most airplane manufacturers supported the 
spending increases which had slowly gained momentum since 1948, prominent 
executives, including Charles Wilson, president of General Motors, and Philip Reed, 
board chairman of General Electric, considered the massive buildup as troublesome (Lo 
1982). They warned of the negative economic consequences of defense spending, such 
as inflation, growing debts and taxes, and criticized lacking efficiency within the 
defense establishment.  
Commercial defense interests gained more influence only after the Korean War, when 
the investment in new weapons, especially aircraft and missiles, changed not only the 
US military production map, but created companies and areas almost fully dependent on 
defense dollars. Since the more sophisticated weapons required increased specialization, 
the concentration of the defense sector increased despite the lawmakers’ explicit intent 
to broaden the industrial base for a faster mobilization (Senate Select Committee on 
Small Business 1951). The continuous importance of aircraft and electronics and the 
growing emphasis on missiles set a trend towards a strong defense-dependent industry 
along the West Coast and relative decline of the Great Lake states. The most evident 
sign of this change was the displacement of New York by California as number one 
state with regard to the share of contract awards by 1958 (Markusen et al. 1991, 13; 
Peck/Scherer 1962, 111).  
Some other groups sought to affect the military policy in their favor. Like the defense 
industry, research facilities also greatly benefited from military contracts during the war 
(Barnet 1972, 41-44). For example, the Radiation Laboratory at the Massachusetts 
Institute for Technology, the biggest established laboratory for defense research, 
employed a staff of 4,000 in 1945 (Leslie 1993; Kevles 1990, 239). It was the leading 
nonindustrial defense contractor in the US with 75 separate contracts worth $117 
million by 1945 and it remained the top academic facility for military R&D thereafter. 
During the late 1940s, 85 percent of the MIT research budget came from the military 
and the AEC (Kevles 1990, 244). In addition, the R&D efforts for the Manhattan 
Project at Los Alamos strongly benefitted the University of California. Since military 
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R&D provided prestige and funding for universities and other research institutions, 
many scientists were eager to maintain close ties with the federal state after the war. 
Yet, there resources to influence the political process were limited to their relevance as 
sources of information independent of the military establishment.  
A number of other groups pursued special interests in military policy. The veteran 
organizations such as the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which 
participated in a range of defense policy questions, served as an extension of the armed 
forces into society. Their interest generally aimed at a strong military establishment and 
support for their respective Service. Military reserve associations such as the National 
Guard Association (NGA) and the Reserve Officers Association also supported a strong 
defense, but had at the same time their own wellbeing in mind. They supported 
especially the personnel procurement measures in the organizational dimension, which 
directly affected the inflow of personnel into the reserve components. Moreover, the 
NGA was careful to protect the autonomy of the tradition-rich National Guard against 
any attempts of incorporation by the War Department (Doubler 2003, 221). The director 
of the association, Ellard Walsh, was a highly effective lobbying force in Washington, 
who could rely on the support of the numerous states’ rights advocates in Congress and 
“[w]henever the NGB [National Guard Bureau] especially needed to influence 
Congress, it turned to the NGA.” (Mahon 1983, 200) 
The Committee on Present Danger (CDP) emerged in 1950 to promote a broad military 
buildup. The committee was founded in August when a struggle between Secretary of 
State Acheson and Secretary of Defense Johnson jeopardized the implementation of the 
buildup as outlined in NSC-68. Driven by anticommunism and a strong security 
interest, R. Ammi Cutter, Tracy Voorhees, and James Conant
111
 created the fast 
growing committee to alert the country of the Soviet threat. The latter two founders had 
good relations to Paul Nitze, head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, and 
were involved in the formulation of the secret NSC-68 policy document. When the 
public and congressional support for military buildup during the early stages of the 
Korean War threatened to fade away, the CPD engaged in public campaigns to warn of 
the Soviet threat and promote military strength beyond Korea (Sanders 1983). In 
December 1950, Vannevar Bush, Conant, and Voorhees made the group’s first public 
                                                             
111 Voorhees had resigned from his post as Under Secretary of the Army over Johnson’s opposition to 
NSC-68. Conant was President of Harvard University. 
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announcement calling for support of universal military training, nuclear armament and a 
general buildup (Wood 1950; New York Times 1950). With Defense Secretary 
Marshall’s consent, the committee fought also for reinforcements for Europe and the 
controversial military and economic support for US allies. The impact of the CPD on 
innovation is rather negative, since they pushed for more rather than a different military 
policy besides the European defense. When Eisenhower won the presidency in 1952, 
numerous members of the CPD joined his administration and the committee ended its 
activities. 
Concerned over state intervention in society, family associations, organized labor, civil 
business, farm interest groups, education groups, church groups, and peace and civil 
liberty groups voiced vocal opposition to various policy options during the military 
transition. To be sure, hardly any group opposed the existence of some permanent 
defense establishment. But they rejected specific outgrowths of it, which they 
considered to excessively affect society and to threaten democracy. Already by the end 
of the war, various interest groups from the civil industry called for a rapid 
demobilization in order to meet the demand for peacetime workers (Gibson 1983, 91). 
Moreover, farm groups, labor unions and some business associations sought to block 
the armed forces grasp on society by opposition to universal training. They feared that 
this program would drain labor force in the best age from the market. Church groups, 
peace and civil liberty groups opposed the creation of permanent armed forces and 
compulsory measures on ideational grounds. While the former two categorically 
rejected a defense establishment of size, the civil liberty groups were particularly 
concerned with compulsory elements and the secrecy of military policy. The gloomy 
vision of a garrison state and military dictatorship fueled opposition groups such as the 
National Commission for the Defense of Democracy through Education which sought to 
defend liberal democracy. They feared not only governmental intervention in individual 
freedom, but the creation of a military power center which would lead the US down the 
same road as Germany and Japan. While their influence remained selective, especially 
with regard to the postwar organization, these groups acted as strong status quo powers 
(e.g. HMAC 1945a).  
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
IS THERE A STRONG MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE? 
How large is the economy 
dependent on defense 
investments? 
- Small military aviation 
industry 
- Small, but growing 
military aviation 
/electronics industry 
How large is the labor force 
dependent on defense 
investments? 
- Small - Small, but growing 
IS THERE A STRONG ECONOMIC OR MIL. DEPENDENCE ON THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE? 
How is the military industry 
spread over the country? 
- Concentration in 
Midwest, Middle 
Atlantic, and Pacific 
states 
- Concentration in 
Midwest, Middle 
Atlantic, and Pacific 
states 
How much competition is in the 
defense market? 
- Strong competition - Strong competition 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO ACTORS WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS PURSUE IN THE DIMENSION OF … 
…military budgets? 
- Defense industry: 
Protection of acquisition 
funding 
- Veterans: Strong 
military establishment 
and funding for 
respective Service 
- CPD: Support for broad 
and stable buildup 
…military organization? 
- Civil industry: Rapid 
demobilization 
- Civil liberty groups/ 
labor/ churches: Limit 
intervention in domestic 
affairs 
- Veteran/Reserve 
groups: support for UMT 
- Reserve groups: Strong 
and autonomous military 
reserve 
- CPD: support for UMT/ 
troops for Europe 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Defense industry: 
Protection/expansion of 
aviation programs 
- Scientific community: 
Further innovations 
- Defense industry: 
Protection/expansion of 
aviation programs 
- Scientific community: 
Further innovations 
- CPD: broad buildup 
…doctrine & Service mission 
statement? 
- - 
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5.1.1.3. Societal demands 
As expected, the demand patterns vary considerable across the dimensions of military 
policy and the periods of transition. For the builddown 1945-1949, societal demands 
were biased in favor of the Air Force. They were mostly based on common preferences 
which provided a quantitative corridor for strong but not unlimited military preparations 
with a clear qualitative emphasis on the Air Force. These preferences remained weak 
until the threat of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Korean War 
raised its relevance after 1948. No other groups expressed stronger alternative positions 
during the transition. Although the veteran and reserve groups disagreed with the 
aviation bias, their attention focused more on the organization dimension than on the 
budget. In the organization dimension, the societal demand provided a mixed pattern. 
Society, especially families of soldiers but also the civil industry, strongly demanded a 
rapid demobilization. The public support for a relatively stronger Air Force was not 
disputed by other groups in this context, but remained weak. The demands on UMT 
created an inconsistent pattern, since various special interest groups organized against 
UMT, whereas the public and other special interest groups constantly favored the 
program. In the acquisition dimension, the common preference for nuclear weapons and 
means for their delivery was backed by the small nuclear scientific community and the 
aviation industry. But all positions remained weak during the 1940s. For the doctrine & 
mission statement dimension, finally, neither the public nor special interests articulated 
any demands. Only a moderate mindset of military radicalism could provide the 
political and military actors with some guideline. In sum, there is a weak innovation 
bias pointing at an increasing emphasis on air atomic power evident.  
During the buildup of the early 1950s, the common preferences hardly changed,
112
 but 
became more salient against the backdrop of the Korean War. Other groups held their 
position in the various dimensions of military policy. Only the CPD emerged as a new 
challenge to the public’s preferred budget and organizational distribution and the 
emphasis on nuclear means. Although the CPD consisted of well-known figures and had 
good ties into the government, their influence should not be overestimated and it is 
                                                             
112 The preference for air atomic power is also reflected in the positive reception of Eisenhower’s New 
Look policy with nuclear capabilities as first line of defense: In 1954, 64 percent argued that the US was 
today better prepared to defend itself than it had been in 1952 (AIPO, 9/1954). 
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expected that the strong public preferences dominated the disputed dimensions of 
military policy. Hence, the societal innovation bias increased during the early 1950s. 
Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
ARE THERE WEAK OR STRONG SOCIETAL DEMANDS FOR INNOVATION OR STABILITY IN THE 
DIMENSION OF… 
…military budgets? 
- weak demand for Air 
Force prioritization 
- strong demand for Air 
Force prioritization 
…military organization? 
- strong demand for 
demobilization 
- weak demand for 
technology over 
personnel / Air Force 
over Army 
- inconsistent position on 
UMT 
- strong demand for 
technology over 
personnel / Air Force 
over Army 
- Moderate demand for 
troops to Europe 
- inconsistent position on 
UMT 
…weapons acquisition? 
- weak demand for 
technological solutions, 
especially nuclear 
weapons and its means 
of delivery 
- strong demand for 
technological solutions, 
especially nuclear 
weapons and its means 
of delivery 
….military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- no explicit demand - no explicit demand 
 
5.1.2. Political actors’ preferences 
5.1.2.1. Congress 
Although the late 1940s were highly competitive and saw repeated changeovers in the 
congressional majorities,
113
 two central parameters in the field of military policy were 
shared by broad majorities on Capitol Hill and narrowed the scope of potential 
disagreement: (1) After the massive defense spending during the war years, political 
actors of both parties preferred a ceiling approach including significantly reduced 
defense budgets to rebalance state funding. This consensus started to fade only when 
federal deficits came under control by the end of the decade and the fears of a military 
                                                             
113 The late 1940s and early 1950s were tumultuous years for Congress. In 1946, the Democratic Party 
lost the majorities in both chambers for the first time since the victorious elections for the 73rd Congress 
in 1933. But the Republican strength was short-lived and the Democrats reclaimed Capitol Hill in 1948. 
In 1950, the Republicans were again on the upswing and significantly reduced the margin during the 
midterm elections. In the wake of the Eisenhower election in 1952, the GOP won a very thin majority. In 
fact, 48 Republicans faced 47 Democrats and one independent in the Senate. This majority was again lost 
it in the subsequent midterm elections. 
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conflict increased. Thus, during the early 1950s, most Democrats in Congress preferred 
an increase in military spending. Republicans remained much more skeptical of the 
administrations’ military interpretation of containment and a buildup beyond the Korean 
War (Karol 2009, 135). 
(2) Large majorities in both parties were committed to a strong anticommunism during 
the late 1940s and the early 1950s (Dueck 2010, 73; Barnet 1972, 18-19; Hodgson 
1976, 17-18). Disagreement over the Yalta conference in early 1945 had opened a 
partisan cleavage with the Republicans arguing that the liberal Democrats were weak on 
communism and had capitulated to Stalin’s demands (Dueck 2010, 70; Boettcher 1992, 
49). The Truman administration’s China policy and the fall of Chiang Kai-shek’s 
nationalist regime provided further reasons for the Republicans to blame the 
administration’s lacking determination in its treatment of communism.114 However, the 
Democrats themselves, except for a shrinking progressive wing, soon came to terms 
with a firm stance on communism including a strong military policy. While the more 
conservative Southern Democrats were never close to communist thinking, especially 
within the party’s liberal wing, with its base among the Trade Unions and the cities to 
the North-East, was the post-war position on communism controversial. After the 
Democrats’ electoral defeat in 1946, the liberal movement split into a liberal and a 
progressive part (Beinart 2006, 4-15; Brock 1962, 39-83). While the latter did not 
renounce communist influences in their ranks and called for a peaceful relationship with 
the Soviet Union, the former, most prominently organized in the Americans for 
Democratic Action, vocally resisted communism as the latest manifestation of a 
totalitarian ideology. After the progressives’ leader William Wallace was clearly 
defeated by Truman in the 1948 elections, the anticommunist position increasingly 
dominated the party. In fact, the congressional Democrats were more hawkish than the 
Republicans by the end of the 1940s. All leading Democrats in military policy, 
including the key players David I. Walsh (D-MA), long-time chairman of the SNAC, 
Elbert Thomas (D-UT), chairman of the SMAC, Millard Tydings (D-MD), chairman of 
                                                             
114 Reflecting the growing public resentment towards communism, the Republicans soon extended their 
suspicion of communism abroad to communist movements and activities within the US, the Democratic 
Party and the Truman administration. The anticommunist sentiment found its most aggressive and 
populist expression in Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), who warned that the administration was 
infiltrated by communist traitors. He was supported by numerous conservative Republicans and even 
some moderate Republicans, who considered McCarthy a useful means to smear the Truman 
administration (Boyle 2005, 21).  
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the SASC, and George H. Mahon (D-TX), chairman of the merged SubHAC after 
1949
115
, supported a strong defense (Keith 1991, 401-407; Blechman 1990, 23).  
Besides these broad parameters on which Congress and the administration largely 
agreed, Congress held moderately departing views on the qualitative course of the 
transitions. Different perspectives on the state as well as welfare and foreign policy 
resulted in quite similar preferences on the course of the military transition. After the 
war, the New Deal coalition, which had unified the Democrats under Roosevelt, slowly 
disintegrated. Congressional Democrats consisted of an uneasy alliance of three groups: 
The liberals were flanked by Southern Democrats, the so-called Dixiecrats, to the right 
and progressive Democrats to the left. With the turn to a robust stance on the Soviet 
Union, the liberal Democrats had lost their general distaste for large defense spending 
and government interventions for reasons of national defense such as UMT. But since 
most industry in the Midwest and Middle Atlantic regions rapidly and largely 
successfully conversed to consumer production and the national welfare hardly 
depended on defense dollars, they did not see a particular need to back defense spending 
beyond the most obvious security needs. As each extra defense dollar would distract 
money from the New Deal welfare program, they preferred the cheapest way to 
maintain defense. After initial ambiguity with regard to this way, which left Congress 
largely reactive, air power emerged as the most promising means to meet these 
requirements by 1948. Moreover, while the liberals and the progressives hoped that 
atomic weapons could be placed under UN control (Brock 1962, 52-53), the former 
increasingly lost hope and started to consider air atomic power as an inevitable part of 
national defense. Many shared Senator John H. Bankhead’s (D-AK) opinion: “The old 
methods of fighting vanished at Hiroshima.” (in Washington Post 1946)  
The conservative Southern Democrats slowly departed from the New Deal coalition on 
domestic issues,
116
 but they largely shared the New Deal Democrats’ preferences in the 
                                                             
115 He succeeded Albert J. Engel (R-MI), the last chairmen of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations 
for the Military Establishment, and Charles A. Plumley (R-VT), the last chairmen of the House 
Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department of the Navy. 
116 The rejection of civil rights for Southern blacks was the major issue that separated most Southern 
Democrats from the North-Eastern majority (Rae 1995, 146). Although Roosevelt had tried to 
marginalize these Southern conservatives, who opposed the administration’s New Deal policy, during his 
tenure, the Dixiecrats had a strong base in the firmly Democratic South and represented a formidable 
element of the party. Therefore, any unified party effort especially on domestic issues was hard to 
achieve. In fact, the party split in three fractions during the 1948 elections. On the left, Henry Wallace ran 
on the Progressive Party platform. On the right, Strom Thurmond (D-SC) became the candidate of the 
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budget and weapons acquisition dimensions of military policy. Their preferences were 
based on a completely different rationale, however. The Dixiecrats had a hard time with 
large defense spending, state intervention and the creation of a consolidated permanent 
military establishment. Therefore, they repeatedly defected to the Republicans to keep 
military efforts in the organizational dimension in check. At the same time, the Southern 
Democrats shared the clear preference for a tough stance towards communism and a 
strong national defense (Lerche 1964, 38-39). The most prominent Southern advocate of 
strong defense was congressman Carl Vinson (D-GA), long-term chairman of the 
HNAC and HASC, who earned his nicknames ‘The Admiral’ and ‘Mr. Navy’ through 
his early preferences for a strong Navy. After the war, he was one of the most influential 
Democratic spokesmen in defense matters, supporting especially naval and air power 
concerns (Deering 1993, 165). A testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Appropriations nicely sums up Vinson’s position: “I think the Government’s first 
obligation is its defense. I think nothing comes ahead of insuring the people of the 
Nation that they can be protected as far as is possible by an Army, a Navy, and an Air 
Force at adequate strength, which strength in turn has a stabilizing effect in maintaining 
peace throughout the world.” (SubHAC 1949, 216) In order to provide security and at 
the same time keep the federal state small, Southern Democrats came to the same 
conclusion than the New Deal Democrats by the late 1940s: The exploitation of air 
power.  
With the growing international tensions in 1950, NSC-68, and a promising economic 
outlook, the Democratic radicalism turned into preferences for a far-reaching and broad 
buildup to match the Soviet capabilities (Reichard 1978, 54-57). Military weakness 
would invite Soviet aggression and therefore increase the likelihood of World War III. 
A strong Air Force including nuclear weapons remained necessary, but was not 
sufficient to contain communism. Reliance on air atomic power was not only morally 
dubious, but also reduced the US strategic options and international freedom of action. 
The Democrats’ turn to a more supportive military policy position pitted them against 
the conservative Republican. 
Throughout the postwar years, most Republicans shared the Southern Democrats 
skepticism of a large federal state, state intervention and excessive defense spending. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
States’ Rights Party, supported by many Southern Democrats. Both parties were clearly beaten by the 
incumbent in the general election. 
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Especially conservative Republicans with their primary strongholds in the Midwest, 
including Senator Robert A. Taft, ‘Mr. Republican’ from Ohio, and Representative Joe 
Martin (R-MA), strongly fought against big government, growth of presidential power, 
high taxes and state intervention (Dueck 2010, 39-84; Matthews 1982). They rejected 
not only the New Deal legislation, but also an expensive and large military 
establishment depicting a path towards military dictatorship. Even moderate 
Republicans were concerned that state interventions and large expenditures justified 
through security needs would open the door to socialist control over the economy and 
society.  
The resulting position on the course of transition was not only informed by the GOP’s 
concept of the state, however, but also strongly influenced by the leading Republicans’ 
disagreement on foreign policy. By the end of the war, the Republican Party was in a 
difficult transition splitting the party in two main foreign policy fractions (Woods 2003; 
Gould 2003, 311-314). Already in a downward trend, the traditional isolationists and 
America First supporters, with Taft as their leading proponent, were still a strong force 
in Congress (Edwards 1999, 11; Doenecke 1979, 25; Cagle 1964, 7-9). They were 
critical of the emerging international institutions as well as permanent deployment of 
troops abroad, which carelessly tied the US to other nations’ affairs: Europe was 
primarily a European problem. Deeply distrustful of America’s allies, many 
conservative Republicans rejected any economic and military assistance to Europe and 
other places and suspected Truman to exaggerate the communist threat in order to gain 
political support (Doenecke 1979, 118). Given the rejection of an international military 
commitment and involvement, Taft and other conservative Republicans settled for a 
military posture based on sea and air defense backed by nuclear weapons.  
But a growing number of Republicans had converted to internationalism during World 
War II. Pearl Harbor had destroyed the belief of many former isolationists that the 
oceans could effectively protect the US from foreign aggression. And if the US “could 
not hide from the rest of the world, it must control it.” (Woods 2003, 47) This 
advancing conservative internationalism is best represented by Arthur Vandenberg, the 
party’s foreign policy heavyweight. Vandenberg (R-MI) shared most of Taft’s positions 
on the role of government and free enterprise. But he strongly disagreed on foreign 
policy: The converted internationalist was convinced that the US should dominate in 
order to preserve the status quo in an uncertain world. A Pax Americana would serve 
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the country’s interests best. Therefore, he supported the government’s active 
international role including foreign deployments. The internationalist advance within 
the party was further backed by the public opinion. Given the public support for 
internationalism, “[b]eing tagged as an isolationist had clearly become an electoral 
liability.” (Dueck 2010, 72) As anticommunism implied for many people a commitment 
to military power and at least some international involvement, the isolationists struggled 
with inconsistencies in their positions. After the war, many isolationists including Taft 
had weakened their isolationist position and called themselves nationalists which 
opposed communism and an active foreign policy alike. But the fact that Thomas 
Dewey of the GOP’s Eastern, internationalist wing rather than Taft gained presidential 
nomination in 1948 shows the continuous difficulties of the party’s conservative wing 
to appeal to broader constituencies (Edwards 1999, 34-36).  
The political impact of Taft and the conservative Republicans on the GOP’s military 
policy was nonetheless considerable. After Dewey’s defeat in the 1948 elections and 
with Vandenberg sidelined by illness, Taft rose to the leading Republican spokesman 
for domestic and foreign policy and pushed the party towards his preferred military 
posture (Boettcher 1992, 117). In early 1951, nationalist Republicans launched the so-
called Great Debate over the military implications of the containment strategy and 
deployment of troops to Europe. In a long speech before the Senate, Taft argued that 
“the immediate problem of defending this country depends upon control of the sea and 
control of the air.” (97 Cong. Rec., January 5, 1951, S57) A strong military 
establishment including forward presence in Europe for preventive purposes would only 
increase the likelihood of war, hurt liberal economy, and threatened to turn the US into 
a garrison state.  
At the same time, Taft and other nationalist Republicans moved to a position of 
aggressive roll-back of communism (Dueck 2010, 81). When Pacific Commander 
MacArthur, long-time star of the Republicans, urged a military escalation in Korea and 
a shift of emphasis from Europe to the Pacific prior to his discharge in April 1951, they 
merged the rejection of permanent military entanglements and an aggressive roll-back 
strategy: “‘Fortress America’ was quickly replaced by ‘Asia-first’ as the new rallying 
cry of conservative Republicans and some Southern Democrats as they completed the 
transition from isolationism to an imperialism of their own.” (Sanders 1983, 99) In a 
speech briefly after MacArthur’s dismissal, Taft accused the administration of lacking 
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rather than excessive engagement: “It would be hard to deliberately invent a more 
disastrous series of policy moves than this Administration has adopted during the past 
eighteen months in the Far East.” (in New York Times 1951c) Opening a partisan 
cleavage on the Korean War, the conservative Republicans argued that Truman was 
failing to provide sufficient resources to Korea while at the same time wasting money in 
Europe and spending the state into bankruptcy (Sanders 1983, 86). Although the Great 
Debate did not succeed and Eisenhower’s nomination for the presidential candidacy 
over Taft marked a bitter defeat for the conservative Republicans, their positions had an 
important influence by moving the party towards a military radicalism based on nuclear 
air and sea power.
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The party preferences on the doctrine & mission statement dimension are only evident 
from the context of their positions. Thus, the Democrats preferred a mixed position, 
which included land forces as well as long-range strategic aviation. The Republicans 
instead put more weight on the latter means and limited emphasis on the former. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
117 During the early months of Eisenhower’s presidency, Taft controlled the Senate and closely interacted 
with the administration (Edwards 1999, 60-66). His sudden death in summer 1953 robbed the 
conservative Republicans of their most important spokesman and leader, however. Taft’s death resulted in 
a drastically reduced influence of the party’s conservative wing. 
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PURSUE IN THE DIMENSION OF … 
…military budget? 
-Preference for air 
(atomic) power since 
1948 
- Republicans: Moderate 
support for air atomic 
power 
- Democrats: Moderate 
stability bias (balanced 
funding) 
…military organization? 
- Democrats: Support for 
a permanent force and 
UMT 
- Conservative 
Republicans/Southern 
Democrats: Rejection of 
large permanent force 
and UMT 
- Democrats: Support for 
a permanent force, UMT 
and forward deployment 
- Conservative 
Republicans/Southern 
Democrats: Rejection of 
large permanent force, 
UMT and forward 
deployment 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Support for aviation and 
nuclear weapons 
- Democrats: Moderate 
stability bias (broad 
acquisition) 
- Republicans: Support 
for aviation and nuclear 
weapons 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Narrow preparations 
- Democrats: Stability 
bias (broad preparations) 
- Republicans: Narrow 
preparations 
Do these preferences represent 
societal demands? 
- In parts (Republicans 
only partly on 
organization) 
- In parts (Republicans 
not on organization; 
Democrats not on 
budgets and weapons 
acquisition) 
Are these preferences 
consistent with the dominant 
societal idea underlying the 
course of military transition? 
- Yes  
(military radicalism) 
- Democrats: No 
(military conservatism) 
- Republicans: Yes 
(military radicalism) 
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5.1.2.2. President and administration 
The Harry S. Truman administration 
Since 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been the towering political figure who 
kept the ship America on course through the Great Depression and World War II. When 
he died in April 1945, the nation and particularly his successor were utterly shocked 
(Donovan 1977, 7-9). Roosevelt’s political dominance would have made any 
succeeding President look inadequate, but Harry S. Truman seemed particularly 
unsuited for the job (Maddox 1988, 45-46). Especially on foreign and military policy, 
Truman was badly prepared to lead the nation. Truman knew neither more than an 
interested citizen about the Yalta conference and the state of the war alliance nor 
anything about the Manhattan Project. Furthermore, since the presidency took him by 
surprise, Truman had developed little policy positions of his own. The unexpected 
President lacked not only public approval and political legitimacy based on political 
majorities, but also professional reputation. Truman’s pragmatic response to this 
situation was to keep things running and stick with the commitments Roosevelt had 
made. Without a strong power base, he was careful not to provoke public wrath 
especially early into his first term.
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Nonetheless, he was soon forced to take positions as the end of war approached rapidly. 
Reflecting public fears, Truman’s major concern was to avoid an economic crisis after 
the war. Therefore, the President stuck to the principle of balanced budgets and fiscal 
austerity, which he considered major measures to avoid inflation and a related economic 
downturn. Yet, despite fiscal austerity, he was neither willing to sacrifice welfare 
programs altogether nor ready to neglect his responsibility for US security (Truman 
1955, 509). Thus, on the domestic side, the President sought to continue the New Deal 
policy in the postwar era by his Fair Deal proposals after 1946.
119
 On the foreign policy 
side, Truman believed that it was in America’s interest to participate in global politics 
                                                             
118 At the same time, he was determined to establish presidential authority within the administration and 
gain a reputation as strong leader. The President valued clear lines of authority and left no doubt that the 
buck would stop with him (Barber 2009, 336).  
119 It is difficult to assess whether the Fair Deal program reflected Truman’s own policy interest or 
whether it reflected a political strategy to secure reelection in 1948. He had supported Roosevelt’s New 
Deal policy in domestic policy and therefore might have had a genuine ideational interest in the Fair Deal. 
But it seems plausible that the pragmatic Truman embraced the Fair Deal as a strategy to gain public 
approval for reelection. After the defeat in the midterm election 1946, the Wardman Park Hotel group, a 
group of liberal Democrats, suggested the move to the left as key to win the 1948 election (Brune 1989, 
360). 
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even at some costs and he was convinced that world leadership lacking a formidable 
military force would be futile. Yet, a sound economy and welfare had priority after the 
war and defense would only gain what remained under the given ceiling after all other 
costs were covered (May 1990, 37; Huntington 1961, 42-43).  
To make the best of the limited resources available for defense, Truman pushed for 
efficiency. Back in the Senate, Truman had chaired a special committee to investigate 
cases of waste, corruption, and favoritism within the military procurement process 
(Ferrell 2003, 15-17). This occupation qualified his generally favorable view of the 
military, stemming from his World War I experience: “The function of generals and 
admirals is to fight battles. (…) They have no experience in business or industry, and 
the job of producing what they ask for should be left to businessmen under the direction 
of experienced civilians.” (Truman in 1942 cited in Haynes 1973, 21-22) Two months 
after his nomination as Vice President, Truman published an article promoting 
unification to reduce duplications and waste (Boettcher 1992, 22).
120
 And he remained 
skeptical of the armed forces’ pleas for additional funding throughout most of his 
presidency. He reasoned that without wasteful spending in the military establishment a 
strong defense could be maintained with less money (Donovan 1977, 138).  
Truman refrained from giving qualitative directions with regard to the military 
transition. Instead, he relied on the administration’s civilian and military staff which had 
significantly grown during the war.
121
 Two general positions on military policy can be 
distinguished within the civil administration: The so-called economizers, which 
dominated Truman’s first term, shared the President’s commitment to balanced budgets 
and a sound economy, yet articulated little qualitative preferences. They generally 
supported internationalism, containment of the Soviet Union including a military 
component, but were unwilling to subordinate other goals.
122
 The economizers were 
                                                             
120 After the war, Truman considered the consolidation of the military forces as a way to strengthen the 
coordination, end interservice rivalries, and establish clear responsibilities and hierarchies (Donovan 
1982, 57). The President was skeptical of the domestic impact of a durable military establishment and 
opposed the creation of a central military actor such as a combined chief of staff who could challenge 
civilian control and exercise strong political influence (Ayers 1991, 96). But he figured that clearer 
responsibilities would improve civilian control of the postwar military establishment and therefore the 
presidential power to affect the organization. 
121
 In 1939, only about 10 percent of the federal government’s civilian employees worked for national 
security agencies. In 1945, this share had risen to more than 75 percent, as the war had contributed to a 
massive expansion of the national security bureaucracy (Barnet 1972, 24-25, 28). 
122 The most prominent exception from this consensus was Henry Wallace, the initial Secretary of 
Commerce and central figure of the Democrats’ left-wing, who was an explicit opponent of large military 
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especially strong in the Bureau of Budget within the President’s executive office. Under 
Truman’s first Director of the Budget Harold D. Smith and his successor James E. 
Webb the office became a highly influential institution and the most vocal champion of 
efficiency, economy, and centralized governmental management. Both directors 
considered the Budget Bureau as defender of balanced budgets and a sound economy 
against parochial interests. In the words of Paul Appleby (1957, 156), assistant director 
on the Budget Bureau 1944-1947: “Fiscal sense and fiscal coordination are certainly 
values. The budgeting organization is designed to give representation in institutional 
interaction and decision-making to this set of values.” Since all other executive agencies 
wanted a share of the budget as big as possible, the Budget Bureau considered itself as 
moderator and constraint at the same time: “It is on the whole rather strongly against 
program and expenditure expansion.” (Appleby 1957, 156) Hence, without pursuing an 
explicit defense agenda, Smith and Webb argued that an extensive defense policy 
without taking fiscal and domestic needs into account would harm the state’s goals in 
the long run (Hogan 1998, 83). The group of vocal budget balancers was complemented 
by the former president of the American Economic Association, Edwin Nourse, who 
became the first chairman of the newly established Council of Economic Advisors in 
1946 (Brune 1989, 358). Although in many respects a Keynesian economist, Nourse 
held conservative views on balanced budgets and the wastefulness of war. He argued 
that states had only limited resources and would always face a trade-off between 
different goods. Additional spending on military power would inevitably lower the 
domestic productivity.  
In contrast to this large group, the number of defense hawks, who pushed for a strong 
defense even at the expense of deficits, was initially limited to the military departments. 
Both secretaries of the military departments shared the opposition to underfunded and 
understaffed military forces, yet sought to direct additional funding to their respective 
organizations. Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal was committed to a strong 
defense against any worst case scenarios, which might threaten the democratic-capitalist 
system (Cornell 1987).
123
 At the same time, he skillfully and relentlessly fought for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
spending, which distracted money from New Deal projects. More sympathetic to the Soviet Union than 
the rest of the Truman administration, Wallace publically suggested a foreign policy turn and was forced 
to resign in 1946. With Averell Harriman succeeding Wallace, the last high level opposition to an anti-
Soviet stance within the government ended (Abramson 1992, 411, 425). 
123 Like many other officials within the military establishment, Forrestal drew gloomy lessons from the 
military unpreparedness during the interwar years and the Pearl Harbor disaster.  
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prosperity of the Navy and thus challenged not only the economizers, but also the War 
Department on postwar military policy. His colleague, Secretary of War Robert P. 
Patterson, defended the interests of the War Department and especially fought for the 
continuous importance of ground forces. When the National Military Establishment was 
created in 1947, Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense.
124
 While the new 
Secretary of Defense moved to a moderating position between the civil and military 
preferences, the Service secretaries remained strong supporters of their organizations. 
For example, Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington, who became civil head of the new 
Air Force branch in 1947
125
, was convinced not only that military strength was crucial 
for US security, but also that air power was central in this effort: “Believing that he 
should do anything necessary to keep the Air Force from being overshadowed by the 
other armed services, he viewed his primary job as ensuring that the Air Force received 
its fair share of the appropriations.” (McFarland 2001, 22) The same holds true for the 
other Service secretaries after unification. Yet, in their struggle for funding, the 
secretaries disagreed on the course for military preparations resulting in inconsistent 
strategic advice. They canceled out each other’s far-reaching suggestions and consensus 
was necessarily close to the status-quo and often a highly reactive patchwork. 
Considering all secretaries individually, they all suggested potentially innovative 
policies, but taken together, stability was dominant. 
A more balanced position came from the State Department.
126
 While Truman’s first 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes played a minor role in the defense debates, his 
successor George C. Marshall took a more explicit position. Well aware of the political 
and fiscal difficulties of a permanent military force during peacetimes, he considered 
efforts to strike a balance between domestic and security needs as inevitable. But in 
contrast to other economizers, the former military leader derived a preference on the 
shape of the future military force from this matter of fact: Considering all branches 
                                                             
124 John L. Sullivan assumed the post of the Navy Secretary (Waggoner 1947). Even before the War 
Department was split by the National Security Act, Kenneth C. Royall replaced the retiring Patterson as 
last Secretary of War. His title soon changed into Secretary of the Army. 
125 Before he joined the Truman administration in 1945, Symington was president of Emerson Electric 
Company, the leading producer of gun turrets for US bombers and boosters for artillery shells during the 
war. He became assistant secretary of war for air in 1946 and was therefore the obvious choice as the Air 
Force’s first secretary. Thomas K. Finletter, the main author of the report “Survival in the Air Age” of 
1948 which had furthered the Air Force’s course, became Air Force Secretary in 1950. 
126 Fred M. Vinson, who Truman transferred from the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion to 
head the Treasury Department, also strengthened the economizers’ case. The moderate Southern 
Democrat, a personal friend of Truman and former Congressman, opposed excessive federal spending 
(New York Times 1953c). 
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equally important, he supported a policy which maintained only a small permanent 
force but provided provisions for rapid mobilization. Marshall’s mobilization approach 
was the most consistent alternative innovation to the congressional air power focus. 
George Kennan, who became head of the State Department’s newly established Policy 
Planning Staff, largely agreed with Marshall’s balanced budget approach despite the 
alarming rhetoric in the X-article (Miscamble 1992). Indeed, he regarded economic and 
diplomatic means as major instruments of the containment policy and believed that 
military capabilities were of minor importance. Thus, Kennan argued that the aspiration 
for military strength must not put economic prosperity at risk.  
By the decade’s end, Truman increasingly fell victim to his public interpretation of 
containment as a military effort and anticommunist rhetoric, which the President 
employed in order to push his foreign and defense policy and offset Republican attacks. 
As the public, Congress, and, after initial ambivalence, the President himself turned 
openly hostile to the USSR, his ceiling approach, granting only the left-over to defense, 
increasingly came under pressure. In fact, balanced budgets seemed increasingly 
incompatible with the efforts to counter the ‘red menace’ abroad and to implement the 
Fair Deal at home.  
Moreover, the balance between economizers and defense hawks in the administration 
shifted in favor of the later. Especially the arrival of Dean Acheson, who replaced 
Marshall at the State Department in 1949, proved most consequential. While his 
predecessor had been working for a mobilization system, Acheson leaned more towards 
a permanently strong national security to improve the credibility of US containment 
policy. Acheson (1969, 379) recalls in his memoirs: “Four years of trial had convinced 
us that agreement with the Kremlin was not then possible. Certain obstacles stood in the 
way that had to be removed. Among them was the existence in the non-Communist 
world of large areas of weakness, which by its very nature the Soviet system had to 
exploit. (…) Therefore, we had been at work to create strength where there had been 
weakness, (…) to replace the dams that once contained Russia to the east and to the 
west.” In March 1950, Paul Nitze, the later architect of NSC-68, succeeded Kennan at 
the top of the Policy Planning Staff. Like Acheson, Nitze was much more critical with 
regard to the maintenance of peace with the Soviet Union not based on military 
strength. The broad qualitative preferences of these defense hawks are arguably best 
described in NSC-68: “In the absence of (…) elimination and the securing of these 
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objectives, it would appear that we have no alternative but to increase our atomic 
capability as rapidly as other considerations make appropriate. In either case, it appears 
to be imperative to increase as rapidly as possible our general air, ground and sea 
strength (…) to a point where we are militarily not so heavily dependent on atomic 
weapons.” (NSC 1950, 83) Even at risk of increasing federal deficits, this group sought 
a broad buildup offering various strategic options. 
Meanwhile, the economizers lost relevance. Since defense policy was increasingly 
dominated by the NSC, which created a better balance between fiscal and strategic 
consideration, the Budget Bureau lost relative influence (Huntington 1954a, 215-
216).
127
 For a short time, the most powerful and at the same time unlikely new 
economizer became Louis Johnson, who replaced Forrestal as Defense Secretary in 
1949.
128
 In an attempt to foster his political ambitions with the reputation as strong 
leader, Johnson sought to exert strong civil control within the DOD. Johnson especially 
picked up Truman’s preference for fiscal austerity and put saving pressure on the 
Services. He was willing to make hard and unpopular decisions with regard to the 
course of the defense policy, but lacked a clear strategic vision. His opposition to the 
defense hawks and often rude handling of conflicts soon alienated many in the defense 
establishment (Childs 1949; Herspring 2005, 73). Especially Acheson repeatedly 
clashed with Johnson and the exchange between the State Department and the Pentagon 
was reduced to the most formal channels during Johnson’s tenure (Donovan 1982, 62). 
After his unsuccessful battle to halt NSC-68 and the initial military setbacks in Korea, 
the early resignation of Johnson, who was largely isolated within the administration by 
then, became inevitable.
129
 
                                                             
127 Acheson brought the former director of the Budget Bureau James Webb to the State Department to 
become undersecretary. The vocal defender of a balanced budget during his time at the Budget Bureau 
changed sides and followed the course of his new superior. Webb’s successor at Budget Bureau, Frank 
Pace, proved less influential. When Pace left the Budget Bureau to become Secretary of the Army, 
Frederick J. Lawton became the new Budget Director. 
128 Johnson was selected as a reward for the effective organization of Truman’s campaign financing 
during the 1948 election. He had a strong base among the American Legion in which he served as 
commander during the 1930s. 
129 The economizers’ position was further weakened, as the tide in macro-economic thinking within the 
administration turned increasingly against the imperative of balanced budgets (Brune 1989). New ideas of 
military Keynesianism became a prominent economic argument first outside and then inside the 
government during the 1950s. Leon Keyserling, the Council of Economic Advisors vice chairman, 
represented this departure from Nourse’s warning of economic trade-offs. When Nourse resigned in 
frustration and was succeeded by Keyserling in late 1949, the economic feasibility of guns and butter 
became the common assumption “by which the American public and its politicians justify obtaining the 
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Marshall returned to the administration in September to succeed Johnson. Although he 
did not consider military requirements as overriding other federal tasks in peacetime, he 
was willing to take the necessary steps in a national emergency and thus came much 
closer to the defense hawks’ positions. Marshall was succeeded by Robert Lovett, the 
former Deputy Secretary of Defense, after a year in office. The highly experienced 
Lovett, a longtime confidant of Marshall, believed that a strong defense based on a solid 
industrial base was not only necessary as the Cold War took shape, but also sustainable 
in the long run. Shortly after becoming Defense Secretary he declared: “There is no 
other way but strength. We tried weakness. It didn’t work.” (in Lockett 1951) Like 
Marshall, Lovett believed that each Service had its role to play and was therefore 
supportive of a balanced force posture (Condit 1988, 37-38). 
 
The Dwight D. Eisenhower administration 
When Eisenhower became the 34
th
 President of the United States, the tide turned again 
in favor of economic positions. Yet, this time, the administration sought to actively tie 
the fiscal position to a clear strategic perspective. As a former military leader, 
Eisenhower was able and willing to implement a strategic vision connecting the Soviet 
threat and the fiscal constraints. Already during the election campaign, Eisenhower 
expressed three insights gathered during the Truman years: “First, our defense program 
has suffered from lack of farsighted direction. Second, real unification of our Armed 
forces is yet to be achieved. Third, our defense program need not and must not push us 
steadily to economic collapse.” (in Reston 1952) Eisenhower criticized the Truman 
administration for departing from its early commitment to balanced budgets and the 
indecisive performance in Korea (Dueck 2010, 86-87; Ferrell 2003, 169). While he was 
the candidate of the moderate internationalist wing of the GOP, he shared many of the 
conservative Republican’s positions on military policy. He objected high federal taxes 
and spending which drained resources from society and market and promised heavy 
reductions in defense expenditures during the campaign (Alsop/Alsop 1952b). In his 
eyes, the excessive defense budgets strained the economy, fueled fears of a garrison 
state, and increasingly alienated the Republican Party as well as the public. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
highest degree of military security without sacrificing the middle class welfare programs.” (Brune 1989, 
357) 
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A far-reaching builddown was out of question however, as the Cold War loomed 
beyond the Korean War. Eisenhower denied any relaxation of pressure towards the 
Soviet Union, which he considered a totalitarian, uncooperative regime and a long-term 
threat.
130
 While the Truman administration during the second term increasingly 
interpreted the conflict as heading towards a military showdown, Eisenhower regarded 
the Cold War as a permanent struggle. Against this backdrop, the President saw a strong 
defense and a strong economy inevitably connected. Therefore, he pursued a defense 
policy, which would be sustainable in the long-run.  
In order to gain a comprehensive perspective on the military policy options, Eisenhower 
upgraded the NSC to become the major body for policy discussion and decision within 
the administration.
131
 He put more weight on economic considerations by making the 
new Budget Director Joseph M. Dodge and Treasury Secretary George M. Humphrey, 
both dedicated fiscal conservatives, new usual members of the NSC (Boyle 2005, 19, 
28). This reduced the relative influence of the Services over other preferences. Given 
the desire for a sustainable balance between economy and security, Eisenhower and the 
NSC soon moved to a single strategic option based on air atomic power, which 
promised the most ‘bang for a buck’ and which had long developed among the public 
and within the Republican Party. He argued that a “great retaliatory power” would deter 
an attack and thus serve the national security best (in Bernstein 1971, 411). 
Few political actors within the administration challenged the radical shift in military 
policy during his first year. As a step to improve civil control of the military, 
Eisenhower named Charles E. Wilson, the former CEO of General Motors, as Secretary 
of Defense. Wilson had little political and military experience and Eisenhower did not 
select him to formulate military policy, which was left to the NSC. Instead, he hoped 
that Wilson would use his management skills to lead the huge defense organization and 
implement the NSC’s decisions effectively (Trask/Goldberg 1997, 69). Indeed, Army 
                                                             
130 Like Truman, he also pursued further military assistance to allied states which contributed to the 
credibility of containment without significantly increasing the burden for the US economy. During a NSC 
meeting in March, Eisenhower is cited as having explained that “we should never forget that in defending 
Europe with $6 billion of Mutual Security assistance we are getting a very great deal for our money.” 
(Memorandum of a Special Meeting of the NSC cited in Boyle 2005, 44) 
131
 Early on, the President asked Robert Cutler, a member of his presidential campaign team, to review the 
administration’s national security organization. Cutler reorganized the NSC by putting it under control of 
a presidential assistant who chaired meetings and linked the Council much better to the President than 
before. Cutler himself became this assistant. Showing the raised importance of the NSC, Eisenhower 
missed only 29 meetings during his eight years in office (Dockrill 1996, 23). 
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Lt. General Gavin (1958, 155) recalls that Wilson “tended to deal with his Chiefs of 
Staff as though they were recalcitrant union bosses.” In the struggles between the NSC 
and the military Services, the Defense Secretary was often the mere executor of 
directions.  
Moreover, Eisenhower replaced the Service secretaries with former industrialists, who 
kept a rather low political profile and understood their task as managers. Indeed, faced 
with a strong group of civilian leaders, the Service Secretaries found only marginal 
possibilities to influence military policy. Other critical voices emerged only very 
selective and remained weak. For example, John F. Dulles, an important spokesman of 
the conservative Republican and Secretary of State in the administration, initially 
argued for a replacement of the containment policy by an active military policy to 
liberate the states oppressed by Communists (Dockrill 1996, 18; Bernstein 1971, 403-
404). Yet, while he was a highly visible member of the administration, he never 
questioned Eisenhower’s authority (Dueck 2010, 91). 
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO POLITICAL ACTORS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION PURSUE IN THE 
DIMENSION OF … 
…military budgets? 
- remainder method 
(balanced 
budgets/domestic needs 
have priority), no clear 
strategic perspective 
(reactive) 
- Truman: stability (rapid 
buildup / broad strategic 
perspective) 
- Eisenhower: 
sustainable defense 
spending / bias in favor 
of air atomic power  
…military organization? 
- Support for UMT, no 
clear distributional 
preference 
- Truman: Support for 
UMT, forward 
deployment, balanced 
organization 
…weapons acquisition? - No clear preference 
- Truman: Stability 
(broad acquisition) 
- Eisenhower: Bias on 
air atomic power 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- No clear preference 
- Truman: No clear 
preference 
- Eisenhower: Bias on 
air atomic power 
Do these preferences represent 
societal demands? 
- in parts (partial 
agreement on 
organization/no 
agreement on budget) 
- Truman: In parts 
(agreement on 
organization/no 
agreement on budget and 
acquisition) 
- Eisenhower: Yes 
Are these preferences consistent 
with the dominant societal idea 
underlying the course of military 
transition? 
- No 
(No consistent mindset) 
- Truman: No (Military 
conservatism) 
- Eisenhower: Yes 
(Military radicalism) 
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5.1.2.3. Consistency of political actors’ preferences 
During the builddown, the administration and large majorities of Congress shared a 
broad consensus with regard to two important factors of military policy, which already 
unified Congress and reflected the societal position: (1) The opinions on the precise size 
of the defense budget and fiscal role of the federal state in general differed across and 
within parties, but “the President and the Congress wanted smaller budgets.” (Sharp 
1976, 285) (2) Most political actors shared the anticommunist stance and considered 
military force essential to meet this threat. Beyond these positions the two branches of 
government departed in important ways and consistency was low. While Congress 
turned to air atomic power in the budget and weapons acquisition dimensions after some 
hesitation, the Truman administration remained undecided beyond the commitment to 
sharp budget cuts. Only in the organizational dimension, did the administration share 
the societal position, with Southern Democrats and especially the conservative 
Republicans departing from this consensus. 
Overall, the congressional positions reflected the societal demands much more 
accurately. Both parties turned to a more or less strong military radicalism based on 
limited defense spending and air atomic power by 1948. But the administration 
dominated the military policy making most of time. To be sure, Congress was eager to 
exercise its prerogatives that had been held back by military necessity during the long 
war (Sparrow 1994, 294). As Sharp (1976, 284) argues: “In the minds of a number of 
Congressmen, the military had become a little too lordly, possessed of too many 
privileges for too long a time, and they wanted to reduce it to more human proportions.” 
But these ambitions were rarely met and Congress hardly challenged the administration 
in a decisive way. With low salience of military policy, lawmakers could gain little 
from a struggle over defense policy from a vote-seeking point of view. Instead, 
congressional opposition could easily backfire on lawmakers, since the administration’s 
position was publically considered to reflect the judgments of the highly popular and 
decorated senior military leaders. Hence, Capitol Hill was careful to avoid the 
impression of unfounded disagreement with the President and especially the armed 
forces (Blechman 1990, 24-25). Moreover, faced with a substantially larger defense 
establishment and more complex budgets, the legislators often had little means to 
develop a comprehensive and independent position and were forced to rely on the 
testimonies of the administration’s representatives. As Huzar (1950, 80) puts it: “The 
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subcommittees needed a substantial amount of faith (…) for the several-billion-dollar 
military budgets of the late forties.” Consequently, lawmakers focused on 
administrative problems and minor lapses rather than on the general course of the 
military policy or the soundness of budget items. Congress rarely directly intervened on 
a broad scale and its challenges remained piecemeal.  
Rather than turning towards the raised societal demands, the administration settled for a 
much more status quo oriented position in accordance with NSC-68 during the 
subsequent buildup. Only in the organizational dimension did the administration remain 
in sync with dominant societal preferences. And many Democrats in Congress followed 
this course at least in parts. Since the Democrats had the majority in both chambers until 
1952, the shift of the congressional Democrats allowed for a consistent military policy 
position. When Eisenhower sharply turned towards a position in high congruence with 
the societal demands, the hawkish congressional Democrats continued to propose a 
more conservative force posture and challenged Eisenhower to increase defense budgets 
in seven out of eight years of his tenure (Huntington 1969, 2). Yet, since the Democrats 
lost their majority during the 1952 election, the consistency of the political actors’ 
positions remained high. 
Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
ARE POLITICAL ACTORS’ PREFERENCES CONSISTENT IN THE DIMENSION OF … 
…military budget? Low consistency High consistency 
…military organization? Moderate consistency Moderate consistency 
…weapons acquisition? Low consistency High consistency 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
Low consistency High consistency 
Do political actors share ideas on 
the course of military policy? 
No 
- Truman: In parts 
- Eisenhower: Yes 
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5.1.3. Military actors’ preferences 
The massive buildup during World War II empowered the military actors which 
previously had played only a very limited role. The armed forces suddenly became huge 
organizations with vast fiscal and personnel resources as well as political attention and 
weight (Barnet 1972, 24-25, 28). During the war and in its aftermath, military leaders 
were not only involved in military affairs, but served as presidential advisors on foreign 
policy and political representatives abroad. Yet, most military leaders still remembered 
the marginalization of the armed forces after World War I and feared to share the same 
fate by the war’s end.132 Thus, the Services threw all their weight into the political 
battles against military insignificance. The Chiefs of Staff were convinced that their job 
was not over after defeating the Axis Powers and tried to emphasize the necessity of 
permanent postwar forces. Well aware that the newly dominant US was a major target 
for any aggressor, they were highly suspicious of Soviet intentions earlier than most 
politicians and implicitly based postwar force planning on requirements of an East-
West-confrontation (Dockrill 1996, 6). Planning remained piecemeal during the first 
two postwar years, however, since the military implications of the growing tensions 
were not fully visible and the armed forces lacked a clear basis for strategic planning.  
As the prospects of a military conflict with the Red Army became more tangible over 
time, fear of military insufficiency and inferiority further fueled the resistance to 
postwar marginalization. In fact, early planning scenarios in response to a Soviet attack 
on Western Europe caused serious concerns among military leaders (Ross 1988). With 
occupation forces in Europe and Asia and as the only nation with enough economic and 
military capabilities to counter a Russian advance, there was little doubt that the US 
would quickly be forced into an all-out engagement. Yet, all planning efforts came to 
the conclusion that the American military preparations were insufficient to halt an attack 
on Europe: The Red Army would rapidly overrun Western Europe and push into the 
Middle East.
133
 To make things worse, sharp decreases in procurement funding would 
                                                             
132 In the 1920s, Congress had rejected the concept of a large standing force, dooming the military to a 
shadowy existence. In fact, the deeply embedded skepticism of large standing armies had resulted in rapid 
and almost complete demobilization after all previous American war efforts. 
133 Based on an intelligence report in October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated a Soviet Union’s 
postwar military strength of 4.4 million troops in 113 divisions, 410 air regiments and a small navy. 
Hence, they concluded that the Soviet Union had the capabilities to overrun Europe excluding Britain at 
any time between 1945 and 1948, especially considering a demobilization of US forces (Ross 1988, 5). 
Although the American mainland was not threatened by Soviet forces due to their lacking naval 
capabilities and nuclear weapons, Eurasia seemed impossible to defend by current conventional means. 
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reduce not only the Armed Forces’ state of readiness, but also wreck the industrial base 
for a quick remobilization. In the eyes of the military leaders, that kind of 
unpreparedness would not only frustrate a decisive early response to aggression but put 
the state at risk.  
Therefore, the armed forces “made a habit of pointing to hot spots around the world, 
stressing military rather than economic or political threats, and planning for worst-case 
scenarios.” (Hogan 1998, 164) Accurate intelligence on the Soviet military capabilities 
and intentions were not available until 1956, when the first U-2 spy planes started 
gathering information (Alic 2007, 44-45). The resulting vagueness offered the Services 
an easy option to tailor intelligence in support of their interests with each Service 
emphasizing some aspects of the Soviet threat and downplaying others.
134
 When war 
broke out in Korea, the JCS were not only convinced that this was a Soviet plot, but also 
that the conflict would escalate into an all-out war with the USSR including the early 
use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the numerous casualties and near disaster during the 
opening days of the Korean War convinced the Services that their demands for 
additional funds had been justified all along. 
But the collective concerns for a strong national security were deflected by 
disagreement over the qualitative dimension of the transition, due to conflicting 
institutional interests in continuous prosperity. When the builddown began and the 
budgets dropped in 1945, tense interservice competition for strategic and therefore 
budget relevance erupted. Since the branches regarded their significance for future 
warfare as pivotal for the distribution of resources, influence and prestige, they strived 
to secure the biggest pieces of the cake. Each branch hoped to avoid cuts by providing 
or developing an indispensible contribution to the nation’s defense. The conflict, which 
continued even after the fiscal situation relaxed in 1950, was fueled by obvious overlaps 
in some major capabilities. Each Service took great pains to legitimize its posture on 
strategic terms potentially blaming the others for duplication. Hence, all Services sought 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
To make things worse, the bomber force consisted mainly of medium-range B-29 bombers mostly based 
within the US and a first use of atomic bombs would have taken more than two weeks (May 1990, 8).  
134 In hindsight it is clear that the Soviet capabilities were persistently overestimated. 
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to defend their claims and made preparations for a share of the new capability at the 
same time.
135
  
 
Air Force preferences 
Especially the Army Air Force sought to push for its long term objective of institutional 
independence including full control of all military aviation. Since the 1920s, the flyers 
had fought for strategic independence from its auxiliary role and institutional 
independence from the War Department. Yet, prior to World War II, the flyers’ pleas 
were refused by the Army and Navy leaders, who considered strategic bombing “as 
much a theology as strategy.” (Weiner 2009, 100) This situation of subordination 
strongly shaped the Air Force’s positions, feeling permanently under siege and not 
taken serious by its sister Services even after independence in 1947. After the successful 
war, the Air Force most aggressively claimed its share in the emerging military 
establishment. In the words of the first Air Force Chief, Carl A. Spaatz: “[T]he Air 
Force believes that until international organization succeeds there is no stronger force to 
preserve peace, or to re-establish it if necessary, than strong air power.” (in Waggoner 
1948) The promises and prospects of technology played a vital role in the Air Force’s 
preference formation. From the flyers’ perspective, claims for independence and 
resource allocation fundamentally rested on the assumption of an independent strategic 
contribution of air power through strategic bombing, which achieved its final 
breakthrough with the emergence of nuclear weapons (Builder 1994; Futrell 1989, 365-
416; Caraley 1966, 73-79). After initial hesitation to focus on strategic bombing and 
embrace nuclear weapons, the Air Force doctrine, organization and weapons acquisition 
was increasingly shaped by this mission. By 1948, The Air Force fully focused on 
strategic bombing and sought to control the technologies on which their relevance 
rested. It vocally claimed responsibility in aviation, especially strategic air power, at 
least including all land-based aircraft. It also tried to monopolize the access to nuclear 
                                                             
135 The branches were even willing to use their channels to Congress to push their interests against their 
superiors. While civil control was increased between 1947 and 1953, the Services were quick to make 
their own preferences in case of disagreement with the Defense Secretary heard. A DOD legislative 
liaison officer during the Kennedy administration described the relation between OSD and the Services to 
the point: “Legislative liaison in DOD is like riding a tiger. If he feels friendly, OK. If not, look out, 
you’re in trouble.” (in Holtzman 1970, 138)  
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technology and to gain sole responsibility for unmanned land-based aviation, although 
airplanes were the Service’s favored tool. 
 
Army preferences 
In contrast to the Air Force, the Army generals considered the ground forces’ 
contribution as most basic and necessary regardless of the technological state: Only 
ground forces could ultimately decide a war. But reading its history as a cycle of 
mobilization and demobilization, the Army feared that the nation would again abandon 
its most obedient servant (Scoggs 2000, 113; Cohen 1995; Hewes 1975, 135-136). 
Especially the challenge of aviation and nuclear bombs contributed to “something of an 
identity crisis” within the postwar Army (Craig 2004, 221). A JCS study in late 1945 
concluded that the Army would only have a minor role in future nuclear warfare, since 
nuclear weapons would be most effectively deployed by air against industrial centers. 
Therefore, the study continued, would the new weapon affect the future balance of 
military branches (Midgley 1986, 6-7): Manpower would only be needed for postwar 
stabilization and occupation duties, while the Air Force and the Navy do the actual 
fighting. Indeed, nuclear bombing seemed to be the only realistic option in case of war 
against the overwhelming ground forces of the Red Army (Linn 2007, 154-155). An 
article in the Reader’s Digest said in 1948: “Choosing to fight Russia with divisions is 
like choosing to fight a lion with a bowie knife.” (Huie cited in Gavin 1958, 101)  
The generals responded to this situation with a strategy, which can be described as 
‘entrenching’: They tried to defend and consolidate their claims and slowly work 
towards a better position especially in the budget, organization, and doctrine & mission 
statement dimensions. Since the Army provided the bulk of the occupation forces, there 
was always a minimum position to fall back to. At the same time, the Army leaders 
promoted unification partly in order to transfer the competition for resources inside a 
joint institution, in which the Army hoped to play out its institutional weight more 
effectively. Highly suspicious of the Marine Corps’ intentions, they also tried to secure 
the full ground war mission against opposition from the naval forces. Moreover, as a 
large permanent force was considered unlikely, Army leaders pushed UMT and the 
buildup of reserve forces to institutionalize the vital support with manpower and prepare 
for a rapid mobilization. The Army’s continuous case for the enduring importance of 
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ground forces gained new weight, when Truman ordered largely unprepared and 
underequipped troops into Korea. The initial defeat of the hastily deployed forces 
became a decisive experience for the generals and ‘No more Task Force Smith’ their 
lasting argument against peacetime marginalization in the age of US global interests. 
Beyond the focus on maintaining and controlling the Army’s core competencies, the 
general’s sought to exploit new technologies in order to expand into the new emerging 
missions. Especially the development of missiles and tactical nuclear capabilities were 
considered promising new fields in weapons acquisition.  
 
Navy preferences 
Like the Army, the Navy faced a challenge to its raison d’être after the war. Prior to the 
war, the Navy had proudly considered itself the first line of defense, keeping 
approaching aggressors at bay and thus assure essential time for mobilization at home. 
With the defeat of Japan, the last opponent with a capable high-sea fleet had 
disappeared, however, and the Navy mission had largely lost its relevance (Davis 1966, 
188). Since the Soviet Union’s power rested on land capabilities rather than naval 
forces, the emerging East-West-conflict did not close this strategic gap. And it was 
neither evident how the Navy might contribute to land missions nor expected that the 
USSR would develop formidable naval capabilities in the short run. To make things 
worse, the emergence of long-range aviation and nuclear power generally put the 
relevance of the naval forces for future military operations in doubt. Not only could 
planes simply cross oceans, concentrated sea power would also offer a welcome target 
for nuclear bombs. Already experiences from the Pacific theater during World War II 
had proved battle fleets vulnerable to air attacks and generally inflexible.  
The Navy did not settle for a consolidation of its core competencies, which had sharply 
lost importance, but rather sought to actively reclaim relevance by open up new 
capabilities and missions. As the emerging opponent was a land power, the Navy tried 
to emphasize its capabilities which reached beyond the high seas in the doctrine & 
mission statement dimension. In the organizational dimension, the focus moved to the 
means which allowed inland power projection. Moreover, the Navy opposed unification 
not only due to its longstanding preference for autonomy and decentralized structures 
(Friedman 2009, 76), but also for the threat it posed to the existence of the Marine 
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Corps and the naval flyers. Both means were the Navy Department’s central 
contributions in a potential inland war with the Red Army. The Navy especially tried to 
improve its position through additional air power capabilities, potentially including 
nuclear assets. Already during the war, the Navy and the Army Air Force had bitterly 
fought over the appropriate place for air power. After the war, the Navy pushed, on the 
one hand, for a larger contribution of its carrier based aviation. On the other hand, the 
Navy was in Forrestal’s words “fanatic” (Forrestal cited in Hogan 1998, 52) about a role 
in land-based air power including antisubmarine warfare, over-water reconnaissance, 
and the protection of shipping. Besides the aviation arm, the admirals were constantly 
pushing for a large Navy, including large surface vessels and submarines. Hence, 
Builder (1989, 21) argues that the Navy was the “hypochondriac” of the Services, 
consistently concerned about its size, which it most often found insufficient.  
Taken together, the Services’ competition and animosities could only produce a 
continuous position of strategic plurality. An equal share of resources and missions was 
the only feasible compromise among the chiefs. Yet, given the limited budgets, this left 
all Services short of their wishes and the civil-military relations were continuously 
shaped by the Services’ struggle to overcome the budget ceilings. Since the political 
actors did not yield, the Services could only increase their position at the expense of the 
others. 
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO MILITARY ACTORS PURSE IN THE DIMENSION OF… 
…military budget? 
- All Services: 
Preferences for increased 
budgets and budget 
shares 
- All Services: 
Preferences for increased 
budgets and budget 
shares 
…military organization? 
- Air Force: Preference 
for strategic bomber 
wings 
- Army: Preferences for 
active personnel, UMT, 
reserve 
- Navy: Preferences for 
overall number of ships 
and capital ships 
- Air Force: Preference 
for strategic bomber 
wings 
- Army: Preferences for 
active personnel, UMT, 
reserve 
- Navy: Preferences for 
overall number of ships 
and capital ships 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Air Force: Preferences 
for strategic bombers, air 
superiority fighters 
- Army: Preference for 
missiles 
- Navy: Preference for 
aircraft carriers, missiles 
- Air Force: Preferences 
for strategic bombers, air 
superiority fighters, 
missiles 
- Army: Preferences for 
missiles, tactical nuclear 
weapons 
- Navy: Preferences for 
aircraft carriers, missiles, 
submarines 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Air Force: Preferences 
for strategic bombing, 
increasingly nuclear 
bombing 
- Army: Preference for 
the status quo (enduring 
relevance of the soldier) 
- Navy: Preference for 
inland power projection 
and antisubmarine 
warfare 
- Air Force: Preferences 
for strategic bombing 
including nuclear 
bombing 
- Army: Preference for 
the status quo (enduring 
relevance of the soldier) 
- Navy: Preferences for 
inland power projection 
and antisubmarine 
warfare 
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5.2. The military policy process 
5.2.1. Strategic Planning and the defense budget 
5.2.1.1. Builddown 
Years of uncertainty 
As the war ended, the budget was clearly out of balance. While the FY 1940 budget 
earmarked 1.7 percent of the GDP for national defense, the share had risen to 37.5 
percent of the GDP in FY 1945 (OSD 2008, 208). War efforts had not only raised the 
expenses, causing considerable state deficits, but also displaced domestic welfare 
programs and inflated the federal state. Against this backdrop, the civil leaders set and 
defended firm ceilings on military appropriations for all budgets in the late 1940s 
(Kolodziej 1966, 38). The armed forces responded with two major tactics to the 
challenge on their claims. (1) They used their expert status to warn of international 
threats and lacking preparations and, at times, the “[t]he gap between what seemed 
politically feasible and what the military said was necessary was alarmingly wide.” 
(Hammond 1962, 275) (2) They sought to split the political actors and tried to find 
support among lawmakers: “When senior military leaders felt attacked, they turned to 
their allies on the Hill to help override what they perceived to be a weak president.” 
(Herspring 2005, 84) But the Services fought most often up-hill battles during the late 
1940s as the consensus on decreased budgets remained strong among the political actors 
even in the face of growing tensions with the Soviet Union: “The United States 
government evidently took a calculated risk by drastically reducing its armed forces 
after 1945 and maintaining austere defense budgets throughout the late 1940s.” (Ross 
1988, 155) 
Since the administration’s economizers gave little direction beyond the ceilings and the 
Joint Chiefs were deadlocked in their struggle for resources, the resulting budget 
process lacked a clear policy perspective and was predominantly reactive. Especially 
between 1945 and 1947, the strategic course of the military transition was in limbo and 
the distribution of military budgets was based on ad-hoc demands. The weak societal 
demands had no influence on the budget process during these early postwar years. The 
demobilization consumed much political attention and the salience of defense issues 
beyond the builddown was small. Moreover, the future threat environment was still 
opaque and the military implications of new technologies not fully clear.  
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In late 1945, the White House issued direction for the FY 1947 military budget, the first 
postwar budget and Truman’s first full request: After the FY 1946 budget had provided 
more than $40 billion, the Services had to share approximately $13 billion including $8 
billion for occupation costs or no more than 20 to 25 percent of the estimated 
government budget (Hogan 1998, 72). In what would become a common pattern during 
the 1940s, the Services Chiefs failed to agree on shares under these ceilings and 
summed up their individual wish lists for a total of $22 billion. When Truman did not 
significantly deviate from his ceiling and cut equally from the Service requests, the JCS 
complained that the envisioned budget would not allow for sustaining an adequate 
occupation force. During the subsequent hearings, Secretary of War Patterson assured 
the congressmen “that these figures represent the very minimum necessary to carry out 
the tasks.” (in SubHAC 1946, 12) Although Vinson attacked the recommendation on 
the House floor as insufficient, the President remained victorious, as the final FY 1947 
defense budget was only slightly above the administration’s request. Yet early on, 
“Truman began to see himself as besieged by disloyal insubordinates and a rebellious 
Congress.” (Hogan 1998, 79)136 Since the budget sought to finance no more than the 
Services’ most urgent needs, the Army Ground Force that carried most of the 
occupation duties gained the largest share. 
After the success of the FY 1947 budget which even produced a small surplus, the 
President was determined to keep the saving course for the FY 1948 budget. Again, 
Truman’s final budget request was far below wish lists of the Services, who again tried 
to convince Congress of their need for additional funding (SubHAC 1947a, 1401-1402; 
Campbell 1947, 458). Yet, the situation in Congress had changed to the worse for the 
military leaders in 1947: They now faced a Republican majority determined to stop the 
growth of the federal state. After an electoral campaign against excessive spending and 
taxation, the Republicans regarded their success as a popular mandate to critically 
scrutinize public spending including the large defense account (Huzar 1950, 171). 
Especially the personnel heavy and cost intensive Army Ground Force was in the 
Republican’s focus. Albert J. Engel (R-MI), new chairman of the Military Affairs 
Appropriations Subcommittee, explained later: “During the war (…) I have refrained 
                                                             
136
 This was not the end of the conflict, as Truman fixed the defense expenditures below the approved 
amount which caused bitter resistance by the armed forces. The Navy even considered recalling its fleet 
from the Mediterranean and the Army threatened to terminate its occupation services in Europe to save 
money. But neither did Truman and his budget staff falter nor did the Services follow through with their 
threats. 
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from calling the attention of the House to the outrageous, willful, and unnecessary waste 
of the taxpayers’ money. The war is over. The War Department continues to throw 
money down the military rat hole despite every effort.” (94 Cong. Rec., January 22, 
1948, H451) But not only the War Department suffered deeper cuts, as all pleas by 
CNO Nimitz did not save the Navy from reductions (SubSAC 1947, 26). In the end, 
Congress cut the FY 1948 defense budget to little more than $10 billion. In an early 
show of Republican support for air power, the Air Force emerged with the largest share 
in new money.  
Taft had even recommended a defense budget of only $7 billion and arguably only the 
growing ascertainment of the future threat environment and the emergence of the 
containment policy during 1947 protected the Army from additional cuts (Edwards 
1999, 19-25). A year after George F. Kennan’s ‘long telegram’, had emphasized the 
futility of a peaceful co-existence with communist Russia, Truman publically called for 
a containment of communist expansion in Europe and beyond in March (Gaddis 2005, 
19-20). Right from the start, a capable military force was considered an important 
element for the credibility of this emerging foreign policy strategy. Hence, the support 
for Greece and Turkey was backed by the presence of the 6
th
 US fleet in the 
Mediterranean Sea. These raised tensions were a powerful argument against further cuts 
and shifted the governmental balance in favor of the administration (e.g. Leroy Johnson 
(D-CA) in 93 Cong. Rec., June 4, 1947, H6359). 
 
The cumbersome rise of air power 
It was not before 1948 that an extensive public debate on the quantity and quality of 
postwar military policy occurred. After five months of preparations the Air Policy 
Commission issued its final report ‘Survival in the Air Age’ in January 1948, which 
provided a clear strategic vision and had a decisive impact on subsequent debates (Hurd 
1948b). Truman had appointed the commission, chaired by Thomas K. Finletter, to 
assess the strategic and economic significance of aviation and to recommend on the 
future course of aviation policy. The final report was utterly clear in its central message: 
“We believe that it is the overwhelming view of those most qualified to know that the 
country must have a new strategic concept for its defense and that the core of this 
concept is air power.” (Air Policy Commission 1948, 10) Expecting the nuclear 
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monopoly to last only shortly, the Finletter Report argued that only air atomic power 
would provide the retaliatory means to credibly deter nuclear aggression. Therefore, it 
recommended starting an immediate buildup of aviation and nuclear weapons. 
Moreover, the leaders of the aviation industry had been able to make their preferences 
heard during the commission’s hearings. They had warned in strong words that US air 
power was disintegrating due to a lack of funding and long-range planning (Hurd 1947). 
Hence, the Finletter Report recommended the funding of a ready aviation industrial base 
in order to be prepared when the US nuclear monopoly would be broken. While the 
commission suggested giving additional money to the Air Force despite the difficult 
fiscal situation rather than shifting money from the other branches, it left little doubts 
that this relative reorientation would face Service resistance: “We view with great 
anxiety the pressures from many sides directed towards the maintenance of yesterday’s 
establishment (…); of a determination to advance the interest of a segment at the 
sacrifice of the body as a whole.” (Air Policy Commission 1948, 30) The Air Policy 
Commission expressed hope that the civil leaders, especially the newly established 
Defense Secretary, would be able to overcome these difficulties and achieve “the 
maximum in security for the minimum cost.” (Air Policy Commission 1948, 30)  
Truman only reluctantly released the report, since its message threatened not only to 
foster strong disturbances in the newly unified military establishment, but constituted 
also a strong challenge to the administration’s course of fiscal austerity (Lazarowitz 
1999, 927). He accepted the relative importance of aviation and nuclear technologies, 
but was initially determined to keep defense spending in line. Therefore, he requested a 
FY 1949 defense budget of only $11 billion, but he provided the Air Force with largest 
share (Hurd 1948a). Yet, after communists took over Czechoslovakia in February and 
Truman called for a firm stand before joint Congress, the Services could capitalize on 
the changed threat environment. Shortly after Truman’s speech, Army Chief Bradley 
told the SubHAC: “The time to start building toward the Army which can perform the 
minimum functions which will be expected of it in an emergency is now. Any 
appreciable delay (…) may be disastrous.” (in SubHAC 1948a, 4) Air Force Secretary 
Symington argued that the defense expenditures “must be balanced against the terrible 
consequences of defeat and slavery through failure to have developed adequate air 
power.” (in SubHAC 1948b, 3)  
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The situation in Europe caused Truman to propose a defense budget supplemental. 
While the President aimed at “a peace program, not a war program” to avoid any 
provocation, the Services suggested additional funding of up to $22 billion, which 
Defense Secretary Forrestal cut to a recommendation of $9.5 billion (in New York 
Times 1948b). Yet, the Services and Forrestal were unable to overcome strong 
opposition to the still substantial supplemental from the White House. The prospects of 
the European Recovery Plan and tax cuts, which the Republicans sought to push in a 
second attempt through Congress, considerably limited the administration’s fiscal 
leverage. Hence, the Defense Secretary was finally forced to settle for a $3 billion 
supplemental, mostly benefiting the Army which convincingly claimed serious 
personnel shortcomings in case of an emergency in Europe. 
Although Truman called on the Services to present a unified position before Congress 
from now on, Forrestal, with limited institutional power, continuously failed to keep the 
Air Force under control.
137
 Symington recalled in a later interview that the Defense 
Secretary suggested him to quit, after he had told Forrestal that he could not accept the 
FY 1949 defense budget and refused to support it before Congress. Symington replied 
to the Defense Secretary: “I won’t support it, and I won’t quit.” (in Donovan 1982, 53; 
see also McFarland 2001, 25) Opening deep rifts with its sister Services, the Air Force 
Secretary and leading officers heavily lobbied Congress, in which support for air power 
was growing fast. Indeed, rather than responding to public demands since 1945, 
Congress warmly welcomed the Finletter Report and the final report of the bipartisan 
Congressional Aviation Policy Board as the longed for guidance in their search for an 
efficient defense posture (Norris 1948).
138
 Yet, in contrast to the report but in line with 
the public preferences, the lawmakers strongly focused on the Air Force and remained 
indifferent with regard to Navy aviation.  
                                                             
137 With the Finletter Report and its popularity in mind, the Air Force leaders openly challenged the 
administration’s commitment to balanced forces even before the supplemental was sent to Congress. In 
their testimonies for the FY 1949 budget, Air Force Secretary Symington and the Air Force Chief of Staff 
Carl Spaatz criticized the authorized size of their branch as insufficient and claimed that the calculated 
costs to meet their requested buildup were hugely exaggerated. Forrestal tried to outflank and isolate the 
rebellious Air Force within the military establishment, by asking the JCS to assess whether the 
administration should support a larger Air Force. But his plan backfired as the JCS engaged in log-rolling 
and submitted a response which ignored any economic considerations in April. Unable to agree on a 
common position concerning the future force, the Chiefs settled for a maximum position with each 
Service estimating its own requirements proportional to a proposed buildup of the Air Force (Hogan 
1998, 106). 
138 The Congressional Aviation Policy Board, which had studied air power policy on behalf of Congress, 
reinforced the conclusions of the Finletter Report in its final report in March 1948 (Baldwin 1948a). 
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Thus, the House overwhelmingly passed an amendment introduced by the usually 
economy-minded HAC chairman John Traber (R-NY), providing additional $822 
million for the Air Force’s procurement. Especially Carl Vinson backed this 
amendment, providing money for the first step of a five-year-program to build up the 
Air Force, against strong resistance of the administration (94 Cong. Rec., April 14, 
1948, H4449, April 15, 1948, H4530-4542; Strout 1948b). The Senate approved the 
House’s supplement with only two nays, although the Truman administration had 
continued to oppose the additional funding and some lawmakers had voiced concerns 
over its fiscal implications (94 Cong. Rec. May 11, 1948, S5408; SubSAC 1948; 
Trussell 1948a). Angry about what he considered an insubordination by the Air Force 
leaders, the President refused to spend the additional $822 million in the FY 1949 
(Condit 1988, 4).
139
 Lawmakers voiced outrage, but considered the issue not important 
enough to put further pressure on the administration. With the supplemental favoring 
the Army and Truman withholding the additional money for the Air Force, the ground 
forces gained again the largest share of the budget. 
Towards the end of the decade, the conflict between the political and military actors 
over the course of the military transition within the administration ran increasingly out 
of control, making reasonable coordination by the Defense Secretary almost impossible. 
Although the President and his economic advisors set a planning figure of $15 billion 
for the FY 1950 defense budget in May 1948, Forrestal instructed the Services to base 
their initial calculations on military considerations rather than budget constraints. As a 
result, the Services came up with requests for $30 billion in total (Donovan 1982, 59). 
Again, the request was not the outcome of a concerted effort for a common defense, but 
the sum of the Services’ individual estimations to meet the Soviet Union’s capabilities. 
Since the request was clearly unrealistic, Forrestal recommended a ceiling of $14.4 
billion
140
 and asked the JCS to revise the budget request in cooperation with the OSD’s 
budget advisory committee. The resulting compromise still proposed a total of $23.6 
billion, presenting the Defense Secretary with a dilemma: On the one hand, the Service 
chiefs concluded that $15 billion was simply not enough money for the tasks at hand. 
                                                             
139 Although the economizers did not regard the additional defense expenditures as a real danger to the 
economy, the Council of Economic Advisors argued in its quarterly memorandum to the President that 
“[e]very citizen must recognize that further diversion of productive effort to military uses inevitably 
involves some sacrifice of civilian types of consumption.” (in Brune 1989, 361) 
140 This recommendation is below Truman’s ceiling due to estimated $600 million for stockpiling 
strategic materials. 
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On the other hand, Forestall failed to convince the President or any other influential 
member of the administration of the need for spending above Truman’s ceiling. He 
finally evaded the showdown with either side and submitted a proposal with three 
budget scenarios to the White House: The first scenario summed up to $23.6 billion, the 
second option asked for a middle ground solution of $16.9 billion and the third model 
kept the $14.4 billion ceiling (Alsop/Alsop 1949). Truman immediately approved the 
$14.4 figure and thus incurred not only the wrath of the Services, but also further 
damaged the standing of Forrestal.  
When Truman sent the request to Congress, he stressed the importance of a balance 
between the branches in anticipation of congressional opposition, since the request 
again provided almost similar amounts to all three Services (Norris 1949). But the air 
power advocates on Capitol Hill rapidly moved to challenge the request. Vinson, new 
HASC chairman, declared it a “mistake” to divide the budget equally in order to keep 
the Services “satisfied.” (in Norris 1949) He even suggested a budget increase for all 
Services of almost $1.7 billion in total and argued “that we can ill afford, in these 
troubled days, to fail to give heed to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as is proposed 
in the President’s budget.” (in SubHAC 1949, 216) Yet, the House Appropriations 
Committee only agreed on an increase in the Air Force budget of $800 million by 
shifting funding from other defense programs (Waggoner1949).  
As in earlier years, lawmakers expressed their support for air power only by adding to 
the Air Force accounts, but without a reference to the parallel societal demands. When 
Harry Sheppard (D-CA), member of the SubHAC, introduced an amendment backed by 
numerous HASC members from both parties to provide additional $300 million for the 
Navy flyers, Mahon and other members of the appropriation committee and 
subcommittee moved to oppose the changes. Albert J. Engel (R-MI), ranking minority 
member on the SubHAC, argued: “If the Navy is not getting an adequate number of 
planes with that money, it is because they are spending the money for super carriers and 
other weapons than airplanes. (…) If they are short of airplanes in this bill it is because 
they themselves, Mr. Chairman, did not put them in.” (95 Cong. Rec., April 13, 1949, 
H4527) And Mahon urged the House: “But please let us not try to divide the defense 
dollars into three equal parts. (…) We are not the servants of the Army and Navy and 
the Air Force. We are the servants of the American people.” (95 Cong. Rec., April 13, 
1949, H4528) In the end, the House voted Sheppard’s amendment down.  
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In the Senate, the SubHAC, chaired by Elmer Thomas (D-OK), reported a return to the 
administration’s initial request, after the representatives of the Air Force largely 
refrained from challenging the administration’s original budget request. Air power 
advocates, led by conservative Republican Knowland (R-CA), who tried to add at least 
some additional money for the aviation buildup, suffered a further defeat on the floor, as 
a clear majority followed the committee’s recommendations (Washington Post 1949a). 
Most opponents of additional Air Force funding in the Senate did not deny the need for 
a buildup of air power and the recommendations of the Finletter Report, which the air 
power advocates vehemently referred to. They rather argued that this was not the time 
to hurry, since new technologies were on the way and the administration including the 
Air Force had not asked for more at the moment. A statement of the conservative 
Republican Wherry (R-NE), Senate Minority leader and member of the SubSAC, made 
this congressional subordination clear. Referring to Air Force Secretary Symington, he 
argued: “During the Eightieth Congress, (…) he came out for a 70-group air force, and I 
supported him. Now the Secretary (…) comes before the committee and is perfectly 
willing to take a 48-group air force. Once again I rely upon his judgment.” (95 Cong. 
Rec., August 26, 1949, S12305) While air power supporters argued that the Air Force 
Secretary was testifying under orders, a clear majority of the Senate was unwilling to 
take on the administration.  
The successive deadlock in conference could only be solved after the Senate agreed to 
the House’s increases for the Air Force with the understanding that Truman would again 
withhold the money (95 Cong. Rec., October 12, 1949, S14355). The overall 
appropriation in October 1949 was only slightly above the administration’s request. 
While the Navy and Army gained almost similar shares, the Air Force was the major 
beneficiary.
141
 But the President indeed denied spending the additional money and 
                                                             
141 The FY 1950 defense budget was not the only congressional debate with military significance during 
summer and fall of 1949. After yearlong negotiations, the administration asked for ratification of the 
North Atlantic Treaty in August. As expected, isolationists from the right and the left feared the loss of 
autonomy and opposed the US participation in a predominantly European alliance, which they considered 
a departure from centuries of American foreign policy tradition (Doenecke 1979, 160). In the end, they 
proved unsuccessful to overcome the bipartisan support backed by Vandenberg and the Senate ratified the 
treaty with a clear majority on July 21, 1949 (Briggs 1994, 42). Four days later, the administration 
submitted a military assistance request. Despite increased short-term expenditures, Truman believed that 
military assistance would save money in the long run by enabling US partners to carry some of the 
military burden of containment. Again, isolationists and fiscal hawks including powerful Southern 
Democrats objected to the program. In fact, it is questionable whether Congress would have passed the 
military assistance bill without the successful nuclear test of the Soviet Union (Kaplan 1988, 37). But 
against this background, Congress enacted the Mutual Defense Assistance Bill in October 1949. The JCS 
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protesting lawmakers saw no possibility to force the President to change his position 
(Washington Post 1949b).  
 
Summary 
While the domestic impact on the budget size is apparent, the influence of societal 
demands on the budget distribution is small. Early societal preferences for a distribution 
in favor of the Air Force did neither affect the administration nor Congress. Thus, 
societal demands had no early influence on the budget distribution, which was largely 
driven by ad-hoc needs. Only by 1948 did the Congress decisively move in support of 
air power and thus met societal demands. But public demands, which were specific 
since 1945, were hardly involved in this turn. Independent expert opinion, expressed in 
the Finletter Report, the Congressional Aviation Policy Board report, and Service 
members’ testimonies were much more decisive. While the aviation industry was able 
to influence the turn through the Finletter Report, no further impact of societal demands 
is evident. 
 
5.2.1.2. Buildup 
The implementation of NSC-68 
By 1950, the limitations of a military policy with continuous spending caps and no a 
clear qualitative priority became increasingly apparent. After Truman requested another 
balanced defense budget including $13.1 billion in new budget authority for FY 1951 
and Defense Secretary Johnson indicated that this budget would become the model of 
defense spending through FY 1952, Air Force Secretary Symington publically 
complained that an “arms outlay of 13.5 billion, in the ‘cold war’ with Russia, is not 
buying military superiority.” (in McFarland 2001, 35; see also Norris 1950a; 1950b) 
There existed only two possible solutions to this dilemma: Either to set qualitative 
priorities or to spend more money. While the public and congressional majorities had 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
was less than enthusiastic about the alliance and military assistance to allies (Kaplan 1984, 69-70). They 
feared the redirection of parts of their already strained budgets for European military assistance. 
Furthermore, they were concerned that the formal engagement in European security left no exit options 
and could drag the US into a war with the numeric superior Red Army over European mainland. Given 
the allies’ weakness, they would remain of little help in a military conflict for some time. 
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come to the conclusion that the former option was most appropriate, the administration 
had made only slow progress with regard to a prioritization, as the Services had kept the 
political costs of any changes from the status-quo high.
142
 Instead, fueled by the Soviet 
Union’s successful nuclear test and the communist takeover in China, Acheson and 
Nitze started to challenge the economizers’ budget ceilings by 1950 (Gaddis 1980, 166). 
The formulation of NSC-68 in spring 1950 became the defense hawks’ political vehicle 
to break the economizers’ phalanx.143 According to Acheson (1969, 374), the 
document’s purpose was “to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not 
only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out.” Its 
authors sought to provide coherence to the erratic national security policy by calling for 
a defense policy closely tied to the Soviet Union’s capabilities and predominantly based 
on military rather than economic necessities. NSC-68 marked the departure from 
Kennan’s emphasis on political and largely reactive containment to a more robust and 
active response to communist expansion (NSC 1950, 99). In line with the Finletter 
Report and against the background of the unexpected early end of the nuclear 
monopoly, NSC-68 argued that the Soviet Union would possess enough nuclear bombs 
to seriously harm the United States by 1954.
144
 Based on this forecast, Nitze and the 
NSC study group stressed that the current US military policy was insufficient to meet 
the Soviet buildup and international commitments. Thus, in order to be prepared by 
1954, the report concluded: “A building up of the military capabilities of the United 
States and the free world is a precondition (…) to the protection of the United States 
against disaster.” (NSC 1950, 92) NSC-68 did not specify the costs of the buildup, but 
there was no doubt that a significantly increased funding would be necessary and the 
members of the NSC-68 working group informally assumed annual budgets of $40 
                                                             
142 While the administration’s military policy did not depart from the balance, military strategy relied on 
air atomic power nonetheless. Thus, the JCS’s war plans ‘Pincher’ in 1946 and ‘Halfmoon’ in 1948 put 
emphasis on atomic bombs (Ross 1988; Millett/Maslowski 1984, 477; Rosenberg 1979, 64,67). And the 
NATO’s strategic concept in January 1950 assigned the strategic bombing mission to the US (Kaplan 
1988, 39). This caused a strange mismatch as the US hardly possessed the arsenal of nuclear bombs and 
means of delivery to justify its strategic reliance on nuclear power (Millett/Maslowski 1984, 477-478). 
143 Based on a directive of Truman in January to review the US foreign and security policy, NSC-68 was 
prepared by a study group of State and Defense Department officials chaired by Paul Nitze. It’s threat 
assessment largely reconfirmed NSC-20/4, drafted by Kennan and approved in 1948, arguing that the 
Soviet Union had the capabilities to overrun continental Europe as well as the Middle East within six 
months and that they would possess the means to attack the USA by atomic, biological and chemical air 
strikes by 1955 (Donovan 1982, 27-28). 
144 The report estimated that the Soviets already possessed 10-20 atomic bombs, would have 45-90 in 
1952 and at least 200 in 1954 (NSC 1950, 66). 
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billion or more (Nitze 1980, 173; Acheson 1969, 377).
145
 With regard to the quality of 
the transition, NSC-68 ran counter to the public and congressional position. It argued 
that the US should maintain a broad force posture and build up a spectrum of means, 
which allowed responding to different levels of Cold War escalation and symmetrically 
balancing any Soviet capability (Gaddis 1980, 168-169). Nuclear means were a 
necessary but by no means sufficient part of these balanced preparations. 
The authors of NSC-68 were well aware that a buildup faced particular hurdles within a 
democracy: “The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on 
recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold 
war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake.” (NSC 1950 
108) The message of NSC-68 was kept simple and blunt on purpose to reach the 
average citizen (Acheson 1969, 375). Thus, the defense hawks sought to create a 
responsive influence by the public. But the public showed no sense of urgency before to 
the Korean War and remained passive. In fact, after a hike in 1948, the salience of 
national security, while still fairly large, was decreasing for the second year in a row 
(Smith 1985). Hence, the public did not provide any help in the defense hawks’ 
campaign to implement NSC-68 (Hammond 1962). Moreover, Millard Tydings (D-MD) 
and Brien McMahon (D-CT), both important figures in defense policy, urged new 
international arms control efforts in the face of the Soviet Union’s nuclear tests rather 
than a buildup in Congress in February 1950 (Acheson 1969, 377-378). And within the 
administration, the defense hawks made only slow progress in promoting the policy 
recommendations of NSC-68. After Defense Secretary Johnson had repeatedly clashed 
with Acheson and Nitze during the formulation of NSC-68, he finally approved the 
report in April, which was supported by all Service secretaries and Chiefs of Staff 
(Acheson 1969, 373-374). But Truman postponed his final approval and asked the NSC 
to specify the programs and resulting costs first. The President figured that the review of 
the document from a budgetary point of view would make sure that representatives of 
the economizers could join the review group and probably calm its ambitions.  
The review indeed resulted in a stalemate between economizers and defense hawks that 
could not be solved before North Korean troops crossed the 38
th
 parallel and attacked 
                                                             
145 Resembling Keyserling’s thinking, the report leaned towards a Keynesian logic and argued that 
massive short-term military investments and state deficits would foster economic prosperity and thus 
contribute to a balanced budget in the long run. 
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South Korea on June 25, 1950 (Fautua 2006, 6). The US administration read this 
aggression as part of a broader Soviet strategy on weakening and testing Western 
commitment to containment and responded quickly: Only five days after it became 
apparent that South Korea would otherwise be rapidly defeated, Truman directed the 
deployment of US ground forces, which marked the full engagement of America into 
the war (on Korean War see Stewart 2005, 217-250; DOA 1956, 464-486). As 
Washington Post columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop (1950) wrote: “Now, (…) a grim 
spirit of urgency informs Washington.” 
The administration backed the military effort by rapidly expanding the defense budget. 
Although the regular budget, finally approved by Congress in September, provided only 
$13.2 billion, additional funds were requested soon. In order to cover the war expenses, 
Truman asked Congress in summer for an $11.6 billion supplement for FY 1951 which 
Congress approved with little adjustments. In fact, while lawmakers fought over the 
blame for the bad preparations prior to Korea, they shared Vinson’s analysis of the 
situation: “It is a situation that demands the utmost concentration of effort, the greatest 
forbearance, the greatest willingness to sacrifice we have ever had. Above all, it requires 
that for the indefinite future our people and this Congress must keep as our first thought 
the maintenance of an adequate defense.” (96. Cong. Rec., July 25, 1950, H10984) 
Against this backdrop, Congress quickly rallied behind the administration. Together 
with additional supplemental budgets in fall 1950 and spring 1951,
146
 the overall FY 
1951 budget exceeded $48 billion. Since the Army carried the main burden of the war 
in Korea, the largest share of the emergency funding went to the Army. 
But the other Services had little reason to complain, as the crisis in Korea provided the 
defense hawks with the necessary urgency to finally overcome the economizers’ 
resistance to a general buildup in accordance with NSC-68. The war was not only a 
powerful demonstration of the international system’s fragility, but also underlined the 
defense hawks’ claims concerning the qualitative inadequacy of the US military 
preparations including the implicit reliance on strategic nuclear weapons (Cagle 1964, 
12-13). Public opinion skyrocketed in support of a robust answer to the communist 
aggression. Against this backdrop, the recommendations of NSC-68 became the 
                                                             
146 For the second supplemental, the JCS initially requested $20 billion, which was reduced to $11 billion 
on November 22. Yet, when Chinese forces entered the war three days later, arguments for a faster 
mobilization won the upper hand again. Thus, Truman agreed to a NSC recommendation on a 
supplemental of $16.8 billion including more than $9 billion for the Army. 
157 
 
foundation of the administration’s military policy even before its policy conclusions 
were formally approved in September 1950: “The once-disregarded document 
dominated the whole scene, and all its clauses, including the four-year defense time 
schedule, became the policy makers’ law.” (Alsop/Alsop 1950) While the public rallied 
behind the administration, the acceptance of NSC-68 inevitably implied the denial of 
the societal demands for a prioritization of the Air Force. In fact, more of the same 
rather than an innovative redistribution became the central guideline and the need for a 
balanced buildup was hardly questioned for the rest of Truman’s tenure.  
Only the discussion on the long-term costs of a buildup until 1954, the year of maximal 
risk according to the NSC-68, remained controversial and skeptical voices with regard 
to its costs quickly returned.
147
 Indeed, public support for an unconditional buildup soon 
threatened to ebb away, as the early military engagements revealed the strength of the 
opponent. The creation of the Committee on Present Danger was a response of the 
defense hawks close to the administration in order to sustain the public support for the 
buildup and thus maintain pressure on the economizers.
148
 But the international 
situation, especially the Chinese intervention, rather than the public opinion or the CPD 
contributed most to the defense hawks’ case. For the economizers, not the current 
societal demands, but the fear of a future public backlash in opposition to excessive 
spending had significant weight. Marshall and Lovett were well aware that a far-
reaching mobilization would impact on the economy and domestic welfare which in 
turn could undermine public support for the buildup and the President in general 
(Condit 1988, 230-233). Thus, Marshall suggested reviewing the JCS’s initial estimates 
of $235 billion for a balanced armed forces’ buildup over a five-year period. Although 
Truman formally approved the policy recommendations in NSC-68 in September, he 
agreed with Marshall and ordered a second estimate of its budgetary implications.
149
 In 
cooperation with the Budget Bureau, Defense Undersecretary Lovett drove the JCS 
                                                             
147 Only a minority of the extended budgets over the following years was spent for the war effort. 
Between FY 1951-1953, 60 percent of the defense budget was spent on a general buildup as outlined in 
NSC-68. 
148 E.g. Johnson accepted the reality of the threat, but carefully scrutinized the Service’s proposals against 
the NSC-68 requirements in order to avoid unnecessary spending. 
149 NSC-68 had several additions. NSC-68/1 included military programs and their projected costs 
estimated by the Services and submitted to the NSC by Secretary Marshall in September. NSC-68/2 
contained the policy conclusions of NSC-68. In fall 1950, NSC-68/3 and NSC-68/4 which became the 
basis for the FY 1952 budget planning adjusted the scenarios outlined in NSC-68 to the new reality of the 
Korean War and the Chinese intervention. It called for substantial active forces, a large supply of war 
reserves, and a mobilization base in case of a global conflict (Hogan 1998, 322).  
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estimates to $131 billion. A final decision was not taken, however, as Truman finally 
instructed the group to focus on the FY 1952 budget and postponed the discussion about 
the overall buildup.  
Despite this temporary setback, the implementation of NSC-68 happened quickly. In 
December 1950, Truman approved NSC-68/4, which advanced the 1954 buildup goal to 
mid-1952 reflecting an increased fear of escalation after the Chinese intervention. A 
month later, Truman (1951) used the State of the Union Address to draw a grave picture 
of the international situation and to ask Congress to enact tax increases for a continuous 
military buildup and further US efforts in Asia and especially Europe.
150
 With the 
buildup accelerating, the Services estimated requirements of $82 billion for the FY 1952 
defense budget, which Lovett later referred to as “letters to Santa Claus.” (in Condit 
1988, 250) Arguing that the economy would not be able to supply goods and services to 
the extent of the Services’ request, the Budget Bureau reduced the request to 
approximately $49 billion. Yet, with the armed forces complaining that the Budget 
Bureau had partially cut into vital programs, Lovett added some additional money 
focusing on equipment such as aircraft and ships, which took long production times. 
Thus, the Navy and the Air Force benefited disproportionally in their procurement 
accounts. Although this prioritization was partly consistent with the societal demands, it 
resulted from technical rather than political considerations. 
The final budget request of $56.2 billion was met with some doubts on Capitol Hill. 
Especially lawmakers in the House questioned whether such high expenditures were 
still necessary as the Korean War had settled into a stalemate and first negotiations were 
on the way (Condit 1988, 258; Stevens 1951a). The suspicion of lawmakers that the 
                                                             
150 Since political and military actors prepared for a potential total war with the Soviet Union rather than 
the limited war in Korea, far-reaching economic steps were taken. On December 15, 1950, Truman 
declared a national emergency and announced the establishment of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
(ODM) to coordinate rearmament efforts and defense production. The ODM sought to create a permanent 
and sufficiently large defense industrial base to sustain a large military program without hurting the 
economy in the long run. Moreover, Congress passed the Defense Production Act in 1950 in order to 
avoid inflation and supply problems. The bill included standby controls over wages, prices, and rents. 
Furthermore, it allowed the government to expand defense plants, restrict credit, allocate scarce 
commodities, and settle labor disputes. Although the Act was subject to considerable controversy, 
Congress renewed it in 1951 and 1952. Especially Truman’s seizure of steel mills to avoid supply 
shortage in the name of national security in April 1952 caused heavy opposition and damaged the 
President’s reputation (Hogan 1998, 344-355). Eisenhower terminated the economic controls soon after 
his inauguration, but maintained procurement clearly larger than during the late 1940s (Huntington 1961, 
79-80; Doughty 1979, 14). This would keep production lines in operation and thus available in case of an 
emergency (Watson 1986, 150-152; Snyder 1962, 400-406). It also allowed better planning and more 
stable income for military suppliers, which would benefit the defense economy.  
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Services did not need and were not able to properly manage the large amounts of money 
was further raised by various stories of waste in the national press (e.g. 97 Cong. Rec., 
August 8, 1950, H9540-9541). Moreover, the American public had grown increasingly 
unwilling to make further sacrifices in the name of national security and demonstrated 
general disappointment with the war situation in Korea. But central lawmakers still 
shared the administration’s grim assessment of the international situation and the 
resulting need of a balanced buildup. When introducing the FY 1951 appropriation bill 
in the House, Mahon, Chairman of the SubHAC, told his audience: “In my judgment, 
there is only a minimum hope that our difficulties with Russia can and will be solved 
short of war. (…) Let us, therefore, accelerate our military buildup program and seek to 
become stronger in guns and planes and plans (…) in order that we may be fortified 
mentally, spiritually, and physically for the testing days ahead.” (97 Cong. Rec., August 
8, 1950, H9543) To be sure, some isolationists and fiscal conservatives articulated 
disagreement with the administration’s buildup in quantitative terms. For example, 
Representative John T. Wood (R-ID), an outspoken opponent of the UN and NATO, 
strongly blamed the CPD for their attempts to support the administration’s policy “and 
thereby hasten the day so fervently hoped for by Joe Stalin when we will have spend 
ourselves into bankruptcy.” (97 Cong. Rec., February, 8, 1951, H668) But with the 
conservative Republicans shifting from isolationism to an aggressive roll-back strategy, 
they did neither seriously question the quantity nor the quality of the request.  
In fall, the Senate voted for a budget even larger than the administration’s request, since 
the negotiations in Korea had run into first difficulties. The final congressional 
compromise provided $55.5 billion including an additional billion for American air 
power, in response to complaints that the Air Force lacked behind with regard to its 
general buildup goals. While this made the Air Force the main beneficiary of the 
budget, the congressional euphoria with regard to the air atomic power had markedly 
decreased since the Soviet Union’s nuclear test. Conservative Republicans remained 
focused on air and sea power, but especially the Democrats were less sure of the utility 
of the former panacea: “Those who flippantly talk about flying over some far-away land 
and tossing out an atomic bomb and coming home and saying, ‘The war is over,’ have 
not thought this thing through.” (Mahon in 97 Cong. Rec., August 8, 1950, H9543)  
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Early stretch-out of the buildup 
While Congress approved the FY 1952 budget, plans for a further buildup within the 
administration came to a sudden end. Unprepared for the massive buildup, the economy 
showed strong difficulties to cope with the rapidly increasing military demands in 
equipment and services during 1951 and the military production for NSC-68/4 fell 
significantly behind schedule.
151
 Given the eminent problems in the production, the 
President, the OSD, other economizers, and officials involved in the mobilization effort 
doubted that the economy could tolerate defense budgets like the FY 1952 budget in the 
long run. They feared that a breaking point in the civil economy would further 
undermine public support for the long-turn buildup program, which had already 
markedly cooled off (Condit 1988, 276-277; Stevens 1951b). Numerous prominent 
executives and the Chamber of Commerce publically warned that government spending 
would lead to large scale inflation and argued that mobilization should not go any 
further (Lo 1982; New York Times 1951d). Philip Reed, chairman of General Electric, 
criticized the administration’s plans, arguing that the “peak of the program is too high 
and comes too soon.” (in Forrest 1951) He added that “the dangers from another serious 
wave of inflation may be as great or greater than the dangers of further warlike moves 
on the part of Russia.” The OSD finally decided for the early creation of a strong 
plateau rather than to continue preparing for a peak year, arguing “that an arms 
production line in being is better than large and rapidly aging war reserve stocks.” 
(Norris 1952) In October 1951, the stretch-out of the buildup and benchmark for FY 
1953 defense spending of $45 billion, almost $20 billion below the JCS’ wishes, was 
approved by Truman. The buildup of the Air Force, which still lacked behind the other 
Services, gained by far the largest share in the budget request. Again, while the stretch-
out was driven by the anticipation of a public backlash, the Air Force prioritization was 
based on technical consideration. 
Lovett was convinced that the OSD’s efforts had taken out all the ‘fat’ and was possibly 
cutting “a little into the muscle” (Hinton 1952; see also Alsop/Alsop 1952a), but 
lawmakers received the request again with caution. Against the backdrop of public 
dissatisfaction, especially the Republicans but also fiscal conservatives among the 
Democrats grew concerned over the political implications of the buildup during an 
                                                             
151 The sudden buildup created shortages in raw materials, railroad cars, machine tools, and labor force. 
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election year, especially since a further international escalation seemed less likely: 
“With income taxes fresh in mind and an election at hand, Congress is in a mood to 
emphasize butter rather than guns.” (Strout 1952) Moreover, as the economy was only 
slowly meeting the buildup, the DOD’s budget carryover since FY 1951 had increased 
sharply and fostered complaints over waste. Hence, leading Democrats were unable to 
prevent the Republicans and the fiscal conservative Democrats to moderately reduce the 
budget to $43.9 billion (Condit 1988, 280; Morris 1952; New York Times 1952). Taft’s 
calls for a stronger prioritization on air power remained again unheard (Childs 1952). 
 
Public backlash and the New Look 
In 1952, public majorities put their growing dissatisfaction with Truman’s military and 
Korean policy to the ballot. The Democrats lost the presidential election and majorities 
in both chambers of Congress. Their presidential candidate, Adlai E. Stevenson, had 
campaigned on the promise to essentially continue NSC-68 including balanced forces. 
He had argued that the economy could support the military expenditures that security 
required (Bernstein 1971, 410, 424). High expenditures and taxes as well as inflation 
and casualties in Korea were the inevitable price to pay for freedom. In contrast, 
Eisenhower had called for reduced defense spending and a sustainable military with 
strong retaliatory power, but without a fixed target as outlined in NSC-68 (Huntington 
1961, 64-76). While both presidential candidates had promised to end the Korean War, 
only Stevenson had made clear that he fully agreed with Truman’s decision to keep the 
war limited. Eisenhower had argued instead that he “always stood behind General 
MacArthur in bombing those bases on the Yalu from which fighter planes are coming.” 
(in Bernstein 1971, 419)  
To be sure, the different conceptions of military policy were certainly not the only 
reason in favor of the Republican candidate. Other important issues including 
corruption, taxes and costs of living were also debated. But most domestic concerns 
were increasingly put in relation to and dominated by the Korean War and the general 
buildup to fight communism, which were seen as the reasons for the unpopular 
governmental economic interventions and excessive spending (Bernstein 1971, 429-
430). From the public point of view, the former war hero Eisenhower was not only more 
qualified to end the war, but also promoted the more efficient military policy option. He 
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was clearly more in line with societal demands promising to end the war, cut taxes, and 
reduce excessive expenditures and prioritize air power (Stevens 1953a).  
When Truman proposed his last budget, requesting $41.3 billion in new budget 
authority equally distributed across the Services, there were widespread expectations 
that further reduction would follow with the new President. But when Wilson asked the 
Services shortly after taking office to estimate the impact of reductions for a $35 billion 
in FY 1954, the proposed cuts caused tumult among the armed forces (Childs 1953a). 
The Services argued that they could not fulfill their tasks, especially the war in Korea, 
with reduced spending bringing the US in a strategically vulnerable position. Yet, 
Eisenhower regarded Truman’s overall budget request with a deficit of $9.9 billion as 
unacceptable. In April 1953, the Republican administration issued NSC-149/2, 
concluding that a strong economy based on balanced budgets and moderate taxes was 
the essential foundation for a sustainable security (Hogan 1998, 393, 401; Watson 1986, 
61). And almost all cabinet members agreed that defense spending, accounting for 73 
percent of the federal budget in 1953, was the area in which real savings should be 
achieved (Boyle 2005, 27). As an early sign of tightened civil control, the NSC agreed 
on reductions despite the Services’ complaints. The final FY 1954 defense budget 
request was $5.2 billion smaller than the Truman proposal, but did not include any 
further decisions with regard to the qualitative course of military policy yet (New York 
Times 1953a). 
Most savings should come from the reduction of new money for the buildup of the Air 
Force, which still had a large carryover of unobligated money from earlier procurement 
appropriations (Snyder 1962, 397-399). Since the assumption of a fixed date of 
maximum danger was replaced by a continuous state of preparedness, the 
administration considered it feasible to stretch the Air Force buildup beyond 1955. Of 
the three Services only the Army gained some additional money, reflecting the 
administration’s intention to provide sufficient funding for the war efforts. Thus, the 
Army rather than the Air Force gained the largest share of the budget in Eisenhower’s 
first defense budget. 
Reactions were mixed on Capitol Hill following a continuous pattern for most of 
Eisenhower’s years (Norris 1953a). The Republicans were split between the 
internationalist and the conservative nationalist wing. Some backed the administration’s 
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request, e.g. HASC chairman Dewey Short (R-MO), and some – with the end of the 
Korean War in sight – called for additional cuts. Chairman of the HAC, John Taber (R-
NY) as well as chairman of the SubHAC, Richard Wigglesworth (R-MA), and the 
conservative wing with Taft and Daniel A. Reed (R-NY) among others called for further 
spending cuts to reduce taxes. In contrast, most Democrats were unwilling to be seen as 
soft on defense (Dueck 2010, 93). They wanted to continue the buildup and therefore 
criticized the Air Force cuts. Even prior to the budget request, former Air Force 
Secretary Symington (D-MO), minority leader Johnson (D-TX) and Jackson (D-WA) 
had urged the administration to refrain from additional cuts (Childs 1953a). Now, 
Democrats attacked the administration arguing that “our first line of defense is certainly 
not the place to fulfill campaign promises” (Maybank (D-SC) in New York Times 
1953a) and that the Air Force cuts were “too big a gamble.” (McCormack (D-MA) in 
Norris 1953a) Samuel Yorty (D-CA), an Air Force veteran and representative of a 
district with large aircraft industry, even embarrassed the administration by disclosing 
internal Air Force statements that the cuts would reduce its combat power below the 
absolute minimum (Hinton 1953a).  
The Air Force leadership denied their involvement in this disclosure, but there is no 
doubt that the Services fought hard to reinstate the lost funding. The outgoing Army and 
Air Force Chiefs Collins and Vandenberg testified before Congress that the reductions 
increased the security risk. Especially the latter openly attacked the administration’s 
sudden turn to more economy, which would threaten the US strategic capabilities and 
had caused confusion among the Service’s planning (Norris 1953b; Hinton 1953b). 
Against this opposition, Wilson took efforts to defend the Air Force funding from 
attacks by Democratic lawmakers and at the same time prevent further cuts by the 
Republican majority. Eisenhower repeatedly publically intervened in the debate, 
supporting the administration’s budget request. Although the request’s priorities ran 
counter to the public position, the new President could build on his high approval rates, 
the public reduced support for defense spending and the belief that the savings would 
reduce waste and not compromise the national security (Hilsman 1958, 737; Gallup 
1953). In the end, the House voted down several Democratic amendments to increase 
the Air Force budget largely along party lines, but followed the SubHAC 
recommendation to reduce the administration’s request by an additional $1.4 billion 
with the largest share coming from the Army account (Christian Science Monitor 1953). 
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The Senate closely followed the House bill with the Republicans again defeating 
Democratic amendments for more Air Force spending and the final budget departed 
little from the administration’s request (Leighton 2001, 88-113; Hinton 1953c). 
While the budget debates for FY 1954 went on in Congress, the Eisenhower 
administration prepared its military strategic reorientation. Already in May, Eisenhower 
announced the replacement of the Joint Chiefs and the CJCS as a sign of the break with 
the past and an assertion of civilian control. Taft had argued for some time that the 
current chiefs stood in the way of a new military policy, since they were clearly 
committed to Truman’s positions (Taylor 1959, 20; Childs 1953b).152 In the same 
month, the Eisenhower administration launched the so-called Project Solarium to 
identify the most fiscally and strategically sound defense policy for the coming years. 
Three independent task forces compared the financial implications of three policy 
options towards the Soviet Union: A containment option, an aggressive roll back option, 
and a position which relied on the threat of total war (Dockrill 1996, 33-35). Besides the 
task forces, Eisenhower directed the new CJCS, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, to propose 
a military posture based on the implications of NSC 149/2 (Trest 1998, 158). The 
CJCS’s final report argued that the new strategic perspective would require a clear 
emphasis on nuclear deterrence. All other elements of the national security would have 
to give in order to finance nuclear capabilities without straining the budget. The report 
furthermore suggested a reduction of troops in Europe and Asia and the creation of a 
mobile defense force.
153
  
The results of both assessments were integrated after hard bargaining in a new policy 
paper in October 1953. The end product, NSC-162/2, framed the so-called New Look 
policy, in which the ambivalence between the desire for less expensive defense without 
putting American and allied security at risk was a basic theme. Dockrill (1996, 2, 36-42) 
identifies four differences in NSC-162/2 compared to previous policy: (1) The NSC-
68’s massive buildup for the year of maximum danger was replaced by moderate 
constant armament for the long haul. This perspective should detach US military policy 
from the prior tendency to constantly react to external events and provide more 
                                                             
152
 He suspected especially CJCS Bradley to be a Truman partisan after the general had publically sided 
with the administration during the Great Debate on deployments to Europe. 
153 Critics of the proposal, including State Secretary Dulles, doubted the ability of American allies to 
offset the reduction on the US side and feared that the partners would misread the redeployment as an 
isolationist move. 
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coherence.
154
 The capacity of the economy and the availability of new weapon systems 
became the primary criteria (Snyder 1962, 498). (2) The national security must not 
jeopardize the democratic state and economic stability; (3) The US should use nuclear 
weapons as major means of deterrence. This far-reaching reliance on nuclear weapons 
departed from Truman’s preparations for the full mission spectrum and established 
“massive retaliation as the first line of defense.” (Hogan 1998, 467); (4) The US should 
promote increased allied efforts and deploy less forces abroad. As Eisenhower argued: 
“We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions.” (in Dueck 
2010, 98)  
In sum, the logic of the New Look turned the force planning of NSC-68 upside down, 
since it “started from the internal objective of economy and the balanced budget, moved 
from there to the idea that significant economies could be made only by a ‘selection’ of 
military means (…), from there to the need for devising a strategy which would permit 
such ‘selection’, and, finally, to the need for a ‘national policy’ directive sanctioning 
such a strategy.” (Snyder 1962, 498-499) With regard to the budget distribution, the 
New Look was a strong innovation from the prior focus on balanced budgets, which 
characterized most Truman years. To be sure, already earlier budgets had emphasized 
air power, but for technical reasons related to the slower buildup of sophisticated 
equipment rather than for an explicit strategic rationale. 
Especially the Army, for which the New Look was “an unmitigated disaster” (Bacevich 
2002, 87), did not accept this change without a fight. Although NSC-68 had eased the 
conflict, the Army leaders had followed the debate on nuclear strategic bombing with 
strong concerns for some time (Ridgway 1956). In the generals’ eyes, the new 
administration’s focus on nuclear deterrence not only reduced the role of the Army to an 
auxiliary branch, but also dangerously narrowed strategic options and left no room for 
gradual escalation. Maxwell Taylor, the later Army Chief of Staff, wrote Ridgway 
shortly after the Korean War in 1953: “An outstanding impression from the operations 
in Korea has been the ineffectiveness or inapplicability of many of our modern weapons 
to the requirement of the Korean type of limited war.” (Taylor 1959, 15) The New Look 
fundamentally contradicted this Army experience. In the Army leaders’ perspective, the 
war had proven the limits of deterrence and the risk of failing to prepare for 
                                                             
154 Yet, the debates over a bomber gap in 1955 and a missile gap after the Sputnik-shock in 1957 show the 
limits of this detachment (Roman 1995).  
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conventional war. A sound armament policy should prepare forces for combat, instead 
of speculating on the avoidance of combat. Furthermore, Ridgway questioned the 
morality of a strategy, which allowed for the annihilation of cities and other civil 
targets. Against this backdrop, the Army organized resistance at all levels. Within the 
administration, the Army Chief challenged the New Look, but failed to convince the 
JCS or the NSC.
155
 As all attempts to convince the political actors had failed, the Army 
escalated the conflict over the New Look a year later by taking the case to the public. 
The Army’s attempts to create public support were particularly damaging, as they 
revealed cracks in the US determination to engage in nuclear war.
156
  
But the President’s commitment to the New Look was steadfast. Radford outlined the 
new strategy to the public in December 1953, arguing that “[o]ffensively, defensively 
and in support of other forces, air power is a primary requirement.” (in New York 
Times 1953d) In a speech in January, Secretary of State Dulles (1954), who had framed 
the underlying concept already in a 1952 Life Magazine article, publically introduced 
the term ‘massive retaliation’ (Dueck 2010, 96). The New Look came very close to the 
public position and caused therefore little public controversy. In fact, societal demands 
had a large impact on the New Look policy. While the details of NSC-162/2 were the 
result of extensive strategic consideration within the administration, the prior elections 
had strongly reduced the administration’s policy options. Majorities had voted for less 
state intervention and less federal spending and therefore blocked the option of large 
defense spending. At the same time, voters had sided with Eisenhower’s notion of 
strong retaliatory power rather than with Stevenson’s balanced budget approach.  
Although Wilson contended that the transition to the New Look would be evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary, the administration started to implement the new prioritization 
with the FY 1955 defense budget. Prior to the full formulation of NSC-162/2, Dodge 
and Eisenhower had pressured Wilson to realize further savings for FY 1955, but in the 
strategic limbo especially the Army and Navy had pushed for balanced budget shares 
                                                             
155 Within the DOD, CJCS Radford stood with the civil leaders and the Air Force, the main beneficiary of 
massive retaliation, had little reason to complain. While CNO Carney was sympathetic to some of 
Ridgway’s arguments, he preferred to secure a role for the Navy in the new strategy and refrained from 
openly siding with the Army. 
156
 Indeed, Eisenhower had come to the conclusion that the advent of thermonuclear weapons had made 
any war with the Soviet Union an unthinkable catastrophe and thus left only a credible deterrence as 
feasible option (Linn 2007, 165). Any doubts that the US might use nuclear weapons could entice the 
Soviet Union to test the US determination leaving no other options than nuclear escalation or being 
caught bluffing. 
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(Alsop/Alsop 1953). Thus, Wilson presented an initial request of more than $42 billion 
in October 1953. Eisenhower was furious about the Services’ request and told them to 
accept the administration’s new priorities (Hogan 1998, 408-409). The Pentagon 
subsequently reduced defense expenditures to $37.5 billion including $29.9 billion in 
new budget authority, cutting almost $3 billion from the Army’s request (Bacevich 
2002; Norris 1953c). On Capitol Hill, Army leaders attacked the budget and its 
distribution. Ridgway made clear that “a reduction in the order of magnitude that we are 
making will certainly (…) leave us with less combat effectiveness than we had when we 
started.” (SubHAC 1954, 54) Implicitly challenging massive retaliation, he argued: 
“Man is the master of weapons and not their servant.” (SubHAC 1954, 49) But 
Republican lawmakers met these complaints with little goodwill. Only the Democrats 
supported the Army and renewed their calls for stronger defense. Senators Albert Gore 
(D-TN) and John F. Kennedy (D-MA) as well as the representative John W. 
McCormack (D-MA) criticized the conclusions of the policy review and the second year 
reductions in the defense budget (100 Cong. Rec., June 16, 1954, S8327-8347). They 
feared that a sole reliance on massive retaliation might lead to World War III (New 
York Times 1954). Yet, an attempt by Kennedy to add $350 million to the Army budget 
to maintain two divisions was defeated. Despite some doubts among the press (e.g. 
Alsop/Alsop 1954; Baldwin 1954a), the majority of the lawmakers was willing to give 
the New Look a chance. 
 
Summary 
The link between societal demands and the administration’s budget prioritization is 
surprisingly weak during most of the buildup years. While the extensions and the 
subsequent stretch-out of the defense budgets were roughly in line with societal 
demands, the distribution of the budget – even when leaving the immediate war funding 
aside – clearly differed from the dominant societal preferences. Especially during 1950 
and 1951, in which the salience was high and the largest impact from common 
preferences was theoretically expected, the match with governmental positions was 
particularly weak. Societal demands played no role in the administration’s turn to NSC-
68, which qualitative implications Congress accepted without hesitation. In fact, the 
advocates of NSC-68 were aware that their broad buildup plans ran counter to the 
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societal positions at the time. While the Korean War changed the tide in the 
administration and silenced Congress, societal demands returned after a short period of 
support for broad mobilization to a more critical position as the war made little 
progress. Yet, the public beating of the Democrats during the elections in 1950 
remained moderate. In contrast, the presidential campaign two years later was strongly 
shaped by the different conceptions of military policy, the disappointment over the 
Korean War and the rejection of further sacrifices for mobilization. While the 
specificities of the military policy were not yet fully clear, Eisenhower argued for a 
sustainable retaliatory force during his election campaign and promised to end the 
limited war in Korea and excessive federal expenditures. Early in office, Eisenhower 
turned indeed to a budget distribution, which met the public demands.  
 
5.2.2. Military organization 
5.2.2.1. Builddown 
‘Bring the boys home’ 
V-E Day marked the beginning of the greatest postwar demobilization of US armed 
forces in history. Driven by the American people’s desire to return to normal life and 
the imperative to return people to the civil economy, the active duty personnel of 12 
million was rapidly and drastically reduced (OSD 2008, 204; DOA 1956, 446-447). 
Planning for this impressive task had begun long before the war’s end (Sparrow 1994, 
31; Ballard 1983, 54).
157
 The Services reasoned that early planning would prevent an 
uncoordinated demobilization as after World War I and provide the foundation for a 
                                                             
157 In an early attempt to coordinate military demobilization within the military establishment, General 
Marshall presented War Department plans to the JCS in 1943. Based on this preparatory work, the JCS 
quickly agreed on several basic planning assumptions: (1) V-J would take at least a further year after V-E; 
(2) a partial demobilization would be possible after V-E; (3) the US would maintain a force of 400,000 
personnel in Europe after victory, partially as occupation force and partially due to lacking shipping 
capacities for redeployment; (4) some form of universal military training should be enacted to meet 
postwar military requirements; (5) all troops in Africa, the Middle East, South America and the Atlantic 
which were not required for their contribution to the Pacific war should be withdrawn or at least reduced; 
(6) requirements for a future international police force may be disregarded during the immediate planning 
(Gibson 1983, 49; Schnabel 1996, 92-93). Furthermore, the JCS accepted a point system as mechanism 
for personnel demobilization as suggested by the Roosevelt administration’s National Resources Planning 
Board. Although it was abolished in 1943, the board significantly contributed to the report 
‘Demobilization and Readjustment’ which laid out 96 recommendations for the transition including the 
recommendation to discharge military personnel on an individual instead of a unit level (Gibson 1983, 
42). The report also became the basis for the Mustering-out Pay Act and the GI Bill, both enacted in 
1944, which provided legislation for a successful reintegration of veterans after the war (Ross 1969, 67-
124; Sharp 1976, 14-18). 
169 
 
significant postwar force, which they considered vital in the new environment (Sparrow 
1994). As Secretary of War Stimson argued during his farewell statement in 1945: 
“[W]e must never again allow ourselves to be caught in a state of complete 
unreadiness.” (Stimson 1945)  
The Services planned a rapid demobilization which would lead to a substantial 
permanent peacetime force of 25 Army divisions, 70 Air Force groups and 339 major 
combat ships for the Navy (Rearden 1984, 15). After the surrender of Japan, assistant 
Army Chief Edwards told lawmakers that the Army aimed at a postwar strength of 2.5 
million including the Army Air Forces by the end of FY 1946 (in HMAC 1945b, 3-8). 
This represented a significant reduction from the wartime force, but it was almost ten 
times larger than the personnel levels in 1940 (OSD 2008, 204). While Edwards 
explained that this was not the figure at which the draw-down would finally level off, 
the War Department was clearly pushing for a personnel strong postwar force. The 
Navy Department was less concerned with personnel but ambitious with regard to its 
force structure. Determined to fight for a big and independent postwar Navy, Basic 
Post-War Plan No. 1 of April 1945 planned to keep most ships after the war, although 
many would be put in inactive reserve (Davis 1966, 113-114).
158
 During hearings in the 
House Naval Affairs Committee in fall 1945, the Navy outlined an active fleet including 
10 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, 31 cruisers, 70 submarines, and 135 destroyers 
(HNAC 1945, 1167; Davis 1966, 202-203, 211-212). At the same time, it proposed to 
reduce its war force of 3.3 million to 558,000 by September 1946. The Marine Corps 
were to shrink by three-quarters and reach 116,000 personnel. 
Yet, when actual demobilization gained momentum, the departments’ plans became 
soon obsolete and the military leaders were forced to react to societal demands. The 
administration came under enormous public pressure for fast demobilization after the 
Japanese surrender. Although in hindsight it seems clear that only a minority of the 
American people held strong preferences for rapid demobilization, the continuous calls 
to ‘bring the boys home’, the public fears of economic hardships after the war and the 
general preference for significantly smaller postwar forces clearly reduced the 
government’s leverage. Especially family members of deployed soldiers pushed for 
rapid release of their husbands, fathers or sons. Truman (1955, 509) recalled in his 
                                                             
158 The Basic Post-War Plan No. 1 was the last of several Navy plans. Earlier plans were soon dismissed 
as the directive became to “think big” (Davis 1966, 106). 
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memoirs: “Despite the dangerous speed with which the program was being carried out, 
public pressure on me and on the heads of the services for even faster demobilization 
continued to mount.” 
The Army Ground and Air Forces soon started to voice the negative military 
implications of the rapid and indiscriminate demobilization (Donovan 1977, 127). In 
November, the European Commander Eisenhower estimated that his troops “could 
operate in an emergency for a limited period at something less than 50% normal 
wartime efficiency.” (Sparrow 1994, 266) And Deputy Commander Clair Streett, 
Continental Air Force, informed his superior that “we will have soon reached a point, if 
it has not been reached, at which the Army Air Forces can no longer be considered 
anything more than a symbolic instrument of National Defense.” (in Craven/Cate 1983, 
569) Truman agreed with the military leaders’ concerns, but was unwilling to risk 
public wrath. In fact, the President even raised the pressure on the War Department by 
publically promising in September that more than 2 million soldiers would be home by 
Christmas.  
The speed of the Navy demobilization was hardly less drastic (Huntington 1961, 35-36). 
In September 1945, Navy planers assumed a reduction of only 336,800 personnel for 
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard until the end of the year, due to continuous needs 
for naval capacities for occupation tasks and especially the return of soldiers and 
supplies (Schnabel 1996, 97). Just six weeks later, Navy officials adjusted their numbers 
assuming up to 1.2 million separations for the same time span causing concerns similar 
to the War Department’s worries. Only one-third to one-half of the Navy warships was 
still considered ready to fight by fall 1945 (Gerhardt 1971, 32). In October, Forrestal 
wrote that the nation was “going back to bed at a frightening rate.” (in Boettcher 1992, 
48) Yet, an attempt by Vinson to fix the Navy’s postwar strength early on through a 
Concurrent Resolution entitled ‘Composition of the Postwar Navy’ failed, as the Senate 
– by request of the President – did not take up the Resolution for consideration (New 
York Times 1945b). Still, while the demobilization was realized faster than planned, the 
Navy remained close to its target in personnel and force structure (OSD 2008). 
In contrast, the societal pressure forced the personnel-heavy War Department not only 
to accelerate the speed of demobilization, but to adjust its depth, which seemed to make 
the Army’s worst nightmares of renewed insignificance come true. As opposed to rather 
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abstract costs of military policy, the separation from their loved ones was regarded by 
many as too much of a sacrifice in peacetimes. And the ground forces, whose strength 
rests on large personnel rather than technology, suffered disproportionally from these 
societal demands. In November 1945, the War Department departed from its initial 
target of 2.5 million and submitted a force target of 1.63 million by July 1946 and 1.34 
million the year after, both numbers including 400,000 for the Army Air Force. In 
January 1946, the new Army Chief Eisenhower warned that the US would “literally 
‘run out of Army’” by April if the discharge rate was not reduced (in SMAC 1946a, 
341).
159
 But at the same time, he admitted to Congress that he had never expected the 
“emotional wave to get men out of the Army (…) would reach proportions of near-
hysteria.” (SMAC 1946a, 340) In fact, when the War Department announced a 
slowdown of demobilization, furious soldiers waiting for their return caused revolt-like 
scenarios. In February, the Army further reduced its target strength to 1.07 million still 
including 400,000 for the Army Air Force by the end of 1947. These force level 
reductions were accelerated by congressional action in June 1946, limiting the Army to 
1.55 million by July 1946 and 1.07 million a year later (Schnabel 1996, 108-109; 
SMAC 1946b).  
When the last non-voluntaries were discharged and thus the official Army 
demobilization came to a close by the end of June 1947, the War Department was very 
close to the public’s preferred number of one million but significantly below its own 
preferred figures. Lt. General James Gavin (1958, 106) sums the impact on the Army: 
“We were not demobilizing the Army, we were absolutely destroying it.” The remaining 
Army Ground Forces personnel included only 685,000 men and women of which more 
than half were on occupation duty (OSD 2008, 204). Of 91 combat-trained Army 
divisions on V-J Day only ten under strength divisions were left at the end of the 
demobilization of which only 2 divisions were combat ready (Rearden 1984, 12, 316).  
The government had proved unable or unwilling to resist the societal pressure, although 
the President and Congress were aware of the negative implications of a far-reaching 
demobilization (e.g. Acheson 1969, 196). In his memoirs, Truman (1955, 509) calls the 
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 The Separation Centers, which ran on fully capacity during the fall 1945, had discharged more 
personnel than expected by the War Department. They actually discharged in September 1945 597,000 
personnel (instead of estimated 450,000), in October 1.2 million (instead of estimated 550,000), in 
November 1.2 million (instead of estimated 750,000) and in December 1.1 million (instead of estimated 
750,000) (SMAC 1946a, 340). 
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overall demobilization of more than ten million active duty forces within two years “the 
most remarkable demobilization in the history of the world, or ‘disintegration’, if you 
want to call it that.” But political actors backed away from challenging the public’s 
strong demand. An editorial in the New York Times (1945a) accurately sums the 
situation: “[T]he cry that rings loudest through the land and makes every Congressmen 
jump in fear of his job is, ‘Bring the boys home,’ with its accompanying demands for 
(…) a demobilization of our ‘citizen’ army in favor of a small ‘volunteer’ army.”160 
Without the government’s backing, the Services could hardly sell society on the need 
for a much larger armed force than before the war (Pogue 1987, 158). As Sharp (1976, 
285) argues: “The boys came home in the final analysis, though, because the people 
wanted them home.”  
 
The struggle for a permanent military establishment 
With societal demands clearly blocking the road to a personnel heavy force posture, last 
hopes to sustain a large postwar active duty ground force faded. Therefore, the generals 
put all their efforts into the establishment of permanent mechanisms for manpower 
procurement, which would at least fence against complete insignificance and secure the 
availability of military personnel in case of a national emergency.
161
 Strongly inspired 
                                                             
160 Senator Millard Tydings chose a telling electoral theme during his senatorial reelection campaign in 
Maryland in 1944: “Win the war, win the peace, bring the soldiers home quickly.” (Keith 1991, 391-392) 
161 The War Department’s second major effort to increase its position, the unification of the armed forces, 
proved even more controversial and only partially successful (Sparrow 1994; Ward 1993; Caraley 1966; 
SASC 1947). The National Security Act established the National Defense Establishment consisting of the 
Departments of the Army, Navy and the newly created Air Force as largely autonomous units with direct 
access to the President. The JCS was formally established as a body for coordination between the 
branches. A Secretary of Defense became responsible for general policy direction as well as control, 
supervision and coordination of the armed forces. Furthermore, the act established the Munitions Board 
and the Research and Development Board to coordinate defense acquisition, the National Security 
Resource Board to make preparation for a possible mobilization, the CIA, and the NSC. To the 
disappointment of the Army, the act left the autonomy of the Services largely unaltered and coordination 
weak. The newly established Secretary of Defense lacked an own department, putting him in a weak 
position towards the Services. The limitations of the new military establishment became almost 
immediately apparent. Expressing the growing disillusion among lawmakers, Mahon complained in April 
1949: “Each service is angling for prestige, a place in the sun, a larger slice of the national defense dollar. 
During the war there was glory, and money, and manpower sufficient for all; but the peacetime situation 
is entirely different.” (95 Cong. Rec., April 12, 1949, H4428) Overshadowed by the conflict between the 
Navy and the Air Force about their role in strategic air power, Congress finally enacted the committee 
recommendation in an amendment to the National Security Act. The Services lost their autonomous 
position and became components of a single Department of Defense, which replaced the National 
Defense Establishment. With the DOD as executive department, the military departments lost their direct 
access to the National Security Council and the Cabinet. The amendment provided a chairman for the JCS 
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by World War II, the War Department’s planning was directed towards another total 
war in which the US would need large numbers of men (Hewes 1975, 133-134). But in 
contrast to previous wars, military leaders assumed that the luxury of sufficient time for 
a broad mobilization would be lacking, given the deep international involvements and 
the technological progress which had reduced early-warning time. With the ideal option 
for a strong and ready force foreclosed, Army Chief Marshall regarded a small 
peacetime force with a well-trained civil base organized in a strong reserve as a second 
best solution, since it would reduce mobilization time without causing substantial costs 
(Doubler 2003, 220). But to staff the active duty and reserve forces, a permanent inflow 
of personnel was necessary. Unfortunately, the Army, which had the largest requirement 
in personnel, was the least popular branch for voluntary enlistments and relied most on 
compulsory schemes. Yet, the extension of the wartime Selective Service System was 
considered only a short-term solution to offset for current personnel shortcomings. In 
the long run, Universal Military Training was supposed to become a central and 
permanent pillar of national security (Gerhardt 1971, 3). 
Representatives of the War Department outlined the innovative UMT idea before the 
House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy (1945b) already in June 1945.
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Supported by witnesses from the Navy and the reserve components, the War 
Department argued that universal training would be vital for the maintenance of strong 
ground forces. Moreover, UMT would not only increase readiness and deter potential 
aggressors, but also improve the health, skills and democratic persuasion of young 
Americans. Due to its large impact on individual lives, UMT became a highly 
controversial domestic issue. Most of the press, public opinion, business groups such as 
the Chamber of Commerce and veteran groups, most vocally the American Legion, 
strongly supported the policy (House Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy 
1945b; Hogan 1998, 125-128). Indeed, universal training seemed to be the perfect 
institution for a country skeptical of large standing armies, but with a strong sense of 
civic duty (Boettcher 1992, 6). Yet, the public position was inconsistent, as a coalition 
of domestic groups including churches, labor, liberal and libertarian groups and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as central advisor to the President and defense secretary. The post of the Secretary of Defense was 
significantly upgraded. 
162 The House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, the so-called Woodrum Committee after its 
chairman, was established in early 1944 to investigate all matters of postwar military requirements 
(House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy 1945a). It included seven representatives each from 
the Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committee and nine further representatives from the House. 
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educational associations strongly opposed the proposal early on. They voiced concerns 
over a militarization of society, rejected governmental interference in individual 
liberties and considered a compulsory training as entirely un-American. Nonetheless, 
the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy (1945a, 2) recommended 
further congressional steps to establish UMT. 
 
In fall 1945, the President, who shared Marshall’s reasoning (Truman 1955, 510), 
picked up the measure and proposed legislative action on UMT. His plan outlined a 
force based on small regular troops and backed by an extended National Guard and 
Service reserves as well as a pool of ready citizens trained under UMT (Truman 1945, 
3). To meet criticism, which characterized UMT as undemocratic and an unlimited 
extension of the Selective Service System, Truman (1945, 3) stressed: “Trainees under 
this proposed legislation, however, would not be enrolled in any of the armed services. 
They would be civilians in training.” The successive hearings on UMT largely echoed 
the earlier debate, showing strong disagreement between societal advocates and 
opponents of the program (HMAC 1945a). Congress itself was split, as the Southern 
Democrats and conservative Republicans rejected UMT. To be sure, conservative 
lawmakers liked the idea of civic duty and physical training. But they were radically 
opposed to a program which strongly intervened into people’s affairs based on legal 
compulsion. Taft regarded UMT “as the weapon of a totalitarian state.” (in Eckel 1948) 
Against this backdrop, the HMAC repeatedly postponed action and Truman finally 
withdrew his proposal in early 1946 for another introduction after the coming midterm 
elections.  
The administration prepared a new attempt to implement a modified version UMT in 
spring 1947. To provide further support, Truman established an Advisory Commission 
on Universal Training in December 1946, which endorsed UMT as a matter of military 
necessity in its final report. After the coup in Czechoslovakia, Truman condemned the 
Soviet Union’s foreign policy and called upon the Congress to enact UMT to meet 
manpower shortage. In summer 1947, the HASC held again hearings on universal 
training, now stripped of the alarming term ‘military’. Although the opinions were still 
strongly divided during the hearings, the committee, in absence of seven Republican 
committee members, voted unanimously to report favorably on the UMT bill. Despite 
this success and the support of the SASC chairman Chan Gurney (R-SD), universal 
training soon faced new obstacles (Rearden 1984, 14-15). With the consent of the 
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Republican leadership, the House Rules Committee, chaired by Leo Allen (R-IL), an 
open opponent of UMT, blocked floor consideration on the program for more than ten 
months (Trussell 1948b). In the meantime, pending UMT became a victim of the 
increased popularity of air power on Capitol Hill.  
Despite the drastic demobilization, the Army Air Force had not given up their ambitious 
postwar goal of 70 regular air groups in an independent branch. Yet prior to 1948, 
Truman and Congress largely ignored the Army Air Force’s pleas (Cagle 1964, 9-
10).
163
 When the Air Policy Commission sided with the Air Force and recommended a 
rapid buildup of 70 groups, the tide turned. The subsequent popularity of air power in 
Congress meant the factual death blow to the administration’s proposal for universal 
training. While Truman and Forrestal argued that an air power buildup and UMT would 
be vital supplements to each other, Congress saw it more as an either-or-decision 
against the backdrop of their public promises of fiscal constraint (Strout 1948a). 
Especially conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats argued that balanced 
force structures, as sought for by a UMT implementation, were outdated and should be 
abandoned for the sake of a much more efficient air power buildup (Norris, 1948; Eckel 
1948). And although the number of outright opponents of UMT was small, majorities 
sided with air power and against UMT in an either-or decision.  
The public preference for aviation over manpower and the inconsistent demand patterns 
on UMT most likely contributed to this solution, as presidential elections were coming 
up by the end of the year. Uncertain of the societal demands, Republicans feared a 
public backlash from this intervention in civil liberties. With numerous interest groups 
expressing strong resistance during the hearings, the air power solution was clearly less 
costly in political terms. Hanson Baldwin (1948b) commented in the New York Times 
that in an election year “Congress would like to buy defense with dollars and not with 
their constituents.” Thus, despite desperate efforts by the Army and the civil 
administration, Congress denied money for universal training in favor of additional 
spending for the first step towards a 70-group Air Force in its FY 1949 legislation. 
Although the chances of UMT diminished, legislative action on the program continued 
and especially Truman did not dismiss universal training. The administration’s FY 1950 
                                                             
163 E.g. an amendment by Senator Henry C. Lodge (R-MA), a moderate Republican, to provide funding 
for the full 70 groups in the FY 1948 budget was rejected on the floor (93 Cong. Rec., July 10, 1947, 
S8605-8610). 
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request provided again funding for UMT, but only money for 48 air groups, down from 
55 groups in FY 1949 (Norris 1949).
164
 In response, the House shifted the money 
earmarked for UMT to move again towards 70 air groups as promoted by Mahon and 
Vinson (95 Con. Rec., April 12, 1949, H4431-4432; April 13, 1949, H4546). 
The House’s decision did not imply the procedural defeat of UMT, but it meant its final 
political defeat. Voluntary enlistments in combination with the Selective Service 
System, which allowed for ad-hoc adjustments rather than stable personnel 
procurement, became the Army’s only option (Ross 1969, 36-38). By the war’s end, 
Congress had enacted the Armed Forces Voluntary Recruitment Act, suspending the 
post-World War I peacetime manpower limits and permitted the Services to enlist 
individuals of 17 years and older for 3, 2 or 1.5 years. Selective Service was supposed 
to expire in May 1946, but with UMT pending, the generals called for an extension of 
the induction system. After controversial hearings, the House and Senate finally agreed 
to extend the program for another nine months (HMAC 1946; SMAC 1946c).
165
 The 
Army Ground Forces made strong use of the Selective Service System between 
September 1945 and June 1946 to meet its authorized strength (Selective Service 
System 2007). Although a growing number of voluntary enlistments during the second 
half of 1946 raised hopes that future needs could be met without Selective Service, the 
Army came again into trouble to fill its ranks after the system expired in early 1947. As 
the Army threatened to run short of more than 100,000 troops in 1948, Forrestal and the 
JCS decided at the Key West conference on the Services’ roles and mission that 
Selective Service should be reenacted (Rearden 1984, 316-317; Hammond 1963, 475-
476). In June 1948, Congress approved Selective Service for another two years to 
induce men between the age of 19 and 25 for 21 months of active service and 5 years of 
subsequent reserve service (House of Representatives 1948). 
At the same time, the postwar buildup of reserve forces was far from efficient and made 
only slow progress (Crossland/Currie 1984, 79-95; Mahon 1983, 198-207; DOA 1956, 
452). Significantly fewer than expected war veterans enrolled for the reserve 
components after the war and the reserve units lacked federal money for adequate 
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 Since the Air Force decided to increase the number of B-36 bombers in heavy air groups from 18 to 
30, the decline in the number of air planes is less significant.  
165 The act provided age limits of 19 to 44 and a ceiling for the overall Army, Navy, and Marine Corps 
forces of 1.07 million, 558,000, and 108,000 respectively by July 1, 1947 (SMAC 1946b; Sparrow 1994, 
254-257). 
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equipment and training. With limited personnel inflow and little funding, the federal 
Army reserve, the so-called Organized Reserve Corps, and state-organized National 
Guard competed for relevance. In the wake of the unification in 1947, the War 
Department, the Defense Secretary and the President supported an effort to unify the 
Army reserve components under federal control. Afraid of losing its autonomy and 
suspicious of the ‘regulars’, the National Guard Association quickly rose in opposition 
to the proposal and its official publication announced “The Battle is On!” (in Mahon 
1983, 201) After the intervention of NGA director Ellard Walsh, Congress, stressing the 
power of the states, turned the administration’s advance down (Mahon 1983, 200). 
Thus, the reserve organization remained fractured and underfunded until the Korean 
War. While the National Guard, which insisted to be the first reserve component to be 
called-up in case of an emergency, achieved an acceptable buildup until 1950, 
especially the Organized Reserve Corps fell behind earlier expectations. In 1948, Brig. 
General E.A. Evans, director of the Reserve Officers Association, told lawmakers: “The 
unorganized condition of the Army and Air Reserves substantiates the statement of 
Secretary of State George Marshall that our security forces are nothing but a hollow 
shell.” (in HASC 1948, 6530) 
 
Summary 
While Truman frustrated a clear air power prioritization during the late 1940s, society 
and Congress in turn blocked the road to a personnel heavy force. The consequence was 
an implicit reliance on air atomic power, the only possible trump, by the end of the 
transition. As Herken (1988, 196) concludes: “The rapid demobilization (…), budgetary 
constraints, and the de facto rejection of peacetime universal military training by 
Congress and public opinion, (…) assured the victory of air power by default.” The 
societal resistance to large permanent forces especially struck the ground forces, losing 
a disproportional share of troops during the demobilization and thereafter. As the 
Navy’s attempts to benefit from the support for aviation were in vain, the Air Force was 
the only branch which significantly increased its relative share in personnel between 
1947 and 1950 (OSD 2008, 204). Societal demands clearly contributed to this outcome. 
Special interests put strong direct pressure on the government to rapidly release 
personnel after the war leaving the political actors little leverage. At the same time, the 
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inconsistency of societal demands on UMT provided lawmakers with the leverage to 
oppose the administration’s attempts to implement the program.  
 
5.2.2.2. Buildup 
Rapid force expansion in response to the Korean War 
The outbreak of the Korean War proved the fragility of the international order, which 
the Services had sought to prepare for. Yet, it did not resemble the kind of conflict, they 
had been preparing for. In the Pacific rather than Europe and limited rather than total, 
the Korean War caught the US administration by surprise. Especially the shortage of 
ground forces became immediately apparent. The Army’s FY 1951 budget provided 
funding for 630,000 personnel in 10 divisions, of which one in Germany and four in the 
Far East were on occupation duty (Condit 1988, 58-59, 224).
166
 All Pacific divisions, 
which were closest to Korea, were under strength and not combat ready, lacking organic 
infantry, artillery and armor. Further divisions in the US were either under strength or 
unsuitable for the war on the peninsula.  
Against this backdrop, the administration and Congress started a far-reaching buildup of 
troops even prior to the deployment of the first ground forces to Korea. On June 28, 
lawmakers overwhelmingly voted for a year-long extension of Selective Service, which 
had been pending since January (Gerhardt 1971, 127-129). Two days later, Congress 
raised the authorized Army strength to 837,000 men and the Air Force strength to 
502,000 men for 70 air groups. The buildup gained urgency as the lack of military 
preparedness became dramatically apparent during the early days of the conflict. 
Underequipped and outnumbered, the first, hastily deployed 540-men task force Smith 
suffered 180 casualties during first contact with North Korean forces and was forced to 
retreat.
167
 Although the magnitude of the early war problems was not fully reported and 
therefore not immediately clear to the public (e.g. Parrott 1950), the military failure put 
the Truman administration and especially Defense Secretary Johnson under pressure. 
                                                             
166 The Marine Corps was down to two divisions at 36 percent of their combat strength. 
167 The 24th Infantry Division which was the first division on the Korean peninsula suffered 30 percent 
losses within the first 18 days after their landing. Even the early arrival of reinforcements did initially not 
stop North Korean progress.  
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Within ten days after the first deployment, commanding General MacArthur called for 
reinforcements raising the requirements from two to eight divisions (Condit 1988, 60). 
And Truman announced on radio that he had authorized an increase in end strength – 
from 1.5 million to more than 2.1 million –, the use of Selective Service, and the 
activation and call-up of National Guard and Reserve units (Condit 1988, 61-62; 
Galloway 1957, 468-471). Moreover, he called on Capitol Hill to remove the legal force 
size ceilings. Lawmakers quickly responded, passing legislation to suspend personnel 
ceilings for 4 years and extend all existing enlistments for 12 months (Hammond 1962, 
351). While Congress was well aware of the public dislike for large-scale inductions of 
personnel, they felt that the international emergency situation outweighed domestic 
concerns. As Dewey Short (R-MO), ranking member of the HASC, told his colleagues: 
“It is tough for a 30-year-old man, fighting in the rice paddies of Korea, his wife and a 
couple of kids in Japan or back home (…). But, ladies and gentleman, liberty is the first 
casualty of war. (…) All of us are going to be required to do things we do not want to 
do.” (96. Cong. Rec., July 25, 1950, H10987)  
The Korean War triggered not only an immediate buildup of forces. It also had a direct 
impact on the Services’ long-term estimates in accordance with NSC-68. A week prior 
to the North Korean attack, the JCS had estimated their force requirements to 
implement the pending NSC-68 proposals at 12 Army divisions, 324 Navy ships, and 69 
Air Force wings (Condit 1988, 228-240). By September, the Services had drastically 
increased their recommendations for the required force: 18 Army divisions, 1,161 Navy 
ships, 95 Air Force wings, and a total of 3.2 million men by 1954. As the political actors 
wanted a broad and far-reaching buildup, the Services were hardly constrained in setting 
their force structure goals. While concerned over the fiscal and economic implications 
of this force growth, the Chinese intervention dissolved any doubts and NSC-68/4 
advanced the Service force objectives to be reached by mid-1952 (Condit 1988, 251). 
Quickly more of the same rather than a significant change became the implicit directive.  
 
European defense and a new attempt for UMT 
To meet the dramatically raised personnel levels, Truman sought not only the extension 
of Selective Service, which was to expire in July, but also a renewed implementation of 
universal military training in 1951. Already in 1950, the National Guard Association, 
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the Reserve Officer’s Association, and the American Legion joined for another attempt 
to implement UMT (Mahon 1983, 207). Yet, the success of both measures was soon 
threatened from two directions. (1) After the Truman had urged additional and 
potentially permanent US efforts for European defense in his 1951 State of the Union 
Address, the conservative Republicans in Congress, which disliked compulsory efforts 
to begin with, picked the renewed efforts to implement personnel procurement schemes 
as a chance to challenge the administration’s international commitments. Thus, the 
measures became subject to the Great Debate between nationalists and internationalists, 
as the former blamed the administration for promoting the personnel procurement 
schemes in order to acquire manpower for Europe.  
(2) Only hours after Truman had called for extension of Selective Service and urged for 
a stronger commitment to Europe in his 1951 State of the Union Address, Kenneth S. 
Wherry (R-NE), a conservative Republican and Senate floor leader, introduced a 
resolution “declaring it to be the sense of the Senate that no United States ground troops 
shall be sent to western Europe pending determination by the Congress.” (97 Cong. 
Rec., January 8, 1951, S94) He picked up a claim of Taft and other Republicans 
questioning the legal authority of the President to send troops without congressional 
approval, as Truman had indicated in a press conference in the first days of January 
(Krock 1951). When the Pentagon outlined its UMT plan on January 11, Representative 
Quentin Burdick (R-ND) explicitly linked all these issues by arguing that “the only 
reason the President wants to draft 18 year old boys is that he intends to use them in 
Europe regardless of what Congress (…) thinks.” (in Sanders 1983, 89) 
But in the atmosphere of international crisis, opponents had trouble to counter the calls 
for deployments to Europe by the administration, by many Democrats in Congress, and 
by members of the CPD (Sanders 1983, 92-95). As a sign of the raised importance of 
the North Atlantic Pact and US commitment to permanent European defense, Truman 
had announced in his State of the Union Address that General Eisenhower had been 
selected to coordinate the pact’s preparations as Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. 
On the same day, the CPD had published an article in the New York Times (1951a) 
arguing that “General Eisenhower must be given full support by the American people. 
We must do this by creating balanced armed forces of great strength and by giving the 
people of Europe a sense of our unity with them.” The public remained only moderately 
supportive, however. But congressional resistance to further forward deployments 
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started to melt in February, when Eisenhower returned from Europe and briefed 
lawmakers that the European allies had made efforts to improve their own defenses and 
urged them to abstain from troop limitations (Acheson 1969, 494-495; Trussell 1951). 
In the end, Taft and his allies quickly lost the Great Debate and the Senate approved 
reinforcements for Europe on April 4.
168
 The decision was the final step to change the 
mission of the US forces in Europe from occupation to European defense and thus to 
make forward deployments permanent.  
With regard to military preparations, the commitment to Europe implied a need for 
ground forces, but it did not predetermine a decision on the mechanisms of personnel 
procurement. While opinion polls showed the silent majority still in support of UMT, 
various societal groups and especially the Republicans in Congress continued to voice 
strong opposition to compulsory training (New York Times 1951b). After a successful 
start in the Senate, the bill ran into strong opposition in the House. Suspecting the 
administration of fear-mongering and still opposed to a permanent peacetime 
conscription, the conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats threatened to defeat 
the bill on the floor. In order to pass at least an UMT framework, the House leaders 
were forced to introduce an amendment, which required Congress to pass additional 
legislation at a later point in time to put the UMT program actually in operation (Trott 
1951a). Hence, the opponents of the program were able to postpone the factual start of 
UMT and thus successfully withdrew the final congressional decision from the current 
emergency situation. Despite strong pressure from the administration, the House upheld 
the amendment during conference making the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act basically useless (Washington Post 1951). It turned out short after, that the 
opponents of UMT had calculated correctly: As the situation in Korea relaxed during 
the following months, the House of Representatives rejected the successive proposal on 
UMT execution and the program never came into operation (Watson 1986, 164; 
Huntington 1961, 59). Thus, the Services were again forced to rely on voluntary 
enlistments and Selective Service, which Congress continued until 1955.
169
 Without 
                                                             
168 The final resolution approved the sending of armed forces as might be needed for the European 
defense, but not more than four divisions without further congressional approval. 
169 With UMT most likely lost and drawing lessons from the difficulties in Korea, the administration 
sought to reorganize the reserve forces (Crossland/Currie 1984, 102; Mahon 1983, 210-212; Galloway 
1957, 473-482). In 1952, Congress passed the Armed Forces Reserve Act which divided the reserves into 
three categories: (1) Ready Reserve could be mobilized by Presidential order. All induced personnel was 
automatically transferred to the Ready Reserve after the active duty years; (2) Standby Reserves and (3) 
retired Reserve could only be mobilized by congressional declaration of emergency or war. After 
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UMT, the compulsory Selective Service seemed a necessity for a country at war. In fact, 
it had become an accepted element of US military policy and remained until the mid-
1960s (Selective Service System 2007; Gerhardt 1971, 133). Due to Selective Service, 
the rejection of UMT did not limit the buildup. 
 
Balanced force expansion in response to NSC-68 
While the battle over UMT occupied Congress, the armed forces started to push for 
further expansions of their capabilities before the scheduled leveling-off period was to 
begin (Condit 1988, 261-262). In summer 1951, the Army, which had reached its 18 
division force objective, asked for 3 additional divisions. The Navy, at 1,037 ships, 
requested to increase its approved size to 1,191. And the Air Force, 8 wings short of its 
approved 95 wings, called for 163 wings including 25 troop carrier wings by the end of 
FY 1954. After interservice rivalry had decreased with sufficient money for all Services 
pouring in, the Air Force’s massive request brought the competition back. The Army 
and Navy considered the flyers’ objective as breaking the balance between the Services, 
since even the enormous budgets could not carry all three expansions. After the cautious 
congressional reactions to the FY 1952 budget, the Services expected further large 
budgets to face close congressional scrutiny and potential reductions.  
Unwilling to pay the bill for the Air Force buildup, the Navy and Army challenged the 
Air Force’s force planning target during the budget preparations for FY 1953 arguing 
that 138 wings would be a sufficient number. Furthermore, they challenged the Air 
Force’s composition of wings demanding to provide more tactical and less strategic 
wings. Against the backdrop of the Korean War, especially the Army felt that the flyers 
had lost sight of the tactical support and put too much emphasis on strategic capabilities. 
Considering the size and composition as vital for their independent strategic 
significance, the Air Force resisted both claims. The resulting deadlock made an 
intervention by Lovett necessary, whose decision carried considerable weight for the 
future course of the transition. As Baldwin (1951a) put it: “Mr. Lovett’s decision (…) 
will either reassert the past principle of ‘balanced forces’, i.e. a team of all services 
integrated to a common strategy, or it will give clear-cut priority to the Air Force.” As 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
intervention by the National Guard Association, the final law reaffirmed the priority of the National 
Guard for being called to service, as part of the ready reserve. 
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in prior years, the OSD predominantly sided with a balanced approach, as the resulting 
compromise set the Air Force objective at 143 wings including 17 troop carrier 
wings.
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When the administration decided to stretch-out the buildup, the US had established an 
impressive force (Linn 2007, 164; Condit 1988, 292; Huntington 1961, 60-61). From 
the end of FY 1950 to the end of FY 1952, the Army had doubled its divisions and was 
confident to be able to halt a potential Soviet invasion in Europe. The Navy had almost 
doubled its active combat ships including an extension from 9 to 16 carrier groups and 
the Marine Corps had increased from 2 to 3 divisions. While clearly short of its newly 
approved size, which it did not expect to reach until FY 1955, the Air Force had 
extended its 42 combat wings and 6 troop carrier wings to 95 wings including 15 troop 
carrier wings. The armed forces overall manpower had reached 3.6 million (OSD 2008, 
204). During the two years of buildup, the political actors had strongly backed a 
balanced distribution. Consequently, the shares in personnel in FY 1953 hardly differed 
from FY 1950.  
With Eisenhower’s arrival, the stretch-out turned into reductions. While Truman had 
aimed at a high defense plateau, Eisenhower considered only a smaller plateau as 
sustainable and put early pressure on the Services.
171
 Even before the New Look was 
formalized, personnel reductions, creating quick savings, were on the administration’s 
agenda. Already NSC 149/2 in April directed overall personnel reductions of 250,000 
                                                             
170 When the Air Force criticized the Navy’s plan to build a third Forrestal-class aircraft carrier a year 
later, Lovett again choose a balanced response. He included only funds to partly finance the carrier in the 
budget (Stevens 1952b). 
171 Eisenhower backed his push by reforming the military establishment, which still did not function 
satisfactory (Leighton 2001, 21-43; Baldwin 1953). Therefore, Wilson formed a committee to study 
reform recommendations. In April 1953, the Rockefeller committee, named after its chairman Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, emphasized four areas for improvement (Stevens 1953b): (1) Clear lines of authority and 
responsibility; (2) Enable the Defense Secretary to clarify the service roles and missions; (3) Make use of 
modern planning models; (4) Increase economies without decreasing military readiness. In order to 
strengthen the civil authority, the committee argued that the Defense Secretary and the Service Secretaries 
had to gain increased power within the DOD. It recommended the replacement of the Munitions Board, 
the Research and Development Board and other agencies and offices by assistant secretaries within the 
OSD. Moreover, since the JCS was considered ineffective due to the Service parochialism of its 
members, the Rockefeller committee recommended taking it out of the chain of command. Additionally, 
the chairman should gain more powers to organize the JCS substructure and thereby additionally freeing 
the chiefs for their primary task of strategic planning and advice. Eisenhower accepted almost all 
recommendations and only the proposal to enable the Defense Secretary to clarify the Service roles and 
missions was not included (Strout 1953). When Eisenhower put the reorganization plan before Congress, 
only the reform of the JCS caused heavy resistance on Capitol Hill. Echoing earlier concerns, opponents 
of the proposal feared that the increased authority of the CJCS was a step towards military dictatorship, 
creating a “Prussian-style general staff.” (New York Times 1953b). The supporters finally succeeded 
when a motion to dismiss the reorganization was defeated on the House floor. 
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until the end of FY 1954 (Watson 1986, 61-63). The successive turn to nuclear 
deterrence resulted in further reductions in personnel. After numerous debates between 
the Services and the OSD, the administration approved intermediate FY 1955 force 
levels of slightly less than 3.03 million and final force levels of 2.8 million to be 
reached in 1957.
172
 By far the largest reductions came from the Army, which lost one-
third of its manpower between FY 1953 and FY 1956.
173
 In contrast, the Air Force 
manpower remained virtually unchanged and, while its buildup of wings was reduced 
and stretched over a longer time span, the number of wings still grew to 131 by FY 
1956 (Watson 1986, 84).  
To compensate for the reduced active duty personnel, the Eisenhower administration 
planned to improve the manpower mobilization base (Huntington 1961, 81-82). Since 
the New Look emphasized the first month of a war, a pool of trained personnel, which 
could be activated on short notice, was essential. But a renewed UMT proposal was 
considered politically unfeasible especially for a Republican administration. Instead, 
Eisenhower turned to improve the current reserve system, which provided only 
insufficient numbers of trained personnel.
174
 The administration proposed a national 
reserve plan not unlike UMT, which included a mixture of voluntary and compulsory 
recruiting. Yet, Congress significantly modified the bill along the familiar patterns by 
dropping the compulsory element from the bill. The final Reserve Forces Act in 1955 
aimed at the buildup of a total of 2.9 million reserve forces by 1960.
175
  
 
Summary 
The transition during the early 1950s saw virtually no intended qualitative change in 
personnel or force structure prior to Eisenhower’s election. In fact, the Truman 
                                                             
172 In December 1954, Eisenhower decided to accelerate the reductions to reach the 1957 goal already a 
year earlier. 
173 The Army maintained a combat strength of 18 divisions and 10 regimental combat teams after the 
reductions (Huntington 1961, 79). The Navy was cut by 130,000 leading to a reduction of 100 active 
ships between 1953 and 1955. Another 60 ships were cut by 1956. The Marines faced reductions of 
60,000 from their 1953 level. 
174 The Reserves forces included 1.7 million in the Reserve and additional 313,355 in the National Guard 
in 1953. The largest part of these forces was Army reserve with 1.07 million men. The Navy had 665,571 
men available and the Marine Corps 78,455. The Air Force could resort to 276,182 reservists. 
Approximately 80 percent of the Reserve Forces were part of the Ready Reserve. 
175 The Act obligating volunteers and induced personnel to serve 5 years in the Ready Reserve and 
offered a special training program for young men, which consisted of 6 month training followed by 7,5 
years in the Ready Reserve. 
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administration was actively engaged in keeping all Services sufficiently supplied and 
the DOD in balance. With the exception of the conservative Republicans, who 
challenged the administration especially during the Great Debate, Congress did hardly 
question this balance. Societal demands played only a selective role during this early 
buildup. After brief support for a broad buildup, public demands returned to an air 
power bias. Yet, the political actors did not respond to the public’s turn and remained 
focused on a broad buildup. The administration made only stronger efforts to win over 
the public with regard to European defense, although forward deployment does not go 
easy with the emphasis on air power. Although it is not clear whether the 
administration’s efforts were successful, there is no evidence that the issue damaged the 
administration. In seems that in the face of a national emergency, society gets more 
willing to follow the administration’s lead and thus societal demands get weaker rather 
than stronger. Eisenhower’s turn to a force posture, which met international 
commitments more in line with the societal demands, occurred only after the Korean 
War had lost its momentum. 
 
5.2.3. Weapons acquisition 
5.2.3.1. Builddown 
The slow turn to atomic power 
World War II was a powerful demonstration of the American industrial power with an 
annual production of 50,000 aircraft, 20,000 tanks, 80,000 artillery pieces, and 500,000 
trucks in 1944 (Vawter 1983, 7-8). After victory, the administration pursued radical 
procurement cuts and conversion of the mobilized mass production to rapidly revitalize 
the civil economy.
176
 Military contract termination was pushed forward on large scale 
and with very kind concessions to the contractors (Markusen et al. 1991, 8; SubHAC 
1946, 128). Very little new procurement occurred during the builddown period and the 
armed forces had to rely on the enormous war surpluses of equipment and munitions. 
With the congressional support for air power, the raised international tensions and 
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 In February 1944, the Office of War Mobilization, which functioned as the administration’s major 
planning cell for demobilization, submitted the ‘Report on War and Post-War Adjustment Policies’, 
commonly referred to as Baruch-Hancock-Report. The report recommended an aggressive procurement 
contract termination, payment of obligations, clearance of government properties from private contractors 
and the sale of surplus property after the war. 
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warnings of insufficient equipment, the tide briefly seemed to turn in 1948.
177
 But the 
administration’s strict budget ceilings kept procurement low (Millis 1958, 197-198).  
Considering the many war time inventions, many political and military actors argued 
that large scale procurement made little sense at this point in time, since the procured 
new systems would quickly be trumped by new developments. As William Allen, 
president of Boeing, noted with some concern: “It was the fashion following the end of 
the war that everything built in the past was completely obsolete.” (in Parrish 1968, 
128) Therefore, political actors preferred focusing on R&D and restrained from 
reducing this budget title along the procurement account (Huzar 1950, 174).
178
 Largely 
in line with public opinion, they regarded further pushes in technology inevitable to 
keep the military edge in an uncertain world and thus provide national security in the 
long run. Francis Case (R-SD) arguably expressed the opinion of most members of the 
SubHAC by stating that “a little money spent for research and development can save 
catastrophes that cost a great deal more as well as making a definite, positive 
contribution to the success of any mission or any action in the prosecution of war.” 
(SubHAC 1946, 556) For the Services, R&D efforts promised an additional payoff 
beyond advanced national security: Weapon innovations constituted a central means to 
lay claims on contested military missions and expand one’s own significance in the 
postwar environment. As Armacost (1969, 7) argues: “[T]he expectation is widely 
shared that successful weapons development efforts may enhance a Service’s claims for 
both additional money and missions.”  
Beyond the general affinity to technology, societal demands contributed only 
moderately to the direction of R&D efforts. While the demands particularly pointed at a 
strong interest in atomic bombs, the advent of atomic bombs inspired surprisingly little 
military innovation after the war (Parrish 1968, 103-109). The indiscriminate 
destructive power of atomic weapons raised difficult moral questions and many 
                                                             
177 General Lutes, Staff Director of the Munitions Board, stressed a severe shortage of basic equipment in 
February and doubted whether the Army would be able to equip more than 50 percent of its forces within 
the first 18 month of a military crisis (Rearden 1984, 317). 
178 Government sponsored military research became a major source of national R&D funding after World 
War II (Kevles 1990, 244-245). The Military Establishment accounted for 62 percent of all federal R&D 
expenditures by 1948 and supplied about 25 percent of the total R&D funds available in the industrial 
sector during the late 1940s (Kevles 1975, 20) In 1949, the Services and the AEC accounted for 96 
percent of all federal dollars spent for physical science research at US universities. The Navy’s Office of 
Naval Research sponsored almost 1,200 research projects in almost 200 universities and financed some 
2,500 science PhDs. 
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scientists, political and military actors were disgusted by the prospect of nuclear 
warfare. The political discussions on placing atomic weapons under UN control or even 
outlawing the weapon altogether left the Services uncertain on the benefits of further 
acquisition efforts. Beyond these political considerations, there was large confusion on 
the impact of the weapon, due to the secrecy surrounding nuclear developments 
(Rosenberg 1979, 64-65). While the Air Force emphasized its role in strategic bombing 
and had dropped the first atomic bombs, it was in fact unsure about the handling and 
operational utility of these weapons for future warfare. The situation was worse for the 
Navy and the Army, which had no experience in the use of atomic devices (Reinhardt 
1964, 3). Since the postwar nuclear tests only studied the effects of nuclear warheads for 
strategic use, especially the Army had difficulties to assess the potential use of nuclear 
weapons in its field of operations. Although the atomic bomb was developed under the 
direction of the War Department, the Army gained no clear data on the effect of nuclear 
weapons on future battlefields until 1951. Unsure of the impact of nuclear weapons on 
future warfare and their roles in a potential nuclear war, the armed forces approached 
the major wartime invention much more hesitantly than the public.  
One of the major reasons the Services finally started to focus more on nuclear weapons 
was only indirectly related to the societal influence: With Truman blocking off 
additional spending and Congress preventing a buildup of personnel, both decisions 
affected by the society, nuclear weapons were the only feasible military option. Since 
AEC funding was not subject to the defense budget ceilings, atomic bombs could 
substitute the lack of funding for conventional means. Yet, when the interest of the Air 
Force and the other Services slowly grew in 1947, atomic energy had almost been 
isolated from military influence. The Atomic Energy Act, which Truman had finally 
signed after two years of debate in August 1946, provided only a very limited military 
access to nuclear R&D.
179
 An attempt by the Services to gain at least responsibility for 
                                                             
179 Early on, control over the R&D of atomic energy was of major interest for civil and military leaders. 
In October 1945, Truman brought the issue of nuclear control before Congress where two proposals 
dominated the successive discussions (Feaver 1992, 93-94). Representative Andrew J. May (D-KY) and 
Senator Edwin C. Johnson (D-CO) sponsored a bill, which largely resembled a War Department’s 
proposal to include an almost equal number of military and civilian commissioners. The bill was strongly 
criticized as a draft by the military to assure military control of atomic energy (Senate Special Committee 
on Atomic Energy 1946, 390; HMAC 1945c). While the HMAC, chaired by May, reported the May-
Johnson bill favorably, the Senate decided to set up a Special Committee on Atomic Energy, chaired by 
Brien McMahon (D-CT), to consider the bill. McMahon proposed an alternative bill in December 1945, 
suggesting a commission under full civilian control, in fact excluding the military forces altogether. 
Providing a feasible compromise between military concerns and civilian control, Vandenberg (R-MI) 
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weapons’ custody was also rejected by the President.180 Still considering an 
international control of atomic bombs feasible, Truman wanted to keep early military 
reliance on atomic bombs limited and devoted little attention to atomic energy matters 
beyond the creation of the AEC (Rosenberg 1979, 66-69). In fact, personnel and 
facilities for the acquisition of atomic bombs were reduced after the war and the demand 
for more economy severely constrained peacetime atomic activities (Rosenberg 1979, 
65-66).  
The political reluctance and the Services’ ambivalence and lacking access considerably 
constrained early military activities in the field of nuclear weapons and created a 
mismatch between preparations and military strategy, which increasingly relied on 
atomic bombs as deterrent to Soviet aggression. There were no long-term plans and no 
dynamic activity with regard to acquisition of nuclear capabilities. The stock of atomic 
bombs increased only slowly from 2 bombs in 1945, to 9 bombs in 1946, and 13 bombs 
in 1947 (Ross 1988, 12). In 1948, the nuclear stockpile had reached 50 bombs with little 
improvements in quality. This was still not enough to win a war with the Soviet 
Union,
181
 but neither the public nor arguably many political and military actors were 
fully aware of these early deficits. Even actors who knew of the situation had little 
interest in publically addressing the issue which would have scared the people and 
revealed the true state of the nuclear production to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the 
public lacked the crucial information to specify its demands and potentially address the 
political actors’ lack of progress. Thus, society put much of its hope in a capability, 
which was actually not available in sufficient numbers for most of the postwar 
transition.  
Only towards the end of the decade did nuclear acquisition become more vivid. With 
growing international tensions, the Air Force’s stronger commitment to air atomic 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
finally sponsored an amendment which added a Military Liaison Committee with a consulting function to 
the civilian AEC.  
180 General Lewis Brereton, chairman of the Military Liaison Committee, summed the major argument in 
1947: “It is prerequisite to national security that all possible means of defense be available to the Armed 
Forces for instant use. (…) The Armed Forces must have them ready and be prepared to use them when 
so ordered.” (in Feaver 1992, 114) After the AEC and the Pentagon failed to reach an agreement, the 
parties presented their case directly to the President in July 1948. Truman turned the Services’ request for 
the transfer of nuclear weapons down and the civilian control remained complete. Feaver (1992, 105) 
concludes that “it seems clear that lawmakers feared a virulent American militarism more than an 
immediate Soviet attack.” 
181 Indeed, the JCS informed the AEC in fall 1947 that a military requirement for approximately 400 
Nagasaki type bombs existed and called for accordant buildup until 1953 (Rosenberg 1979, 67). 
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power,
182
 and the Finletter Report’s recommendation for a retaliatory capability, the 
political actors, especially Congress slowly became more committed to nuclear means 
(Schilling 1961, 27-28). While doubts concerning the feasibility of air atomic strategies 
persisted within the administration, the President had lost hope that an international 
agreement could be reached and came to the conclusion that atomic bombs were a 
central means in the future national defense by the end of the decade. With new 
emphasis on air atomic power and more efficient technologies, the stockpile of bombs 
was rapidly rising. The AEC informed the JCS that 400 bombs would be available by 
1951 (Rosenberg 1979, 73-75).  
 
The push for aviation and interservice conflicts 
In contrast to the slow start for nuclear means, R&D and limited procurement of 
aviation means, often with a potential application in nuclear war in mind, became the 
Services’ most dynamic acquisition efforts during the transition period. While aviation 
was another public favorite and less constrained by secrecy, more than a general or 
indirect influence of societal demands was not evident. Societal demands were very 
unspecific and political actors’ control over the R&D agenda limited.183 Indeed, the 
Services clearly dominated the fractured field of conventional acquisition after the war 
                                                             
182 The Air Force claimed sole responsibility for the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, the 
Services’ military counterpart to the AEC, and for strategic target selection. Both requests were repelled 
by the other branches and the door for future Army and Navy nuclear projects remained open. 
183 Before the war, the armed forces had rarely cooperated with civilian scientists and engineers (Kevles 
1975). Although the National Research Council and the National Academy of Science provided an 
institutional link between civil and military research, the Services largely ignored these organizations as a 
source of innovation. Therefore, Vannevar Bush, “the chief architect of wartime science policy” (Leslie 
1993, 6), mobilized civilian military research not through these weak institutions but through the National 
Defense Research Committee and its successor, the Office of Scientific Research and Development, 
during the war. But after successful civil coordination of military R&D during the war, the balance 
shifted towards a fragmented structure strongly controlled by the military during the late 1940s 
(Peck/Scherer 1962, 71-72). As the political actors failed to establish an early postwar framework, each 
military department realized plans for ‘in-house’ organizations for research coordination (Hogan 1998, 
224-229; Leslie 1993, 7; Kevles 1975). In summer 1946, Congress approved the creation of the Office of 
Naval Research to coordinate the Navy’s military research and negotiate R&D contracts with research 
facilities and private business. The War Department also established its own Research and Development 
Division to coordinate and advice in the field of military research. And the Air Force followed after 
independence by establishing the Air Research and Development Command in 1950. In order to improve 
coordination and avoid duplications in fields of common interest, the National Security Act of 1947 
established the Research and Development Board to advice the Secretary of Defense on R&D progress 
and needs (Kevles 1990, 246). But the board, which was nominally the most powerful advisory group, 
had severe problems to gain influence on the defense R&D process. This shift to military dominance in 
R&D met with the armed forces’ already established dominance in procurement. The Munitions Board, 
which was continued after the war by Executive Order and became part of the military establishment in 
1947, had only a limited impact on the coordination and planning of procurement. 
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(Dancy 1977, 349). To be sure, society and political actors framed the process by 
limiting the budgets, preferring R&D over procurement and expressing more or less 
strong hopes in aviation. But beyond these broad guidelines, the Services were basically 
left to design their programs. The civil authorities intervened only when the Services 
could not solve deadlocks by themselves, Service competition resulted in obvious 
inefficiencies or conflicts threatened to escalate into a public struggle.  
Congressional micromanagement was as limited as cases of clear pork barrel politics. In 
those rare cases where parochial economic interests played a role, their weight was 
limited. For example, Representative Aime J. Forand’s (D-RI) attempt to forbid the 
Navy from shifting its plant for torpedo production and overhaul from Newport, Rhode 
Island, to Forest Park, Illinois, failed.
184
 The most dependent aviation sector was 
benefitting at least in parts from the aviation R&D, which prevented a potentially strong 
conflict of interests here. Except for the vocal advocacy during the testimonies of the 
Finletter Commission, the aviation industry did hardly pressure political actors to 
intervene in the acquisition process. Hence, companies were either unable or unwilling 
to translate economic weight into political power and the Services’ parochial interests, 
resulting in innovation and waste, had most impact on the field.  
Air support, which had proven vital during the war, is a case in point. Besides the weak 
aviation industry, neither society nor political actors had a clear position and the 
acquisition was almost completely shaped by interservice competition. Although the 
Army Air Force had promised to provide strong tactical aviation in return for the War 
Department’s support of its independence, the Air Force was reluctant to divert money 
from long-range bomber and advanced fighter acquisition, which it considered vital for 
its independent role (Schlight 1996, 199; Wall Street Journal 1949). At the same time, 
jealously guarding its stakes, it rejected Army attempts to build its own close air support 
aviation and thus essentially taking over the mission. As an Army official complained in 
1951: “[T]he Air Force has made repeated efforts to cripple and curtail our whole 
aviation program.” (in Beach 1951)  
This competition on organic aviation hampered the early progress with regard to 
helicopters, which were used for rescue and transport missions during World War II and 
                                                             
184 Forand introduced an amendment to the FY 1947 budget bill which was passed by the House but 
turned down with small margin in the Senate. 
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became an important asset during the Korean War. After Air Force independence, the 
Army and Air Force agreed to limit organic Army aviation to fixed-wing planes 
weighing no more than 2,500 pounds and rotary-type aircraft with no more than 4,000 
pounds (Condit 1988, 298; Beach 1951).
185
 The weight restrictions severely limited the 
Army’s options and reduced the incentive to push for helicopter developments. 
Moreover, the Air Force, which functioned as the Army’s aircraft purchasing agent, was 
reluctant to support an uncertain project like the helicopter and further prevented 
significant R&D efforts (Trest 1998, 148; Bradin 1994, 76-77). Although the Bell 
Aircraft Company, which struggled to survive after the war, gained the Army’s interest 
in the acquisition of advanced helicopters, the lack of money and the Air Force’s 
suspicion prevented far-reaching efforts (Bradin 1994, 80-81; Doughty 1979, 4). “The 
helicopter is aerodynamically unsound,” the Air Force officer in charge for the project 
argued, continuing that (…) [n]o matter what the Army says, I know that it does not 
need any.” (in Gavin 1958, 111) Hence, the Army continued to acquire only small 
amounts of rotary systems for limited missions and an early innovation was missed.
186
  
In the field of missile development, Service competition resulted in a more innovative 
but hardly efficient dynamic. The political actors’ interest was stronger here, since 
missiles were an attractive alternative to manned aviation (Werrell 1985, 103). They 
were cheaper than planes and could be used without risking a pilot’s life. Given the 
expectation that missiles would be able to carry nuclear weapons in the future, they 
promised to conduct the air atomic mission more efficient than the manned aviation. For 
the Services, missile R&D held the opportunity to acquire a share in the so far 
unassigned mission of unmanned aviation and thereby potentially gain access to nuclear 
means. The public support for missiles as a potential means to deliver nuclear ordnance 
arguably had a passive influence in strengthening the Service’s hopes in the field. 
Baldwin (1946) even argued: “[T]he struggle for control of the long-range missile 
                                                             
185 The Marine Corps, which pursued the development of helicopters for their amphibious missions, were 
only slightly more successful (Millett 1991, 456).Although the Navy cooperated with the Air Force to 
save money, the Marines were not able to develop a helicopter which met their requirements for heavy lift 
by 1948. 
186 Overall, the Army acquisition efforts were most limited in the immediate postwar years. To develop a 
picture of the necessary equipment for future ground forces, Marshall established the War Department 
Equipment Board chaired by General Joseph Stilwell soon after the war (Midgley 1986, 2). The so-called 
Stilwell Board underlined the importance of further research and made recommendation for future 
capabilities. It argued for a continuous importance of ground forces, but emphasized nuclear weapons as 
first line of defense (Cagle 1964, 5). But without access to nuclear R&D and with the smallest funding for 
weapons acquisition of all Services, the Army achieved only limited improvements. 
192 
 
program is in one sense a struggle for survival.” Indeed, all Services independently 
pursued the development of missile systems and – in the case of the Army – advanced 
artillery systems without much coordination (Midgley 1986, 11-13). 
Especially land-based missiles caused early controversies within the War Department, 
as the Army considered missiles as enhanced artillery, whereas the Air Force saw them 
as additional aircraft. The Army Air Force identified missiles as an attractive asset for 
their mission already during the war and claimed sole responsibility within the War 
Department. A successive agreement in late 1944 rejected an exclusive responsibility at 
this early stage of the technology. Instead, the responsibilities were divided along 
technological criteria: The Army Service Forces gained responsibility for ground-
launched ballistic missiles and the Army Air Force received the responsibility for air-
launched missiles and cruise missiles. In other words, “winged missiles looked and 
performed like aircraft and therefore went to the AAF, wingless missiles looked and 
performed like artillery and, hence, went to the ASF.” (Werrell 1985, 80)  
This did not settle the issue for long and the Army Air Force continued to claim full 
control of the long-range missile development after the war. While some still considered 
the maintenance of numerous programs and service cooperation as reasonable, scientific 
and industrial leaders complained in 1946 that the War Department was wasting 
resources because of duplications in the missile field (Neufeld 1990, 22). The 
successive intervention by military and civil leaders ended with the Army reluctantly 
agreeing to place research priority for guided missiles under the Army Air Force 
control. Yet the questions of operational responsibility remained unsettled before 
unification.
187
 In September 1947, the Army and the newly independent Air Force 
agreed on sharing missile R&D in areas of concern for both Services. Under budget 
pressures, the Air Force had decided to put most weight on the development of air-to-air 
and air-to-ground missiles, which would enhance the capabilities of its manned aircraft 
(Neufeld 1990, 8). But a request by the Army to gain control over all surface-launched 
missiles was blocked by the JCS in 1949.  
The situation looked hardly easier between the Navy and the Air Force. Considering the 
Air Force’s Matador program as a direct threat to its mission, the Navy launched the 
                                                             
187 The Army would control tactical surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-air missiles to protect field 
forces from air attack. The Air Force would control strategic surface-to-surface missiles which do not 
directly affect the tactical operations and surface-to-air missiles for area defense (Neufeld 1990, 52).      
193 
 
Regulus program, which was comparable to the Matador, as a response in 1947 (Werrell 
1985, 114). Regulus, as the Army’s Hermes, was not only an attempt to remain in the 
missile race, but also an clear effort to break the Air Force’s hegemonic access to 
nuclear technology beyond the limited carrier-based aviation. The Matador-Regulus 
competition caused an obvious duplication, but the OSD failed to reach a compromise, 
as the two Services heavily fought for their programs. Given the limited budgets, hardly 
any of the numerous missile projects could be financed properly. When the budget cuts 
hit the departments in FY 1947 and again in FY 1949, numerous missile development 
programs had to be canceled or downscaled. 
For the Air Force, missiles were only a secondary area of conflict in the context of its 
efforts to control aviation capabilities. The focus of its acquisition rested on manned 
aviation, as the rapid improvement of airplanes was regarded as crucial task. In a speech 
in June 1946, Symington warned against a future attack by aircrafts “with supersonic 
speed, carrying atomic bombs, which in a few seconds would leave the target a glowing 
dome of destruction.” Therefore, he concluded that “the surest defense (…) is our 
ability to strike back quickly (…) to neutralize a hostile attack at the source. For such 
action only air power has the reach and speed.” (in McFarland 2001, 11) By 1948, the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC) under General Curtis LeMay became the Air Force’s 
symbol for its new importance as guardian of national security through strategic air 
power (Kaplan 1983, 40). Although Truman repeatedly withheld additional funding for 
air power, there was a concrete incentive for the Air Force to push into this area which 
had the support of Congress. Ranking Member of the HAC Clarence Cannon (D-MO) 
arguably voiced the opinion of many lawmakers after 1948: “The airplane is the 
supreme weapon. It is the controlling, dominating, and decisive weapon of any war.” 
(94. Cong. Rec., May 11, 1948, H5599) Since congressional support for air power was 
based on the Finletter Report rather than societal demands, the societal influence on the 
plane acquisition was again only passive. From societal and congressional perspectives, 
the Air Force had to improve first of all its air superiority fighter and long-range bomber 
fleet. Thus, the rapid introduction of the B-36 and B-50 were supposed to back the 
SAC’s credibility to attack any place with nuclear weapons if necessary. Besides these 
short-term solutions, the Air Force pushed the conversion to jet-powered planes. In 
1948, Air Force Secretary Symington assigned “the greatest importance” to the 
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acquisition of the jet-propelled B-52 (Trest 1988, 156). The F-84 and F-86 followed 
suit. 
 
The revolt of the admirals 
Society played only a larger role, when the Air Force’s acquisition activities after 1948 
pitted it against the Navy. The latter’s weapon acquisition was drastically reduced with 
only a few ships under construction after the war (Hammond 1963, 467-469). 
Therefore, the Navy focused on capabilities, which seemed particularly important in the 
new environment. Besides anti-submarine warfare, the development of advanced heavy 
aviation means clearly outbalanced other projects.
188
 The most central element of this 
aviation program was the development of a new and large class of flush-deck aircraft 
carriers, which had elated Navy leaders since the war. When design studies began in 
1945, the technologically advanced supercarrier was considered a logical extension of 
the World War II carriers. Since it would allow for the launch of potentially nuclear-
equipped long-range bombers the admirals soon regarded the new carrier also as its 
primary road to a nuclear mission. In late 1947, Assistant CNO Daniel Gallery 
suggested in a memo that “the time is right now for the Navy to start and aggressive 
campaign aimed at proving that the Navy can deliver the Atom Bomb more effectively 
than the Air Force can.” (in Rosenberg 1978, 254) Although this radical position met 
skepticism among senior admirals and Navy Secretary Sullivan denied any ambition to 
take over the Air Force’s strategic bombing mission, there is little doubt that the Navy 
pushed for a share in nuclear warfare inspired by the general mood in favor of air 
atomic power (New York Times 1948a). Navy representatives referred to the 
supercarrier as ‘atomic carrier’ as early as 1947. After years of starvation, the project 
was planned to become the starting point for a whole range of new ship types. 
In March 1948, Forrestal told the Chiefs that the President had approved the 
construction of the prototype supercarrier. But although the Congress had appropriated 
money for the first-year costs in the FY 1949 budget and appropriations for FY 1950 
were on a good way in Congress, the project came to a sudden end (McFarland 1987). 
                                                             
188 Thus, Senators were displeased to learn that the Navy had used $25 million especially provided by 
Congress for antisubmarine programs to save its other aviation programs after Defense Secretary Johnson 
had subsequently cut the FY 1950 appropriations (SubSAC 1950, 200-202). 
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Defense Secretary Johnson, newly arrived in office, canceled the Navy’s supercarrier 
five days after the ship’s keel was laid in April 1949. Searching for efficiency, Johnson 
concluded that the Services’ acquisition portfolio was leaving all Services short of their 
needs and provided suboptimal outcomes. He therefore asked the JCS to decide on the 
fate of the disputed supercarrier project, which tied large amounts of funding. Preferring 
a continuous investment in intercontinental air power, the chiefs of the Air Force and 
Army considered the project a waste of scarce resources and a duplication of the Air 
Force’s strategic mission. Thus, the JCS decided 2 to 1 that the project should be 
canceled in favor of a continued buildup of the Air Force’s fleet. Both Services had 
heavily lobbied Congress and the public to create support for their central projects. 
Now, the Air Force seemed to have won the upper hand. To make things worse for the 
Navy, Johnson’s new budget provided not only no money for the canceled supercarrier, 
but also reduced the active carrier force from 8 to 4 and the Navy air groups from 14 to 
6 (Millett/Maslowski 1984, 481).  
In an immediate reaction to the cancelation, Secretary of the Navy Sullivan, who had 
not been consulted on the decision, resigned. Other naval leaders, fearing for the Navy’s 
very existence, were not willing to accept Johnson’s ruling without a fight. In a series of 
events, which was later called the revolt of the admirals, they publically challenged the 
quality of the postwar military transition. An anonymous document, prepared by 
Cedrick Worth, special assistant to Under Secretary of the Navy Kimball, without the 
knowledge of his superiors, marked the beginning of the revolt. In parts based on 
rumors, the paper argued that the Air Force’s B-36 long-range bomber was an inferior 
weapon system and only approved for production, due to unsound favoritism on the 
hands of Johnson and Symington (McFarland 1987). As rumors made their rounds in 
Washington, James Van Zandt (R-PA) revealed these allegations before the HASC and 
called for an investigation (Hogan 1998, 186-187; Hurd 1949). Vinson responded by 
announcing hearings in the HASC, “to give the information to the public that the public 
desires, as to whether or not we are purchasing what is best for the defense of the 
country.” (HASC 1949a, 5)  
It soon turned out during the hearings that the claims of corruption were untrue 
(Christian Science Monitor 1949; Conklin 1949). Still, naval leaders, including CNO 
Denfeld and Under Secretary Kimball used the opportunity to publically warn of the 
currently low moral within the Navy and to question the strategic, fiscal and moral 
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feasibility of B-36 procurement and the reliance on nuclear bombing (HASC 1949a; 
1949b; Hammond 1963). Led by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CINC Pacific Fleet and 
former VCNO, the Navy’s witnesses pointed out that the bomber was easy prey for 
Soviet jet-engine fighters and only capable of imprecise strategic bombing (HASC 
1949b). Connecting to the moral discussions on nuclear weapons, the admirals claimed 
that the Air Force’s promise of strategic air power ultimately rested on indiscriminate 
atomic bombing and was therefore immoral. Furthermore, the sole reliance on the 
unproven promise of strategic air power and the Air Force’s attempt to monopolize 
strategic capabilities narrowed strategic options and threatened national security. The 
Air Force defended the B-36 as a leading-edge weapon system and emphasized the 
soundness of their strategic outlook. From the outside, the controversy soon resembled 
Services out of control including all kinds of mudslinging. In fact, the admiral’s open 
challenge to the administration’s military policy provoked the anger of other Pentagon 
officials. The heaviest blow to the naval position was dealt by CJCS Bradley, who 
responded to what he considered an “open rebellion against the civilian control” by 
arguing that “[t]his is no time for ‘fancy dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have 
on every play, unless they can call the signals.” (HASC 1949b, 533, 536)  
In the end, the admirals earned some understanding by Congress, but clearly lost the 
battle. They proved unable to alter the public position, which remained in strong favor 
of the Air Force and air atomic power. Hence, the Navy neither benefited in budgetary 
terms nor was the supercarrier saved (Allard 1984, 293).
189
 Moreover, as a late 
consequence of the revolt, Johnson removed Louis E. Denfeld, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, for his open challenge to the Defense and Navy Secretaries’ testimonies. 
Indeed, the flyers’ case for the B-36 seemed even more valid than before, although the 
committee members agreed that only the test of war would prove the validity of 
positions. The revolt of the admirals was the strongest civilian intervention in military 
acquisition and a situation in which societal demands had a direct, but largely 
responsive impact. The public’s clear and unchanged support for the Air Force 
confirmed the emerging paradigm shift in the military preparations away from the Navy 
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 With the supercarrier canceled, the Navy’s focus moved from the construction of carriers to anti-
submarine capabilities, including nuclear-powered submarines, to counter the growing Soviet undersea 
fleet. Four Mitscher-class frigates, equipped with modern antisubmarine weapons, and three hunter-killer 
(SSK) submarines, equipped with sensors and weapons to detect and destroy enemy submarines, were 
laid down in FY 1950 (Allard 1984, 295-296). 
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and the sea as first line of defense to the Air Force and the air as dominant medium of 
operations.  
 
Summary 
Besides this clear responsive influence, only a moderate impact of societal demands is 
evident. As expected, there was hardly any political influence based on the defense 
industry’s demands. On the contrary, the most central actors, such as Vinson (D-GA), 
Mahon (D-TX), Walsh (D-MA), Short (D-MO), Gurney (R-SD), or Taft (R-OH) did 
either not come from states with relevant defense industry or pursued policies, which 
did not clearly benefit the constituency’s defense industry. For example, Taft supported 
air power rather than tanks and automotive production, Ohio’s strong card (Markusen et 
al. 1991, 13, 18). The unspecific and weak public preferences had also only little 
impact. Covered by secrecy, the acquisition of atomic bombs did hardly meet the public 
expectations and only other decisions with societal participation had an indirect 
influence on the Services turn to nuclear weapons. With regard to the aviation where the 
relevant information was available, the public provided only broad guidelines and 
general influence for innovation. The Services were largely free to act within the fiscal 
constraints, as the political actors only intervened when obvious problems arose. These 
interventions provided the rare opportunity for the societal demands to connect to the 
acquisition process. In this context, the revolt of the admirals proved highly influential 
for the course of the transition.  
 
5.2.3.2. Buildup 
The test of war 
In 1950, a new dynamic and urgency took over the whole weapons acquisition. Backed 
by public support, the procurement of weapon systems was rapidly expanded. The 
overall FY 1951 acquisition funding was more than five times larger than the prior 
year’s acquisition funding and continued to rise in FY 1952 (Condit 1988, 241, 259). 
But the massive buildup immediately revealed the limitations of a system of industrial 
mobilization, as the industry struggled to meet the armed forces’ suddenly raised 
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demands and production faced shortages in raw materials, machine tools, and labor 
force. For example, the placement of new production lines for ammunition, which were 
effectively all closed or converted in the late 1940s, took up to 24 months. Hence, 
supplies for the Korean battlefield increased very slowly in spite of sufficient 
appropriations. Initially, the production lag was offset by large World War II leftovers, 
but the heavy use of artillery fire rapidly shrank the stockpiles.
190
 The Army soon faced 
supply shortages and had to draw from shipments destined for military assistance to 
allies and from the supply for the European occupation forces to prevent ammunition 
shortage in Korea (Condit 1988, 157-161). During 1952, the Army even had to restrict 
the use of critical ammunition until the industrial production kicked in and increased 
supply reached the Korean battlefield in November. The tank production, which was 
rapidly accelerated early into the war, faced similar problems and was still running six 
to nine months behind schedule by the end of 1951 (Abel 1952).  
The changing international situation and NSC-68 triggered not only a push for more, 
but also for better weapons. R&D funding tripled between FY 1950 and FY 1952 and 
approximately two-thirds of the US scientists and engineers were occupied with defense 
programs by late 1951 (Kevles 1990, 251).
191
 R&D funding continued to rise even after 
the procurement was first stretched and then drastically reduced in 1952 and 1953 
(Armacost 1969, 30). Since the New Look sought weapons for their general deterrent 
value rather than for short-term deployment, the permanent technological edge became 
more central than the quantity of weapon systems (Markusen et al. 1991, 30). By 1955, 
the DOD and AEC spent together almost 50 percent of the total federal R&D 
expenditures (Clayton 1970, 40).  
 
The decision to develop thermonuclear weapons 
Various innovations resulted from these R&D efforts, but the impact of societal 
demands was again only selective. While many acquisition efforts coincided with public 
                                                             
190 For example, the 38th Field Artillery Battalion fired in one operation 11,600 rounds in 12 hours which 
equals a rate of 1 round per minute per 4.13-inch howitzer (Doughty 1979, 11). 
191
 While the funding for nuclear R&D increased quickly, non-nuclear R&D did not rise until the 
outbreak of the Korean War. Indeed, with the tightened budget ceilings by 1950, R&D came under 
considerable pressure by the decade’s turn. For example, the Office of Naval Research, working fairly 
unconstrained during the late 1940s, came under pressure to direct its research funds more closely to 
naval needs and to justify its programs more explicitly (Sapolsky 1979, 388). 
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demands, the unspecific common preferences had little apparent causal weight. In 
contrast, special interest groups gained in the decisions for the development of 
thermonuclear weapons early importance. Already prior to the Korean War, Truman 
ordered the development of thermonuclear capabilities and the expansion of nuclear 
weapon stockpiles in the wake of the Soviet Union’s atomic tests (Condit 1988, 5-6; 
Rosenberg 1979, 80-84; Schilling 1961).
192
 Given the slow progress in the field of 
nuclear weapons during the late 1940s, the decision to develop H-bombs was the first 
major innovation since the advent of atomic bombs (Huntington 1961, 298). Due to the 
secrecy surrounding nuclear R&D, most societal interests were excluded from the 
decision. This allowed civil scientists occupied with nuclear R&D to play an important 
role despite their limited resources. Especially Ernest O. Lawrence and Edward Teller 
urged the Services and lawmakers early on to support the development program in 
response to the outside events (Huntington 1961, 300-304). Despite a negative 
recommendation by leading scientists including J. Robert Oppenheimer and a split 
position within the AEC, the military chiefs, central political actors in the 
administration including Johnson and Acheson, and lawmakers in the Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy backed the program. Lawrence and Teller benefitted greatly from the 
decision with regard to their reputation and research project funding.
193
 Especially 
Teller had advocated the H-bomb development for some years and returned to Los 
Alamos to work on the project shortly after the decision was taken. While the public did 
not participate in the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons, it clearly backed the 
effort. When it finally learned of the program, 73 percent answered by late January 1950 
that the US should try to make the new bomb (Gallup 1972b, 888). The accelerated 
nuclear R&D efforts resulted in a first successful thermonuclear explosion in 1952 and 
                                                             
192 With a nuclear exchange on short notice becoming a real option, the AEC’s control of nuclear 
weapons started to crumble. Already in early July 1950, Truman approved the transfer of non-nuclear 
components of nuclear weapons to US forces in Britain. The nuclear components would remain in AEC 
custody and only transferred if necessary. Within the successive weeks, the President allowed for the 
storage of non-nuclear weapon components in the Pacific and on aircraft carriers. In April 1951, Truman 
approved a request by Air Force Chief Vandenberg to transfer nine complete nuclear bombs to Guam. 
The AEC agreed after ensuring its involvement in any decision to use nuclear weapons. The process 
continued with the election of Eisenhower, who considered A-bombs, in contrast to H-bombs, as regular 
weapons and wanted them to be treated like it by the DOD. The OSD established the position of an 
assistant to the secretary for atomic energy in 1953, which improved the DOD’s role in nuclear 
acquisition (Feaver 1992, 158-159).  
193 Lawrence worked at the University of California Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. With the growing 
importance and funding of nuclear R&D, a second Radiation Laboratory at Livermore was established in 
1952 to further spur innovation. Both laboratories closely worked together and were named after Ernest 
O. Lawrence. 
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contributed to increasingly smaller warheads, which reduced the requirements for 
delivery capabilities and broadened the range of applications.  
 
Conventional R&D and continuous interservice conflicts 
Whereas Congress refrained from challenging the acquisition process in qualitative 
terms even more than during the late 1940s, the political actors within the 
administration made efforts to improve their control and coordination of the weapons 
acquisition during the early 1950s (Dancy 1977, 350; Peck/Scherer 1962, 73). A first 
step was taken in late 1950, when Truman appointed a director of guided missiles to 
coordinate the numerous missile projects.
194
 A year later, Truman established a 
Scientific Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) to advise 
the President as well as the ODM director on scientific questions.
195
 Under Eisenhower, 
the committee became a continuous voice within the NSC. Civil control was further 
strengthened by the DOD reorganization in 1953, which replaced the toothless 
Munitions Board and Research and Development Board with assistant secretary 
positions within the OSD. Yet, all these efforts did hardly result in an improved 
connection between societal demands and weapons acquisition, however.  
Innovation during this period stemmed rather from two other sources. (1) The war made 
painfully clear that the reliance on World War II equipment was insufficient to match 
the North Korean forces equipped with advanced capabilities from the Soviet Union. 
This created a powerful argument for acquisition, which the political actors could hardly 
resist and provided the military actors with considerable leverage. For example, the T34 
tank proved almost unstoppable for the first US forces on the peninsula and only the 
hasty deployment of larger rocket launchers, medium tanks
196
 and close air support 
                                                             
194 In the same year, the National Science Foundation was established to increase the civil coordination on 
defense R&D. However, it failed to acquire a significant influence on the military R&D. Although it was 
widely expected that the National Science Foundation would pool basic research efforts after the Korean 
War, the Office of Naval Research successfully undermined a strong role for the new institution (Kevles 
1990, 259).  
195 The placement within the ODM was a political compromise. A review, prepared by investment banker 
William T. Golden in December 1950, suggested the appointment of a Science Advisor to the President, 
informed of all R&D activity. Yet, the newly established National Science Foundation feared losing 
relevance by the creation of a presidential advisor. Furthermore, the ODM argued that the post of a 
science advisor should be based in the ODM, since the advisor would deal basically with mobilization 
issues. 
196 The Army deployed mainly M4 Sherman tanks and M46 Patton, an improved version of the Pershing 
tank.  
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solved this problem in successive months. The administration rapidly responded by 
appropriating money for vastly expanding the development and production of 
innovative medium and heavy tanks, the first significant efforts in the field of 
mechanized ground systems since World War II (Norris 1950c). 
Moreover, the Russian MiG-15 jets, which were first reported from the Korean theater 
in November 1950 and increased to 1000 jets by June 1952, proved superior to the US 
propeller planes and the Air Force’s first fighter jet F-80 (Condit 1988, 75, 83).197 Even 
the F-84 Thunderjet had trouble to keep up with the enemy aircraft in rate of climb and 
combat ceiling and was therefore largely tasked with close air support operations 
(Condit 1988, 128). Only the hastily deployed F-86 Sabre was initially on par with the 
MiG fighters in air combat. This created a powerful incentive to further push fighter 
development, resulting in the evolutionary F-100 Super Sabre and the innovative design 
of the F-104 Starfighter.  
The war also offered the Navy an opportunity to prove the value of its capabilities after 
the lost political battle in 1949. In fact, naval forces played a particularly prominent role 
during the highly successful amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950 which 
changed the war tide in favor of the UN forces. Additionally, up to four aircraft carriers 
simultaneously supported the US forces in Korea and importantly contributed to close 
air support and air superiority missions, although the Navy’s propeller planes and its jet 
fighter F9F Panther proved inferior to the MiG-15 fighters. The war efforts as well as 
the revealed deficits helped the Navy’s course at home and the political actors refrained 
from again challenging the construction of the lead ship of a new carrier class.   
(2) Despite increased funding and war needs, the Services continued to compete for 
dominance in disputed areas and pushed for related acquisition. Driven by Service 
competition and war requirements, the Army’s increased integration of organic aviation 
was taking shape in the early 1950s. After the Army had only half-heartedly pursued the 
acquisition of helicopters during the late 1940s, the Korean War proved a watershed in 
the Army’s desire for organic aircraft (Bradin 1994, 78-88). Unsatisfied with the Air 
Force’s support, it pushed for a rapid expansion of helicopters, which proved a highly 
valuable asset in the mountainous Korean territory. Since the earlier Army-Air Force 
                                                             
197 The F-94 Starfire, a stretched version of the F-80, which was used to protect bomber groups in battle 
fared better, but played only a minor role (Bright 1992, 217-218). 
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agreement severely limited the Army’s possibilities to expand its air capabilities, Army 
Chief Collins asked Air Force Chief Vandenberg to grant a waiver for the helicopter 
procurement in September 1950 (Norris 1950d). The latter turned down the request, 
fearing a growing challenge to the Air Force’s mission. As an Air Force officer 
explained: “Whenever you let them branch out, it’s like letting them get a foot in the 
door.” (in Beach 1951) After continuous interservice feud, tests, and requests, the 
weight restrictions on Army aviation were surprisingly lifted a year later (Norris 1951). 
Army aviation was instead limited to functions within a 50-mile radius of the combat 
zone, which did not duplicate the Air Force’s tasks. This did not settle the issue for 
long, however. As the Army increasingly took measures to organizationally separate its 
aviation assets from the Air Force, the latter intervened in 1952. The subsequent 
struggle ended in a new memorandum, which increasing the Army’s aviation radius to 
100 miles, but reinstated weight restrictions at 5,000 pounds. The latter made 
nonetheless good use of the relaxed restrictions and increasingly built up its organic 
aviation components, which substantially enhanced the ground forces’ means in future 
wars (Futrell 1989, 348-349).  
In the field of missile systems the general influence of societal demands for air atomic 
power remained apparent. After slow progress during the 1940s, considerable dynamics 
resulted from the increasing funds during the early 1950s. By the end of the transition 
period, missiles had advanced to a major factor in strategy and tactics (Baldwin 1954b). 
The establishment of an OSD Director of Guided Missiles showed the political actors’ 
raised interest in the efficient acquisition of these alternative means to deliver nuclear 
ordnance. Yet, as during the 1940s, the development was accompanied by almost 
permanent conflicts over the appropriate place for missile development and operation 
and a lot of the dynamic must be attributed to interservice conflicts (Watson 1986, 179-
182). In fact, the Air Force grew increasingly concerned by the ambitions of the other 
branches. Although the flyers still focused on manned aircraft, they feared to lose 
control over the new aviation systems, which posed a potential threat to its prerogatives 
(Builder 1994, 167).
198
 As late as 1954, an Air Force officer wrote: “The attitude of Air 
Force personnel, individually throughout the Air Force and collectively in the major 
commands, seems to best be described as a combination of skepticism, indecision, and 
                                                             
198 Especially bomber airplanes were central and the Air Force started to prepare for the successor of the 
B-52, the B-70, as soon as the former became available after the Korean War. 
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indifference.” (in Werrell 1985, 103) But the Air Force leaders considered missiles as 
planes and were not willing to prematurely give up on them.
199
 Especially the Army 
contested this responsibility for missiles, which it still considered as self-propelled 
artillery shells (Army Almanac 1959, 209). Moreover, with the raised importance of 
nuclear means, the Army considered missile technology more than ever as its path to 
nuclear participation. Hence, the free rocket Honest John and the tactical surface-to-
surface missiles Corporal, both introduced in 1953, were potentially capable to carry 
nuclear warheads (Cagle 1964; Bragg 1961). And the Army was running further 
promising projects to develop the short-range ballistic missile Lacrosse and medium-
range ballistic missile Redstone (Braun 1963, 453-455). Emphasizing the all-weather 
utility of its innovative artillery and tactical missiles, the Army challenged not only the 
Air Force’s responsibility for missiles but also the flyers’ close air support mission 
(Norris 1954; Stevens 1952a).  
Against this backdrop, the Air Force sought to draw clear lines of responsibility. 
Already in December 1949, the Air Force blamed the other Services for illegally 
developing strategic missiles (Neufeld 1990, 54). It furthermore criticized the Navy for 
duplicating the Air Force’s air-to-air missiles. The flyers gained an early victory in 
1950, when the Defense Secretary Johnson approved exclusive jurisdiction over the 
development of long-range strategic missiles and short-range missiles for air war to the 
Air Force (Armacost 1969, 27). Yet, the other Services continued missile ‘studies and 
designs’ hoping to bypass the restriction with their evolutionary approach that might 
almost accidently result in complete missile systems. Hence, the general question on the 
responsibility for ground-launched missiles remained contested and the development 
continued on a broad basis. In 1951, Air Force General Vandenberg sought to limit the 
Army’s missile development to surface-to-surface missiles with a maximum range of 
150 miles. Unsurprisingly, Army General Collins opposed Vandenberg’s claim arguing 
that this limitation would violate the principle that every commander should have 
control of all the means needed to carry out assigned missions. The Research and 
Development Board, the Munitions Board, the Director for Guided Missiles, and other 
institutions for coordination proved unable to satisfactorily solve this conflict during 
Truman’s second term (Neufeld 1990, 66).  
                                                             
199 To underline the aircraft character of missiles, the Air Force even used their designation for bombers 
and fighters for missile projects.  
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When the Army asked the DOD for permission to purchase some of the Navy’s Regulus 
missiles to assist the development of its Hermes program in 1953, the conflict revived. 
Since the Air Force considered Hermes and Regulus outside of the Army responsibility, 
it opposed the request and suggested the discontinuation of the Hermes program. The 
debate was settled by the OSD, which argued that the Army could participate in the 
Navy’s test program to evaluate the missile without purchasing it. A report on the state 
of the missile programs brought new dynamic to the coordination process in early 1954 
(Watson 1986, 182-185). While rejecting the charge of duplications, the final report 
argued for a clarification of Service missions to avoid duplications in future missile 
development. Therefore, the JCS established a committee to develop a framework for 
missile responsibilities in June 1954. The committee’s draft pointed out that the Air 
Force should be responsible for intercontinental surface-to-surface missiles and that the 
Army should develop surface-to-surface missiles for use against tactical targets within 
its zone of combat operations. Although the Air Force would be allowed to develop 
surface-to-surface missiles for their functions in close air support, the report 
recommended that the Air Force should focus on manned aircraft.
200
  
 
The development of continental defense 
An additional committee was necessary to solve the outstanding issue of anti-aircraft 
missiles which slowly gained importance.
201
 Although the advent of atomic weapons 
and aviation made continental defense against air attack a plausible project, anti-aircraft 
missiles like other systems for defense purposes were no Service priority and made only 
slow progress after World War II (Huntington 1961, 326-341). The Air Force, which 
had principal responsibility for air defense, preferred to focus on the buildup of SAC 
and the offensive strategic bombing mission. It made only small steps to embrace 
                                                             
200 However, many questions remained unsolved and would provide cause for further interservice conflict 
(Watson 1986, 185-186). The most public incidence of interservice rivalry was the Thor-Jupiter 
controversy over the responsibility for IRBM systems (Armacost 1969).  
201 With the growing importance of air defense, the Air Force claimed sole responsibility for this mission 
and suggested sharp budget cuts for the Army’s anti-aircraft Nike missile program. Nike had made good 
progress, while the Air Force anti-aircraft system GAPA had been canceled in 1949 and the successor 
program BORMAC was far from being completed. The Army planned to equip 40 anti-aircraft artillery 
battalions with Nike systems by FY 1955.The compromise, approved by Wilson in fall 1954, saved Nike, 
since it allowed the Army to develop anti-aircraft weapon systems with horizontal ranges up to 50 
nautical miles, while the Air Force would develop missiles with greater range. 
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continental defense and in parts even obstructed progress.
202
 To be sure, the flyers were 
constructing a radar network of 79 stations and provided 15 air-defense wings by 1952. 
The Army further equipped 57 battalions of anti-aircraft artillery around the United 
States. But the growing nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union additionally fueled the 
issue of continental air defense and by the end of 1952, the Truman administration had 
largely come to the conclusion that more efforts should be made for continental defense 
(Watson 1986, 111-116). Yet, the outgoing President was in no position to challenge the 
status quo and left the final decision to his successor. When Eisenhower assumed office, 
the ODM’s Science Advisory Committee argued that the current air defenses were 
inadequate to counter a potential Soviet attack and should be advanced by new anti-
aircraft defenses and an early warning radar line across Canada (Hogan 1998, 378-379).  
After a deadlock between economizers, especially Treasury Secretary Humphrey, 
Budget Director Dodge and Defense Secretary Wilson, and proponents of continental 
defense, including most prominently Secretary of State Dulles, Eisenhower finally 
turned to an aggressive buildup of continental defense capabilities in fall. The Soviet 
Union’s successful thermonuclear tests in summer strongly contributed to this decision. 
The decision was again made without much public awareness and the public lacked the 
information to take a strong position on continental defense. Consequently, the debate 
between supporters and opponents of continental defense within the administration was 
shaped by speculations on the public position: The economizers argued that society was 
sick of the strong defense spending and would not approve additional funds for 
continental defense, whereas the proponents of continental defense argued that society 
would support the effort if they just knew of the magnitude of the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear capabilities. The latter urged the President to publically reveal the information 
on the Soviet nuclear capabilities in order to create public support, but the 
administration refrained from fully informing the public on the issue at hand.  
 
 
 
                                                             
202 Thus, the Air Force leaders refused to approve the conclusions of an Air Force study group in 1952, 
which made a strong argument for a continental defense system, and did not recommend the report for 
NSC consideration. 
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Summary 
Societal demands played an even smaller role during the buildup than during the prior 
builddown. The Korean War provided the military actors with a powerful leverage to 
dominate the acquisition process. This is not to say that military actors pursued 
programs which obviously ran counter to societal positions. In fact, society wanted 
innovation and got innovation; it wanted a focus on technology and got a focus on 
technology. But hardly any innovation was directly or indirectly caused by societal 
demands. Since Congress refrained from challenging the administration’s broad defense 
spending, even the incentive to push into a particular area in response to societal 
preferences lost relevance. Only the scientists as a special interest group made a direct 
impact on the innovation of thermonuclear weapons. 
 
5.2.4. Military doctrine & Service mission statement 
5.2.4.1. Builddown 
There was little doubt that military forces were necessary in the postwar world, but the 
precise political and military formulation of the Services’ purpose took shape only 
slowly. The uniqueness of the situation and the strategic uncertainty with regard to the 
goals as well as means of national security during the postwar years obstructed early 
solutions. Although the Truman Doctrine and containment policy framed a foreign 
policy perspective, its military implications were vague. Without precise political 
guidance, early Service planning focused solely on the prospect of an all-out war with 
the Red Army most likely in Europe. Yet, the Services disagreed over lessons of World 
War II and favored different ways of preparation for future war (Gavin 1958). 
Moreover, the Services expected the new technologies to transform future warfare, but 
their actual implications on their roles and functions were still unclear (Rearden 1984, 
385).  
All they felt certain about was that that their prominence and even existence was tied to 
their ability to quickly formulate a plausible role for their own branch and to secure a 
large share of the relevant postwar missions (Wolfe 1994, 7-15). Ironically, the National 
Security Act in 1947, which was supposed to unify the armed forces, further fueled the 
conflict over roles and missions. Since each branch sought to maintain its autonomy and 
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importance even within the new Military Establishment, the Services engaged in far-
reaching functional differentiation, demarcating their claims from outside challenges. 
The Committee on National Security Organization, which was established in 1947 to 
evaluate the national security establishment, concluded that “each service has ambitions 
of fighting the whole war or a large part of any war itself.” (in Norman 1949) 
Competition prevented a true unification beyond institutional reorganization and a clear-
cut differentiation of responsibilities. The subsequent Key West agreements in 1948 on 
Service functions did not clarify the responsibilities in contested missions, but moved 
the debate from a question of clear separations to the hardly easier question of 
coordination and cooperation. Wolfe (1994, 3) concluded in retrospect: “Key West did 
not apportion roles and missions in a way that maximized cooperation and coordination 
among the components of a single fighting organization. Instead, it reduced friction 
among fighting forces that sought to remain separate to pursue individual strategies to 
guard distinct organizational interests.”203 
The Services’ doctrine & mission statement formulation was closely tied to this struggle 
for relevance in the postwar years’ roles and functions. Societal demands did not 
actively intervene in the field of doctrine formulation. In fact, not even political actors 
exercised influence beyond the roles and mission debates. Thus, the Services were 
largely free – within the limitations of roles and functions – to formulate their doctrine 
& mission statements and thus outline their contribution to future warfare. Only a 
general societal influence is evident, since the societal military radicalism based on air 
atomic power was one background against which the Services chose their positioning. 
Besides responding to the new international and the technological environment, doctrine 
also served as an argument for the branch’s relevance in spite of or because of the 
societal mood and in competition to the other branches.  
 
 
 
                                                             
203
 Especially the agreement in the contested air power functions were complex: While the Navy got 
responsibility for the close air support for Marine Corps, the Air Force was put in charge for the Army’s 
air lift and close air support. Furthermore, the Air Force gained the primary responsibility for the area of 
strategic bombing, but agreed to generally allow the Navy to develop atomic weapons for naval 
campaigns without creating a strategic air force.  
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The Air Force’s turn to strategic bombing and air atomic power 
As the most popular Service, the Air Force’s doctrine formulation after the war 
stemmed strongly from its ambition to dominate all aviation capabilities and the desire 
to outline its significance as an equal component of the armed forces. Some Air Force 
representatives even called for a reversal of the prior hierarchy: “The function of the 
Army and Navy in any future war will be to support the dominant air arm.” (Doolittle 
1949) Yet, the ambitions faced two problems: (1) The Naval continuous claims for an 
aviation mission of its own constituted an annoying challenge to the Air Force’s 
uniqueness. Air Force Chief Spaatz complained in a Life magazine article after the Key 
West accords, which maintained naval aviation, that “the Nation is dissipating its wealth 
and wasting aviation talent in supporting two air forces.” (in Futrell 1989, 200) (2) 
Critics, especially within the other branches, disputed the significance of strategic 
bombing and thus the Air Force’s strategic significance independent of ground forces 
(Gavin 1958, 99). Indeed, after early confusion over its future focus, the flyers’ had 
turned to strategic bombing, whereas interdiction and especially close air support gained 
less attention (Bradin 1994, 76).
204
 Strategic bombing was jealously guarded as the 
Army Air Force’s and Air Force’s main argument to overcome the old air-ground 
interdependence expressed in its only official doctrinal document FM 100-20 (Mowbray 
1995). Doubts with regard to the significance of strategic bombing were particularly 
damaging in this context. But the administration’s Strategic Bombing Survey, a review 
of the air power impact during World War II, concluded in contrast to the widely held 
popular belief that strategic bombing did not decide the war especially in Europe (GPO 
1945). To make things worse, the demobilization left hardly enough bombers to 
credibly promise decisive strategic bombing operations. 
Atomic power provided the obvious means to upgrade the strategic bombing mission 
beyond any doubts. Most students of strategy were indeed convinced that nuclear 
weapons elevated aviation systems to the major weapon platform in future warfare 
(Kaplan 1983, 35-37). But the Air Force initially struggled to integrate nuclear power in 
its strategic bombing doctrine (Herken 1988, 209-217). With a far-reaching debate on 
                                                             
204 The flyers failed, however, to explicitly formulate this doctrine in a new publication. They were well 
aware that the combination of official FM 100-20 and the implicit strategic bombing doctrine seemed ad 
hoc and ambivalent. Therefore, Air University, established in 1946, was charged with reviewing FM 100-
20 and developing a framework for future doctrine development (Jones 1997, 1). But numerous 
disagreements within the Air Force and few resources circumvented early success and the doctrine 
remained implicit. 
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the morality of nuclear weapons and limited technological information, skepticism and 
confusion concerning the impact of a full embracement of the new weapon persisted 
within the branch (Greenwood 1978, 220).
205
 Especially traditional air power 
proponents feared a reduction of the large air force in being, since a nuclear doctrine 
would rely on a few special air wings and make massive bomber formations as well as 
tactical aviation unnecessary (Parrish 1968, 104). 
Only after 1948, did atomic bombing start to dominate the Air Force (Huntington 1961, 
309). By then, the likelihood of an international control had greatly diminished and the 
Finletter Report provided a powerful backing for a nuclear mission. General Hoyt 
Vandenberg, who became Air Force Chief in 1948, and Major General Curtis LeMay, 
who became commander of SAC few months later, dispelled most doubts within the 
branch and by 1949, Baldwin (1949b) observed: “[T]he Air Force is wedded (…) to the 
theory of victory by long-range atomic bombardment. All of its major energies, the 
greater part of its appropriations and most of its emotional interest go to this one-
weapon concept.”206 SAC, the institutional embodiment of strategic bombing, became 
central to the Air Force: “LeMay’s SAC would own the Air Force; SAC was the Air 
Force; and SAC was the world’s most awesome and respected military force.” (Builder 
1994, 146; emphasis in the original) Requiring little doctrinal adjustment, LeMay 
shifted SAC’s emphasis from conventional strategic bombing to strategic deterrence 
based on the threat of retaliation by nuclear bombing during his tenure. This shift in 
emphasis occurred largely unnoticed by society and without direct congressional 
participation (Huntington 1961, 309). 
 
The transoceanic Navy and its struggle for the strategic bombing mission  
While the Air Force’s turn to strategic deterrence perfectly underlined its claim for a 
large postwar role, the Navy found itself in a much less favorable situation by the war’s 
end. To be sure, victory in World War II provided a major vindication for the Navy, 
proving its crucial strategic value especially in the Pacific (Palmer 1988, 7). But from a 
                                                             
205 The Air Force’s war planning contributions proved still limited by late 1947, due to lacking 
information concerning the availability and use of atomic bombs (Greenwood 1978, 230). 
206 The fighter pilots, better represented by the tactical focus in FM 100-20, subordinated their preferences 
in order to achieve and defend the superior goal of independence. Thus, despite the Air Force’s promise 
to provide the Army with strong tactical support forces during the unification debates, the tactical 
components were successively reduced under Vandenberg. 
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functional and doctrinal point of view, the end of World War II pushed the Navy into 
deep crisis. While it had confidently considered itself America’s first line of defense 
before the war, its achievement of global dominance and the advent of new technologies 
during the war put the Navy’s prior image and doctrine in strong doubt (Huntington 
1954b, 487). This is also reflected in public opinion which had clear positions on the 
relevance of the Air Force and the Army but seemed unsure about what to think of the 
Navy in between. Early on, the Navy faced strong claims of obsolescence from the 
Army Air Force, since the latter considered the Navy’s postwar capital ship, the aircraft 
carrier, a challenge to its position. Lt. General James Doolittle predicted in 1945: “As 
soon as airplanes are developed with sufficient range (…) there will be no further use 
for aircraft carriers.” (in SMAC 1945, 308) Later, an Army Air Force officer went even 
further: “Why should we have a Navy at all? (…) There are no enemies for it to fight 
except apparently the Army Air Force.” (in Huntington 1954b, 484)  
Naval officers and secretaries responded by a twofold strategy to this situation. First, 
they downplayed the strategic significance of nuclear weapons and argued that 
invention did not threaten the relevance of the Navy (e.g. Cranwell 1946). Forrestal told 
lawmakers that he considered the reliance on atomic bombs, without really knowing 
their impact, would be a risky gamble, concluding: “[I]t seems that our national policy 
with respect to such an important instrument as the Navy must be based only on the best 
thinking available; and we should beware of any conclusions based on unproved 
theories.” (SubHAC 1947b, 26) This argument was more than rhetoric. In fact, many 
admirals continued to consider the high-sea defense vital despite the dawn of nuclear 
power and long-range aviation. They insisted that any aggressor, regardless of whether 
equipped with nuclear weapons or not, still had to cross oceans before attacking US 
mainland and therefore the Navy would still provide the first line of defense. Moreover, 
many naval officers considered nuclear bombing as a highly dubious concept. As Rear 
Admiral Daniel V. Gallery, assistant CNO, argued in 1948: “It is a strategy of 
desperation and weakness. I believe we should abandon the idea of destroying enemy 
cities one after another until he gives up and find some better way of gaining our 
objective.” (in Rosenberg 1979, 70) Finally, nuclear weapons could hardly meet all 
relevant military needs. The protection of free trade and transport on the seaways 
remained an important mission even in a world without rival sea powers. In this vein, 
Forrestal testified before the House Naval Affairs Committee in late 1945: “In the 
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future, as in the past, the key to victory and to the freedom of this country will be in the 
control of the seas and of the skies above it.” (HNAC 1945, 1164)  
Second, given the nature of the opponent, the technological opportunities and the 
societal preferences, the naval leaders pushed into the field of air power to find 
relevance beyond the oceans (Fisher 1995). Being the ‘world’s unchallenged 
policeman’ was clearly not enough to secure continuous prosperity for the Navy. 
Airpower seemed in this context not only vital to protect the surface fleet from air 
attack, but it provided means to extend the Navy’s relevance beyond the high-sea. 
Therefore, Forrestal wrote in 1945: “The Navy, if it is to keep pace with the public mind 
and the changing character of war, must be an air Navy.” (in Cornell 1987, 96) Even 
prior to the war’s end, the Navy Secretary had identified the Soviet Union as most likely 
future opponent and started to team up allies within the branch to prepare the Navy for 
this scenario. Together with the group of young officers, including Chester W. Nimitz, 
Forrest Sherman, and Louis Denfeld, he prepared a new naval role, which turned from 
high sea battles and command of the sea towards forward, offensive operations and sea 
based inland power projection (Palmer 1988, 12; Huntington 1954b, 491). Submarines, 
air force carriers and amphibious capabilities should create a role for the naval forces in 
future land warfare with the Red Army. Sherman outlined the Navy’s plan for future 
war in early 1947: In case of Soviet aggression, the naval forces would engage in early 
submarine warfare while carrier task forces would attack targets at sea and ashore with 
amphibious forces reinforcing and seizing forward positions (Palmer 1988, 37). Despite 
resistance from the battleship community and proponents of Mahan’s traditional 
doctrine, aircraft carriers, “the only air bases that can be made available near enemy 
territory without assault and conquest” (Nimitz 1948), replaced the battleship as capital 
weapon platform and major strategic asset of the Navy.  
This focus on carriers and carrier task forces left even the door for a future strategic 
bombing and nuclear mission open, which would place the Navy in the most promising 
and best funded section of the military establishment. In fact, the Navy emphasized its 
strategic capabilities in the first general postwar doctrinal statement ‘US Fleet 
Publication Number One, Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare’ in 1947 
(Rosenberg 1978, 250-251). And CNO Nimitz (1948) confidently predicted on his day 
of departure in 1948: “In addition to the weapons of World War II the Navy of the 
future will be capable of launching missiles from surface vessels and submarines, and of 
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delivering atomic bombs from carrier-based planes.” Nimitz’s successor Denfeld and 
VCNO Radford continued to push the Navy’s role in aviation from direct support for 
naval operations to strategic bombing (Palmer 1988, 49-51). 
However, with the cancelation of the supercarrier in 1949, this attempt suffered a 
terrible setback. During the subsequent hearings, CJCS Bradley made clear that the 
attack of land targets was not the primary purpose of the Navy and further efforts in this 
direction would only distract resources from its central mission of high-sea control 
(HASC 1949b, 528). He told Congress: “It is easy for men to lose the perspective of 
long range plans and understandably difficult to keep a steady hand on the tiller of the 
primary mission. But if they can’t do it themselves, then the American people must do it 
for them.” (HASC 1949b, 528) He recommended a return to high-sea control with a 
stronger focus on anti-submarine warfare. With no public resonance for the Navy during 
the revolt of the admirals, the naval doctrine was in limbo by the end of the decade. 
 
The Army’s claim for enduring relevance 
Given the societal distaste for large standing forces, the Army was hardly in a better – 
even though more predictable position – than the Navy. While the occupation duties in 
Europe and Asia provided temporal importance and guaranteed a proportion of the 
budget, its long-term perspectives were grim. With the advent of new technologies 
making the Army Air Force the rising star, the Army Ground Forces struggled to make 
a good case for its contribution. Early after the war, the Army held conferences and 
organized committees to review their postwar situation. The findings were unpleasant: 
A report by the War Department’s operations and plans division in 1946 contended that 
the air was the new primary medium of attack (Alsop/Alsop 1946). While airborne 
troops would gain new importance, ordinary ground forces were merely needed for 
occupational and policing duties.  
Since the Army expected the least and latest gains from the new technologies, the 
generals took a defensive position to protect the traditional Army mission (Sheehan 
1988, 60-61). They fought against the perception of nuclear weapons as panacea for a 
cheap national defense. Army Chief Eisenhower said in 1947: “[W]e cannot permit 
complacency or an ‘atomic bomb mentality’ – a possible modern counterpart of the 
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‘Maginot Line mentality’ to lull us into another post-war apathy.” (in Horne 1947) He 
also emphasized that bombers relied on bases, which would need a conventional 
defense (Midgley 1986, 7). Without denying the importance of the other branches, 
Army leaders continuously reminded political actors that only boots on the ground 
could ultimately win wars and a one-sided air power buildup would result in an 
unbalanced and weakened force (Doughty 1979, 2). Army Chief Bradley told 
lawmakers in 1948: “[A]ll phases of any future war will require highly trained soldiers 
in mobile, organized units and equipped with the best weapons which can be given 
them. Without these trained men there is no way for the air and naval arms to deliver 
their efforts to the enemy. These men of which I speak are the Army.” (in SubHAC 
1948a, 4) Army officials went even further and turned the popular perception upside 
down, arguing that the Air Force had still only a supporting role by preparing the 
Army’s decisive ground attack (Linn 2007, 159). 
Since the Army leaders had little incentive to emphasize the importance of nuclear 
bombs, doctrinal publications paid little attention to the technology’s impact on future 
ground warfare. With no other state in possession of nuclear weapons and the 
breakthrough of tactical nuclear weapons in the future, there was little urgency for far-
reaching preparations. Thus, the 1949 Field Manual FM100-5 discussed the dangers of 
radiation and radioactive material and scenarios for Army-Air Force cooperation, but 
did not mention any tactics for nuclear battlefields (Gavin 1958, 112; DOA 1949, 60). 
Rather, Bradley considered the Army’s victorious war performance in World War II as 
a template for future conflicts (Kretchik 2001, 143). Since the Services expected the 
next war to be a total war mostly fought in Europe again, major lessons from the 
European battlefield were still valid. Yet, the manual had no regional focus and rather 
discussed tactics along different terrains for a global applicability (Doughty 1979, 2-
3).
207
 Even beyond the total war focus, the Operations Field Manual 100-5 mirrored in 
most aspects its 1944 predecessor.
208
 Both manuals stressed that “in spite of the 
advances in technology, the worth of the individual man is still decisive.” (DOA 1949, 
17; War Department 1944, 27) And they both heavily leaned towards conventional war 
                                                             
207 Although the Field Manual spent considerable time discussing defensive operations, it left no doubt 
that only attacks would produce crucial military effects: “Through offensive action, a commander 
preserves his freedom of action and imposes his will on the enemy.” (DOA 1949, 21)  
208 Therefore, the Army added additional tanks to infantry divisions and infantry to armored divisions. 
Thus, the Army became overall heavier, even though the infantry remained the central unit within tactical 
considerations. 
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based on massed troop deployment and concentration of fire power. Only some changes 
in ground warfare found their way in the 1949 manual. Thus, while the infantry 
remained the central unit, Army leaders were convinced that the close support of 
mechanized units could greatly enhance infantry performance (Doughty 1979, 4-5). 
Moreover, infantry units should gain firepower by organic artillery and additional fire 
support by naval units and especially tactical air force (DOA 1949, 93).
209
 Thus, the 
Army tried to uphold its relevance from a conservative position, which highlighted the 
enduring principles of ground war and tried to qualify the impact of air atomic power. 
Stability rather than innovation was the result. 
 
Summary 
Societal demands and even the political actors’ preferences did hardly reach into the 
field of doctrine formulation. Thus, the Services were largely free to outline their 
contributions to future war. Yet, their doctrine formulation responded not only to the 
threat environment and the technological realities, but also included the general societal 
mood in favor of air atomic power. The Air Force and the Navy fought over the 
dominance in aviation, which was merged with a nuclear relevance by the end of the 
decade. In contrast, since the Army had little chances to benefit from air atomic power 
early on, it took a conservative position that downplayed the novelty of the postwar 
situation.  
 
5.2.4.2. Buildup 
The war in Korea provided the first test for the armed forces’ doctrinal thinking in the 
post-World War II environment. But preparing for a war with the Red Army in Europe, 
military leaders were taken aback by the opponent and the location of the war. Despite 
the early suspicions that the Soviet Union was the driving force behind the North 
Korean attack, the war on the Korean peninsula looked nothing like the expected all-out 
                                                             
209
 Air-Ground Operations Field Manual 31-35 was published in August 1946 to coordinate the 
interaction of the different branches. Yet, a conflict around the Air-Ground operations evolved between 
the Air Force and the Army Artillery. The Artillery promoted the broad organic integration of tactical air 
control parties, advising ground forces on the best use of aviator support, into artillery battalions. 
However, the Air Force successfully resisted the integration under artillery control (Doughty 1979, 3). 
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war. Moreover, Truman’s decision to refrain from nuclear escalation robbed the armed 
forces of their most decisive advantage and made prior war planning obsolete. Since 
1948 and even more so after the successful A-bomb test of the USSR, nuclear weapons 
had taken an increasingly prominent place in US war planning. In case of a nuclear 
showdown, planners argued by 1950 that nuclear weapons should be used early on to 
destroy the enemy’s strategic capabilities before being used to avoid considerable 
destruction (Feaver 1992, 130). But the weapon around which most planning circled 
was held back for political reasons during this first war of the nuclear age. Surprisingly, 
this experience had very little impact on the doctrine & mission statement formulation 
of the Services. Not only was the Soviet Union still looming behind the Korean War 
and the Service competition unsolved, but the societal general influence was unchanged 
in favor of air atomic power. Even the political actors did not push for doctrinal 
adjustment in response to the Korean War. In contrast, the Eisenhower administration 
embracement of societal demands in the other dimensions raised the incentives to 
pursue an air atomic power doctrine even further. Thus, the Services treated the war as 
an outlier which provided little guidance for future conflicts. 
 
Reassurance of strategic bombing 
Especially the Air Force tried to downplay potential lessons from Korea. Indeed, the 
war was bad for the Air Force, which had focused the most on the strategic impact of air 
power (Mowbray 1995, 6). Since Truman denied air attacks on China and nuclear 
escalation, the adversary’s war making capacities were out of reach and strategic 
bombing soon ran out of valuable targets. Therefore, the Air Force largest missions in 
Korea were again interdiction and close air support. But the Air Force’s strong 
emphasis on its bomber fleet and air superiority fighters during the late 1940s had left 
the close air support component weak (Bradin 1994, 74-75). Army troops jealously 
looked at the Marine Corps’ organic air support, which seemed more committed and 
better prepared for close-air support.  
From the flyers’ perspective, the experience of Korea threatened the strategic bombing 
doctrine and thus its newly earned institutional independence. Hence, former Air Force 
Secretary Finletter claimed in 1955 that “the Korean War was a special case, and air 
power can learn little there about its future role in United States foreign policy in the 
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East.” (in Jones 1997, 5) And the first postwar Air Force doctrine, finally released in 
spring 1953, served to reassure the branch as well as the political actors and society that 
the focus on strategic bombing was still unchanged and valid.
210
 AFM 1-2 referred to 
World War II experiences of total war rather than to Korean-style limited war and 
highlighted the importance of strategic bombing and atomic air power. The main 
chapter on airpower argued that “no nation can long survive unlimited exploitation by 
enemy air forces utilizing weapons of mass destruction.” (in Jones 1997, 4) New 
versions of AFM 1-2, which followed in 1954 and 1955, included only marginal 
changes from prior basic doctrine. Therefore, Mowbray (1995, 8) concludes that “1955 
found the Air Force with basic doctrine that was little more than a derivative of FM 
100-20.” Indeed, after the battle for independence and its recognition as a Service with 
distinct roles and functions, the Air Force ceased to discuss air power theory (Builder 
1994). Despite the changing requirements, reformulation of doctrine was considered a 
danger to the very pillars on which the institution was built. Public approval and 
Eisenhower’s turn to nuclear deterrence reassured the flyers in their preferences by 
allowing the Air Force to benefit from its unquestioned commitment to nuclear 
bombing. Rather than new doctrinal thinking, the Air Force was more than ever 
concerned with its means. Already in 1952, Vice Air Force Chief Twinning told 
lawmakers: “The Air Force is not bound to any fixed doctrine or concept. It grew out of 
scientific achievement.” (SubSAC 1952, 672)211  
 
Confirmation of the transoceanic strategy 
For the Navy, the Korean War was a quite positive experience. It offered an opportunity 
to prove its military value beyond high-sea control and improve its difficult situation 
back in Washington after the setbacks during 1949. Especially the amphibious assault at 
Inchon was widely praised and underlined the continuous relevance of amphibious 
landings in the nuclear age (Trott 1951b). Moreover, aircraft carriers were in high 
demand and the naval aviators proved better prepared for close air support than the Air 
                                                             
210 AFM 1-2 was the first of a number of doctrinal documents published over the next two years. In fall of 
1953, Air University issued four operational doctrines for theater air operations, air defense operations, 
and air operations in conjunction with amphibious operations. In May 1954, a strategic air operations 
manual was added. None of the additional manuals did depart from the major themes of AFM 1-2. 
211 Against this backdrop, advances in missile technology and a new generation of officers pushing for a 
warfare based on guided missiles threatened the bomber community and SAC. 
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Force flyers, due to their superior interaction with ground troops. With naval forces 
conducting or contributing to critical operations during the war, the Navy made political 
ground at home (Rosenberg 1978, 264). But after the admirals had badly burned their 
fingers with their push into a far-reaching role in strategic aviation, the Navy settled for 
a balanced position between high sea control and expeditionary capabilities. To be sure, 
the emphasis on early offensive operations against the Soviet Union was maintained and 
the capability for strategic bombing was effectively reached during the early 1950s. But 
the admirals formulated their claims more carefully and humbly. In 1952, CNO 
Fechteler outlined naval strategy before Congress: “It is generally appreciated that a 
navy must keep the oceans free for our use in time of war (…). What may not be 
understood is the fact that in the fast carrier task force the Navy has the ability to carry 
the war to the enemy in its initial stages, to knock out his coastal bases, (…) and to put 
him on the defensive at the outset.” (in SubSAC 1952, 1030) Unsure about the Soviet 
Union’s capabilities, the naval leaders swung between submarines, land-based aviation 
or missiles as the most serious threat to naval operations (Palmer 1988, 68-92). With the 
introduction of the New Look, the Navy’s focus on forward operations was blurred by a 
focus on nuclear deterrence. In a strategy of massive retaliation, naval missions, besides 
providing means for a second strike, had little importance. Hence, the offensive doctrine 
increasingly turned to a defensive approach focused on the prospect of a nuclear 
exchange. 
 
Army resistance to the New Look and the turn to the nuclear battlefield 
While the Korean War proved the Army’s reluctance with regard to the novelty of the 
post-World War II situation right, its postwar doctrine still turned out only partially 
adequate. FM 100-5 had focused on the prospect of global war requiring all-out 
mobilization and did not account for the outbreak of a limited war (Dougthy 1979, 7-
12). With regard to tactical concepts, the doctrine also proved flawed and the North 
Korean and Chinese armies repeatedly found ways to exploit tactical weaknesses of the 
UN ground forces. The doctrine neither foresaw the difficult territory nor provided 
guidance for the extensive battles from defensive positions or the Chinese human wave 
assaults. Thus, the Army learned painful lessons during the Korean War and adapted 
slowly during the war, improving especially defensive tactics. 
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But when the Army published its new FM 100-5 in 1954, it was no comprehensive 
adaption of lessons learned in Korea. While it included some lessons from the Korean 
War,
212
 Army leaders largely argued that prior doctrine was proved right during the war 
and thus change would be unnecessary. This emphasis of continuity with prior manuals 
was largely directed against the administration’s defense course after the Korean War. 
Indeed, FM 100-5 was a crushing military statement in rejection of the New Look and 
massive retaliation (Linn 2007, 168-169; Bacevich 2002; Doughty 1979, 12-16). Army 
Chief Ridgway used the manual as a policy tool to oppose Eisenhower’s preference for 
the Air Force and reliance on nuclear weapons, which leading Army officers saw a 
threat to their role within the defense establishment. For the generals, the Korean War 
carried the most important lessons for the national security strategy rather than for the 
individual Service preparations: It reinforced the Pearl Harbor lesson that the outbreak 
of an unexpected war with US involvement can hardly be anticipated early on and more 
fundamentally that deterrence could fail. In their eyes, Task Force Smith demonstrated 
the failure of Truman’s military policy, starving conventional means, while implicitly 
relying on the promise of nuclear bombs.  
But rather than drawing the right lessons from this renewed failure of military 
preparation, Eisenhower pushed the bias against conventional forces even further 
(Gavin 1958, 125). Against this backdrop, FM 100-5 was a manifest for the continuous 
necessity of ground combat forces with the soldier as enduring foundation for victory. 
Rebutting the prospects of becoming an auxiliary branch, the manual made clear that 
“Army combat forces do not support the operations of any other component.” (DOA 
1954, 4) Furthermore, it advocated limited conventional war over massive retaliation: 
“In general, indiscriminate destruction is unjustifiable in a military sense, since the 
Army destroys the instruments of enemy political force but does not destroy the bases 
on which a peace can be built when the conflict is over.” (DOA 1954, 5) After acquiring 
a copy of FM 100-5, the New York Times featured a front side story titled “Army Is 
Top Military Force of US, It States in Manual”, making the Army’s criticism public 
(Leviero 1955). 
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 For example, artillery support gained more prominence in the 1954 FM 100-5. Since artillery was less 
mobile, defense tactics also gained more consideration in the new Army doctrine. It described two 
defensive tactics, of which the mobile defense absorbed some of the lessons from Korea (DOA 1954, 
117-118). An additional lesson from the Korean War was the broader discussion of night combat (DOA 
1954, 157-161). 
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Despite this attack on massive retaliation, a closer reading of FM 100-5 reveals that the 
Army’s treatment of nuclear means was ambivalent and not fully dismissive. The 
manual discussed nuclear bombs as “an extremely powerful means of fire support.” 
(DOA 1954, 94) And it instructed commanders to “consider atomic fires as additional 
firepower of large magnitude to complement other available fire support for 
maneuvering forces, or he may fit his maneuver plan to the use of atomic fires.” (DOA 
1954, 40) Thus, while the Army rejected the strategic use of atomic weapons on moral 
grounds, it left the door open for their tactical use on the battlefield. Indeed, progressive 
thinking on the tactical use of nuclear weapons was underway within Army circles since 
their growing importance became obvious in 1949 (Doughty 1979, 16-18; Gavin 1958, 
112-116). 
As the Eisenhower administration did not yield to the Army’s fierce attacks on the New 
Look, the turn to a nuclear doctrine seemed a matter of Service survival and only after 
the period of transition did the political pressure foster innovation in the Army doctrine. 
After 1954, several field tests were run to assess the need for organizational and tactical 
adjustments for the nuclear battlefield (Abel 1954). The results suggested the advantage 
of dispersed small battle groups over a linear battlefield formation building the 
foundation for the so-called Pentomic division.
213
 The innovative Pentomic concept was 
approved in 1956 and had major impact on tactical thinking and as Sheehan (1988, 89) 
puts it “constituted one of the most significant peacetime changes in operational and 
tactical doctrine in the annals of military history.” Until 1958, all Army divisions were 
pentomic and the nuclear battlefield became the standard for tactical planning. 
 
Summary 
Although the Korean War differed strongly from World War II, it left little marks in the 
Services’ doctrine. Since the Soviet Union remained as a threat, the public remained in 
favor of air atomic power and the Service competition continued, the Korean War was 
treated as an outlier. Eisenhower’s turn to nuclear deterrence confirmed the Services’ 
resistance to doctrinal change during the war. Societal demands had again only a 
                                                             
213 For a detailed description of the Pentomic concept and its development see Sheehan (1988, 89-148) 
and Midgley (1986, 31-85). With hindsight, the pentomic concept proved highly flawed (Linn 2007, 178-
179; Sheehan 1988, 140). It was soon recognized as failure and lasted only until 1961. 
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general influence. Only when the public turned active during the elections 1952, the 
influence temporarily became indirect. 
 
5.3. Summary 
During both periods of military transition, only little innovation can be attributed to 
societal demands. To be sure, between 1945 and 1949 the societal demands were 
consistent on most issues but weak. In the annual budget process, the dominance of the 
President prevented any prioritization of air power. In the organizational dimension, the 
inconsistent societal position on UMT allowed Congress to depart from the 
administration’s support for this innovation. In the weapons acquisition, there was a 
widespread innovative activity, especially in aviation technologies, but the societal 
positions provided only a general influence in conventional R&D and an indirect 
influence in atomic R&D. With Truman opposing large budgets, Congress rejecting 
UMT and societal demands blocking a personnel-heavy force, nuclear weapons were 
the only feasible military option prior to the war. In the doctrine & mission statement 
dimension, the society failed to articulate a position at all and only the societal mindset 
of air atomic power constituted a general influence.  
While common preferences faced little competition from special interests, their 
influence remained largely unspecific and passive. Only the strong demand of the 
soldiers’ families had a direct effect resulting in rapid demobilization with a subsequent 
discrimination of personnel over technology Moreover, during the revolt of the 
admirals, in which Congress explicitly appealed to the public, the public position played 
an important but responsive influence. It remained steadfast in its support for long-range 
aviation at the expense of the supercarrier. Most innovative dynamics during the 
builddown period were not caused by the weak societal demands, but resulted from 
political and interservice struggles to meet the changed and uncertain international and 
technological environment. Societal demands rather had a conditional effect, affecting 
the chances of innovative initiatives within the political process. 
In contrast to the theoretical expectations, societal demands did not gain additional 
influence between 1950 and 1952, despite the strongly increased salience of national 
security issues. In fact, the public demands became even more passive until they 
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intervened during the 1952 elections. After the defense hawks had failed to create a 
responsive public influence in support of NSC-68, the war caused a strong support for 
the administration’s defense efforts. Against this backdrop, the Truman administration’s 
commitment to balanced budget distributions and a balanced organization became even 
more decisive. Although the public rapidly returned to its preference for air power, the 
administration focused on a balanced buildup and sought quantitative rather than 
qualitative changes. Acheson (1969, 421-422) commented on the political situation in 
late 1950: “It was often said that the Truman Administration and, particularly, the 
Secretary of State were ‘unpopular’ and had trouble with Congress. It is true that many 
uncomplimentary things were said, but in Washington it is better to get what one wants 
than to be loved.” Yet, as the buildup put an emphasis on the time-intensive products 
first, there was an unintended relative shift in favor of air power nonetheless.  
While NSC-68 hardly met dominant societal demands, only limited public influence is 
apparent during the early buildup. While the administration made efforts to gain public 
approval during the Great Debate on deployments to Europe, the public’s reaction was 
small. In the dimension of weapons acquisition, the war provided the armed forces with 
additional leverage and further reduced the weight of societal demands. Only the 
scientists as a special interest group made a direct impact on the innovation of 
thermonuclear weapons. The impact on doctrine formulation remained general. 
The public finally respond to the inconclusive situation in Korea and the 
marginalization over military policy during the elections in 1952. Eisenhower’s 
subsequent military policy strongly realigned with the public demands in the budget and 
organization dimensions. Hence, the election outcome directly affected military policy 
in most dimensions. The doctrine & mission statement dimension was only indirectly 
affected by the societal demands. Doctrine formulation remained the military actors’ 
domain to respond freely to the environment in their quest for relevance. 
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Relevant questions 1945-1949 1950-1953 
WHO IS DOMINATING THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE DIMENSION OF… 
…military budget? 
Political actors 
(administration) 
Truman: 
Military/Political actors 
(administration) 
Eisenhower: Political 
actors (administration 
…military organization? Political actors 
Military actors /Political 
actors 
…weapons acquisition? Military actors 
Military actors /Political 
actors 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
Military actors Military actors 
WHAT IS THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIETAL DEMANDS ON MILITARY INNOVATION IN THE DIMENSION 
OF… 
…military budget? No influence 
Truman: No influence 
Eisenhower: Direct 
influence 
…military organization? 
Direct influence 
(demobilization) 
No influence ( rejection 
of UMT) 
Truman: No influence / 
responsive influence 
(forward deployments) 
Eisenhower: Direct 
influence 
…weapons acquisition? 
Indirect influence 
(nuclear R&D) 
General influence 
(aviation R&D) 
Responsive influence 
(supercarrier 
controversy) 
Truman: Direct influence 
(nuclear R&D) 
General influence 
(aviation R&D) 
Eisenhower: Direct 
influence (aviation R&D 
/ continental defense) 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
General influence 
Truman: General 
influence 
Eisenhower: Indirect 
influence 
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6. NEW CHALLENGES: MILITARY POLICY BETWEEN 1990-1998 AND 2001-2007 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the US “again emerged victorious from forty 
years of war.” (McCormick 1998, 1) When the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
finally collapsed two years later, the US armed forces were already in the middle of a 
renewed downward transition. The economic slowdown of the late 1980s and large 
budget deficits put the government under early pressure to meet the calls for a peace 
dividend.
214
 Yet, there was considerable uncertainty with regard to the future force 
posture, as the US was forced to fundamentally rethink its foreign and military policy 
(Haass 1995; Cimbala 1995; Adelman/Augustine 1990). Without the overwhelming 
threat of the ‘Evil Empire’, the US “was freer to pursue a wide range of foreign policy 
goals, and at the same time less compelled to do so.” (Dueck 2010, 254) In this 
uncertain situation, three broad paths emerged for the military transition: First, a 
departure from prior high-intensity conventional war and a stronger focus on smaller 
scale contingencies and low-intensity operations, meeting the armed forces’ operational 
experiences of the 1990s. In fact, a range of formally suppressed conflicts erupted in the 
power vacuum of the post-Cold War and called for US military attention (Luttwak 
1996, 34). The very conventional Gulf War in 1991 was rather an outlier in a series of 
low-intensity missions including Somalia, Haiti or Bosnia (Dumbrell 2009). Second, 
proponents of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) argued that the strategic pause 
after the Cold War allowed for radical modernization of the forces to meet future 
threats. New military threats would inevitably emerge and only an aggressive push for 
information-age innovation could guarantee continuous US military superiority.
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Third, a conservative course, which left the spectrum of capabilities essentially 
unchanged.  
During the 1990s, the latter approach largely prevailed despite numerous low-intensity 
operations and pressure from RMA advocates. With the terrorist attacks on September 
11, 2001, military policy gained new momentum. Like the buildup in 1950, the attacks 
were perceived as a call to arms (Leebaert 2003, 614) Already during the late 1990s, the 
armed forces, Congress, and military experts had grown increasingly concerned about 
the reduced state of readiness and had called for an end of the procurement holiday 
                                                             
214 For an economic discussion of the term see Intriligator (1996). 
215 Andrew Marshall compared the 1990s to the phase between the end of World War I and World War II, 
which was characterized by significant military innovation (Owens 2002, 208-209). This comparison 
indicates of course that the next war would come and early preparation might determine its outcome. 
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(Schmitt 1998).
216
 Therefore, a renewed transition towards a stronger force was 
initiated, reaching beyond the immediate punishment of the aggressors and the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT). The administration early on committed to a RMA inspired 
transition, now labeled transformation. But the realities of the GWOT soon redirected 
military attention from preparing for the future to meeting present challenges. 
Especially the costly counterinsurgency operation in Iraq provided a powerful 
counterweight to the conventional and future-oriented focus of transformation efforts. 
With the support for transformation on the one hand and the necessity for increased 
emphasis on low-intensity conflicts and strong persistency of the status quo on the 
other, innovation remained fragmented.  
 
6.1. Actors and preferences 
6.1.1. Societal preferences 
6.1.1.1. Common interests 
Salience of preferences 
With the end of the Cold War, the public’s interest in international issues plumped. 
Support for an internationalist US foreign policy remained strong, but the public was 
hardly concerned with issues outside the own borders anymore (Richman 1996; 1993). 
Already by 1990, the threat of war with the Soviet Union, the formerly most salient 
international problem, sharply dropped and public opinion towards Russia grew 
friendlier (Gallup 02/1989, 02/1990, 08/1991). To be sure, skepticism remained and 
even after the fall of the Berlin wall, 21 percent of the public expected a hard-line 
crackdown to end the reforms in Russia (Gallup 12/1989). In fall 1991, more than half 
of the respondents said that there was still a ‘cold war’ between the US and the Soviet 
Union (Gallup 08/1991, also 09/1990). But the wariness with regard to the Russian 
transformation did not entail a strong attention on international problems. 
Only the temporary military missions, most prominently Iraq 1991, and the problems of 
terrorism and arms control gained some public attention. Yet, attention was either of a 
                                                             
216 The situations before World War II and the Korean War were cited as examples which struck the US 
unprepared and therefore almost ended in failure. In the words of Chabraja (1999), Chairman and Chief 
Executive of General Motors: “There is no such thing as a peace dividend – we pay for it one way or the 
other – either in increased cost for our nation’s defense, or in human misery.” 
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limited duration or of relatively low salience. In fact, a significant proportion of the 
public did not see the US as facing major foreign policy problems at all. Hence, when 
asked to name the biggest foreign policy problems in 1998, more than a fifth of the 
respondents in a CCFR poll did not name even one problem (Rielly 1999, 10). 
 
Chart 6.1: Trends in public opinion on selected foreign policy problems mentioned as one of “the 
two or three biggest foreign policy problems facing the US today”, 1986-1998 (CCFR 2002) 
 
The public turned inwards, instead (Jones, C. 1999; Richman 1993). Faced with an 
economic downturn and soaring federal deficits, domestic problems dominated the 
public agenda. As Weiner (1996) concluded: “Ever since the Berlin Wall became a 
speed bump in 1989, polls and interviews suggest that people are far more interested in 
their pocketbooks, schools and neighborhoods than in America's role as the last great 
superpower.” Thus, in 1991, almost 80 percent, a 20 percent point increase over 1985, 
agreed with the statement: ‘We should not think so much in international terms but 
concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and 
prosperity here at home’ (Potomac in Richman 1996).  
Defense issues regained moderate importance during the 2000 election campaign
217
, but 
only the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, finally brought security concerns back 
                                                             
217 The changing emphasis is clearly evident in the election campaigns. After the budget deficit together 
with economic and social issues had fully dominated the elections during the 1990s (Gallup 10/1991, 
12/1994, 12/1996), 70 percent considered the candidates’ position on national defense as extremely or 
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to the front. The share of people, finding it extremely important for the government to 
deal with military and defense issues, more than doubled between in January and 
October 2001 (Gallup polls in Torres-Reyna/Shapiro 2002). Although economic issues 
soon regained the top ranking position, two issues with implications for defense, 
terrorism and – after 2003 – the fear of war, remained in the top group of most 
important problems and even dominated public concerns after 2004.  
 
Chart 6.2: Most important problem facing the country today, 2000-2007 (CBS/New York Times 
polls)
218
 
 
Specificity of preferences 
As during previous periods of transition, the specificity of preferences differed greatly 
along the dimensions of military policy. After the Cold War, the specificity also varied 
greatly between the two periods of transition. During the 1990s, the public articulated 
very little specific preferences. Given the low importance of international issues and the 
lack of threats, this is rather unsurprising. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
very important for their voting decision during the 2000 election campaign (Gallup 07/2000). While 
defense still clearly ranked below social issues, such as education, health care, or the economy, it was 
more relevant than during previous elections. Especially Republican voters considered national defense as 
an important issue. Asked on the top priority for the Bush administration’s first 100 days, 9 percent of the 
Republicans named foreign policy and defense, whereas only 1 percent of the Democrats named this 
priority (Gallup 12/2000). 
218 Prior to 4/03, the wording of the question was: What do you think is the single most important 
problem for the government to address in the coming year? 
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(1) In the budget dimension, only demands concerning the budget size were specific 
during both periods of transition. The public clearly supported a downsizing of the 
armed forces during the early 1990s. In fact, relative majorities considered the amount 
of defense spending as too high already since the early years of the Reagan buildup. 
And with the demise of the Soviet Union, the demand for demobilization peaked in 
1990 and continued thereafter. Clear majorities preferred to redirect defense dollars in 
order to reduce the budget deficit (Gallup in Torres-Reyna/Shapiro 2002; PIPA 1996). 
 
Chart 6.3: Net support for defense spending, 1989-2007 (based on CCGA 2008; Carroll 2007; 
Moore 2006; Torres-Reyna/Shapiro 2002)
219
 
 
While the public called for a peace dividend, it did not push for an unlimited 
demobilization (Ullman 1995, 50). Five aspects of the data indicate that the public 
favored a quite high floor for defense spending even after the end of the Cold War. 
First, CCFR polls in 1994 and 1998 and a 1996 PIPA poll consistently show that the 
                                                             
219 Gallup asked: “There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington, 
DC, should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think 
we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?” NORC-GSS asked: “Turning now to the 
business of the country—we are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved 
easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell 
me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. 
Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on… the military, armaments, and 
defense?” CCFR asked: “Below is a list of present federal government programs. For each, please select 
whether you feel it should be expanded, cut back or kept about the same… defense spending.” The Gallup 
polls since 2001 were all conducted in February. Hence, the high support for defense spending in 2001 is 
actually seven months prior to 9/11. 
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public considered the maintenance of global military superiority as an important foreign 
policy goal (CCFR 2002; PIPA 1996). Although no enemy directly threatened 
American territory, people believed that the US had global interests that required strong 
military capabilities, including the promotion of international stability. As Bacevich 
(2008, 2) observes: “Americans became accustomed to thinking of their country as ‘the 
indispensable nation’.”220 Second, many people considered the maintenance of large 
defense spending as insurance for unforeseeable threats. In 1996, half of the respondents 
agreed with the statement: “If defense contractors stop building certain weapons, it 
would be hard to get those industries geared up again in the future. Therefore, even if 
some of the weapons may not be strategically necessary right now, they should still 
continue to produce them. Things might change so that we would need them later.” 
(PIPA 1996)  
Third, society continued to see the military as a highly trustworthy, morally integrated 
organization (Burk 2001, 247). There is some reason to argue that the 40 years of public 
support for a large standing force and internationalism had established a relationship 
that outlasted the end of the Cold War. Luttwak (1996, 35) rightfully argued: “The Cold 
War lasted so long that nobody remembers any prewar normality to which the military 
should revert.” The very successful war with Iraq further contributed to the popularity 
of the military. Colin Powell (1995, 532) recalls in his memoirs: “We had given 
America a clear win at low casualties in a noble cause, and the American people fell in 
love again with their armed forces.” Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the Iraq 
campaign, and CJCS Powell ranked very high in the public’s list of the most admired 
men between 1991 and 1996 (Gallup 12/1991, 12/1992, 12/1993, 12/1994, 12/1995). 
Fourth, even people without a direct benefit from defense dollars were concerned over 
the economic impact of demobilization (Bartels 1994). In 1996, a substantial minority 
of 43 percent agreed with the argument that “[t]he U.S. government should not cut 
defense spending because many people will lose their jobs when bases are closed and 
factories are shut down.” (PIPA 1996) Fifth, the percentage of people considering 
defense spending as too high decreased relatively quickly and by the end of the 1990s, 
the supporters of more and less spending were almost in balance. Thus, the public again 
                                                             
220 This observation is backed by CCFR pools between 1990 and 1998 in which increasing relative 
majorities believed that the US plays a more important role as world leader than 10 years ago (CCFR 
2002). Moreover, 73 percent of the respondents believed in 1994 that the US would play a greater role in 
the next ten years. 
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reacted as a thermostat to the defense reductions and considered the floor to be reached 
by late 1990.  
Around the end of the decade, the group calling for an increase in defense spending 
slightly exceeded or leveled the proponents of a decrease in most surveys (Torres-
Reyna/Shapiro 2002; see also Rielly 1999, 9). Yet, as Kugler (2001, 113) described the 
situation prior to the terrorist attacks: “The reality is that while the American public 
wants a strong military and accepts current defense budgets, it is not clamoring for a 
big, expensive buildup.” This strikingly changed after 9/11, when 58 percent argued that 
defense spending should be given priority over all other federal programs four months 
after the attacks (Gallup 01/2002). But the new importance that terrorism gained did not 
translate into an unconditional support for military spending. While the public wanted 
the perpetrators of 9/11 punished, a majority of people were skeptical of the military 
bias in the GWOT, which they considered of limited use (e.g. PIPA 2003; PIPA/KN 
2005).
221
 In the eyes of many people, the war on terrorism did not justify an 
unconditional buildup and the balance on defense spending turned surprisingly fast 
against the supporters of increased spending. 
Reviewing the downturn with a focus on partisan positions, net support for defense 
spending was disproportionately caused by people, who identified themselves as 
Democrats or Independents. Thus, while Republicans remained almost stable in their 
positions, the other groups increasingly opposed the level of defense spending.
222
  
                                                             
221 Large majorities supported robust measures such as air strikes and the deployment of ground troops 
against terrorist training camps (CCGA 2008). And more than four out of five respondents approved the 
Afghanistan War in various polls (Gallup, 10/2001, 01/2002, 09/2002). 
222
 The problem perception reveals a parallel pattern: Two years after the attacks, only 7 percent of the 
Democrats in contrast to 17 percent of the Republicans named terrorism still as a major problem (Gallup, 
08/2003). This coincided with a different threat perception during the 1990s. In 1996, 47 percent of the 
Republicans and only 31 percent of the Democrats considered Russia enough of a threat to justify 
maintaining current levels of defense spending (PIPA 1996). 
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Chart 6.4: Partisan trend on military spending, 2001-2007 (percentage saying “we are spending too 
much on national defense and military purposes”, Gallup data in Carroll 2007) 
 
This apparent partisan gap on defense policy during the GWOT is hardly new 
(Simon/Lovrich 2010; Hinckley 1992). Other studies have observed a deepening 
ideological and partisan gap among the public already since the Vietnam War (Goertzel 
1987; Kriesberg/Murray/Klein 1982; Russett 1975). In comparison to the post-World 
War II years, partisans have switched positions, with the Democrats undergoing the 
largest change: Moderately more hawkish than the Republicans after World War II, the 
Democrats turned to a highly critical position on military means after the Vietnam War 
which continued into the post-Cold War periods. People with conservative ideology 
were more likely to support defense spending, to encourage a young person to join the 
military, and in general more favorably of the military than other ideological groups 
(Leal 2005; Bartels 1994). In addition, Republicans were more likely than Democrats to 
support more military spending (PIPA 1996; Rielly 1991, 33). The argument that the 
US should keep acquiring more advanced weapons to protect against unforeseeable 
threats fared also much better among the Republicans than among the Democrats (PIPA 
1996). With the partisan shift, national defense had become Republican turf. In contrast 
to the late 1940s, the public clearly considered the Republican Party as the better 
managers of foreign and defense policy after the Cold War (Campbell/O’Hanlon 2006; 
Gallup 9/1991, 11/1991). Indeed, even Democratic partisans considered the 
Republicans as being more capable of handling defense (Jacobson 2003, 218).  
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With regard to the distribution of defense spending during the 1990s, the available 
evidence is very weak. Neither the press nor polling results reveal any plausible position 
on the general distribution of the budget. Assuming that the media and polling agencies 
picked up relevant or controversial issues, the public either did not care or was largely 
satisfied with the status quo. In fact, the public expressed a general satisfaction with the 
armed forces in various polls, which allows for the careful conclusion that the public 
indeed preferred stability. In 1990, two-thirds considered the national defense as about 
right at the time (Carroll 2007). And almost three-quarters regarded the armed forces as 
adequately prepared to meet military threats in 1996 (PIPA 1996). While the preference 
for technology over personnel continued, there is no evidence that this translated into 
support for a particular branch (PIPA 1996).  
With the GWOT, the preferences on the quality of the armed forces again became more 
specific. Yet, the public prioritization ran not clearly along Service lines, but rather 
along different missions: “Americans show a strategic preference for shifting away from 
large-scale nuclear and conventional war priorities, and toward the personnel-intensive 
requirements of unconventional warfare, peacekeeping, and the development of 
capabilities related to the war on terrorism.” (PIPA/KN 2005). Already a PIPA poll in 
2002 revealed a similar, although less pronounced, strategic prioritization (PIPA 2002, 
2): 44 percent supported spending increases on military personnel for salaries, housing 
and other benefits and only 7 percent called for a decrease. In addition, 61 percent 
supported spending increases for areas of the defense budget that support the military’s 
ability to fight terrorism, such as intelligence or Special Operation Forces (SOF), 
whereas only 18 percent called for an increase of the defense budget items that were not 
for military personnel or necessary for fighting terrorism, such as submarines or nuclear 
weapons. In other words, although the preferences can be translated in a moderate 
prioritization of the Army, the major demand went along mission lines with support of 
means for irregular operations with strong reliance on large personnel and information-
age equipment. This shifting emphasis from high-intensity war with conventional means 
to low-intensity war with transformation equipment ran through all dimensions during 
the buildup period. 
(2) The positions in the organizational dimension strongly follow the budget dimension. 
Hence, there is little evidence for strong preferences in the organization dimension 
during the 1990s. While majorities considered the DOD planning standard that the US 
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needs to be prepared to fight two major regional wars simultaneously as excessive, it is 
not clear what this implied with regard to the quality of the force organization (PIPA 
1996). Only a preference for reduced forward deployment to Western Europe is evident. 
Thus, the mean of the responses in a 1991 CCFR poll was 181,300 troops for Western 
Europe, approximately 120,000 below the current levels (Rielly 1991, 35). 
In contrast, the public expressed a clear preference for additional ground forces and 
SOF after 9/11 (PIPA/KN 2005, 7-10). With the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 
subsequent occupation efforts, this preference became stronger and provided support for 
the Army. In May 2001, relative majorities still held a familiar preference for the Air 
Force (Gallup 05/2001). Asked about the most important branch today, 42 percent 
named the Air Force and only 18 and 15 percent named the Army and the Navy 
respectively. By 2004, the Army led the list with 25 percent, slightly more than the Air 
Force’s 23 percent (Gallup 05/2004). While 23 percent considered the Marine Corps’ 
most important, the Navy had dropped to 9 percent. With the US turning again 
outwards, preferences for a reduction of overseas bases decreased. Majorities between 
53 and 57 percent considered the number of military bases abroad as appropriate 
between 2002 and 2008 (CCGA 2008, 31-32). 
Once again, a partisan pattern became apparent after 2001: Democrats supported a more 
pronounced turn towards a personnel-heavy force than the Republicans. Already in 
2002, the Republicans were slightly more supportive of budget items unrelated to 
military personnel and the war on terror than the Democrats (PIPA 2002, 2). And in 
2005, majorities of Republicans still disapproved reductions in the number of aircraft 
carriers, bombers, destroyers, submarines, and air strike capabilities, whereas 
Democratic majorities supported cuts (PIPA/KN 2005, 10-11). 
(3) Weapons acquisition was marked by a broad indifference with regard to the choice 
of particular weapon systems or the emphasis on a particular Service during the 1990s. 
The missile defense, a highly controversial issue during the 1980s and again in the new 
century, is a case in point: In a 1996 Gallup poll, the share of supporters and opponents 
was almost exactly equal and a relative majority of 37 percent did not articulate any 
position at all (Gallup 07/1996).  
Only a strong preference for technological advanced weapons over personnel is clearly 
evident. Although public majorities believed that the Pentagon often went overboard in 
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its push for improvements, the continuous push for technological innovation was clearly 
accepted as insurance against unforeseen threats. Moreover, technology was considered 
a life-saver for soldiers. Indeed, almost 9 out 10 articulated a willingness to spend 
whatever is necessary to have the best technology to protect soldiers’ lives (PIPA 1996). 
On the intervention side, this public concern for soldiers’ lives is a long debated 
phenomenon. Since the Vietnam War, political actors, media elites – and indeed 
enemies of the US – perceived the American public support for military operations as 
highly unstable and dependent on war casualties and media coverage, which could 
severely undermine military success (Gelpi/Feaver/Reifler 2009, 5). Therefore, public 
support became a central precondition for military intervention in the Weinberger-
Powell-doctrine, the prominent statement of the armed forces’ lessons learned for the 
conduct of interventions after Vietnam.
223
 The belief in the public casualty sensitivity 
was reinforced by the Somalia disaster in 1993 and the successive hasty retreat of US 
forces. Daalder, White House Bosnia specialist in the mid-1990s, argued with regard to 
the political actors: “They believe that Somalia demonstrates conclusively that you 
cannot have any casualties. They take this as a matter of faith.” (in Harden/Broder 1999; 
see also Steel 1995) While this perceived casualty sensitivity in interventions is still 
subject to considerable debate
224
, there is little doubt that the public supports military 
preparations, which minimizes the risk of casualties in future wars. Thus, technologies 
as insurance and live-safer were continuously popular among the public.  
But there is no clear evidence whether this technology bias backed evolutionary 
modernization and RMA programs alike or only one of them. After the media coverage 
during Desert Storm, the public was most likely aware of the promises of information-
age warfare and impressed by the potential of high-tech systems. And the press 
contributed further information on RMA thinking during the following years. For 
example, a Time Magazine’s issue titled “Cyber War” and with a lead article called 
                                                             
223 In fact, Dauber (2001) makes a compelling argument that Weinberger’s initial six conditions for the 
use of force were increasingly collapsed into the demand for public support as major requirement, which 
heavily affected the debates over military interventions during the 1990s. In this context, the Army’s 1993 
operational doctrine FM 100-5 argued: “The American people expect decisive victory and abhor 
unnecessary casualties.” (DOA 1993, 1-3) 
224 There is strong evidence for an at least partial exaggeration of the public’s casualty sensitivity by elites 
(for an overview see Gelpi/Feaver/Reifler 2009; 2005). Hence, Kull/Ramsay (2000, 98-99) show that the 
political and media elites misread the public, among which only a minority favored immediate 
withdrawal, after the battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 (see also Burk 1999b). Most scholars agree 
that potential and actual casualties affect the public’s cost-benefit-calculations, but it is neither the only 
nor the pivotal factor. Yet, since foreign and defense policy were only minor issues during the 1990s, the 
political process did not correct this misperception. 
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“Onward Cyber Soldiers” in 1995 introduced the ideas of information warfare to a 
broader audience (Thompson/Waller 1995). But the public remained indifferent with 
regard to a prioritization for either RMA or modernization. 
This changed with the transition after 2001, during which especially Democrats but also 
Republicans preferred transformation over modernization. Moreover, the public 
preferred additional equipment in line with the stronger focus on irregular warfare. 
 
Majority would reduce (percent) Majority would not reduce (percent) 
Number of nuclear weapons (65) New advanced communications (69) 
Nuclear war capabilities (65) Equipment for infantry and Marines (64) 
New types of nuclear weapons (62) Intelligence (62) 
Large land war capabilities (58) Peacekeeping capabilities (58) 
Large naval war capabilities (58) Capabilities to fight insurgents/guerillas (56) 
New types of destroyers, bombers, 
submarines (52-55) 
New high-tech bombs and missiles (55) 
 
Table 6.1: Public priorities with regard to weapons acquisition in the budget (PIPA/KN 2005, 7-10) 
 
Although differences between Democrats and Republicans were still rather small in 
2002, Republicans and Democrats strongly disagreed on the acquisition of new 
conventional means by 2005 (PIPA/KN 2005, 10-11; PIPA 2002, 2). The former 
opposed cuts in the modernization of bombers, submarines, high-technology bombs and 
missiles (58 percent, 56 percent, and 72 percent respectively), whereas the later 
supported cuts in these items (67 percent, 64 percent, and 53 percent respectively). 
Although Gallup polls show a clear net support for a missile defense system on a 
national level, the Democrats were again significantly less supportive than the 
Republicans (PIPA/KN 2005, 11; Gallup, 03/2000, 02/2001, 02/2002, 02/2003).
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225 This partisan split can explain the paradoxical observation that a substantial and growing minority of 
persons considered the national defense not strong enough despite growing defense spending during the 
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(4) The doctrine & mission statement dimension is again the most uncertain dimension. 
There is no evidence for a position during the 1990s. Since there are hardly any 
qualitative preferences in the other dimensions as well, it is even difficult to identify an 
underlying mindset. A clearer picture emerges with the GWOT. While there is again no 
explicit position on military doctrine, a strong support for irregular operations is 
apparent. Yet, while the Republicans continuously prefer a position of moderate 
military conservatism, which does not neglect conventional means, the Democrats 
quickly moved to a position of strong military radicalism with a full focus on irregular 
warfare with information age equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
buildup (Carroll 2007).The share of persons considering the US defense not strong enough moved from 
38 percent in 2000 over 43 in 2002 to 46 by 2007. 
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Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
IS THERE A STRONG SALIENCE FOR MILITARY POLICY? 
Is there a pattern of security 
interdependencies considered 
threatening? 
- No - Transnational terrorism 
What are the most important 
problems in society? 
- Economic and social 
problems 
- Economic and 
international problems 
(terrorism, war) 
ARE THERE SPECIFIC DEMANDS IN THE DIMENSION OF …? 
…military budgets? 
- Actual spending above 
preferred budget 
corridor until 1998 
- (Stable distribution) 
- Republicans: Actual 
spending is below and 
after 2002 within 
preferred budget corridor 
/ stable distribution 
- Democrats: Actual 
spending is below and 
after 2002 above 
preferred budget corridor 
/ distribution in favor of 
irregular warfare and 
transformation 
…military organization? 
- support for technology 
over personnel 
- stable distribution 
- less forward 
deployment to Europe 
- Democrats: turn from 
conventional forces to 
personnel /ground forces 
and SOF 
- Republicans: Stable 
force structure 
…weapons acquisition? 
- technology bias, but 
indifference with regard 
to the acquisition 
projects 
- transformation from 
heavy and large systems 
to information-age 
equipment 
- Support for missile 
defense 
- Republicans: support 
of modernization 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- - 
Is there an apparent idea 
connecting the explicit 
preferences? 
- No 
- Republicans: moderate 
military conservatism 
- Democrats: Military 
radicalism based on 
transformation and 
irregular warfare 
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6.1.1.2. Special interests 
The end of the Cold War was marked by a significant reduction in military procurement 
activity, which put the defense industry in a difficult spot. Although the post-Cold War 
transition was gentle in comparison with earlier builddowns, central conditions, which 
smoothed the transition after World War II did not exist (Gholz/Sapolsky 1999; Office 
of Technology Assessment 1992, 11).
226
 Many defense contractors had fully specialized 
on military production during the Cold War and had no civil market to return to 
(Markusen 1993a). Moreover, the generally weak state of the economy offered little 
incentive to conduct the difficult and painful conversion and push into the civil market. 
Hence, especially large military platform producers, most dependent on defense dollars, 
called for a “do-or-die policy: make weapons or shut down.” (Uchitelle 1992a) They 
rejected to follow the administration’s call for conversion into civil production like 
during prior builddowns. The most significant trend was therefore a strong 
concentration of defense companies largely through mergers and acquisitions as 
companies tried to improve their competitive position in the struggle for shrinking 
resources.
227
  
                                                             
226 While the production side suffered some downsizing, the military service industry expanded 
significantly during the 1990s and into the GWOT (Avant 2005; Singer 2003). Against the backdrop of 
shrinking defense budgets and yet high operation tempo, outsourcing became a popular attempt to 
increase efficiency. When the US forces defeated the Iraqi forces in 2003, 10 percent of the personnel 
deployed to the theater of operation were members of private security companies (PSC) performing 
logistics, training, and operational support of weapon systems for the military forces (Avant 2005, 1-2). 
By spring 2004, more than 20,000 PSC personnel supported regular forces and civil agencies and 
organizations in their effort to reinstate public order in Iraq. As these service firms’ major assets are 
experienced personnel for all kinds of tasks of a military organization, it can be assumed that they have a 
strong interest in a military policy, which keeps defense efforts high, but reduces regular military 
personnel. But the analysis provides little evidence that PSCs exercise relevant political influence. 
227 For an overview of the defense industrial relations and reforms see Schörnig 2007. 
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Chart 6.5: Selected examples of defense industrial consolidation, 1993-2000 (Druyun 2001, 4) 
 
After the Clinton administration initially backed the consolidation of the defense 
industrial base, it became increasingly skeptical by 1997. Political actors feared that the 
companies’ enormous size and increasingly monopolistic position provided them with a 
precarious amount of political leverage (Druyun 2001, 4). Thus, the DOD denied the 
merger Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman and refused the acquisition of 
Newport News Shipbuilding by two different bidders.  
Although the consolidation period started to phase out after the administration changed 
position (SIPRI 2001, 302-305), the defense industry concentration reached new heights 
during the 1990s (Weidenbaum 2003; Flamm 2000, 55). In FY 1992, McDonnell 
Douglas, Northrop, Lockheed, and General Dynamics, the four major aerospace 
companies, received 26 percent of the contracts going to the top 100 defense 
contractors. After the market concentration of the 1990s, the top 4 aviation companies 
accounted for 50 percent of the market. By 2002, the defense industrial base had 
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General Dynamics Space
GE Aerospace
Martin Marietta
General Dynamics Ft. Forth
Lockheed
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GTE Government Systems
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consolidated into five giant companies: Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing 
Integrated Defense, General Dynamics, and Raytheon (Watts 2008, 33-34). Only 
Lockheed, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman still competed for manned aircraft 
production at the prime contractor level. General Dynamics and the BAE Systems’ 
American subsidiary were the only remaining relevant manufacturers of armored 
vehicles. And all six big shipyards for Navy constructions were owned by General 
Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. Market concentration resulted in an increasing 
strategic relevance of the remaining contractors. The administration faced a situation in 
which the economic decline of any major manufacturer threatened to create either a 
monopoly or even end the US ability to produce leading-edge systems in a sector.   
The consolidation of the defense industry did not result in a proportional reduction of 
production capacities. Although some production lines were closed, the overcapacity in 
the defense industry ranged from about 25 percent to 40 percent by 1994 
(Gholz/Sapolsky 1999; Grier 1994). And while jobs within the defense economy were 
reduced, overall employment in the sector decreased only very modestly, remaining 
significantly larger than after World War II or the Vietnam War.  
 
Chart 6.6: Number of employees in defense related industry and unemployed persons, FY 1985-
2006 (OSD 2008; 2005) 
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Druyun (2001, 5) identifies two reasons for this excessive production capacities. First, 
the government failed to create incentives to close facilities. Second, the companies 
feared that closings would result in reduced political support in their struggle for 
survival. Indeed, defense companies used not only their strategic significance, but also 
their economic weight to lobby for defense dollars. While the economic importance of 
the defense industry on a national scale was limited, the fear of mass lay-offs in an 
already weak economy was a powerful scenario to their advantage (Office of 
Technology Assessment 1992, 10). In fact, a number of states and regions benefitted 
heavily from defense spending. Especially the South Atlantic division with Virginia
228
 
and Florida and the Pacific division with California and Washington received 
disproportionally large amounts of defense dollars. 
 
Chart 6.7: Distribution of DOD contract awards by division, 1988-2007 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1990-2008) 
 
A comparison of defense dollars per capita further reveals that defense dollars had a 
particular strong impact on the New England states Connecticut, Massachusetts and, to 
a lesser extent, Maine. Thus, 1 out of 5 workers had a military-related job in 
southeastern Connecticut, (Grier 1993). Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, and Alaska 
did also have a large per capita benefit from defense spending. In later years, Arizona 
and Hawaii joined this list.  
                                                             
228 Virginia’s share is in parts caused by the military establishment and consultancies close to the 
Pentagon. 
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 1990 1992 1994 1997 2001 2004 2007 
1. CT ME VA VA VA VA VA 
2. MO VA MO AK AK CO AK 
3. MA MS AK MO HI AK CO 
4. VA CT MD HI MD MD AZ 
5. AK MA MA MA AZ AZ MD 
 
Table 6.2: States with the largest contract awards per capita (U.S. Census Bureau 1990-2008)
229
 
 
The regional economic and general strategic relevance of the defense industry provided 
it with two powerful levers to influence the political process in favor of the status quo. 
In fact, with decreasing defense dollars to allocate, the contractors tried to keep 
production lines open and secure modernization programs, which promised less 
technological and economic risk than RMA programs. William A. Anders, chairman of 
General Dynamics, recommended that contractors should “lobby for every military 
dollar that can be squeezed from Congress and the Administration, and from foreign 
sales.” (in Uchitelle 1992a) And Tom Culligan, vice president at McDonnell-Douglas, 
said: “We have told our managers of weapons programs that their survival depends on 
how well they can sell the customer and we have told our officers to get in there and try 
to keep all our programs alive.” (in Uchitelle 1992a) 
The GWOT somewhat relieved the defense contractors as new acquisition funding 
poured into the system. As the DOD started to rebuild and modernize its machinery 
worn out in the occupation operations, the defense industry returned to larger 
production (Haberkorn 2006). Indeed, the expansion of the DOD’s acquisition program 
under Bush strongly benefited the defense companies and the number of employees in 
the defense related industry rose from 2.5 million in FY 2001 to 3.8 million in FY 2005 
(OSD 2005a, 215). The defense industry remained a powerful lobbying force and 
protected their programs against uncertain alternatives. Most profit is gained from large-
scale procurement of tested systems rather than from extensive R&D with little 
                                                             
229 Population numbers were not annually adjusted. The calculations for the 1990s were based on 
population in 1990. For the years after 2000, calculations are based on population in 2000. 
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subsequent production. Hence, the emphasis remained on modernization rather than 
transformation.  
While the defense industry tried to protect the status quo in the weapons acquisition, 
other groups, such as the Association of the US Army, continued to act as a societal 
extension of their respective Services’ interest. Especially the reserve interest groups, 
most notably the National Guard Association, sought to keep the status quo in the 
organization dimension. In size and quality, the reserve forces had reached a very high 
level by the end of the Cold War and Doubler (2003, 302) even argued that the National 
Guard in summer 1990 “had never been in better shape.” With decreasing defense 
resources, the reserve associations fought to avert a negative impact for the reserve. 
After all, a reservist earned about $5,000 to $6,000 dollars a year for their participation 
in a reserve unit (Schmitt 1992a). Traditionally suspicious of the regulars, the NGA 
feared that the Army would intentionally pass most cuts of the transition to the reserve 
in order to preserve active forces. Hence, it used its influence and good connection to 
Congress to protect the National Guard’s stakes. The reserve groups’ influence rested 
on two major pillars. On the one hand, reserve forces had strategic relevance, since they 
provided a relatively cheap pool of personnel available for active military service if a 
shortage arises. On the other hand, reserve units had an important impact on 
constituencies as “a source of jobs as well as considerable local pride.” (Lancaster 1991) 
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Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
IS THERE A STRONG MILITARY INDUSTRIAL BASE? 
How large is the economy 
dependent on defense 
investments? 
- Yes - Yes 
How large is the labor force 
dependent on defense 
investments? 
- Large - Large 
IS THERE A STRONG ECONOMIC OR MILITARY DEPENDENCE ON THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL 
BASE? 
How is the defense industry 
spread over the country? 
- concentration in South 
Atlantic, Pacific states / 
strong impact on New 
England states 
- concentration in South 
Atlantic, Pacific states / 
strong impact on New 
England states 
How much competition is in the 
defense market? 
- Strong concentration, 
little competition 
- Strong concentration, 
little competition 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO OTHER ACTORS WITH SPECIAL INTERESTS PURSUE IN THE DIMENSION 
OF … 
…military budgets? 
- Defense industry: 
Protection of acquisition 
accounts 
- Service associations: 
Back Service 
preferences 
- Defense industry: 
Protection of acquisition 
accounts 
- Service associations: 
Back Service 
preferences 
…military organization? 
- Service associations: 
Back Service 
preferences 
- Reserve groups: Strong 
and autonomous military 
reserve 
- Service associations: 
Back Service 
preferences 
- Reserve groups: Strong 
and autonomous military 
reserve 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Defense industry: 
Protection of weapons 
programs / 
modernization programs 
- Defense industry: 
Expansion of weapons 
programs / 
modernization programs 
…doctrine & Service mission 
statement? 
- - 
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6.1.1.3. Societal demands 
With the exception of the strong defense industry and the NGA, societal interests in 
military policy were very weak during the 1990s. While the international situation 
strongly changed by 1990, the public hardly articulated any specific preferences 
indicating a demand for innovation during the subsequent transition. Rather, it seems 
that the public remained satisfied with the status quo. Only the permanent preference for 
advanced technology in order to save lives indicated a demand for innovation within the 
organization and weapons acquisition dimensions. Yet, while this common preference 
for technology over personnel did not necessarily collide with the reserve groups’ 
stability bias in the organization dimension, the weak common preference in the 
acquisition dimension clashed with the much stronger stability bias of the military 
industry, which sought to preserve the beneficial status quo. Again, no explicit 
preferences were articulated in the doctrine & mission statement dimension. And since 
the societal preferences were so weak, there is not even a clear set of ideas underlying 
the military preparations. Thus, the societal actors articulated very little promising 
demands for innovations during the 1990s. 
With the GWOT, the public’s interest in military policy returned and more specific 
preferences were articulated. But the growing partisan split after 2002 prevented a 
consistent public demand in the military budget and weapons acquisition dimension. In 
contrast to the late 1940s, the cleavage cannot be fully translated in a prioritization of 
one branch over another. Rather, the disagreement ran along military missions with 
Democrats calling for a focus on irregular warfare and Republicans preferring a 
moderately more balanced force posture, which also pays attention to conventional 
capabilities. Hence, the latter continuously preferred a position of moderate military 
conservatism, whereas the Democrats moved to a position of strong military radicalism. 
Both groups agreed that personnel for irregular warfare should be increased, which 
created a strong demand in the budget and organizational dimensions.  
In the weapons acquisition dimension, the interplay of common demands and defense 
industry’s demands created a strong but inconsistent position. Especially the 
Democrats’ preference for transformation ran counter to the defense industry’s strong 
conventional force bias. The Republicans’ preferences were somewhere in between 
these two poles, arguably slightly leaning towards transformation. Since positions of 
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military radicalism and conservatism competed within society, the societal demands in 
the doctrine & mission statement dimension remained again uncertain. 
Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
ARE THERE WEAK OR STRONG SOCIETAL DEMANDS FOR INNOVATION OR STABILITY IN THE 
DIMENSION OF… 
…military budgets? 
- Weak demand for 
distribution stability 
- Strong demand for 
stable weapons 
acquisition funding 
- Strong demand for 
funding in support of 
irregular warfare and 
transformation 
- Inconsistent demand for 
conventional capabilities 
…military organization? 
- Weak demand in favor 
of technology over 
personnel 
- Weak demand for 
reduced forward-
deployment to Europe 
- Protection of reserve 
forces 
- Strong demand for 
personnel/Army, Marine 
Corps, SOF 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Strong demand for 
stable weapons 
acquisition 
- Inconsistent demand for 
conventional equipment 
vs. transformation 
….military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- no explicit demand - no explicit demand 
 
6.1.2. Political actors’ preferences 
6.1.2.1. Congress 
In contrast to the late 1940s, the parties in Congress held strong departing views on 
foreign and defense policy by the end of the Cold War. Without the threat that had tied 
congressional military policy options, the major incentive to reach across the aisle 
disappeared. Hence, partisan competition extended into the field of foreign and defense 
policy, which strongly affected the legislative dynamics as well as the relations between 
government and Congress (Wilzewski 1999; Holsti/Rosenau 1996). As both parties 
actively tried to influence the administration’s defense trajectory according to their 
respective preferences, debate and conflict over defense policy significantly 
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increased.
230
 Greater competition and at the same time greater publicity of defense 
issues further spurred the incentive for office-seekers to engage in defense policy 
debates.  
The split in party positions on defense policy, which became influential after 1990, can 
be traced back to a sudden and radical shift in defense policy positions during the 88
th
 
Congress in 1963 and 1964 (Karol 2009, 144; Fordham 2007). The civil rights and 
antiwar movement shattered the Democratic Party’s liberal Cold war coalition during 
the 1960s and a new powerful fraction to the left of the traditional threads rapidly 
gained influence (McKay 2009, 107; Edsall 2004; Rae 1995). Driven by a post-material, 
highly educated class, these new liberals, who subsequently split into a left and a 
neoliberal thread, were skeptical of strong defense and the use of force. While the more 
technocratic neoliberals increasingly moved to the party center, especially the liberal 
left wing with its base among minority groups, feminists and gay activists, was 
reflexively opposed to a hawkish military and foreign policy. Fighting Reagan’s 
military buildup, the liberal left dominated the party by the 1980s and maintained 
significant influence after the Cold War. They called for a large peace dividend to invest 
in domestic needs. As the Americans for Democratic Action
231
 (2008) argued in a 
policy statement, which was adopted in 1994 and reaffirmed in 2007: “An accurate and 
reasonable evaluation of the Pentagon’s post-Cold War needs would make possible 
massive reductions of defense spending. In any case, the U.S. military strategy itself is 
not justified, since it assumes a U.S. role of policeman of the world, supplanting and 
undermining the role of the UN.”   
But the left’s dominant position had never been undisputed and centrist Democrats 
started to challenge it by the mid-1980s (Beinart 2006, 68). Dissatisfied with the 
liberals’ course, which had not yielded electoral success during the 1980s, a group of 
centrists from the South
232
 and the West, including Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard 
Gephardt (D-MO), established the Democratic Leadership Council in order to return the 
party to a more middle-ground position and regain popular majorities (Rae 1995, 150-
                                                             
230 A clear indicator of the competition is the increased number of proposed amendments to defense 
legislation, although most amendments were voted down or dropped in conference. 
231 While the Americans for Democratic Action were created as an anticommunist alternative to the 
party’s progressive wing during the 1940s, they had moved to an anticommunist but dovish position over 
Vietnam. 
232 Although the most conservative Southern Democrats had joined the Republicans, the Southerners were 
still a force in support for military spending within the Democratic Party (Lowndes 2008). The growth of 
military installations and defense industry in the South added a strong parochial interest to this position. 
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153). The new platform, which blended liberal and conservative positions to an agenda 
including equal opportunities for all, moral behavior, fiscal discipline as well as 
anticommunism, strong defense and global spread of democracy, soon gained 
popularity (Beinart 2006, 77).  
By the end of the Cold War, the supporters of the Democratic Leadership Council, the 
so-called New Democrats, had acquired a solid counterweight to the liberal left. Given 
the alarming budget deficit and the decline of the Soviet Union, the New Democrats 
supported the liberal’s call for a peace dividend during the early 1990s, but declared that 
the “armed forces must remain large enough to deal with other threats to our security, 
and (…) should gain in flexibility, mobility and quality of equipment and training what 
they lose in numbers.” (Democratic Leadership Council 1991; see also Galston 2004, 
78) Hence, the centrists sought to use the transition as a qualitative reconfiguration, 
calling for a robust research into new military technologies and strong capabilities for 
quick crises response. The postwar defense should depart from the focus on 
containment to create a force, which would be able to rapidly respond to the full 
spectrum of contingencies, including humanitarian interventions. The new posture 
would rest on less forward deployment and more mobility assets as well as less quantity 
and more quality. At the same time, the imperative for savings was seen as an 
opportunity to increase efficiency within the DOD. Especially Nunn, the New 
Democrats’ most powerful defense spokesman, did not hesitate to challenge the 
administration on military policy and efficiency. As SASC chairman until 1994, he 
concentrated authority on defense issues to an extent that observers called the 
committee “Sam Nunn Inc” (Lindsay 1994, 61; see also Von Drehle/Dewar 1993).233  
Despite the growing influence of the New Democrats, the party’s stance on military 
policy remained reluctant during most of the 1990s (Griffith 2005). Only by the end of 
the century, the party had shifted to the center and leading Democrats voiced 
preferences for a strong defense (Kaplan 2000). Since the deficit problems were under 
control, there was little reason to refrain from more activities in the field of defense. 
With Al Gore (D-TN) and Joe Lieberman (D-CO) running in the 2000 election, the 
                                                             
233
 Sam Nunn was also one of three names which Clinton thought of as Defense Secretary. But because of 
his critical stance before the Iraq War, he was not suggested for the Defense Secretary’s post (Woodward 
1991, 36; Kenworthy/Broder 1990; SASC 1990). Due to his willingness to publically criticize the 
President, he was neither seriously considered as successor of State Secretary Warren Christopher in late 
1996 (Roy 2008, 32, 42). 
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Democrats had nominated two outspoken defense hawks to challenge the Republicans 
(Beinart 2006, 86). And the Democratic Leadership Council’s agenda for the new 
century argued with regard to military policy: “A strong, technologically superior 
defense is the foundation for US global leadership. Yet the United States continues to 
employ defense strategies, military missions, and force structures left over from the 
Cold War, creating a defense establishment that is ill-prepared to meet new threats to 
our security. The United States must speed up the ‘revolution in military affairs’ that 
uses our technological advantage to project force in many different contingencies 
involving uncertain and rapidly changing security threats – including terrorism and 
information warfare.” (Democratic Leadership Council 2000) The agenda’s signatories 
included influential lawmakers, such as John F. Kerry (D-MA), Joe Lieberman (D-CO), 
Charles Robb (D-VA) and Ellen O. Tauscher (D-CA).  
Hence, Democrats voiced support for additional defense funding and transformation 
even before 9/11. Ike Skelton (D-MO), ranking minority member on the HASC, blamed 
Bush for inadequate funding of the armed forces and Senate minority leader Tom 
Daschle (D-SD) warned that Bush’s proposed tax cuts could damage the national 
defense (Karol 2009, 147-148). Only with the Iraq War turning into a long-lasting and 
costly insurgency, old cleavages between the liberal left’s skepticism of military power 
and the more centrist and conservative Democrats reopened. The qualitative preferences 
remained on advanced means for multilateral engagement. Thus, the Democrats 
strongly called for troop increases and blamed the administration for insufficiently 
equipping the forces during the war on terror. 
NMD remained arguably the only advanced capability, where leading Democrats took a 
negative position. To be sure, many Democrats liked the idea of a missile defense, but 
opposed Bush’s aggressive and unilateral push for an early NMD. Carl Levin, chairman 
of the SASC in 2001, and numerous other Democrats feared that a retreat from the 
ABM treaty would cause a new arms race (Moens 2004, 100). As the Democratic 
Leadership Council (2001) argued: “We need a ‘third way’ on missile defense that 
accepts the basic idea, (…) deploys it only if and when it becomes feasible, and shares it 
with others in order to promote stability.” 
While the Democrats’ defense preferences moved from a liberal-left to a center 
positions, the Republicans moved from a moderate conservative to strongly a 
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conservative position during the 1990s. Already in the 1950s and 1960s, Republicans 
had started a significant convergence around conservative positions based on 
libertarianism, traditionalism and anticommunism (McKay 2009, 95; Ashford 1995; 
Kohn 1994). The Reagan administration, promoting small government, strong defense 
and a tough stance on communism, could build on this conservative coalition with a 
relatively coherent profile during the 1980s. But with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
anticommunism as an important bond of the GOP and justification for strong defense 
disappeared. While most Republicans felt obliged to Reagan’s political heritage and 
conservatism remained strong, there emerged disagreements over the party’s future 
course including foreign and defense policy (Greene 2000, 61).
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Realists, nationalists and interventionists competed over a post-Cold War military 
policy, although all three threads agreed that the maintenance of strong military forces 
was necessary (Dueck 2010, 252-256). Realists were most skeptical with regard to 
humanitarian interventions and feared military overextension arguing that the use of 
military power should be limited to the protection of the most vital US interests. At the 
same time, they supported US international commitments to preserve regional power 
balances and were willing to pursue multilateral strategies based on largely instrumental 
considerations. Nationalists largely agreed on the realists’ reluctance to humanitarian 
interventions, but strongly disliked international commitments as well as multilateral 
action which tied the US’ hands and called for military primacy and assertive use of 
military power. Interventionists shared the nationalists’ position except for their support 
for moral ends in foreign policy. Thus, interventionists sought to use military force 
more freely including interventions to end humanitarian crises or prevent genocide. 
Already during the early 1990s, nationalism emerged as the predominant position 
within the congressional GOP. The traditional, more moderate and pragmatic position 
within the GOP, which included numerous realists and argued that politics should stop 
at the water’s edge, was successfully challenged by a new generation of conservative 
Republicans dominated by nationalists. Major initial cleavage between both groups was 
not foreign or military policy, however. Rather, the new generation of conservatives 
called for a more aggressive ideological competition with the Democratic Party: “The 
                                                             
234 A minor neo-isolationist school, which called for a reduced international involvement in tradition of 
the old isolationists, was never able to gain significant influence. Its most prominent protagonist was Pat 
Buchanan, who recommended bringing the troops home and dissolving US alliances. 
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Old Guard was accused of being too pragmatic, passive and even secretly in league with 
the Democratic majority.” (Koopman 1996, 83) The charge was led by Newt Gingrich 
(R-GA), who organized a coalition of economic conservatives, national defense 
conservatives, and social conservatives including numerous upcoming Republicans such 
as Dick Armey (R-TX), Tom DeLay (R-TX), Duncan Hunter (R-CA), Dan Coats (R-
IN) and Connie Mack (R-FL) in the Conservative Opportunity Society (Edwards 1999, 
269-292; Koopman 1996). While initially focused on a domestic agenda, these 
conservative Republicans also developed a foreign and defense agenda by the end of the 
Cold War. During the congressional campaign in 1994, which brought the Republicans 
into a majority position in both houses, they were able to rally the party behind a joint 
manifesto, the Contract with America, to offer voters a policy-oriented alternative to the 
Democratic majorities (Ashford 1998; Koopman 1996, 25).
235
 While the Contract, the 
first product of the newly aggressive GOP, strongly focused on domestic issues, it 
included a nationalist commitment to the US superpower status based on strong defense 
and the preference for unilateral over multilateral solutions. The Republicans promised 
to implement a National Security Act “to ensure adequate resources to protect the 
national security of the United States.” The “downward spiral” of defense spending 
should be reversed and an anti-missile defense system rapidly deployed (House of 
Representatives 1994).  
While a public majority had never heard of the Contract with America prior to the 
midterm election, the manifesto provided temporary unity among the Republicans and 
marked a conservative roadmap for the coming years (Jones, C. 1999, 108). At the same 
time, it strengthened Newt Gingrich, the new Speaker of the House, in his attempt to 
control the party and seize the national agenda from the President after the electoral 
victory.
236
 Indeed, Gingrich pursued an openly confrontational course, using the media 
as a platform to challenge the President and to call for a return to Reagan’s conservative 
approach of military power and supremacy. In 1996, he gained a strong ally in Trent 
Lott (R-MS), who succeeded Dole as Senate Majority Leader (Schmitt 1996). Gingrich 
                                                             
235 After the 1994 victory, the Republicans dominated Congress until the midterm elections in 2006. The 
only short exemption occurred during the 107th Senate. The Republicans lost 4 Senate seats in the 2000 
election, resulting in a tie between Democrats and Republicans. While the latter initially became majority 
party due to the tie-breaking vote of the Vice President, they lost their majority when the former 
Republican Senator James Jeffords switched to independent in June and caucused with the Democrats 
(Greenstein 2003, 9). Yet, this Democratic Senate majority was lost again in the midterm election 2002.  
236 When Floyd Spence (R-SC) became new Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, it was 
renamed as Committee on National Security (HNSC). 
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referred to Lott as his mentor and both men had worked closely together during Lott’s 
earlier time in the House (Edwards 1999, 270).  
To be sure, the nationalist course was never undisputed. Realists continued to challenge 
nationalists for their ideological perspective and their dislike for international 
commitments. Moreover, the nationalist stance increasingly merged with interventionist 
positions. Early on, the Conservative Opportunity Society had connected to 
conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise 
Institute and to conservative intellectuals, which provided important programmatic 
input. In the field of defense policy, especially neoconservatives, who had joined the 
GOP during the 1970s, gained considerable influence on the conservative Republicans’ 
preferences after the Cold War. Originated “among disillusioned liberal intellectuals” 
(Kristol 2003), this group of former Democrats promoted the moral superiority o f 
American values and the promotion of these values abroad (Kirkpatrick 2004; Gould 
2003, 397-398).
237
 They called for a neo-Reaganite interventionist foreign policy based 
on active global leadership and the export of American exceptional values 
(Kristol/Kagan 2004; Kristol/Kagan 1996). With strong skepticism of international 
institutions and cooperation, robust military power to intervene unilaterally if necessary 
was a central element of their agenda. Neoconservative positions had a strong appeal to 
the conservatives and repeatedly influenced Republican positions during the 1990s.  
Despite continuous differences, a basic consensus with regard to military preparations 
was apparent. Rather than making a qualitative decision, Republicans were most 
concerned with broad defense funding: “Whether America builds 20 B-2 bombers or 30 
is less important than giving its military planners enough money to make intelligent 
choices that are driven more by strategic than by budget requirements.” (Kristol/Kagan 
1996, 23) From the perspective of many conservative Republicans, the call for strong 
defense did not contradict the promotion of tax cuts, since the government’s 
inefficiency and failure to limit welfare expenditure was the cause of the budget 
imbalance. Moreover, a technology bias in the Republican positions is apparent. In 
1997, Gingrich outlined a future agenda including the “commitment to defend freedom 
around the world along with ‘the best defense that science and technology can create’.” 
                                                             
237 They rejected what they considered the liberal Democrats’ “moral self-flagellation” (Khong 2008, 
253) and the increased ‘dovishness’ and departure from anticommunism in foreign policy in the wake of 
the civil rights and anti-war movement (Rae 1995, 162). On the domestic side, the neoconservatives 
preserved some basic Democratic positions (Ashford 1995, 130-132). 
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(Edwards 1999, 317) Particularly the NMD, a heritage of the Reagan era, gained broad 
support from Republicans. Major disagreement remained on the foreign policy goals: 
The nationalists and realists preferred preparations along traditional lines centered on 
conventional war whereas the neoconservatives preferred additional efforts to 
additionally meet all kinds of missions below regular war. Yet, the former maintained 
the dominant position and neoconservatives required the help of sympathetic 
congressional leaders, such as Gingrich and Bob Dole (R-KS) to gain influence (Dueck 
2010, 256).  
The preferences for a strong defense stance gained little momentum during the 1990s, 
however. Given the public’s low interest in international issues, many Republicans, who 
agreed on substance, considered defense spending and even the national missile defense 
as a second order problem. They preferred the more urgent and popular policies of 
balanced budgets and tax cuts over additional defense spending. As Schick (2003, 96) 
argued: “Tax policy is one of the few issues that unites Republicans; spending, by 
contrast, divides them.” Even Gingrich admitted: “I’m a hawk, but I’m a cheap hawk.” 
(in Schmitt 1995a) Indeed, the party position was torn between deficit hawks and 
defense hawks and Republicans had trouble to formulate a consistent position for most 
of the 1990s (Morrison 1995, 276). Only when the increasingly balanced budgets by the 
end of the 1990s made trade-offs less painful, did the Republican’s call for more 
defense dollars become louder. Accordingly, the GOP strongly backed the 
administration’s GWOT and the related defense expenditures. Due to their issue 
ownership in military policy, they heavily benefitted from the salience of international 
problems and their support for the buildup during election in 2002 and 2004 (Griffith 
2005). As this did not dampen their preferences for tax cuts, they were even willing to 
accept temporal deficits. Yet, when the deficit became massive after some time, the 
party’s deficit hawks started to put pressure on the administration in order to cut 
expenditures. 
Beyond these partisan divisions, lawmakers strongly agreed on the necessity to protect 
the defense industry in the weapons acquisition dimension especially during the 1990s. 
As Jim Sasser (D-TN), the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, told his 
colleagues in 1994: “We are now into an era of military pork barreling in this country. 
We are not responding to external threats. We are responding to internal threats of job 
losses as a result of cutting the military budget.” (140 Cong. Rec., March 23, 1994, 
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S6177-6178) And Representative Montgomery, a conservative Democrat from 
Mississippi, summed up: “That’s the name of the game out there, keeping people 
working.” (in Apple 1991) But the support for the defense economy was not limited to 
Democrats. Numerous Republicans, including Gingrich, Lott, John Warner (R-VA), 
William Cohen (R-ME), fought vehemently to keep the defense industry in their 
constituencies busy. This caused numerous conflicts over the shrinking resources which 
blurred party lines. Moreover, the protection of defense industry and labor and the 
abstract support for technological innovation and RMA thinking created an ambivalent 
stance at times: RMA is good, but only as long as it does not threaten my constituency’s 
industry.  
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Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PURSUE IN THE DIMENSION OF … 
…military budget? 
- Democrats: departure 
from large containment 
forces to small rapid 
response forces 
- Republicans: Stability 
bias (conventional 
strategic perspective) 
- Democrats: departure 
from containment to 
rapid response forces 
/irregular operations 
capabilities 
- Republicans: Moderate 
stability bias (broad 
strategic perspective but 
support for irregular 
operations capabilities)  
…military organization? 
- Democrats: Smaller, 
more flexible, mobile 
and qualified force 
- Republicans: Stability 
bias, but less forward 
deployment 
- Large forces 
- More SOF 
…weapons acquisition? 
- General technology 
bias 
- Protection of defense 
industry labor 
- Republicans: Support 
for NMD 
- Democrats: 
transformation bias, but 
opposition to early NMD 
- Republicans: broad 
buildup including 
transformation 
- Protection of defense 
industry labor 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Democrats: broadening 
scope to include new 
challenges 
- Republicans: Stability 
bias 
- Democrats: focus on 
irregular challenges 
- Republicans: broad 
preparations 
Do these preferences represent 
societal demands? 
- Republicans: Yes, as 
far as societal demands 
are articulated 
- Democrats: In parts 
(disagreement on 
budget) 
- Yes, reflecting societal 
inconsistencies 
Are these preferences consistent 
with the dominant societal idea 
underlying the course of military 
transition? 
- No clear societal 
mindset apparent 
- No consistent societal 
mindset apparent 
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6.1.2.2. President and administration 
The George H.W. Bush administration 
With a solid 53.4 percent of the popular vote in the 1988 presidential election, the 
moderate Republican George H.W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan in 1989. As former 
Vice President, CIA Director, and ambassador to China and the UN, Bush was 
commonly regarded as a highly experienced foreign policy expert. He also had the 
credentials for a commander-in-chief, having served as one of the youngest naval pilots 
in World War II and had been honored with the Distinguished Flying Cross (Greene 
2000, 13). In contrast to the strongly conservative profile of Reagan, Hill and Williams 
(1994, 3) describes Bush as “the ultimate pragmatist, rejecting what he dismissed as the 
‘vision thing’ in favor of an approach which (…) regarded compromise as the norm.” 
(see also Herspring 2005, 298) Already in his nomination speech in August 1988, he 
stressed two central elements of his agenda which heavily impacted his later defense 
policy (Bush 1988; see also Oberdorfer 1988). In order to increase his appeal to 
conservative Republicans, he put early pressure on the federal expenditure side by 
famously excluding the option for new taxes. Since the Bush administration sought to 
ultimately eliminate budget deficits, which threatened the economic wellbeing and 
concerned the public, cuts in defense expenditures were mandatory (Bush 1991). 
But following a neorealist approach, Bush resisted calls for a one-sided budget driven 
builddown. Against the backdrop of the Soviet Union’s transition, he declared: 
“Weakness tempts aggressors. Strength stops them. I will not allow this country to be 
made weak again. (…) A prudent skepticism is in order.” (Bush 1988) Reluctant to let 
the guard down too early, he took a reactive position that tied the quantity and quality of 
the US forces directly to the Russian capabilities. Bush promised to “move toward 
further cuts in the strategic and conventional arsenals of both the United States and the 
Soviet Union.” As Dueck (2010, 235-236) sums Bush’s position: “His instinct was not 
to offer grand designs for American foreign policy but rather to move wisely and 
incrementally on a case-to-case basis in order to promote basic U.S. interests – to ‘first, 
do no harm’.” 
Other planning criteria only gained importance after the irreversible decline of the 
Soviet Union slowly became reality. In summer 1990, Bush made clear: “The United 
States would be ill-served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or a 
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shrunken-down version of the ones that we possess. (…) What we need are not merely 
reductions, but restructuring.” (Bush 1990) And he named three areas of particular 
importance: (1) Continuous research as insurance against future threats; (2) 
Improvement of rapid response capabilities, including long-distance air- and sealift; (3) 
Maintenance of high readiness to quickly respond to emerging crises. At the same time, 
Bush remained skeptical of military interventions for humanitarian goals and operations 
which did not meet the Weinberger-Powell-doctrine (Dueck 2010, 246-248). Moreover, 
the prudence with regard to the Soviet transition did not fade and deterrence, forward 
deployment and measures to counter emerging conventional threats remained central. 
Hence, Bush’s 1991 National Security Strategy pledged to promote democratic change 
in the Soviet Union, “while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to 
new quests for military advantage.” (Bush 1991)  
Highly interested in foreign policy, Bush had particularly informal and close relations 
with the administration’s key figures in foreign and security policy: NSA Bent 
Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. 
Bush’s major advisors had known each other for a long time, had worked together and 
developed close personal relations. As David Gergen (1989) wrote in the Washington 
Post: “These three men share the bond of having fought in the same trenches during the 
presidency of Gerald Ford.” And they had learned the same lesson: Play as a team, 
exercise strong top-down guidance, and with regard to foreign and defense policy “keep 
your guard up.” Scowcroft, a retired Air Force Lieutenant General and NSA in the Ford 
administration, was the only true defense specialist among the three men and his 
selection was received as a clear sign of a departure from the Reagan administration’s 
policy (Gordon 1988). The centrist Scowcroft had criticized Reagan’s ideological evil-
empire-rhetoric and his stance on military policy, especially on arms control, missile 
deployment and SDI (Woodward 1991, 50-51). As Bush’s friend and foreign policy 
advisor during the election campaign, both strongly agreed on defense policy positions. 
In the new team, Scowcroft functioned as ‘honest broker’ and tied the foreign and 
defense policy close to the White House and Bush. Early on, Scowcroft and Baker, 
another long-term friend and political ally of Bush, agreed that the former would stay 
out of the operational policy and keep a low profile.  
At the same time, Scowcroft and Baker did not publically intervene in the defense 
secretary’s resort. While arms control remained a joined task with clear guidance from 
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the White House, the military transition was largely left to Richard Cheney, who moved 
to the Pentagon after the Senate narrowly rejected the nomination of John Tower 
(King/Riddlesperger 2002). Scowcroft had strongly advocated the nomination of the 
congressman from Wyoming and former chief of staff in the Ford administration. 
Although Cheney was no outspoken defense specialist and had never served in the 
armed forces, he was familiar with the administration’s bureaucratic processes and 
therefore a plausible candidate to direct the DOD. In contrast to the rest of the national 
security team, Cheney had a clearly more conservative profile of a “hardline cold 
warrior.” (Herspring 2005, 300) Since entering the House in 1978, he had voted for 
every defense spending raise, had supported the Reagan buildup and was highly 
skeptical with regard to the Soviet transition, predicting that Gorbachev would 
“ultimately fail.” (Woodward 1991, 106; see also Rosenthal 1989) But he was not 
uncompromising, as Korb explained after Cheney’s nomination: “Cheney approaches 
defense basically from a conservative viewpoint, but he’s practical enough to know that 
you can’t get out too far ahead of the consensus.” (in Rosenthal 1989) Without a strong 
defense background, he was often forced to rely on Deputy Secretary of Defense J. 
Atwood and undersecretary of defense for policy Paul Wolfowitz.
238
  
Together with Baker and Cheney, Scowcroft built a team that at times appeared closed 
and insulated from external advice (Garber/Williams 1994, 188). Thus, other actors 
within the administration played only a limited role. On defense policy, Cheney sought 
to concentrate power within his office early on and marginalized the Service secretaries 
(Moore/Tyler 1990a).
239
 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the successor 
of the budget bureau, had also only limited influence (Wildavsky 1988, 365; 
Jones/McCaffery 2008, 78-79).
240
 In accordance with Bush’s stance, the 
                                                             
238 Wolfowitz had made first DOD experience as deputy assistant secretary of defense during the Carter 
administration, but had strong conservative views and far-reaching connections in the Republican national 
security circles. He was an outspoken supporter of a broad and strong defense to back leadership after the 
Cold War and appeared as a vocal supporter of the Desert Storm campaign in 1990. Although Wolfowitz 
was not selected by Cheney and the two men did not develop a close relationship, the former played an 
important role in shaping the military policy of the Bush administration. 
239 Cheney’s solitary leadership style complicated his relationship with the military branches and 
Congress. Les Aspin, the HASC chairman, called him the “the Sphinx” (Woodward 1991, 322) and relied 
more on the NSA for defense information. 
240
 The OMB’s influence decreased after the reforms under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. Rather 
than reviewing the defense budget independent of the DOD, the OMB works within a DOD team to frame 
a joint recommendation. In contrast to domestic budgeting, the final decision for the budget which is sent 
to the President is not made by the OMB but by a joint group within the Pentagon. Thus, if the OMB 
wants to cut the budget, it has to negotiate with DOD representatives. And as a tradition dating back to 
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administration’s major foreign and security actors preferred very limited quantitative 
and qualitative changes. Scowcroft closely followed Bush’s line, fearing “that 
Gorbachev could talk us into disarming without the Soviet Union having to do anything 
fundamental to its own military structure and that, in a decade or so, we could face a 
more serious threat than ever before.” (Bush/Scowcroft 1998, 14) And while Baker and 
the State Department were more optimistic with regard to the Russian reforms, 
especially Cheney resisted mounting outside pressure and agreed only to cosmetic 
reductions in defense (Bush/Scowcroft 1998, 44; Moore/Tyler 1990a). Reflecting his 
distrust of the Soviet Union, Cheney preferred current readiness over uncertain 
innovations and cutting conventional systems rather than strategic systems.  
Hence, despite the economic pressure, the administration pursued a wait and see policy, 
which was unwilling to let the guard down early. Early defense reviews did not result in 
a significant qualitative change (Trask/Goldberg 1997, 112). 
 
The William J. Clinton administration 
It may seem ironic that the Bush administration, highly experienced and successful in 
foreign policy, failed to anticipate the impact of the end of the Cold War on domestic 
preferences. To the surprise of most commentators, Bush lost the reelection in 1992 to 
William J. Clinton, who had correctly anticipated the changing tide and campaigned on 
a domestic agenda around the well-known slogan ‘It’s the economy stupid’.241 During 
the campaign, the Arkansas Governor portrayed himself as a New Democrat combining 
a program of deficit hawkishness, free trade, traditional liberalism, law and order 
positions, and welfare state reform (Gillon 2008, 84-87; Purdum 1995). At the same 
time, he criticized Bush’s reactive behavior in the changing world, called for a new 
post-Cold War vision and even expressed some hawkish foreign policy preferences, 
including a tough stance on communist China (Kaplan 2000, 24-25; Clinton 1992, 422).  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the Kennedy government, the budget director would have to appeal to the President in cases of large 
budget decisions which the Secretary of Defense did not approve (Jones/McCaffery 2008, 78). 
241 A debate with a national defense focus, the Republican’s strong field, was hardly promising for a 
Democratic candidate, especially after the successful Iraq War. And exit-polls indicated that the 
Democratic campaign made the right choices. While voters who were concerned about deficit reduction, 
the most prominent issue of the election, were evenly split between Bush and Clinton, the latter won 
among voters who regarded the economy, health care, education, and the environment as important issues 
(Jones, C. 1999, 55, 72-73). 
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But the hopes of defense hawks were soon disappointed, as Clinton’s foreign policy, 
formulated with the help of NSA Anthony Lake, put little weight on defense issues. 
With the Cold War clearly over, the new administration believed that the nature of 
national security itself had been transformed by the rise of new challenges, including the 
proliferation of WMD, regional tensions, ethnic conflict, terrorism or the environment 
(Dueck 2010, 252). Therefore, it abandoned containment and turned to a strategy “of 
engagement and enlargement” to maintain global leadership and stabilize and extend the 
market capitalist democratic word system (Clinton 1995; see also Clinton 1999; 
Brinkley 1997; Lake 1993). Although most new challenges had a military dimension, 
defense and military policy played a very limited role in the administration’s 
considerations. The most prominent defense issue was how to shape a leaner and less 
expensive force and practice more international burden sharing. Thus, Clinton 
emphasized the aspect of defense with the “greatest domestic political significance.” 
(Ullman 1995, 72) Already the campaign booklet ‘Putting People First’ had made clear: 
“We can reduce substantially our military forces and still protect U.S. interests.” 
(Clinton/Gore 1992, 132) In his first State of the Union Address, the President promised 
the audience to “do everything I can to make sure that the men and women who serve 
under the American flag will remain the best trained, the best prepared, the best 
equipped fighting force in the world”, but made clear that the new world situation 
allowed to “responsibly reduce our defense budget.” (Clinton 1993) Furthermore, 
drawing from the Vietnam experience, Lake argued that the US needed to respond 
strongly to aggression, but also to recognize the limits of American military power 
(Dumbrell 2009, 16).  
As military means were deemphasized, the qualitative preferences resembled an 
ambitious collection of pragmatic steps without a coherent foundation. The strategic 
elements “Shape, Respond, Prepare” (Shalikashvili 1997)242 accurately sum the 
requirements for the new force: “Shaping the international environment, responding to 
the full spectrum of crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future.” 
(Flournoy/Tangredi 2001, 142) Thus, military forces should be ready to actively shape 
the international situation across the full spectrum of operations with the response to 
                                                             
242 Although ‘Shape, Respond, Prepare’ was first explicitly articulated in 1997, it is arguably a good 
summery of the continuous qualitative preferences within the administration. 
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threats from so-called backlash or rogue states at the high end.
243
 This implied an early 
balancing act between the preparations for conventional operations along traditional 
lines and a new emphasis on irregular operations. Moreover, the US should use the 
strategic pause to prepare for the likely future missions by modernizing the Cold War 
force. 
Given the low relevance of military policy, its implementation was largely left to 
Defense Secretary Les Aspin and the DOD (Hammond 1994, 174). Besides Nunn, 
Aspin was one of the few Democratic heavy weights in military policy, who showed 
“an encyclopedic grasp of defense and national security.” (Pearson 1995) He had 
touched defense policy first in the late 1960s, when he had worked as Systems Analyst 
under Defense Secretary McNamara during his time in the Army. As a representative 
from Wisconsin, he joined the HASC in 1970 and became its chairman in 1985.
244
 
Given the Clinton’s weak record on defense, Aspin seemed an obvious choice to 
overcome the image of being soft on defense, a Republican challenge that followed the 
President most of his tenure. Already during the election campaign, Clinton’s lacking 
military background had been widely considered one of his political weak spots and 
opponents had attacked him for having evaded military service and participating in the 
antiwar movement during the Vietnam War (Rust 1993). The impression of a weak 
commander-in-chief was further strengthened by the Clinton administration’s early 
attempt to end the ban on gays in the military, a concession to his liberal constituency, 
which severely strained civil-military relations.  
Of Clinton’s three defense secretaries, Aspin was the most ambitious with regard to 
quantitative and qualitative changes. On Capitol Hill and during the Clinton campaign, 
he had strongly challenged the Bush administration on its careful stance towards the 
Soviet transition (Woodward 1993). Considering a reversal of Gorbachev’s reforms 
highly unlikely, Aspin issued position papers calling for a fundamental bottom-up 
review of defense programs, which would result in additional savings as well as a better 
prepared force. Rather than guided by an implausible Soviet resurgence which resulted 
                                                             
243 Without a peer competitor in the foreseeable future, regional powers, resisting the democratic wave, 
were considered the greatest security risk and most likely sponsors of terrorism and weapons’ 
proliferation (Lake 1993, 17). 
244 Aspin had vocally opposed the Vietnam War and was considered a moderate left-wing Democrat when 
he became HASC chairman. Yet, he alienated Democratic supporters by supporting Reagan’s buildup 
(Deering 1993, 166-167). After he narrowly evaded deposition in 1987, he turned to a more inclusive 
style of leadership which allowed him to consolidate his power.  
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only in a smaller, increasingly outdated Cold War force, military planning should be 
focused on the requirements of the recent post-Cold War scenarios (Grunzinger 1996, 2-
3). Therefore, Aspin suggested a smaller force, sufficient for one major conflict and 
additionally a Panama-size contingency.
245
 In qualitative terms, Aspin’s plan was hardly 
a radical approach. He preferred to cut across all branches with a slight emphasis on 
personnel reductions and additional rapid response capabilities. Moreover, his plans put 
faith in high technology, which would allow the Services to accomplish similar 
operations in future with smaller forces.  
When Aspin gained the chance to implement his defense vision, many doubted that he 
could make the DOD work for his preferences after years of critical scrutiny and 
challenges as lawmaker. As Woodward (1993) argues: “To perhaps the most 
authoritarian organization in the nation, Aspin brings a decidedly nonauthoritarian 
personality.” In fact, Aspin had an unfortunate year in the Pentagon overshadowed by 
the bitter debate over the ban of homosexuals in the military and the death of 18 soldiers 
in Mogadishu. New York Times journalist Weiner (1996) described Aspin later as “an 
absent-minded professor who had appalling relationships with the military.” Although 
Aspin finally resigned in fall 1993, his policy preferences had set the course for the rest 
of Clinton’s tenure and his successors pursued only limited changes.  
In February 1994, Aspin’s Deputy William J. Perry, on leave as a professor of 
engineering at Stanford University, succeeded him as Secretary of Defense (Devroy 
1994). Perry was highly regarded by the Services and congressional defense experts. He 
had gained Pentagon experience during his time as Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Development in the Carter administration (Weiner 1996; Dumbrell 2009, 
18). He had therefore been in a central position when the Pentagon launched the offset 
strategy embracing ambitious technological developments to offset Soviet quantity with 
US quality. In spring 1979, Perry had outlined the Pentagon’s goal before Congress: 
“First of all, we will be able to see targets on the battlefield any time of day and in any 
kind of weather. Secondly, we will be able to make a direct hit on any target we can see. 
                                                             
245 Aspin outlined four force sizing options based on recent military missions (Ippolito 1994, 97). 
Depending on the sought for capabilities, options A to D provided means for increasingly challenging 
tasks on top of a foundation including nuclear forces as well as mainland defense (Grunzinger 1996, 2-3). 
Option A was the cheapest version, providing forces for one Desert Storm equivalent major regional 
conflict (MRC) and a peacetime operation at the same time. The largest option D, provided forces for one 
MRC and an extensive hold operation in the style of the Provide Comfort operation. Aspin favored 
Option C. 
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Third, we will be able to destroy any target we can hit.” (SASC 1978, 5510) Given 
Perry’s history and affinity for technological solutions, it is not surprising that he was 
the most supportive defense secretary with regard to the RMA during the 1990s (Owens 
2000, 81-82). As a recognized expert in weapon technology, he was “identified with a 
technocratic position and believes in using technology to substitute for humans on the 
battlefield.” (Chapman cited in Markoff 1994) While he had a strong preference for 
modernization, Perry considered a ready force able to fight two major regional wars 
simultaneously as essential (Trask/Goldberg 1997, 121). 
When Perry, who greatly eased civil-military tensions, decided to leave the Pentagon 
after Clinton’s first term, William S. Cohen became Defense Secretary. Prior to his 
appointment, the Republican with the reputation of being an independent mind had 
served as senator of Maine and member of the SASC for 18 years (Priest/Dewar 1996; 
Baker/Harris 1996). He was not only an expert of military issues, but also a moderate, 
who constantly searched for bipartisan solutions on controversial policies, such as 
missile defense. As first Republican in the Clinton administration, Cohen’s nomination 
was regarded as a signal to the Republican Congress to seek a less competitive 
cooperation. During the nomination hearings, he told lawmakers his first important 
problem to solve would be “how do we maintain a level of readiness that we need in 
order to send troops into difficult situations when required, to balance that and declining 
budgets with also the prospect of a huge wave of procurement requirement that are 
coming along.” (in SASC 1997a, 40) At the same time, he indicated resistance to further 
defense cuts and additional spending for advanced weaponry, even at the cost of 
reduced personnel (Trask/Goldberg 1997, 127). In office, Cohen pursued very 
pragmatic middle-of-the-road positions along the White House lines. Accepting the 
budget realities, he tried to manage the most problematic inconsistencies without the 
ambition of fundamental change.  
 
The George W. Bush administration 
After the closest, most partisan, and most controversial election in more than a century, 
George W. Bush succeeded Clinton in 2001 (Fortier/Ornstein 2003, 138). Given the still 
low salience of international problems, domestic issues were on top of Bush’s campaign 
agenda based on the commitment to compassionate conservatism, which combined 
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conservative position on economic issues with a more moderate stance on social 
programs (Greenstein 2003, 6; Berke 2000). In fact, Bush was not a foreign and military 
policy expert. But with the help of former defense and foreign policy officials 
Condoleezza Rice and Wolfowitz, the campaign still articulated clear positions on 
national security issues to benefit from one of the traditional party’s strong domains. 
Former Defense Secretary and Vice presidential nominee Richard Cheney characterized 
Clinton’s presidency with regard to national defense as “eight years of neglect and 
misplaced priorities.” He continued to argue that the increase in overseas deployments 
“has brought serious problems of readiness, recruiting, retention and morale.” (in Von 
Drehle 2000) The claim was supported by retired General Schwarzkopf and CJCS 
Powell. The latter, who became the Bush administration’s Secretary of State, told an 
audience: “It's time to face the reality that we have given our wonderful military force 
too many missions that we are not prepared to fund them for.” (in Boyer 2000) The 
Bush campaign also criticized Clinton’s extensive deployment of the armed forces and 
pledged to refocus the military on its most central tasks. Rice famously said in 2000: 
“We don't need to have the 82nd Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten.” (in Gordon 
2000; see also Greenstein 2003, 6)  
Hence, although the threat scenario still included rogue states, proliferation of WMD, 
and terrorism, relations with Russia and China and the emergence of a peer competitor 
moved to the top of the Bush administration’s early military agenda (Singh 2006, 14). 
Realist and nationalist rather than interventionist positions dominated the early Bush 
administration. It was only after 9/11 that a strong interventionist element was included. 
The emphasis shifted from peer competitors to the triangle of terrorism, rogue states and 
weapons of mass destruction (Bush 2002a). But since the administration linked 
terrorism and proliferation with the threat of rogue states, it maintained a very 
conventional, state-based perspective (Daalder/Lindsay 2003, 107, 135; Bush 2002c). 
Since terrorism was tied to states, the changing focus did not affect the central 
qualitative military preferences. Already in late 1999, Bush (1999) had named two 
major defense policy objectives: “I will defend the American people against missiles 
and terror. And I will begin creating the military of the next century.” Related to the 
threat of advanced missile technologies in the hands of rogue states, the former pledge 
aimed at the accelerated development of a NMD. The latter promise explicitly referred 
to military transformation based on “a revolution in the technology of war”, which 
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would guarantee US military preeminence in the long run (Bush 1999). In the GWOT, 
Bush reinforced the theme of military supremacy, asserting that “America has and 
intends to keep military strengths beyond challenge. Thereby making the destabilizing 
arm races of other eras pointless and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of 
peace.” (Bush 2002b) But the National Security Strategy made clear that reliance on 
deterrence would no longer suffice to provide national security and the administration 
added a proactive option to eliminate threats before they could strike the US (Bush 
2002c). In the eyes of the civilian leaders, this combination of increased defense and 
“bringing the war to the bad guys” (Bush cited in Woodward 2002a, 281) further 
strengthened the case for NMD and military transformation. A networked, smaller, 
faster, more flexible and precise force was considered the best answer to the terrorist 
challenge.  
When Bush pledged additional defense efforts prior to 9/11, he had no repetition of the 
Reagan buildup in mind. Transformation should not be achieved by budget increases, 
but rather by shifting money from obsolete programs. Bush promised that he would 
initiate “an immediate, comprehensive review of our military” and give the Defense 
Secretary “a broad mandate to challenge the status quo.” (in Lemann 2001) The highly 
experienced and intellectually capable bureaucratic infighter Donald Rumsfeld was 
considered the right person for this task of standing up to the sometimes stubborn 
Service bureaucracies and implementing organizational reform and military 
transformation.
246
 He was an important figure in the Republican defense community 
with a close relationship with Cheney and the reputation of a defense hawk. Although 
no outspoken RMA advocate, Rumsfeld had proven his support for the national missile 
program as chairman of the Committee to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the 
United States (Ricks 2001a). Moreover, he held close ties to the Project for the New 
American Century (PNAC), a neoconservative lobbying group founded in 1997.
247
 
Rumsfeld was one of the signatories of the PNAC’s Statement of Principles, which 
argued that American foreign and defense policy was adrift and the US global role at 
risk, due to Clinton’s policies and the Republicans’ indecisive opposition. To readjust 
                                                             
246 After Rumsfeld had served as a Navy pilot between 1954 and 1957, he first gained political experience 
as a four-term Republican member of the House supporting fiscal conservatism and strong defense. 
During the Ford administration, he worked initially as chief of staff and later as Defense Secretary, 
opposing Kissinger’s course of arms control and limited military spending. 
247 The PNAC was founded by William Kristol, the chief editor of the Weekly Standard and a leading 
neoconservative. 
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the policy, the PNAC urged that “we need to increase defense spending significantly if 
we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces in 
the future.” (Abrams et al. 1997) In the presidential election year, PNAC called for the 
new administration to transform the armed forces exploiting the RMA and advocated a 
return to defense planning for US preeminence (PNAC 2000, ii-v). 
Other Republican defense experts returned with Cheney, Rumsfeld and Powell to the 
Pentagon. Thus, Wolfowitz became Deputy Secretary of Defense. While he lacked the 
managerial assets required for the post and had an uneasy relationship with Rumsfeld, 
Wolfowitz benefited from the support from the Vice President’s office (Cockburn 2007, 
101-102). During the Clinton administration, Wolfowitz had worked at Johns Hopkins 
University and contributed to the neoconservative agenda for the next Republican 
President, especially calling for a removal of Saddam Hussein (e.g. 
Khalilzad/Wolfowitz 1997). Like Rumsfeld, he had signed the PNAC Statement of 
Principles and was a member of Rumsfeld’s committee on the ballistic missile threat. 
Wolfowitz was largely tasked with policy formulation in the new administration, 
whereas Rumsfeld focused on managing the Pentagon and push transformation (Moens 
2004, 63). Together with Douglas Feith, the new undersecretary of defense for policy, 
and Richard Perle, the influential chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory 
Committee and close confidant of Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz formed the neoconservative 
network within DOD circles. Stephen Cambone, who had also served in Rumsfeld’s 
missile committee, became the Defense Secretary’s early point man on transformation 
(Herspring 2010, 80). After starting as special assistant to the Defense Secretary, 
Cambone was soon promoted to principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. 
In order to provide additional intellectual and administrative push for transformation, 
which “soon acquired the aura of an official ideology” (Davis 2010, 20), Rumsfeld also 
sought the support of nonpartisan military experts (Gordon/Trainor 2007, 9). Since 
transformation built on the RMA concept, many early RMA advocates joined the team 
(Davis 2010, 16-17). Hence, after having been marginalized under William Cohen, 
Andrew Marshall, the director of the OSD’s Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and a 
central figure in the RMA debate, became a valued OSD advisor again (Maddrell 2003). 
RMA advocate and member of the 1997 National Defense Panel, Andrew Krepinevich, 
also joined the inner circle of transformers. But the arguably most influential 
transformer in the new administration was Arthur Cebrowski, who had been appointed 
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director of the new Office of Force Transformation in late 2001 (Kagan 2006, 285). As 
member of the Joint Staff and president of the Naval War College, Cebrowski had been 
central in the development of the Navy’s Network-Centric Warfare concept during the 
1990s (Blaker 2006).
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More radically than Aspin, the transformers envisioned a networked, technology based 
force, which strongly departed from the personnel-intense static Cold War force. 
Officially the transformers promised a more efficient force, which could meet the full 
spectrum of international threats and the public’s distaste for messy and bloody wars at 
the same time (Rumsfeld 2002). A closer look reveals, however, that transformation 
implicitly focused on high-end conventional war and thus shifted Clinton’s implicit 
balancing act between irregular and traditional operations in favor of the latter (Boot 
2005). 
Right from the start, Rumsfeld sought to concentrate power on military policy within 
the OSD and made clear that other actors would not intervene in DOD affairs. Two 
months into the Bush administration, a high ranking official said with regard to 
transformation: “It’s already clear that Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice are not 
going to be players.” (in Wilson 2001b, 812) Powell, the moderate Secretary of State 
with long-time military experience, was arguably the administration’s most cautious 
actor with regard to the top-down transformation and the emphasis on military power in 
the conduct of foreign policy.
249
 This pitted him and the State Department against the 
conservatives in the Pentagon and the Vice President’s office (Perlez 2001). With the 
NSC as arena, the groups disagreed over many issues including missile defense 
deployment and policy towards North Korea, Taiwan or the Middle East (Hult 2003, 
                                                             
248 The group was complemented by some military officers, whose freethinking and criticism of the 
military status quo had attracted the civilians’ interest. Rumsfeld’s valued the advice of Army Colonel 
Douglas Macgregor who had published an influential book on Army force structure reform titled 
“Breaking the Phalanx” in 1997 (Scarborough 2004, 43-44; Macgregor 1997, 87). Macgregor continued 
to advocate Army transformation in testimonies before Congress and publications (Macgregor 2003). The 
group of transformers also included retired Air Force General Charles Horner, who promoted the use of 
precision fire to paralyze the enemy’s command and control points, a concept called ‘Shock and Awe’. 
This Air Force concept is closely related to effect-based operations: The goal of effect-based operations is 
to achieve a situation which is described as Shock and Awe, i.e. a paralysis of the opponent’s will to 
continue fighting (Kagan 2003, 8-9; Ullman/Wade 1996). Hence, overwhelming forces is directed at 
commando posts, centers of political decision-making or crucial infrastructure causing an early 
breakdown of the adversary with comparatively little effort. 
249 Powell’s reluctance was not shared by Deputy Secretary of State, Richard L. Armitage (Woodward 
1991, 47). Armitage, a friend of Powell back from their time in the Reagan administration, had been a 
member of the National Defense Panel, which criticized the QDR and promoted a full embracement of 
the RMA in 1997. 
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63). But the realist NSA Condoleezza Rice, advisor on the Soviet Union during G.H. 
Bush’s presidency and close confidante of G.W. Bush, soon failed to provide the 
balance between the competing groups (Kessler 2007; Burke 2005).
250
 Cheney and 
Rumsfeld operated as an “iron wall on defense and war policy that no one could get 
around.” (Woodward 2008, 195) Thus, the Defense Secretary successfully claimed 
direct access to the President on military decisions, marginalized the State Department’s 
influence on defense issues, and rejected any interference by NSC staff (Scarborough 
2004, 6-8). Since the latter was not in the chain of command, he considered NSC 
intervention as a direct attack on his prerogatives. Especially after 9/11, Rumsfeld made 
sure that he remained the strongman on military policy within the DOD and the 
administration. Mitchell Daniels, director of the OMB, and his successor in 2003, Josh 
Bolton, fought a futile battle to keep the federal deficit in check, as the DOD 
requirements soared (Moens 2004, 54-55).  
Moreover, Rumsfeld sought strong control within the DOD, since he believed 
“transformation hinged more on leadership and organization than it did on technology.” 
(Rumsfeld 2011, 295) Therefore, he selected Service secretaries, who would commit to 
transformation. Except for Thomas White, the new Army Secretary, who was selected 
by the White House as a return for his support of the Bush campaign, Rumsfeld picked 
Service secretaries from the business world he knew he could work with to carry the 
reforms into the branches (Cockburn 2007, 112-113). James Roche, who became Air 
Force Secretary, came from the Northrop Grumman Corporation, had contacts in 
neoconservative circles and was a longtime associate of leading RMA advocate Andrew 
Marshall (Kaplan 2003a). The new Navy Secretary, Gordon England, also had a 
background with a defense contractor, General Dynamics. Yet, while their influence 
remained small, especially White, but also Roche soon became advocates of their 
Services rather than Rumsfeld’s agents of change. After White was forced to resign in 
2003, the Defense Secretary tried to transfer James Roche to the Army signaling that he 
was “determined to impose sweeping changes on the Army.” (Ricks 2003; see also 
Kaplan 2003a) When a scandal forced Roche to remove his nomination and to resign 
instead, Rumsfeld selected Francis Harvey, another CEO and loyal Rumsfeld ally, over 
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 During the election campaign, Rice had served as central foreign policy advisor. On military policy, 
Rice shared G.H. Bush’s realist perspective and strongly supported transformation, recommending in a 
Foreign Affairs article that “U.S. technological advantages should be leveraged to build forces that are 
lighter and more lethal, more mobile and agile, and capable of firing accurately from long distances.” 
(Rice 2000, 51) 
268 
 
Les Brownlee, the acting Army Secretary. Brownlee reported that Rumsfeld had told 
him “he preferred to have a businessman as the secretary and not a former career Army 
officer.” (in Gertz/Scarborough 2004)  
Distrustful of the military leaders, the OSD also sought to reduce the influence of the 
Service Chiefs. CJCS Shelton assured the incoming Rumsfeld that the Joint Staff would 
be loyal to the new administration, but the Defense Secretary was concerned that the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act had created a competing power by strengthening the JCS 
(Gordon/Trainor 2007, 7-8). CJCS Shelton (2010, 418) recalled later: “As I transitioned 
into the Bush administration, it felt more like some members of his team had a 
particular agenda (…) and if you were going to be part of their team, you had better be 
willing to vote in that direction or you probably would be looking for another job – 
which made expressing honest opinions more challenging.” In fact, Rumsfeld pushed 
the CJCS to give his military advice to the President through the Defense Secretary 
rather than directly. He criticized numerous duplications between the Joint Staff and the 
OSD and repeatedly called for a consolidation within his office (Shelton 2010, 408-413; 
Scarborough 2004, 136). Moreover, he controlled the military promotion process down 
to the two-star level and micromanaged operational tasks (Herspring 2010, 79-80).  
By late 2006, Rumsfeld resigned against the backdrop of mounting public and political 
discontent with the occupation in Iraq and military officers’ opposition to his top-down 
leadership. He was replaced by Robert Gates, a moderate Republican, who was 
considered a pragmatist and consensus-builder (Kaplan 2008; Kitfield 2006). With more 
emphasis on the immediate requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan, Gates shifted 
attention away from transformation towards a broader posture. In an effort to make a 
new start, Gates forced Army Secretary Harvey to resign and did not continue the tenure 
of CJCS Pace. He portrayed the GWOT as a worldwide irregular campaign and warned 
that “we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and 
strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide all the capabilities necessary to fight and 
win conflicts such as those the United States is in today.” (Gates 2009) At the same 
time, he was tied by the fiscal realities, which made a slow-down of the defense growth 
inevitable. Thus, a balancing of the force posture required a moderate shift from 
preparing for the high-end of operations to the low-end of operations.  
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Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO POLITICAL ACTORS WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION PURSUE IN THE 
DIMENSION OF … 
…military budgets? 
- Bush: stability bias 
(reactive) 
- Clinton: reduced 
defense spending / 
emphasis on rapid 
response and 
modernization 
- Initially limited defense 
spending, strong buildup 
after 9/11 / support for 
transformation and early 
NMD 
…military organization? 
- Bush: stability bias 
- Clinton: Bias in favor 
of technology over 
personnel 
- Bias in favor of 
technology over 
personnel 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Bush: Acquisition in 
response to Soviet 
capabilities, moderate 
support for NMD 
- Clinton: Support for 
modernization /moderate 
support for RMA 
- Transformation and 
early NMD 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Bush: deterrence and 
regional response 
- Clinton: Full-spectrum 
preparations 
- Transformation bias 
Do these preferences represent 
societal demands? 
- Bush: Yes, as far as 
societal demands are 
articulated 
- Clinton: Disagreement 
on organization and 
weapons acquisition 
- Disagreement on 
organization, partial 
disagreement on budget 
and weapons acquisition 
Are these preferences consistent 
with the dominant societal idea 
underlying the course of military 
transition? 
- No clear societal 
mindset apparent 
- No consistent societal 
mindset apparent 
 
6.1.2.3. Consistency of political actors’ preferences 
In contrast to the post-World War II years, lawmakers were much more confident to 
challenge the administration on military policy. Congress had significantly increased its 
means and authority to influence the administration’s defense policy since the 1950s. 
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By establishing the CBO and upgrading the GAO, the lawmakers had greatly improved 
their analytical capacity to challenge the administration’s requests. Moreover, the 
extended scope of annual authorizations has put the armed services committees in a 
position, where micromanagement of the defense budget became possible. While the 
means already existed prior to 1990, only the end of the Cold War and the resulting 
military transition provided the context for their extensive usage. The reality of the East-
West-conflict had limited congressional opposition to the administration’s defense 
course. But against the backdrop of the diffuse and overall less threatening post-Cold 
War environment, Congress was more confident in challenging the administration’s 
policy. 
Bearing in mind the government was divided for most of the 1990s, the lack of 
opponents raised the incentives to use foreign and military policy as an arena for 
partisan divisions. Since the Democrats in Congress did not agree with Bush’s stability 
bias and the Republicans in turn did not agree with Clinton’s suggested transition, 
almost permanent inconsistency followed. Moreover, without an urgent threat 
lawmakers were more willing to use military policy with a focus on domestic economic 
considerations (Stockton 1995, 244). Art’s (1985, 241) assessment proved in many 
cases correct: “Taking credit for protecting, expanding, or starting a program is 
electorally more worthwhile than more diffuse policy oversight.” Due to their different 
constituencies, lawmakers were much more responsive to the regional defense economy 
and the state based reserve groups than the President, which resulted in additional 
inconsistencies in the weapons acquisition and organization dimension. 
Congressional assertiveness sharply dropped after 9/11. Both parties rapidly rallied 
behind the administration and its military policy course of transformation and – to a 
lesser extent – NMD. Since the nation under attack soon turned into a nation at war, 
Congress continued to back the President even after the shock of 9/11 faded. Only the 
weapons acquisition remained somewhat conflicting, as Congress continued to protect 
weapons projects and the Democrats opposed NMD. Only after the Iraq War got out of 
hand, did the Democrats and later the Republicans resume a more critical position, 
challenging the administration’s military preparations and calling for adjustments. 
While Congress supported the administration’s transformation focus on substance, 
especially Democrats became increasingly displeased with the limited preparations for 
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irregular challenges. This reflects growing societal demands for more emphasis on 
irregular operations including additional personnel.  
Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
ARE POLITICAL ACTORS’ PREFERENCES CONSISTENT IN THE DIMENSION OF … 
…military budget? Low consistency 
High consistency, but 
decreasing 
…military organization? Low consistency 
High consistency, but 
decreasing 
…weapons acquisition? Low consistency Moderate consistency 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
Low consistency 
High consistency, but 
decreasing 
Do political actors share ideas on 
the course of military policy? 
No clear societal 
mindset apparent 
No consistent societal 
mindset apparent 
 
6.1.3. Military actors’ preferences 
When the Cold War ended, the US armed forces looked back at a long experience as 
important actors in foreign and security politics. Over the years, the members of 
Congress with first-hand military experience had significantly decreased,
251
 but the 
Services had learned to make “greater and more sophisticated use of organizational 
expertise and resources in order to shape political decisions.” (Black 1987, 46)252 More 
importantly, they had learned to live with each other and had settled for a ceasefire in 
their competition for resources, which was hardly seriously tested prior to 1990. But 
with the demise of the Soviet Union, military leaders were well aware that they faced a 
difficult transition. For 40 years, the East-West-conflict had guaranteed substantial 
defense budgets and the lowest Cold War budgets in FY 1978 and FY 1979 still equated 
4.6 percent of the GDP, which nonetheless caused the forces to warn of a ‘hollow 
                                                             
251 The share of Congressmen with military experience was below 47 percent in the House and 66 percent 
in the Senate in the 101st Congress. It further decreased to 31.3 percent and 43 percent respectively in the 
106th Congress.  
252 Yet, Scroggs (2000), who conducted numerous interviews with lawmakers, committee staff and 
Pentagon officials, argues that the strategies and influence of the Services strongly differed. The Army 
was considered reactive, clumsy and least sophisticated. The Navy was regarded as most effective in 
presenting its interests to Congress and the Air Force was seen as most astute in creating legislative 
support (Scroggs 2000; see also Woodward 1991, 74). A former OSD official argued with regard to 
continuous differences between the Services’ liaison strategies: “The Air Force will try to outsmart you. 
The Navy will pretend you don’t exist. The Army will try to out-cooperate you.” (in Scroggs 2000, 58)  
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force’. Now, more severe cuts were expected. Two major guidelines shaped the position 
and preferences of the Services by the end of the Cold War.  
First, the Goldwater-Nichols-Act of 1986 had significantly reduced the power and 
autonomy of the Services within the DOD (Lederman 1999; Chiarelli 1993). On the one 
hand, the act clearly separated the contributions of the Services and the unified 
commands and improved the standing of the CINCs, who had previously lacked any 
institutional power to advance their requirements (Wolfe 1995, 26).
253
 While 
responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces remained with the Services, the 
planning and execution of operations became the task of the unified commands (White 
1996). The Service chiefs were taken out of the chain of command running from the 
President through the Defense Secretary to the CINCs. Moreover, the CJCS’ position 
within the DOD was greatly improved by making the chairman principal military 
advisor to the President and Defense Secretary and assigning him a stronger role in 
strategic planning, training and doctrine development, in order to promote joint forces 
and operations. Hence, the political influence of the Service Chiefs largely depended on 
the leadership style of the CJCS and his civilian superiors. 
Colin Powell, CJCS under G.H. Bush and Clinton, made good use of these new powers 
and some regarded him as “the most powerful military leader since George C. 
Marshall.” (Kohn 1994) Although Cheney articulated early displeasure with the CJCS’ 
concentration of power, Powell made sure that all military information went through 
him as principal military advisor (Woodward 1991, 162).
254
 With first-hand experience 
of the Army’s difficult reorientation after the Vietnam War, he used his power to set the 
agenda for a smooth and balanced transition of the armed forces into the post-Cold War 
era. Powell (1995, 375, 401-403, 436) recalls in his memoirs: “I saw it as my main 
mission to move the armed forces onto a new course, one paralleling what was 
happening in the world today, not one chained to the previous forty years.” His 
successors, John Shalikashvili and John Shelton, were less central in the defense 
planning, but also played an important role, causing Marine Commandant Mundy to 
warn of a declining importance of the Chiefs already in 1994 (Lederman 1999, 91).  
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 Reforms with the same intention by Eisenhower in the late 1950s had not had the sought for effects. 
The lawmakers’ new attempt to institutionally separate the military missions came in response to growing 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the DOD during the early 1980s (e.g. Luttwak 1985). 
254 In fact, Cheney told Powell to stop funneling all information in late 1989, since he felt cut off from 
departing opinions (Powell 1995, 425).  
273 
 
New in office, Rumsfeld sought to reduce the CJCS’ influence. Yet, Shelton was 
determined to defend the prerogatives of his office and rejected Defense Secretary’s 
proposals, which strained the civil-military relations right from the start of the new 
administration. When Shelton’s term ended in September 2001, Rumsfeld selected 
Richard Myers, who was more willing to comply with the Defense Secretary’s 
preferences (Gordon/Trainor 2007, 53). The two men developed a very close working 
relationship and military officials and lawmakers complained that the former failed to 
provide independent advice (Shanker/Schmitt 2002). In fact, the congruence between 
their positions was so high that John McCain (R-AZ) told Rumsfeld after listening to 
his testimony during a SASC hearing in 2004: “I do not need General Myers’ response. 
I know it will be exactly the same as yours.” (SASC 2004a, 36) Cockburn (2007, 111) 
describes Myers even as an “abused puppy” under Rumsfeld. His successor Peter Pace, 
the former Vice CJCS, was also closely associated with Rumsfeld and his 
transformation and was criticized for not stepping up to the civilians (Cloud 2005). 
Blamed by lawmakers for his deferent role especially with regard to the Iraq War, Gates 
decided not to continue Pace’s chairmanship in summer 2007 after only two years in 
office. Loren Thompson, a Lexington Institute analyst, argued about Pace’s successor 
Michael G. Mullen: “He represents a general trend in the administration away from 
crusaders and toward problem-solvers.” (in White/Ricks 2007) 
Second, the Vietnam War had left deep marks in the armed forces’ positions.255 After 
the messy counterinsurgency operation in Vietnam, which caused political and societal 
turmoil, almost broke the institution, and resulted in a loss of prestige and reduced 
resources, the armed forces responded by a strong focus on high-end conventional war. 
This bias found its clearest expression in the Weinberger-Powell-doctrine, which 
underlined the return to the American Way of War focused on the total war with the 
Red Army. Initially formulated by Secretary of Defense Weinberger in 1984,
256
 the 
doctrine stated six conditions for the use of military force (Campbell 1998, 364-365; 
Powell 1995, 302-303): (1) Vital interests of the nation or its allies must be at stake; (2) 
                                                             
255 On a more basic level, the armed forces became “more traditional in its values: Republican, 
conservative, and increasingly conscious of itself as a separate entity in American society.” (Kohn 1994) 
When Clinton became new Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Services were highly skeptical of the 
Democrat, who had evaded military service in Vietnam and participated in the antiwar movement, but 
now wanted to implement changes. In May 1993, Air Force Maj. Gen. Harold Campbell told an audience 
at a NATO base in the Netherlands that “Clinton is a ‘gay loving,’ ‘pot smoking,’ ‘draft dodging’ 
womanizer.” (Rust 1993) 
256 Since CJCS Powell relentlessly fought for the adherence of these conditions prior to Desert Storm, the 
conditions were often referred to as Powell doctrine after the overwhelming victors in Iraq. 
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A clear commitment to victory must exist; (3) Political and military objectives must be 
clear; (4) Forces must be properly sized; (5) Reasonable assurance of public and 
Congressional support must be secured in advance; (6) Military force must be used as a 
last resort. From the military officers’ point of view, the internal refocusing after 
Vietnam had a direct impact on the successful missions in Panama and Iraq as well as 
the revival of the forces. Hence, these six conditions remained the Services’ gold 
standard after the Cold War. Probably backed by budgetary incentives,
257
 organization, 
acquisition and doctrine & mission statement were heavily focused on these 
conventional, fire-power intense warfighting scenarios (Avant/Lebovic 2002).  
 
Army preferences 
As during the prior builddown, Army Chief Carl E. Vuono and his successor Gordon 
Sullivan chose a reactive approach to the upcoming transition (Adams 2006, 27). ‘No 
more Task Force Smith’ became again the mantra, as the Army concentrated its efforts 
to keep the impact of cuts limited and maintain a ready force despite downsizing 
(Jackson 2009, 47; Gellman 1991b). In fact, reductions in personnel were even more 
painful than during previous transitions, since the voluntary Service members unlike 
earlier generations of draftees were not happily leaving the all-voluntary force (Cohen 
1995, 2). Since the static threat of the Soviet Union made way to a range of potential 
challenges all over the world, the Army conducted gradual steps to redefine itself as a 
lighter fast-response force in order to maintain its strategic relevance (Gordon 1990c). 
Against this backdrop, the numerous operations of the 1990s were received with 
ambivalent feelings. On the one hand, the deployments underlined the relevance of a 
rapid response Army and provided an argument to keep reductions limited. On the other 
hand, most missions hardly looked like the generals’ favored tasks. More than its sister 
Services, the Army, which had suffered the worst breakdown after Vietnam and 
experienced its resurrection in Iraq, was biased in favor of conventional warfare 
(Campbell 1998). Hence, the open-ended peacekeeping missions of the 1990s strained 
not only the maintenance of the troops and produced little positive publicity, but they 
also challenged the preference for conventional war and revealed the one-sidedness of 
                                                             
257 Avant and Lebovic (2002, 149-150) argue that the support for the missions varies with the perceived 
support by the Services’ two principals, which indicates a budgetary or at least political calculus 
underlying these positions. 
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the Army’s strategic responsiveness. While this put pressure for additional qualitative 
changes on the Army, the generals resisted substantial turns during the 1990s.  
The Army neither aggressively turned to the information revolution until the end of the 
century. Rather, it was willing to trade technological modernization for large and 
capable forces in being and settled for limited conceptual studies and war games as well 
as incremental adaptation of new technologies. Only after the Kosovo War and into the 
new century, was transformation increasingly accepted within the Army as a means to 
regain relevance in the changing environment. Especially Operation Enduring Freedom 
was a painful experience for the Army, since the Pentagon pushed for a war plan with 
few ground forces to reduce preparation time and prove the power of transformation.
258
 
Thus, small and flexible SOF rather than regular ground forces conducted the majority 
of the ground missions. Against this backdrop, the need for transformation was clearly 
evident. Already in 1999, Army Chief Shinseki had challenged the status quo with the 
words: “If you don’t like change, you’ll like irrelevance a lot less.” (in Rumsfeld 2011, 
651) Yet, the Iraq War and especially its aftermath distracted increasing resources from 
transformation. Neither the focus on conventional war nor transformation, which carried 
over the bias on high-intensity, conventional war, had prepared the Army for the 
counterinsurgency operation in postwar Iraq. The sudden demand for boots on the 
ground and passive protection did not fit in the continuous technology-driven push for 
transformation, which emphasized light and mobile units. Yet, after the turn to 
transformation by the end of the century, “the Army has been remarkably resistant to 
amending or scrapping its preferred vision of future war.” (Jackson 2009, 58) Hence, 
the Army’s preferences were caught between short-term requirements for 
counterinsurgency and transformation for future relevance. 
 
 
 
                                                             
258 While the Army played a prominent role during the Iraq War, it could again not prove its full 
capabilities. The Army’s first fully digitalized division had to be rerouted after Turkey denied passage 
and entered Iraq when the war was effectively over (Cordesman 2003, 242). In contrast, the Marine Corps 
played an important role during the war and especially in its aftermath. Although they had focused on 
high-intensity warfare during the 1990s, the Marines always considered low-intensity warfare a part of 
their mission (Long 2009, 130). 
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Air Force preferences 
More than 40 years after independence, the Air Force still actively struggled with its 
relevance. Thus, “survival of the service” still was, according to Mowbray (1995), “the 
single overriding intellectual feature of Air Force thinking.” Although the fighter pilots 
rather than the bombers dominated the Air Force since the 1970s, their concern was still 
closely related to the claim of strategic independence and technological superiority, 
especially in the field of advanced fighter planes (Wordon 1998; Builder 1994, 179). 
When the Cold War ended, the Air Force sought the leading role in rapid response 
missions pitting it against the Army and the Navy’s carrier battle groups. Based on the 
Weinberger-Powell-doctrine’s thinking, the flyers argued that only airpower could 
conduct the quick and low-risk operations, which the public was willing to support 
(Gordon 1990c). Air Force Chief Michael Dugan was even relieved of his duty in 
September 1990, after he had made comments to the press which indicated the 
superiority of air power over the other arms and disclosed details about Desert Storm 
(Atkinson 1990). After the impressive results of Desert Storm, the aviation branch 
argued that the war had proved the decisiveness of air power, which could win a war 
independent of ground forces and with less risk (Kitfield 1998). Thus, confidence, 
autonomy and technology were still closely intertwining. Against this backdrop, the Air 
Force preferences for the builddown were focused on modernization rather than force 
structure: A smaller, but technologically advanced force was the goal.  
In this context, the RMA was considered a promising development and the Air Force 
felt rather well placed in the course for transformation (Bolkcom 2006, 2-4; Kohn 2001, 
12). Air Force officials argued that the Air Force had demonstrated two of three relevant 
elements of transformation, the introduction of new technologies and operational 
concepts, already during Desert Storm 1991. And organizational change, the third 
element of the Air Force’s transformation conception, had followed after the war. While 
the flyers expressed satisfaction with their efforts, they argued for further transformation 
of air warfare and an extension into space and cyber space. But the Air Force’s 
optimism was not untroubled, as the GWOT held numerous unloved operations and 
strained readiness. With only few fixed targets of strategic importance, independent air 
strikes were of little use in the Afghanistan War. Instead, airpower provided close air 
support, attacking targets provided by special operation teams on the ground. Moreover, 
the demand for forward bases delayed and limited the involvement of the short-range 
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Air Force planes. Hence, more than 70 percent of the combat sorties during Enduring 
Freedom were flown by Navy aviators launched from six participating aircraft carriers 
in the Arabian Sea (Lambeth 2005, x).
259
 The successive counterinsurgency troubled the 
Air Force even further, since its utility in such a campaign is limited. Due to PGM, 
UAVs and C
4
ISR capabilities, the Air Force provided crucial tactical support, but could 
hardly underline its claim for strategic independence, advanced planes, and increased 
resources. While the flyers tried to protect the capabilities, on which its relevance in the 
GWOT rested, the flyers considered preparations for a potential Chinese aggression as a 
more promising long-term focus. 
 
Navy preferences 
With the end of the Cold War, the Navy was again forced to search for relevance. Like 
the other Services, the admirals had focused on traditional high-sea control and all-out 
confrontation with the Soviet forces including strategic strike capabilities. While the 
Navy argued that high-sea control and forward presence based on carrier battle groups 
had not lost any of their importance, scarce resources forced the Navy to more actively 
push into other areas as well. The Gulf War, which was publically considered a major 
success of the Army and the Air Force rather than the Navy, further underlined this need 
for a reorientation.
260
 Thus, a combination of expeditionary means, conventional strike 
capabilities and forward presence moved to the center early on (O’Neil 2002). While 
this made adjustments in its mission statements necessary and required a closer 
cooperation of the Marine Corps and the Navy, there was little incentive to change the 
force’s posture. In fact, the Navy strongly fought to keep its capital ships active and 
continued to consider the number of ships as an important measure for the branch’s 
health. Therefore, the Navy adjusted its doctrine and developed concepts to improve 
area access enforcements, but protected its force structure and Service shares against the 
backdrop of the transition.  
                                                             
259 The Iraq War was also far from perfect for the Air Force. Instead of an initial air campaign as in Desert 
Storm, the Army successfully opted for a simultaneous ground and air attack to achieve most surprise. 
And when the ground invasion started early to stop Iraqi forces from sabotaging oil fields, the sequence 
of action was completely turned upside down (Weiner 2009, 109).  
260 The Navy was not only seen as a mere supporter, but also blamed by the media as unable and 
unwilling to fully participate in joint operations (Ullman 1995, 82). 
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In the trade-off between current operations and future capabilities, the Navy sided with 
the former and adjusted only evolutionary to technological change. While broad 
conceptual thinking on transformation was conducted within the Navy, the admirals 
remained cautious and embraced only modest changes to its weapons acquisition. From 
the admirals’ perspective, there was little reason to fundamentally change course. The 
long-time GWOT tied the Marines to occupation duties, but provided little links for the 
Navy. Thus, the Navy contributed to different missions but lacked a clear focus by the 
end of Bush’s presidency. 
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Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
WHAT PREFERENCES DO MILITARY ACTORS PURSE IN THE DIMENSION OF… 
…military budget? 
- All Services: 
preferences for increased 
budgets and budget 
shares 
- All Services: 
preferences for increased 
budgets and budget 
shares 
…military organization? 
- Air Force: Preference 
for quality rather than 
quantity 
- Army: Preference for 
active personnel, 
especially light forces 
- Navy: Preference for 
large number of ships 
and capital ships 
- Air Force: Preference 
for quality rather than 
quantity 
- Army: Preference for 
large active personnel 
- Navy: Preference for 
large number of ships 
and capital ships 
…weapons acquisition? 
- Air Force: Preference 
for modernization of 
fighter planes 
- Army: Preference for 
modernization of 
conventional weapons 
systems 
- Navy: Preference for 
modernization of 
conventional weapons 
systems  
- Air Force: Preference 
for modernization of 
fighter planes, UAVs 
- Army: Preference for 
transformation of 
weapons systems 
- Navy: Preference for 
modernization of 
conventional weapons 
systems, in parts 
transformation of 
weapons systems 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
- Air Force: Preference 
for rapid global air 
power response 
- Army: Preference for 
conventional rapid 
response 
- Navy: Preference for 
expeditionary means and 
forward presence 
- Air Force: Preference 
for rapid global air power 
response 
- Army: Preference for 
conventional rapid 
response / 
counterinsurgency 
- Navy: Preference for 
expeditionary means and 
forward presence 
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6.2. The military policy process 
6.2.1. Strategic planning and the defense budget 
6.2.1.1. Builddown 
The peace dividend and Base Force Plan 
When the Cold War ended, the DOD had already been working with shrinking budgets 
for three years. As the soaring federal deficits during Reagan’s second tenure became 
worrisome, the feast of the early buildup had increasingly turned into famine 
(Weidenbaum 1992, 6-9). In order to get the deficits under control, fiscal discipline has 
been enforced through deficit control acts since 1985, which automatically cut spending 
if the budget exceeded fixed deficit targets, and the large discretionary defense budgets 
were an obvious field for savings (Williams 2001, 4-5).
261
 First signs of far-reaching 
changes in the Soviet Union put additional pressure on the defense budget, as society 
and Congress claimed peace dividends. Yet, society provided little guidance beyond the 
demand for defense cuts. Since the political actors in the Bush administration did not 
believe in an imminent decline of the Soviet Union and remained cautious, they also 
failed to frame the subsequent transition early on.  
Colin Powell took the initiative instead and made early steps to prepare for the 
inevitable transition. He was aware that only a well prepared plan could convince the 
public and Congress of the need for sustained robust forces and prevent the 
administration from losing control (Metz 2000, 7). In other words, only a 
comprehensive plan would save the military from arbitrary congressional clear-cutting. 
After Powell became CJCS in summer 1989, the Joint Staff became the dynamic center 
for transition planning.
262
 During his time as NSA in the Reagan administration, he had 
come to the early conclusion that the Soviet Union was in irreversible transformation 
and sought to manage the successive inevitable demobilization “to minimize their 
impact on military capabilities and interservice rivalries.” (GAO 1993, 15) Within days 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Powell was able to present the first outlines of the so-
called Base Force Plan to Bush, Cheney, and Scowcroft stressing new military 
requirements in a rapidly changing world (Lewis/Roll/Mayer 1992, 21).  
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 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings statute I and II, enacted under Reagan in 1985 and 1987 respectively, 
established deficit ceilings to balance the budget within 6 years (LeLoup 1993). The reductions were 
equally divided between domestic and defense items (Ippolito 1994, 28-31). 
262 Already the Joint Staff of CJCS Crowe started force structure studies (Jaffe 1993; McCormick 1998, 
30-37).  
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Skeptical about an early transition but unwilling to lose control, Cheney instructed 
Wolfowitz to pick up planning in cooperation with the JCS. Yet the momentum was 
with the military and “Cheney let Powell and the service chiefs decide which forces 
should be reduced.” (Herspring 2005, 325) Hence, Powell had achieved what Knight 
(2000) calls a “brilliant preemption”, reversing the ‘normal’ top-down relationship 
between the civilian principals and the military agent (Korb 2000). This had significant 
impact on the quality of the transition, since the Base Force Plan, the most 
consequential reorganization plan of the 1990s, enshrined a large amount of stability 
and determined the roads in which change was to take place early on (Korb 2001, 38). 
Assuming that the Soviet aggression would slowly cease to be an immediate threat, the 
Base Force Plan departed from threat based military planning, due to the uncertainty of 
the international situation as well as the lack of plausible threats (Gordon 1990d; 
Goldstein 2002, 320). As Powell joked after operation Desert Storm: “Think hard about 
it, I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of villains (…) I’m down to Castro and 
Kim Il Sung.” (Powell 1991 cited in Kaufmann/Steinbruner 1991, 45) Therefore, the 
requirements for the Base Force were determined by a capabilities based approach, 
which did not focus on particular enemies but estimated the minimum forces needed to 
meet abstract objectives in any real manifestation: Preserve US leadership, protect US 
interests and meet enduring defense needs (Troxell 1997; Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 
2001, 9).
263
 These goals were transferred in four conceptual force packages: Strategic 
forces to deter nuclear opponents, Atlantic forces to project force across the Atlantic, 
Pacific forces to project force across the Pacific, and US based contingency forces to 
meet emergencies (GAO 1993, 16). 
Of central importance for planning was the introduction of the Two-Major-Theater-
War-standard at the high-end of the deployment continuum: The size of the 
conventional forces should allow the US to rapidly deploy sufficient troops to 
simultaneously win two major theater wars (2-MTW) in any place. Beyond the two-
war-standard, the armed forces should be capable to conduct all kinds of smaller scale 
                                                             
263 In 1992, the US Military Strategy outlined the relationship between Base Force and military strategy 
and national security strategy in detail (JCS 1992; Bush 1991). The strategy stressed four basic tasks of 
the Armed Forces: Strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstruction 
(Snider 1993b). The military strategy lined out that the forces must be capable to conduct missions along 
the whole possible spectrum from operations other than war to global nuclear war. Yet, it assumed that 
peacetime missions are more likely than regional conflicts. Global nuclear war was considered the least 
likely event. 
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operations and guarantee nuclear deterrence. This framework allowed the armed forces 
to reorganize and provide a rational for transition without fully abandoning reversibility 
in case of a reemerging threat by the Soviet Union. At the same time, the plan 
introduced two innovative elements to meet the new environment: (1) It reduced the 
emphasis on forward deployment which in turn raised the importance of mobility 
means; (2) It put weight on the conventional capabilities and reduced the relevance of 
the strategic arsenal.  
In order to avoid renewed interservice battles, the Base Force framed a transition which 
McCain had previously called “the worst of all possible worlds” (in Thompson 1990): It 
took care of proportionality and spread the pain of the builddown equally across the 
branches (Owens 2000, 32-34). Disagreement within the administration was only about 
the projected savings resulting from the Base Force: Powell and the Joint Staff expected 
the plan to allow for overall 25 percent budget reductions, whereas the reluctant Cheney 
estimated only 10 percent cutbacks. Despite the ambiguity with regard to the plan’s 
fiscal implications, Cheney approved the Base Force as official DOD plan on August 1, 
1990, after the President had indicated his support for the concept (Powell 1995, 457-
458). A day later, Bush publically announced the new Base Force Plan at the Aspen 
Institute, referring the “needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence.” (Bush 
1990, 677) Since Iraq had invaded Kuwait just the previous day, the continuation of 
robust forces gained additional plausibility.  
At the same time, the Gulf crisis prevented a full public campaign on behalf of the new 
plan. The administration, especially Powell, had planned to use this campaign in order 
to seize the initiative from Congress (Jaffe 1993, 36-37). Indeed, while the Base Force 
emerged within the DOD, the Bush administration faced fierce criticism from Congress 
after submitting its budget request for FY 1991 in early 1990. Bush had rejected the 
Democrats’ calls for new taxes and presented a national defense budget request of $307, 
which provided only minor reductions and would clearly violate the deficit target of the 
deficit control act. Fearing an automatic budget reduction that would hurt the domestic 
and defense accounts alike, especially the Democratic majority pushed for more 
reductions in the defense category and criticized the administration’s lacking account 
for the ongoing Soviet transition (Wines 1990). The administration defended its 
cautious request and Bush told an audience in February 1990: "I would rather be called 
cautious than I would be reckless." (in Devroy 1990; see also HASC 1990) But 
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Congress largely shared Sam Nunn’s disappointment: “[I]n summary, I have concluded 
that the Bush administration’s 1991 defense budget proposal is based on a 1988 threat 
and a 1988 strategy.” (136 Cong. Rec., March 22, 1990, H5035) Lawmakers were 
convinced that further cuts were possible. Yet, liberal Democrats, calling for steep cuts, 
and centrist Democrats as well as lawmakers with defense dependent constituencies still 
clashed over the right amount of cuts in the Budget Committees (Morgan 1990).  
In March, Nunn complained that figuring out an appropriate defense budget was almost 
impossible, because “with threat, strategy and program assumptions that are, at 
minimum, two years out of date, we are left with very important blanks in the FY 1991 
defense budget.” (Gordon 1990b) Hence, lawmakers started to do what Powell had 
feared: They suggested various post-Cold War plans of their own in order to provide a 
rationale for reductions.
264
 To meet the charges of lacking strategic foundation and fend 
alternative proposals off, DOD officials increasingly relied on aspects of the Base Force 
Plan in their testimonies. In June 1990, Cheney outlined before Congress that by FY 
1995 there would be a 25 percent force reduction and 10 percent budget reductions.
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And on the day of Bush’s speech at the Aspen Institute, Cheney and Powell briefed the 
leaders of the armed services committees and appropriations committees on the Base 
Force Plan, who responded favorably but indicated that they were likely to disagree on 
the force size (Jaffe 1993, 37-38). A far-reaching debate on an alternative or more 
radical transition was avoided and a potential influence of societal preferences largely 
foreclosed.  
Since the FY 1991 budget did not meet the deficit control act’s deficit target even after 
substantial cuts by Congress,
266
 Bush and the Democratic congressional leaders agreed 
on an alternative scheme to reduce the budget deficit during the coming budget rounds 
already prior to the defense budget act. The Budget Enforcement Act introduced less 
                                                             
264 E.g., the influential Republican senators William S. Cohen (R-ME) and John McCain (R-AZ) 
proposed an alternative defense plan, which they argued would double Bush long-term cuts (Dewar 
1990a). 
265 Cheney’s testimony triggered a prompt reaction by Aspin who questioned why a 25 percent force 
structure reduction would result in only minor budget cuts. 
266 The Base Force Plan did not stop Congress from cutting heavily from the administration’s request and 
Powell soon felt that the Base Force was more the ceiling than the intended base for force preparations. 
But while in the Senate the centrists around Nunn prevailed, liberal Democrats supported by Aspin 
shaped the House’s decision. Thus the former proposed $289 billion and the later recommended $283 
billion (Adams/Cain 1990). The final budget was substantially smaller than the administration’s request, 
but very close to the Senate proposal, including what Peter Grier (1990) of the Christian Science Monitor 
called a “Gulf dividend” (see also Jaffe 1993, 42-43). 
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ambitious and more flexible caps on discretionary spending on defense, domestic, and 
international programs until FY 1995 and banned transfers between the three program 
areas until FY 1993 (Kaufmann/Steinbruner 1991, 23). These budget regulations had a 
twofold impact on future defense budgets. On the downside, the caps which Congress 
put on future defense budgets went far below the OSD’s target of 10 percent spending 
reduction under the Base Force Plan (Lewis/Roll/Mayer 1992, 33). Already the real 
reduction in the regular FY 1991 budget amounted to 8 percent from the past year and 
additional reductions of 3 and 3.5 percent respectively in FY 1992 and FY 1993 were to 
follow. Furthermore, the introduction of pay-as-you-go rules reduced flexibility and 
particularly made supplemental appropriations difficult, since an increase in one part of 
the defense budget had to be met by reduction in another part of the defense budget 
(Gold 2001, 164).
267
 On the upside, however, the budget agreement settled the conflict 
between liberal and centrist Democrats in favor of the latter and set only moderate 
ceilings for defense (New York Times 1990a). And the ban on transfers between budget 
categories foreclosed any further attempts to create a peace dividend by increasing 
domestic funding at the expense of defense. All savings would directly flow into deficit 
reduction. Hence, the budget agreement, dashed hopes for a substantial peace dividend 
and the New York Times (1990b) bitterly complained about the congressional 
accommodating: “By shrinking from the task of canceling wasteful new weapons, 
they’re canceling the entire peace dividend.”  
After the distribution of the FY 1992 defense budget caused little controversy,
268
 Bush 
faced renewed calls for further cuts from Congress by fall 1991.
269
 The signing of the 
START agreement in summer, the failed communist coup in the Soviet Union, and a 
presidential announcement of unilateral reductions in the strategic arsenal provided 
arguments for additional savings. Bush (1992) reacted in January 1992 by promising 
                                                             
267 If the supplemental is deemed to fund a dire emergency, the pay-as-you-go rules do not apply. The 
question whether an event constitutes an emergency which justifies a supplemental out of deficit spending 
caused regular political conflict during the 1990s. 
268 With the Budget Enforcement Act in place, the impressive performance of the troops in Iraq, and the 
Base Force Plan as strategic foundation, the general lines of the FY 1992 defense budget were firmly 
fixed. The Democrats were not yet willing to either break the budget agreement or transfer the money to 
deficit reduction (Gelb 1991; Hoffman/Yang 1991). Hence lawmakers largely stuck to the 
administration’s proposed 050 funding with roughly $10 billion less than in FY 1991 and only fought 
over the balance between funding between different weapons projects (Halperin/Lomasney 1999, 91; 
Morgan 1991). 
269 E.g. Senate majority leader Mitchell (D-ME) called for changes in the 1990 budget agreement and 
additional cuts of about $100 billion over the next five years (Dewar 1992). And Edward Kennedy (D-
MA) even proposed savings of $210 billion over the next seven years. 
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additional savings of $50 billion over the next five years beyond the already agreed 
reductions, which would be achieved especially through cuts in the nuclear arsenal. 
Since the East-West-rivalry rapidly decreased and arms reduction agreements were in 
place, this step allowed the President to stick with his reactive approach and still stay 
ahead of congressional challenges. Again, while societal demands contributed to the 
need for further reductions, they played virtually no role in deciding where to cut.  
The successive FY 1993 budget request asked for $281 billion including $12 billion for 
defense-related activities (Grier 1992). Savings should be achieved by cutting weapon 
systems, whereas the 25 percent force structure reduction was maintained. In fact, 
Powell’s reluctance to open Pandora’s Box of Service shares, roles and missions in the 
Base Force clearly came at a price: The administration increasingly struggled justify a 
force posture, which basically resembled a smaller Cold War force. Andy Pasztor 
(1992) from the Wall Street Journal complained: “President Bush and Defense 
Secretary Cheney have failed conspicuously to confront the generals and admirals, 
allowing ancient service rivalries to warp and bloat the (…) military spending plans.” 
During the budget resolution debate in the Senate’s Budget Committee, Robert C. Byrd 
(D-WV), the chairman of the Appropriation Committee, compared the national defense 
with “a giant woolly mammoth” which was “eating us out of house and home.” (SBC 
1992, 363) 
Especially Aspin continuously criticized the Base Force that would respond to 
organizational needs of the Armed Forces rather than to real strategic objectives (Korb 
2001, 42). He claimed that the capabilities-based force planning was inappropriate to 
tackle the international changes and proposed his threat-based alternative proposal of a 
smaller, modernized response force against it (Troxell 1997, 12). Aspin’s plans found 
wide support among the Democrats, but the administration rejected a departure from the 
Base Force. Powell told lawmakers: “I believe his attempt is fundamentally flawed in a 
number of ways: its methodology is unsound, its strategy unwise, and the forces and 
capabilities it proposes unbalanced.” (SASC 1992a, 491)  
Supporters of defense cuts gained additional arguments, when the Pentagon’s Defense 
Planning Guidance draft for FY 1994 was leaked to the press in March 1992. According 
to this plan, the first objective of the US defense strategy was “to prevent the re-
emergence of a new rival” and the Pentagon planners under the oversight of Under 
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Secretary Wolfowitz argued that “we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring 
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” (New York 
Times 1992; Tyler 1992b) Together with another document outlining planning 
scenarios for future conflicts, which the press had acquired already a month earlier, 
these statements indicated that the Pentagon was pursuing an overly ambitious strategy 
“to prevent further reductions in forces or cancellations of new weapon systems from 
defense contractors.” (Tyler 1992a) While the documents were in line with the Base 
Force Plan and statements of Cheney and Powell, and, in fact, largely reflected public 
opinion, the Pentagon’s plan was strongly criticized by lawmakers, senior officials in 
the White House and the State Department (in Torres-Reyna/Shapiro 2002; Gellman 
1992a; Tyler 1992c).
270
 They complained that this conception expressed an arrogance of 
power and would make the US the world’s policeman. Especially the Democrats in the 
House suspected a hidden rational for the hesitant builddown in this strategic 
positioning. Thus, although the CJCS claimed that further cuts would “break the force”, 
the House cut another $6 billion from the defense budget (SASC 1992a, 490; Pianin 
1992a). Yet the Senate narrowly defeated an attempt to reduce Bush’s proposal, with 
the key vote from Christopher Dodd (D-CT), who was concerned that further cuts 
would hit the submarine manufacturer Electric Boat, a division of General Dynamics 
with 22,000 employees in Connecticut and Rhode Island (Birnbaum 1992; Pianin 
1992b). Thus, although the final agreement was closer to the House budget, the 
Pentagon again largely escaped deeper cuts, as the concerns over jobs in an election 
year outbalanced other arguments.  
 
National defense inconsistencies and the turning tide 
Clinton’s victory in 1992 and his appointment of Aspin as Defense Secretary implied 
the end of the Base Force Plan and promised a new course for the transition. But the FY 
1994 budget turned out to be essentially a budget driven stand-by budget (O’Keefe 
1994, 50).
271
 Critics immediately claimed that the administration had engaged in a 
                                                             
270 After the public outcry, the DPG was redrafted and the controversial goal of preventing the emergence 
of a rival superpower was dropped (Tyler 1992d; Gellman 1992b).  
271 The outgoing Bush administration had not send a budget proposal to Congress and the time for the 
new team, still in the middle of personnel transition, to prepare a budget was limited. Hence, the 
administration’s first request resembled an ad-hoc budget largely guided by Clinton’s deficit reduction 
plans. In February, Aspin had ordered the Services to recommend additional cuts of $8.3 billion almost 
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premature cutting activism, since the hasty budget followed fiscal rather than strategic 
considerations (e.g. Kirkpatrick 1993).
272
 Indeed, while the budget was almost $12 
billion below Bush projections, it cut across the board and left all difficult qualitative 
decisions open (Ippolito 1994, 98-99). Aspin promised further steps and justifications 
after completion of a Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the new administration’s tool to 
comprehensively review the national defense (Aspin 1993, iii). Yet the review, released 
in September, fell short of most expectations. With the OSD still in transition and the 
new administration in a bitter conflict over the ban of homosexuals from military 
service, Aspin had had to rely on military officers to frame the BUR (Grunzinger 
1996).
273
 The resulting review turned out “more as a series of internal negotiations 
within the Pentagon than as a top-down presidentially directed mandate.” (Ullman 1995, 
42)  
In accordance with Aspin’s earlier proposals, the BUR returned to a threat- and 
scenario-based planning and thus accounted for the irreversibility of the end of the Cold 
War (Aspin 1993). Inspired by operation Desert Storm, force requirements were 
assessed against different war operations and scenarios with potential regional rivals 
like Iraq or North Korea. At the same time, the BUR was strongly motivated by the 
administration’s pledge to reduce defense spending. Hence, the final report promised 
additional reductions over the Base Force Plan of 9 percent or $127 billion until FY 
1998. Further changes were rare and the most striking feature of the BUR was its 
stability with prior planning. Referred to as force enhancements, the BUR pushed the 
Base Force’s turn to improved strategic mobility, increased distance strike power and 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
equally spread across the branches (Ricks 1993). Two weeks later, Clinton announced his first economic 
reform package, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, including $88 billion in additional defense cuts 
from Bush’s plans over four years (Ippolito 1994, 100-104; Woodward 1994; Lancaster/Gellman 1993). 
By the end of March, the FY 1994 defense budget was finally released, asking for $263.4 billion 
including roughly $11 billion for other defense-related activities (Gellman 1993b). 
272 Despite the criticism, Congress passed the FY 1994 defense budget without major controversy. 
273 The abolishment of the ban of homosexuals proved to be highly controversial and very damaging for 
the President. When the President-elect committed himself in November 1992 to work for the integration 
of homosexuals in the military, military leaders articulated fundamental disagreement (Cushman 1992; 
HBC 1992, 45; for an overview see Prakash 2009). They warned that repealing the ban would damage the 
morale, undermine recruiting, force religious Service members to resign and increase the risk of AIDS 
among the troops. Nonetheless, Clinton asked the Pentagon to prepare a study on how to proceed in 
lifting the ban (Schmitt 1993a). Especially conservative Republican, such as Senator Coats (R-IN), 
signalized opposition to far reaching solutions in Congress (Scarborough 2004, 107). Yet, it was Nunn 
who became the military’s leading ally (Von Drehle/Dewar 1993). He first suggested the ‘Don’t ask, 
don’t tell’ policy which strongly resembled the emerging compromise in late June (Lancaster/Devroy 
1993). From the President’s perspective, ‘Don’t ask, don’t tell’ fell short of the initial announcements. 
Yet, White House adviser George Stephanopoulos admitted: “The brass is not moving on this.” (in 
Lancaster/Devroy 1993; Devroy/Lancaster 1993).  
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advanced area access capabilities further. Also in line with the Base Force was the 
further reduction of the relevance of nuclear weapons, although they were not debated 
on details in the BUR.
274
 
Few further impulses were given. The review upheld the Base Force’s building block of 
maintaining sufficient forces to potentially fight and win two nearly simultaneous major 
regional conflicts in spite of arguments that this was unrealistic given the reduced 
funding (O’Hanlon 1995; Aspin 1993, 4).275 Missions below the regional-war-standard 
were not systematically accounted for and the BUR argued that these tasks were to be 
met by the same forces than the larger operations. Initially, Aspin endorsed a less 
demanding win-hold-win strategy, in which forces would account for a credible 
offensive in one major regional conflict while providing a credible defense in a second 
conflict. But when Aspin tested the waters and mentioned the win-hold-win option 
during a speech on the status of the BUR in June, allied governments especially South 
Korea strongly criticized this idea (Powell 1995, 579). Furthermore, military leaders 
including the CJCS were highly skeptical with some of them outrightly opposing this 
less demanding force planning rational, which one senior officer called “the win-hold-
oops strategy.” (in Gellman/Lancaster 1993) Especially the Navy was critical of this 
option, which would have shifted emphasis on the Air Force, since long-range air power 
was to become the major means to conduct the hold operation (Gordon 1993b). 
Against broad opposition and with little support by the White House, it is hardly 
surprising that Aspin and his deputy Perry, settled for a review, which satisfied the 
Services and the White House at the expense of consistency. Although the Services 
were unhappy with some budget driven reductions in force structure, the BUR – like the 
Base Force Plan – avoided political conflict by spreading the reductions almost equally 
among the Services regardless of strategic considerations (Friedman 2009, 79). Hence, 
the review de facto resulted in a force posture perspective very much like the Base 
                                                             
274 Decision on nuclear weapons followed in the Nuclear Posture Review in 1994 (Boldrick 1995). 
Virtually all actors within the administration, including the military leaders, agreed that the relevance of 
nuclear weapons had decreased with the end of the Cold War. Yet, attempts to shift all nuclear deterrent 
to a small number of nuclear submarines with significantly reduced nuclear weapons and thus break the 
nuclear triad of submarines, bombers and ICBMs was successfully opposed by the Services and 
Republican lawmakers. Only tactical nuclear weapons were significantly decreased.  
275 The BUR differed in its strategic outlook. It outlined engagement, prevention, and partnership (Aspin 
1993, 3) which became central elements of Clinton’s National Security Strategy published in early 1995 
(Clinton 1995). The National Military Strategy in the same year connected the BUR and the National 
Security Strategy (JCS 1995). 
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Force. Consequently, the response to the BUR was critical and many commentators 
claimed that Aspin had missed a chance for comprehensive and realistic reform (Korb 
2001, 42; Krepinevich 1993). Ann Markusen, an outside expert on the defense 
economy, described Aspin’s efforts as “politics as usual, plus a baffling unwillingness 
to ask the Pentagon to shoulder its part of a shared sacrifice.” (Markusen 1993b) 
Lawmakers from both parties joined the criticism and expressed growing concerns over 
the course of defense (Schmitt 1994; Gellman 1993c). Yet the debate took a crucial turn 
after the BUR: Some Democrats continued to complain that the administration was 
holding back the peace dividend and argued that the BUR inflated potential threats in 
order to justify an unnecessarily strong military. Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR) of the 
Appropriations Committee said that more savings would have been possible and 
Representative John Spratt (D-SC) of the HASC criticized that potential allied 
contributions were not factored in. But a growing number of lawmakers warned that 
rapidly cutting funds while maintaining the 2-MRC-strategy and numerous deployments 
would result in a problematic underfunding of the armed forces and cause readiness 
problems.
276
 They could refer to a critical Army paper, which the latter had left 
unclassified in the expectation of its publication. Feeling disadvantaged by the BUR 
results, the Army warned in the paper that the projected cuts would leave the Service 
“substantially weakened.” (Lancaster 1993b) This warning of decreasing readiness 
resulting from a mismatch between funding and force planning became a dominant 
issue for the rest of Clinton’s presidency (Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 2001, 83; Troxell 
1997; Morrison 1994, 2129-2130). And in contrast to the previous debate, the small 
defense budget rather than the large military force was blamed for the growing 
discrepancy. Aspin himself broke the administration’s phalanx for savings by warning 
that defense would need additional $50 billion to avoid shortfalls in the FYDP 
(Lancaster 1993c). This embarrassment of the President was the last straw in a chain of 
unfortunate actions by the Defense Secretary, who resigned after concluding that he had 
lost the full support of the President (Campbell/O’Hanlon 2006, 26).277  
                                                             
276
 During Clinton’s campaign, Nunn had appeared in television ads promising voters that Clinton would 
not slash the military budget. Now he argued: "My folks in Georgia remember that." (in Von 
Drehle/Dewar 1993) 
277 Aspin’s position was already badly tattered after he took most of the blame for the death of 18 US 
troops in Mogadishu in October 1993 (Pearson 1995; Dumbrell 2009, 67-71).  
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The demise of Aspin did not ease the pressure on the White House, however, as a 
distrustful military and a vocal Republican opposition continued to challenge the 
administration’s defense policy. In response to Service pleas, Clinton asked for a 
slightly raised FY 1995 defense budget of $264 billion in January 1994. Although 
Congress in an election year wanted to prove its resolution to reduce the deficit, all 
attempts by liberal Democrats to cut into the defense funding were defeated by clear 
majorities and domestic spending took the majority of reductions. Most lawmakers 
followed SubHAC chairman Murtha’s (D-PA) argument: “The military is at the edge of 
their readiness level and if we cut anything out we will not be able to meet national 
security threats.” (in Pianin 1994) Indeed, the Defense Science Board Task Force on 
Readiness, a federal committee to advice the Defense Secretary, reported “‘pockets’ of 
unreadiness” in summer (Meyer 1994, i). Moreover, the GAO calculated that the 
administration’s funding plans for the BUR were $150 billion short of the real costs and 
the Pentagon put further pressure on the White House by admitting that there was 
probably a $40 billion funding gap (Graham/Harris 1994).  
Thus, already in Clinton’s second year, the tides turned against a further transition as 
the current force posture was largely accepted. Societal demands did neither contribute 
to nor oppose this turn. To be sure, the public considered the 2-MRC standard as 
excessive and still preferred less defense spending, but they hardly cared about the 
debate. As international concerns approached their low point, the shape of the armed 
forces was of little interest. While the Contract with America’s section on military 
policy picked up the readiness concerns, military policy preferences played a very 
limited role in the Republican electoral victory in fall 1994. Still, the Republican 
success raised the Services’ hopes for additional funding and put the opponents of the 
qualitative status quo further on the defensive. Shortly after the election, reports 
emerged that three Army divisions had fallen below peak readiness (Zakheim 1994). 
Although there is evidence that the Army exaggerated its readiness problems, leading 
Republicans willingly picked up the issue to underline their claims of military 
underfunding (Kosiak 1998; Korb 1995; Isenberg 1995; O’Hanlon 1995, 18-20; 
Graham 1995).
 
The designated chairmen of the defense authorization committees 
Thurmond (R-SC) and Spence (R-SC) warned of the return to a hollow force and 
declared that they would work to reverse Clinton’s defense cuts (Harris 1994b; Gertz 
1994).  
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To keep the critics at bay, the White House gradually conceded to their requests for 
more spending than provided in the FYDP (Adams/Williams 2010, 234).
278
 In an 
immediate response to the mounting political pressure, the Clinton administration 
announced additional defense spending of $25 billion over the next six years to close 
the Pentagon’s emerging funding gap in December 1994 (Devroy/Graham 1994).279 But 
the Republican hawks’ were not satisfied and called for further concessions, which were 
only limited by the priority of deficit reductions. When Congress agreed on a $243 
billion FY 1996 defense appropriation bill, adding $7 billion and thus almost leveling 
off real reductions over the previous year, Clinton was determined to veto the bill. But 
he finally refrained from vetoing the appropriation bill in trade for congressional 
approval of funding for the Bosnia mission (Banks/Straussman 1999, 137-138).
280
 The 
intergovernmental conflict repeated itself in 1996 and the defense budget again turned 
out larger than the administration had planned.
281
  
 
Missed chances 
By the end of Clinton’s first term, about $100 billion of the initially $127 billion 
savings projected in the BUR were restored and there was still no relaxation on the 
readiness issue. A HNSC report on readiness warned in April 1997 that the defense 
drawdown and the extensive deployments “have a significant impact on the readiness of 
                                                             
278 The numerous deployments made additional spending necessary. Thus, Perry requested a $2.6 billion 
supplemental for the FY 1995 budget to cover deployment expenses for Rwanda, Haiti, and Kuwait 
(McCormick 1998, 48). 
279 Together with $7.7 billion savings in modernization and a $12 billion drop in inflation estimates, the 
increases should close most of the $49 billion funding gap.  
280 Against the backdrop of the parallel Dayton peace negotiations, Republican leaders had warned that a 
presidential veto would cause Congress to deny the estimated $2 billion for participation in the 
subsequent peacekeeping operation (Scarborough 1995). Clinton refrained from vetoing the bill and the 
defense budget became law without the President’s signature. In turn, Congress passed the 
administration’s successive supplemental and reprogramming requests to finance the peacekeeping 
operation largely out of the FY 1996 budget authority. At the same time, Congress attached funds for 
domestic programs to the IFOR supplemental which Clinton otherwise probably would have vetoed 
(Banks/Straussman 1999, 139). 
281 Ignoring warnings of procurement shortfalls from the CJCS, Clinton requested a FY 1997 defense 
budget of $254.4 billion including $10.5 billion for the other defense-related activities (Scarborough 
1996). The Republicans in Congress criticized the White House’s disconnection from the military wishes 
and pushed for additional $13 billion in defense authorization and $9.5 billion in appropriations. When 
the administration continued its engagement in Bosnia late 1996, the administration asked for the urgent 
redirection of $2 billion within the FY 1997 budget for the overseas effort in February 1997 (Foote 
1997a). Congress was displeased with the further costs, lawmakers followed what can be termed an 
unwritten law in defense budgeting: “When troops are on the ground, the sword drives the purse, not the 
other way around.” (Banks/Straussman 1999, 137; see also SubSAC 1997, 26)  
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U.S. military forces and are placing at risk the decisive military edge.” (Spence 1997) 
The attempt to keep federal austerity, prepare for 2-MRCs, and meet the requirements 
of actual deployments and modernization made a coherent planning impossible 
(Zakheim 1997). The Service Chiefs felt that they had no choice but to let either 
modernization or readiness slip (Shelton 2010, 322-324). Therefore, many experts 
hoped that the results of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) would cut the 
Gordian knot and realign the relationship between strategy, resource allocation, and 
international interventions (Cohen 1997; Schrader/Lewis/Brown 1999, 2).
282
 Yet the 
QDR “became a budget-driven process that offered few new strategic ideas but simply 
codified the strategy that existed at the time.” (Metz 2000, 22)  
The chances for a far-reaching review were limited from the start. In quantitative terms, 
while Republicans and Democrats disagreed on the area for savings, they all agreed on 
the need to foreclose substantial deficit spending. Since Clinton preferred to save in 
defense rather than domestic programs, solving the strategy-budget imbalance by 
adjusting the budget was no option. In qualitative terms, the administration wanted to 
avoid actions which would trigger opposition by Congress or the Services such as the 
cancelation of expensive weapon programs or abandoning the 2-MRC-standard. Hence, 
many adjustments represented the lowest common denominator between anticipated 
congressional expectations, OSD, and the Services. To make things worse, the political 
actors in the White House and the OSD, in the middle of the transition from Defense 
Secretary Perry to Cohen failed to provide strong guidance for the review. 
Military actors again took the initiative. Concerned about a further downsizing, CJCS 
Shalikashvili sought to prevent a far-reaching review process early on. One of his aides 
delivered a message to Air Force Chief Fogleman saying that “[t]he chairman would 
like to have the QDR turn out to be as close to status quo as we can make this thing 
work.” (in Wilson 2000b, 40; see also Kohn 2001, 12) The Service Chiefs had good 
reason to follow this guideline: Since the money ceilings seemed firm, the Chiefs feared 
that an intensive review process might result in a bitter interservice struggle for 
resources, breaking the fragile balance of budget shares to their disadvantage 
                                                             
282 The QDR goes back to congressional action in 1993. Unsatisfied with the results of the BUR, 
Congress established with the Budget Authorization Act for FY 1994 an independent Commission on 
Roles and Missions which should make recommendations on Service roles and missions after the Cold 
War (Metz 2000, 18-22). The Commission recommended in its final report that the DOD should conduct 
a major quadrennial review (Perry 1996, Chapter 6; Wilson 2000b, 15). The QDR should take the actual 
situation as well as the military development until 2005 into consideration. 
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(Szafranski 1996). An admiral anonymously complained with regard to the review 
processes: “It used to be a race to the finish line. Now it’s more like a demolition derby: 
to get your program across the finish line, you have to convince others to kill another 
service’s program.” (in Szafranski 1996, 54) Especially the conflict between the Army 
and the Air Force over the dominant role in regional conflicts, smoldering since Desert 
Storm, threatened to erupt over the review (Kitfield 1998). Hence, the Services expected 
much trouble and little gains from a comprehensive review (Wilson 2000b, 36-37).  
When the incoming Cohen sought to make a late imprint on the QDR, the OSD’s abrupt 
and overeager approach further pushed the Services towards protecting the status quo. 
Cohen asked for savings, but the Chiefs conceded savings only at the margins and 
protected their central weapon programs. They considered Cohen’s demands not only as 
a threat to their claims, but also as amateurish quick fix solutions, highly driven by 
politics rather than strategy. Fogleman described the QDR afterwards as “a blatant case 
of asking for military advice and letting it be overridden by the political consideration 
of making a statement: ‘I cut something’.” (in Wilson 2000b, 42) In the end, the QDR 
was strongly biased towards continuity and did hardly address the inconsistencies in 
military policy. Although it included a broader range of threats and operations
283
, the 
basic 2-MRC-focus and the force posture remained virtually unchanged. Procurement 
numbers of some major weapon systems were reduced or stretched, but none canceled. 
Instead, base closings and more efficient buying practices were suggested as a relief to 
the pressured defense budget.  
Most outside experts and the media voiced their disappointment with the review 
(Schmitt, Gary 1998; Vickers/Kosiak 1997; Spinney 1997; for a less critical view see 
Courter/Bernstein 1997). According to a commentary in the Washington Times, the 
QDR delivered “merely the same inadequate force structure, questionable strategy, and 
unbalanced modernization program stuffed into a $250 billion spending ceiling.” 
(Hillen 1997) The most prominent critique of the QDR came from the final report of the 
National Defense Panel, an outside group of former Pentagon officials and military 
experts, which was set up by Congress in 1996 to critique the QDR (National Defense 
Panel 1997a; 1997b): The panel argued that the 2-MRC-standard was strategically 
                                                             
283 New threats included weapons proliferation, organized crime, terrorism and uncontrolled migration. In 
response to these threats counterterrorism and information operations gained more weight. 
(Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 2001, 85, 90) 
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unnecessary and primarily served to justify a “Cold War-lite” force (Korb 2001, 44). It 
also criticized that the Pentagon failed to fully embrace the technological possibilities 
and continued to spend on outdated Cold War weaponry rather than to push 
transformation. In contrast to the QDR’s focus on short-term requirements, the National 
Defense Panel (1997a, i) argued that “the greatest danger lies in an unwillingness or an 
inability to change our security posture in time to meet the challenges of the next 
century.” Therefore, it called for institutional streamlining, increased interservice 
cooperation, so-called jointness, and a heavy emphasis on innovation and modernization 
efforts to realize a RMA. While the panel’s report raised the congressional preference 
for transformation, the JCS and Cohen quickly rejected its recommendations.
284
 Hence, 
the last opportunity to shift the focus either more towards the realization of a RMA or 
more towards the new low-intensity challenges was not taken. 
Defense hawks in Congress shared the disappointment with the lukewarm report. 
Confronted with the FY 1998 budget request as well as the long-range forecast for DOD 
spending until 2003 of around $250 billion in annual real spending, they had hoped for 
new vitality from Cohen’s arrival at the DOD (Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 2001, 87; 
Gertz 1997). Now, Spence complained: “Indeed, what we have is a QDR that will be 
presented as all things to all people. (…) As such, it seems to me that the QDR’s most 
glaring shortcoming is its demand on the one hand that America accept difficult trade-
offs, yet on the other hand the review fails to provide a clearly defined baseline from 
which to assess the risks and trade-offs associated with an expensive post-cold-war 
world security strategy in an environment of fiscal constraint.” (HNSC 1997, 53) And 
Lieberman suspected “that this in fact was a strategy-driven report that nonetheless was 
budget-constrained.” (SASC 1997b, 43)285 
                                                             
284 Critics argued that the National Defense Panel unduly took the existence of a RMA for granted and 
failed to adequately consider the immediate demands for national defense (Kagan 1997). 
285 The Defense Secretary did not deny the influence of budget considerations on the review. But he 
defended his resistance to increased spending, “because the reality is such that Congress is never going to 
support that absent a major conflict.” (HNSC 1997, 55) Indeed, the preferences for stronger defense was 
still shaky in Congress. Just a day before Cohen’s comment, the defense supporters had only very 
narrowly defeated attempts to shift money from defense into domestic areas during the House debate on 
the Budget Resolution (143 Cong. Rec., May 20, 1997, H8904-9027). The most powerful attack came 
from Bill Shuster (R-PA), chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and his 
bipartisan aides. They supported an amendment for a $12 billion increase in transportation programs 
financed by across-the-board reductions in discretionary spending. In the end, the amendment was 
defeated 216 to 214 with the help of 14 Democratic HASC members. 
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But a new Balanced Budget Act in summer 1997 made attempts to increase the defense 
budget through the regular budget process futile. Spence admitted in his floor speech to 
introduce the FY 1999 Defense Authorization Bill: “Caught between an international 
geopolitical environment that requires an expansive United States national security 
strategy and a domestic political environment bounded by declining defense budgets 
locked in place by the Balanced Budget Act, the Committee is left to figure out how 
best to manage risk.” (144 Cong. Rec., May 19, 1998, H3467).  
When federal surpluses came in sight by fall 1998, however, both governmental 
branches considered additional defense dollars feasible and popular. Senate Majority 
Leader Lott and SASC chairman Thurmond planned hearings on the readiness issue to 
make a strong public case for emergency defense funding and blame the administration 
for its weak defense record.
286
 In turn, the White House itself searched for an option to 
bypass the popular Balanced Budget Act and thus also welcomed the hearings (Wilson 
2000b, 94). After successful lobbying by the OSD, Clinton had come to the conclusion 
that there was little political gain from resisting the rising demands from the Services 
(Graham 1999). Hence, both branches of government urged the Chiefs to freely admit 
their readiness problems during SASC’s public hearings to create the case for 
emergency spending (Korb 2001, 36). Already prior to the hearings, the Washington 
Times cited from a memo of General Bramlett, CINC FORSCOM, warning that 
“current funding levels place FORSCOM’s ability to accomplish its mission at an 
unacceptable risk.” (Scarborough 1998b) 
During the hearings, CJCS Shelton told the Senators in contrast to earlier testimonies: 
“Anecdotal, initially, and now measurable evidence indicates that our readiness is 
fraying and that the long-term health of the total force is in jeopardy.” (SASC 1998, 76) 
And when asked whether they considered the FY 1999 funding appropriate to meet 
readiness and modernization demands, all Chiefs and the CJCS answered in the 
negative. They asked for an annual increase of $17.5 billion to cover the most urgent 
shortfalls (SASC 1998, 133-134). Although there is little evidence that the public took 
further notice from the spectacle on Capitol Hill, Clinton called not only for an 
immediate supplemental appropriation, but also opened the door for larger budgets by 
agreeing to add $112 billion to the defense budget over the next six years (Graham 
                                                             
286 Emergency spending was exempted from the ceilings of the Balanced Budget Act. 
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1998; Scarborough 1998c). Thus, FY 1999 marked the beginning of the “post-peace 
dividend years” (Gold 2001, 163).  
 
Summary 
Societal demands played a very limited role. Not even the strong demand for a peace 
dividend left substantial marks as the national economy recovered and the federal 
deficits were successfully addressed. After the budget had dropped to about 85 percent 
of the Cold War average defense spending in FY 1998, it returned to approximately 90 
percent of the Cold War average in FY 1999 (Korb 2001, 35; Williams 2001, 6). With 
regard to the course of the transition, there is little evidence that societal demands were 
of any relevance. The one important exception is the defense economy, which caused 
Congress repeatedly to take an ambivalent position between calls for further cuts and a 
preference for stability. Although the governmental branches fought over the size of the 
defense budget during almost all years, they paid little attention to the overall force 
posture. Especially the administrations left most of the initiative to the military actors 
and were unwilling to risk a conflict. Due to the lacking societal and political interest, 
Powell and his successors were able to dominate the transition and the moderate 
innovations, i.e. the turn to conventional rapid response forces, must be largely 
attributed to their efforts. It is hardly surprising that the 1990s resulted in a smaller but 
hardly changed force. 
 
6.2.1.2. Buildup 
Early efforts for military reform 
The Bush administration’s arrival in 2001 was accompanied by the expectation of a 
turnaround in military policy. Not only had the pressure for additional resources 
continued to mount despite the end of the builddown in 1998, which led defense experts 
to warn of a potential “defense train wreck in the New Millennium.” (Gouré/Ranney 
1999)
287
 Bush had also pledged a more aggressive turn to transformation and a rejection 
                                                             
287 Defense experts estimated that defense budget increases of $10-20 billion in the short run and $30-50 
billion in later years would be necessary to close the gap between existing capabilities and the strategic 
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of humanitarian interventions during the election campaign. Especially the armed forces 
expected better times under a Republican President. But they were hardly aware that the 
incoming administration had drawn critical conclusions from the RMA’s failure during 
the 1990s: “[T]he Bush people believed the generals and admirals had run the building 
under Clinton, and had run it timidly and badly.” (Scarborough 2004, 112; see also 
Herspring 2010, 79; Talmadge 2006, 15) Since Service parochialism had prevented 
transformation from within, pressure for change would have to come from outside the 
branches (Macgregor 2000, 23). Hence, “Rumsfeld had been plotting a hostile takeover” 
that strained civil-military relations right from the start (Scarborough 2004, 112). 
Only two days in office, the Defense Secretary ordered the Chiefs to stop briefing 
members of Congress on perceived money shortages in order to foreclose any attempts 
to bypass the OSD (Wilson 2001a). At the same time, the military leaders were 
sidelined during the initial reviews of various aspects of the DOD, which should 
determine the new military policy and road to transformation (Talmadge 2006, 15; 
Wilson 2001b).
288
 As rumors about cuts in personnel and programs as a consequence of 
the reviews spread, military leaders soon started to complain that there was a lack of 
communication, which effectively excluded them from the review. They were 
bewildered that the new civilian leadership evidently created a transformation effort 
from scratch rather than building on the Services’ earlier proposals and efforts 
(Talmadge 2006, 16).  
Especially Army Chief Eric Shinseki, who had announced a far-reaching transformation 
of the Army already in fall 1999 to forestall unfavorable assessments in future reviews, 
was irritated (Adams 2006, 11-12).
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 The Army’s plans set a timeline to supplement 
the current, only slightly upgraded legacy force with a parallel ‘Interim Force’, a lighter, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ambitions (Kugler 2001, 109). And HASC chairman Spence complained that “[i]t’s going to take a 
decade or more of real growth in defense spending to climb out of this hole.” (in Wilson 2000a, 57)  
288 Rumsfeld relied instead on outside defense experts, industry leaders and retired military officers, 
favorably with some RMA background (Lemann 2001). As a clear sign of continuity with RMA concepts, 
Rumsfeld asked the ONA Director Marshall to direct a study group on strategy, which should provide a 
comprehensive review on future threats, warfare and military means by March 2001 (Ricks 2001b). The 
panels suggested institutionalization of transformation to push technological, organizational and doctrinal 
reform and a new focus of the US forces from Europe to Asia, where China emerged as most likely long-
term competitor (Tomes 2009, 167-168; Adams 2006, 98). 
289 Political pressure to embrace the RMA had constantly grown and especially the war over Kosovo 
added urgency to Army transformation by the end of the 1990s (Jackson 2009; Adams 2006, 55-60, 68). 
The Army had failed to provide suitable forces in time for operation Allied Force and the Air Force 
gained full credit for the campaign. After the Kosovo War, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre 
criticized the Army in a public interview with Defense News: “If the Army holds onto nostalgic versions 
of its grand past, it is going to atrophy and die.” (in Jackson 2009, 54) 
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more mobile and capable force. Both threads should then be consolidated in the fully 
transformed ‘Objective Force’.290 The program had been a far-reaching concession to 
the changing political demands as well as a difficult balancing act within the Army
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and Shinseki had little interest in reopening the debate. Just like the Army, the other 
Services feared for their programs, which they had successfully protected during the 
builddown of the 1990s. 
Therefore, reactions were frosty when Rumsfeld briefed the Service Chiefs on the 
review in May (Kitfield 2001a; Ricks 2001c). Active military officers were careful of 
openly challenging the Secretary, but they started to work Congress and the media 
behind the scenes to keep the OSD in check (Cockburn 2007, 115). Especially Shinseki 
and Army Secretary White opposed any attempts to cut back ground forces and 
modernization programs for its legacy force with increasing zeal, warning of strategic 
silver bullets and arguing that the contributions of the Army were not appreciated. They 
got societal support from retired Army Chief Sullivan, president of the Association of 
the US Army (Kitfield 2001a). The Army’s resistance to Rumsfeld’s review, which they 
considered unfair given their own transformation efforts, poisoned the relationship 
between the Defense Secretary and the Army leaders early on (Weinraub/Shanker 
2003).  
Congress, whose members also felt sidelined by Rumsfeld, soon joined opposition to 
the OSD’s review style (Lemann 2001). Indeed, the Defense Secretary, shocked by “the 
extent of congressional nitpicking and micromanaging”, had not been very eager to 
cooperate with Congress (Von Drehle 2005; see also Rumsfeld 2011, 296-297). In May, 
Senate majority leader Lott, SASC chairman Warner, and SAC chairman Stevens 
warned Rumsfeld that his refusal to consult them would make approval of the defense 
budget request harder (Dao 2001b). A week later, Lott and other Republicans held up 
the confirmation of two DOD nominees to protest Rumsfeld’s information policy. And 
when Rumsfeld came to the Hill in order to testify for the first time on the strategic 
review process, the SASC provided him a chilly welcome (Ricks 2001e). The Senators 
questioned not only the strategic relevance of a national missile defense, but also 
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 Since the Army was blamed for being too heavy and inflexible for an acceptable strategic response 
time, the Army Chief set the goal of deploying a brigade in four days, a division in five days, and five 
divisions in 30 days (Feickert 2009b, 1-2; SASC 2000b). 
291 For many within the Army, transformation ignored operational lessons of the 1990s and might expose 
the Army’s force structure to cuts (Kitfield 2001a). 
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complained about the little and at times confusing information from the Pentagon 
(SASC 2001b).  
The President, preoccupied with the implementation of his central election pledges of 
tax cuts and education reform, provided only little support for the Defense Secretary. In 
fact, national defense, except for NMD, was not on the White House’s initial priority 
list (Moens 2004, 88). Despite complaints concerning readiness and underfunding of the 
military during the election campaign, the White House announced in February that 
there would be only a small defense supplemental for FY 2001 and moderate increases 
for the request in FY 2002.
292
 When Rumsfeld asked for additional $35 billion over 
Clinton’s plan for FY 2002, the OMB rejected an increase of more than $15 billion. 
Although the compromise at $18.4 billion was a significant extension of defense 
spending, it was far below the Defense Secretary’s wishes (Rumsfeld 2011, 332). 
Rumsfeld’s allies Robert Kagan and William Kristol complained in the Weekly 
Standard that the $18 billion would be sucked up by maintenance accounts and frustrate 
transformation: “Here’s some unsolicited advice for two old friends, Donald Rumsfeld 
and Paul Wolfowitz: Resign.” (Kagan/Kristol 2001)  
The administration sought to calm the furious congressional defense hawks by framing 
the FY 2002 budget as a placeholder budget, which added only the most urgent money 
and made no decisive qualitative changes beyond the new emphasis on NMD (Moens 
2004, 90-94; Kitfield 2001b, 644). Comprehensive changes would follow after the 
OSD’s strategic review was completed. But with the military leaders’ refusal to 
abandon precious programs, the review made only slow progress and was soon merged 
with the efforts to provide a QDR by the end of September (Donnelly 2001). In an 
attempt to find agreement with the Services, Rumsfeld gathered three-star generals and 
offered them a deal: If the officers identified expendable modernization programs in the 
defense budget, which had only been defended for political reasons, he would take the 
blame for cutting them and keep the Services from political fire. Yet, the officers closed 
their ranks and did not provide any program of fiscal significance for the list. In a 
further step, the Defense Secretary summoned the Service Secretaries and Chiefs and 
asked them for reductions. Again, the military leaders refused to give in any programs 
                                                             
292 As defense hawks in Congress started to rally support for additional spending, the White House 
conceded increases for the FY 2001 supplemental in order to avoid being trumped (Daalder/Lindsay 
2003, 114). Yet, the final supplemental of $5.6 billion mostly for quality of life improvements and NMD 
fell clearly short of the expectations of the Defense Secretary and hawks within Congress. 
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(Scarborough 2001b). In late summer 2001, Rumsfeld was losing the fight to reform the 
DOD and “was under fire from just about every quarter: from the left and the right, the 
press and Congress, generals and defense contractors.” (Donnelly 2001) Al Kamen 
(2001) of the Washington Post wrote on September 7: “The sweepstakes have already 
begun on who might succeed Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld if and when he 
steps down.” 
 
Comprehensive defense budgets after 9/11 
The struggle over defense reform was still pending, when Al-Qaeda terrorists attacked 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11. The attacks completely altered the 
political dynamics on military policy, as the public and Congress rallied behind the 
commander in chief (Brody 2003, 236). Public approval ratings of Bush and Rumsfeld 
soared almost instantly providing the administration with new leverage for its policy 
initiatives (Langer 2008; Panagopoulos 2006).
293
 Congress closed its ranks and backed 
the administration by an overwhelming bipartisan consensus (Fortier/Ornstein 2003, 
156-158). Within days after the attacks, Capitol Hill authorized the President “to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred 
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” (Senate Joint 
Resolution 23, PL 107-40, September 13, 2001) And while still not being enthusiastic 
about the Defense Secretary’s style, few congressmen were willing to challenge the 
administration in war (Scarborough 2004, 127). Indeed, even the disagreements within 
the administration between State and Defense Department faded for a brief period of 
time (Hult 2003, 64). 
Moreover, the events shifted the administration’s focus immediately from its domestic 
agenda to national defense and the terrorist challenge. In the eyes of many within the 
administration, the attacks were the consequence of earlier administration’s failure to 
respond more decisively to terrorist challenges.
294
 As Cheney argued in 2003: 
“Weakness, vacillation, and unwillingness of the United States to stand with our friends 
                                                             
293 While the support among Republican voters was already high prior to the attacks, especially 
Democrats became much more favorable of the President (Jacobson 2003, 200). 
294 Especially strongly conservative circles were quick to identify terrorism as the latest manifestation of 
the evil against which the US has to stand its ground (e.g. Podhoretz 2007). 
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– that is provocative.” (in Daalder/Lindsay 2003, 119) Therefore, the Bush 
administration issued a forceful response this time. Only hours after the attacks, 
Rumsfeld defined the plot as an act of war going beyond the Clinton administration’s 
reading of terrorism as a criminal matter and placing major responsibility for 
countermeasures in his department. Feith later recalled: “Viewing the 9-11 attacks as a 
war that required a war strategy was a very big thought and a lot flowed from that.” (in 
Scarborough 2004, 2) Only weeks after the attack, American and British forces started a 
campaign, largely based on air power, CIA forces and SOF, to defeat the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan.
295
 Although the war was not without its downsides, most 
prominently Osama bin Laden’s escape, the easy victory strengthened the 
administration and the civilians in the OSD, who had insisted on an unorthodox, 
transformational war plan.
296
 
There is good reason to argue that the sudden demand for military power saved 
Rumsfeld from early losing the battle over transformation and potentially his job. The 
emergence of a new military challenge circumvented a showdown between civilian and 
military leaders and broke the previous deadlock in the military policy process 
(Allen/Ricks 2002). The QDR, which Rumsfeld released a few days after the attacks, 
strongly resembled a new civil-military truce. Only hastily adjusted to the post-9/11 
realities, the report rhetorically embraced transformation, but left the force posture 
almost completely unchanged. A senior military officer involved in preparing the 
review said: “The report is pabulum at best.” (in Fulghum 2001) And O’Hanlon (2002, 
105) claimed that the 2001 QDR “contained the fewest programmatic and force-
structure initiatives of any of the four major US defence reviews since the Cold War 
ended (since it contained virtually none).” In successive hearings on the QDR, SASC 
chairman Levin said: “This QDR seems to me to be full of decisions deferred. (…) 
Rather than the comprehensive road map to the force of the future envisioned by 
Congress, this review largely (…) provides a vision.” (SASC 2001c, 2)  
Three changes are worth mentioning, however. First, the planning document of the 
Bush administration put a stronger focus on Asia, calling for additional regional bases. 
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 Right from the start, the administration’s thinking moved beyond the immediate punishment of the 
attackers. Already on September 12, Afghanistan and Iraq were debated as potential targets for the US 
military response during a NSC meeting. And on September 20, Bush (2001) prepared the nation for a 
long war: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there.” (see also Waller 2001) 
296 For a brief war account see Gordon (2001). For a critique see Biddle (2002). 
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Second, it restored homeland defense as DOD’s primary mission and downscaled 
regional conflicts, most importantly abandoning the 2-MRC standard. It was replaced 
by an approximate 1.5-MRC standard, strongly resembling Aspin’s unsuccessful win-
hold-win scenario.
297
 With the experiences from the 1990s, most experts welcomed this 
adjustment as an overdue step. As Williams (2001, 29) argued: “Keeping two MTWs at 
the top of the list of military missions denies the burden that smaller-scale contingencies 
have posed for the armed forces during the past decade, ignores the likely course of the 
next decade, and codifies a troubling discrepancy between declaratory policy and the 
real job that the US military is being asked to do.” Since the changed force planning 
scenario did not result in changes in the force posture, there is good reason to argue that 
the new framework was more an adjustment to the DOD’s reality with regard to 
capabilities than a strategic reorientation (Isenberg/Eland 2002, 10). Third, the QDR 
turned to a mixture of threat- and capabilities-based force planning to bridge the 
demands for current operations and transformation. Already in June, the Defense 
Secretary had argued for a strategy “using threat-based planning to address nearer-term 
threats, while turning increasingly to a capabilities-based approach to make certain that 
we develop forces prepared for the longer-term threats that are less easily understood.” 
(SASC 2001b, 9)  
Decisions with regard to force planning and weapon programs were largely bypassed in 
the QDR. Indeed, with 9/11 providing a new rationale for budget hikes, the Services’ 
determination to maintain their modernization programs and the OSD’s attempt to free 
money for transformation could be met without painful trade-offs (Talmadge 2006, 16; 
Isenberg/Eland 2002). The regular defense request for FY 2002, which had stuck in 
Congress because of the Democrat’s resistance to the NMD spending increases, passed 
almost completely as requested after 9/11. Furthermore, supplemental appropriations for 
the GWOT became a common feature after the terrorist attacks.
298
 The successive FY 
2003 defense request asked for 396.8 billion including $18.2 billion for other defense 
related activities, a real increase of almost 11 percent over the previous year (Kosiak 
                                                             
297 The QDR’s overall force sizing method was called the 1-4-2-1 scenario (Adams 2006, 106). The first 
two numbers translate in defending the homeland, while providing forward deterrence in four regions. 
The latter two numbers call for sustainable forces for two major conflicts wining in one of them 
decisively.  
298
 Shortly after the attack, Congress enacted the first emergency supplemental “for Recovery from and 
Response to Terrorist Attacks” (P.L. 107-38) including $14 billion for the DOD. In January and March 
2002, two further supplemental appropriations added $3.4 billion and $14 billion respectively to the 
GWOT efforts. Congress provided overall more than $557 billion for the GWOT including the wars until 
2007, of which the vast majority was authorized by supplemental appropriations (Belasco 2009a). 
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2002). Bush commented on “the largest increase in defense spending in two decades” 
during his State of the Union address in 2002: “Whatever it costs to defend our country, 
we will pay.” (Bush 2002a) And Bush made clear that the additional funding in the FY 
2003 would not only be used for the GWOT, but also for all the other defense priorities 
of the administration (Allen/Ricks 2002). Hence, the war on terror did not replace 
earlier priorities. On the contrary, Rumsfeld explained with regard to transformation: 
“The war gives an impetus to it, a sense of urgency.” (Rumsfeld cited in Von Drehle 
2005) As Wirls (2008, 103) pointed out: “In effect, Bush was combining a Vietnam 
War with a Reagan buildup.” 
In Congress, the defense buildup was sustained by strong bipartisan support 
(Fortier/Ornstein 2003, 160). While partisan divisions soon reemerged on domestic 
issues, the popular support for the GWOT made the administration’s defense policy 
almost immune to opposition from Congress. Especially the liberal Democrats were 
trapped in an awkward situation: The new emphasis on defense drained funding from 
their priorities in domestic spending (Dinan 2002). But challenging a highly popular 
war President or questioning war funding in an election year were hardly promising 
undertakings from a political point of view. Although the New Democrats had taken a 
more hawkish position by the end of the 1990s, they were on the defensive even without 
taking action, since the war on terror had shifted the focus from domestic to security 
issues and thus from Democratic to Republican terrain, which the latter readily 
exploited during the election campaigns (Beinart 2006, 172-173; Jacobson 2003, 203). 
As the Democrats tried to make ground by supporting the President on security issues 
and even articulating more hawkish positions (Boyer 2002), the defense budget 
legislation for FY 2003, with exceptions of inconsequential debates on NMD and the 
Army’s acquisition program, was rapidly passed by overwhelming majorities (Hulse 
2002a; 2002b).
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299 While all budget legislation for domestic programs was behind schedule, the defense budget laws were 
passed prior to the November elections to avoid negative public reactions (Morgan 2002; Hulse 2002c). 
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The GWOT and rising budget pressures 
By the time of the elections, the prospect of a war with Iraq had become very 
concrete.
300
 Throughout 2002, questions over Saddam Hussein’s involvement in 
terrorist activities and stockpiling of weapons of mass destructions, the effects of 
sanctions, and prospects of regime change fuelled the discussions within and between 
the Bush administration, Capitol Hill, the media, allied countries, and international 
organizations. While the debate was still going on, war plans were discussed within the 
DOD. Buoyed by the successful Afghanistan operation, Rumsfeld had rejected 
CENTCOM’s initial war planes, basically a ‘Desert Storm light’, as not 
transformational and called for a much smaller, transformational force. The OSD sent 
Macgregor, one of the prominent transformers, to support Franks’ war planning and 
talked of Shock and Awe to achieve early decisive victory (Gordon/Trainor 2007, 37-
40: Correll 2003). In largely bilateral planning between Rumsfeld’s office and COCOM 
Franks, the latter repeatedly reduced the number of troops to meet the OSD’s demands 
(Shelton 2010, 426, 482-484).
301
 When the war was finally launched on March 19, the 
quick and decisive victory seemed to have further strengthened the transformers’ 
position.
302
 After less than six weeks of fighting, Rumsfeld told the victorious U.S. 
troops: “There were a lot of handwringers around, weren't there? A humorist in 
Washington the other day, sent me a note: ‘Never have so many, been so wrong, about 
so much.’” (in DOD 2003b)  
Yet, the postwar situation in Iraq soon got out of hand and forced the attention from 
transformation to immediate occupation needs. Indeed, it became apparent that the 
Pentagon’s push for a transformational war had clearly misjudged the postwar 
                                                             
300 Although Bush and his advisors had initially decided to focus on Afghanistan rather than Iraq after 
9/11, the latter issue remained on the table (Woodward 2002b; Fallows 2004). Bush’s axis of evil rhetoric 
and comments by other officials left little doubt that Afghanistan was not the only potential target in the 
GWOT. In October, only weeks before the midterm elections, a strong bipartisan congressional majority 
passed legislation authorizing the use of force against Iraq (VandeHei/Eilperin 2002). 
301 Many military leaders were neither comfortable with starting a second operation nor in agreement with 
the war planning, which strongly departed from the Weinberger-Powell-Doctrine (Herspring 2010, 82-90; 
Ricks 2002). Yet, with CJCS Myers and the JCS sidelined and the Defense Secretary controlling the 
promotions, few military officers within the DOD resisted the Defense Secretary’s wishes. Only Army 
Chief Shinseki, who was close to retirement, publically challenged the OSD’s troop estimates. But his 
testimony, in which he estimated a requirement of “several hundred thousand soldiers” (SASC 2003a, 
241) to occupy postwar Iraq, was harshly dismissed as clearly too high by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz 
(Loeb 2003c). The Service Chiefs’ only strong ally outside the DOD, Secretary of State Powell, who 
questioned the case for war and warned of the consequences of an invasion, was successfully 
marginalized by Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney, who used his privileged access to the President. 
302 For accounts and assessments of the war and its aftermath see Cordesman (2008), Gordon/Trainor 
(2007) and Packer (2005). 
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requirements and the value of transformational capabilities in it: “When tested, the new 
American Way of War yielded more glitter than gold.” (Bacevich 2008, 130; see also 
Adams 2006, 179; Kagan 2003; Correll 2003) The number of major attacks on coalition 
forces and members of the Iraqi governments increased from 200 in June to 750 in 
September 2003 (Cordesman 2008, 119). As plans to rapidly create self-sustaining 
governments and pull-out US troops became a distant prospect, the costs for the mission 
steadily increased. Already by July 2003, most defense specialists warned that the costs 
of the war’s aftermath would significantly exceed the administration’s initial estimates 
(Weisman 2003).
303
 And political actors rightly feared that these costs would cause 
funding shortfalls in other defense programs including transformation. 
Already prior to the war, the Bush administration submitted its DOD budget request for 
FY 2004, which the OSD described as the first budget in full accordance with the 
transformation vision. The $380.4 billion request was part of a plan to grow the 050 
budget by about $20 billion annually over the next 5 years and included more than $24 
billion for transformation programs (Loeb 2003a; Kosiak 2003; O’Rourke 2003, 7).304 
But a closer look reveals that the budgets started to turn into another direction than 
transformation by 2003. Already the overall FY 2003 national defense budget indicated 
a twofold departure from prior spending patterns (OSD 2008): (1) The current needs for 
the war efforts started to put pressure on the DOD’s internal truce between the OSD and 
the Services. The accounts with immediate relevance, especially O&M but also 
procurement and personnel, expanded more rapidly than the R&D account. Hence, war 
costs started to slowly crowd other efforts out. Since experts doubted that the DOD 
would be able to sustain transformation and modernization even with growing budgets 
                                                             
303 Prior to the war, the administration deliberately avoided clear cost estimates as meaningless 
speculations despite criticism from leading Democrats in the SASC (Loeb 2003c). According to numbers 
leaked out of DOD and from a comment of OMB director Daniels in the New York Times, the war might 
cost $50 to $60 billion. Therefore, Congress had passed an emergency supplemental of almost $63 billion 
to fund the war in April 2003. In November, lawmakers passed an additional emergency supplemental to 
provide funds for the troops in Iraq. The two wars and a second tax reduction, which the administration 
pushed through Congress at the same time it launched the war with Iraq caused increasing budget deficits 
(Schick 2003, 79). 
304 Against the backdrop of the supposedly easy and fast victory in Iraq and the deployment of US troops 
in two countries, the Congress again refrained from challenging the administration’s defense budget 
request. Rather, lawmakers outdid each other in praising the request (Morgan/Pincus 2003). SASC 
chairman John Warner (R-VA) told the press: “This sends a strong signal throughout the world that we 
are unified in the war against terrorists.” (Hulse 2003) And Curt Weldon (R-PA), member of the HASC, 
summed the congressional mood: “[T]his bill is about America’s patriots. This bill is about America’s 
heroes.” (149 Cong. Rec. May 21, 2003, H4404) Only some lawmakers, including later HASC chairman 
Duncan Hunter (R-CA), warned that the budget would require trade-off between current and future needs 
(Loeb 2003b). 
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under these conditions, the need of prioritizations returned to the Pentagon. Kosiak 
(2003, 1) observed with regard to the FY 2004: “[I]n terms of force structure and most 
major modernization programs it is remarkably similar to the Clinton Administration’s 
defense plan.” Only the significantly larger funding for NMD was a clear departure 
from the status quo. (2) With the war came a growing emphasis on the Army whose 
budget grew by more than 66 percent in real terms between FY 2002 and FY 2004. This 
does not indicate an intentional qualitative turn to a more personnel heavy force, 
however. The increase of the personnel account increased by 43 percent between FY 
2002 and FY 2004 and remained constant thereafter, whereas the O&M account grew 
by more than 113 percent and continued to grow during the coming years.
305
  
Determined to keep the war costs limited and bring the budget quickly back on 
transformation track, the Defense Secretary treated the difficulties as temporary 
distractions and fought against a turn to a more ground force heavy force as well as the 
very notion of insurgency (Ucko 2009, 70). But military officers grew increasingly 
anxious over the situation in Iraq and the civilians’ unfounded optimism. One 
anonymous general said: “It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this. The 
American people may not stand for it – and they should not.” (Ricks 2004) Especially 
Army officers were angry with the civil leadership, as another general’s complaint 
makes clear: “I think they are going to break the Army” and to make matters worse “I 
don’t think they care.” (Ricks 2004) Calls to fire Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and CJCS 
Meyers started to appear in numbers. Rumsfeld’s job approval ratings started to plump, 
as the public became increasingly concerned over insufficient troops with deficient 
protection in Iraq. At least since 2002, the public preferences, especially among 
Democrats, had called for a departure from the force planning for conventional 
operations. The situation in Iraq underlined the insufficient preparations in this 
direction, but the administration sought to keep the changes limited.  
With growing public discontent, lawmakers stepped up their attacks on Rumsfeld, 
which had been largely suppressed by the GWOT. McCain, one of the DOD’s strongest 
critics, called the war planning “inadequate” and demanded more personnel (Herspring 
2010, 94-95). The Democrats echoed this critic and attacked the Bush administration for 
letting down the troops. In fact, the number of registered attacks on coalition forces in 
                                                             
305 FY 2005 is the only exception.  
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Iraq had reached 1,900 causing a daily average of 26 coalition casualties in April 
(Cordesman 2008, 119, 273). Furthermore, the Democrats considered the torture 
scandal at Abu Ghraib, which had become public in the same month, as a sign of the 
administration’s growing inability to control the occupation and the GWOT (SASC 
2004b; Hersh 2004). But with elections at the end of the year, no party seriously 
challenged the administration’s defense budget request for FY 2005, which asked for 
$423.1 billion including $20.5 billion for other defense-related activities (Kosiak 
2004).
306
 As the Iraq War kept defense policy salient, both parties fought to project the 
image of being more committed to the wellbeing of the troops and that they were the 
better managers of defense. The ambiguity in congressional behavior became 
particularly evident, when Bush asked Congress in May to add $25 billion to the 
contingency funding provided in the FY 2005 defense appropriations (Hurt 2004b). On 
the one hand, lawmakers were far from happy and Democrats complained that the Bush 
administration was obfuscating the true state of the war to avoid a negative impact on 
the elections.
307
 On the other hand, there was bipartisan consensus that troops in war 
had to be supported with all necessary means. House majority leader DeLay (R-TX) 
correctly predicted: “This is money for our troops, this is supporting our troops. Nobody 
is going to have any problem with that.” (in Hurt 2004b) The FY 2005 funding bill was 
overall only slightly less than the administration had requested including the 
contingency funding (Curl 2004; Washington Post 2004).  
The public also refrained from taking decisive steps and did not punish the Commander-
in-Chief in the presidential elections in fall 2004. Confronted with the choice between 
sticking with the incumbent Republican or turning to an inexperienced Democrat, who 
had a mixed record on defense policy, as leader in the war on terror, the majorities 
preferred the predictable Bush despite his earlier mistakes over the unpredictable 
challenger.
308
 To be sure, the nation was strongly polarized along partisan lines and 
                                                             
306 To be sure, the Republicans in Congress, fearing for their reputation as spending hawks, became 
increasingly concerned about the deficit and called for governmental restraint in spring 2004 
(Hallow/Fagan 2004). Yet, their calls remained largely inconsequential for the defense budget. 
307 An amendment by Kennedy (D-MA) directing the administration to report on progress in Iraq, 
including prospective US troop levels, was only narrowly defeated on the Senate floor (Dewar 2004). The 
Democrats, who suspected Bush to withhold the true costs of the war, were proven right when the White 
House requested another $80 billion emergency supplemental for the DOD in January 2005 (Weisman 
2005). 
308 Since the Democratic challenger John Kerry had opposed or favored cutting some of the most 
prominent weapon systems during his time in the Senate, the Republicans accused him of being weak on 
defense (Hurt 2004a). The Democrats countered by blaming Bush of insufficiently equipping US troops 
in the field and stretching the forces thin (Morgan 2004; Dinan 2004). 
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Democrats desperately wanted Bush out of office (Campbell 2005). As opposed to the 
Republicans, they saw the Iraq War not as part of the GWOT and they disliked the 
administration’s performance there. Democrats preferred a force posture with less 
emphasis on conventional equipment. But the majority of US citizens still considered 
the incumbent as the better leader in the GWOT. Among the 15 percent, who considered 
Iraq the most important electoral issue, Kerry defeated Bush 73 to 26 percent. But 
among the 19 percent who regarded terrorism as most important, Bush won by an 
overwhelming 86 to 14 percent (Beinart 2006, 185, 268). Given the electoral 
confirmation, the changes with regard to military policy after the election remained 
small. With Rumsfeld reinforcing his determination to transform the DOD early into the 
new term (Shanker/Schmitt 2005), the ambivalence between the only halfhearted 
satisfaction of current needs, modernization and transformation continued.
309
  
Since the Iraq situation did not improve and the military budgets continued to soar 
without a clear direction, the public disapproval again increased and the lawmakers’ 
subservience in national defense melted during 2005. While many Republicans still 
tried to back the administration’s course, attacks on the administration’s Iraq strategy 
and the Defense Secretary in particular became more numerous. The Democrats 
vehemently challenged administration’s indecisive stance on Iraq, criticizing the lack of 
explicit strategy and information (Hulse 2005). The Republican leadership was even 
forced to remove the FY 2006 defense authorization act from the Senate floor in July, to 
avoid attempts to amend the bill with controversial proposals including an investigation 
in the military treatment of detainees (Graham 2005b). Since the Democrats refused to 
drop this amendment, the authorization bill remained in limbo until late fall. When the 
bill returned to the Senate floor in November, overwhelming majorities passed 
amendments to ban cruel treatment of enemy prisoners and mandating progress reports 
on the war (Dinan 2005). The Senate also passed an amendment requiring a schedule 
for transition of sovereignty in Iraq, which was introduced by the Republican 
leadership.
310
 Indeed, after returning from an Iraq visit in fall, SASC chairman Warner 
declared that “the secretary of defense (…) was not, in my judgment, showing the 
                                                             
309 In the FY 2006 defense budget, with a DOD request of $421.1 billion and two supplemental requests 
of $50 billion and almost $76 billion respectively, the Army received again increased its relative share of 
the overall budget (OSD 2008; Kosiak 2005). But while its O&M account increased by almost 24 percent 
in real terms, the personnel and R&D accounts increased only by 4.1 percent and 8.8 percent respectively 
(OSD 2008). 
310 Lindsey Graham (R-SC), one of 13 Republicans rejecting the amendment, complained that “senators 
were bowing to nervousness over public-opinion polls rather than setting good policy.” (Dinan 2005)  
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strength and decisiveness that is needed at this time.” (in Von Drehle 2005)311 
Washington Times columnist Ullman (2005) commented: “Like Rip Van Winkle, the 
Senate collectively appeared to have awakened from a long slumber, in this case over 
the conduct of the war in Iraq.”  
 
The acceptance of inconsistency 
Against the backdrop of rising pressure, the Bush administration’s second QDR due in 
late 2005 offered a good opportunity to reconsider the course of the transition. With two 
ongoing major operations, a soaring budget deficit, and a derailed transformation, the 
review came at a time of great challenges (Graham 2009, 575-576). In contrast to 2001, 
the numerous problems provided Rumsfeld with good arguments to insist on a major 
revision of the force posture even over the resistance of the military actors. A 
continuous funding of both, the OSD’s transformation and the Services’ modernization 
programs, seemed impossible to bring in line with the growing GWOT efforts. But the 
third QDR since the end of the Cold War, finally published in February 2006, did not 
live up to the expectation. Most authors approved the review’s analysis of the threat 
environment and the implications for force development. Four potential challenges to 
national security were identified and evaluated with regard to the likelihood of their 
occurrence and related US vulnerability (Rumsfeld 2006, 19; Fairbanks 2006, 37-38; 
Flournoy 2006, 71).
312
 Based on this assessment, capabilities-based force planning 
should maintain conventional superiority but move from mainly preparing for 
conventional challenges to a broader set of means, especially to prevent WMD attacks 
by terrorist organizations. Therefore, the 2006 QDR largely upheld its predecessor’s 
                                                             
311 Within the administration, the new Secretary of State Rice and NSA Hadley started to challenge 
Rumsfeld’s monopoly on strategy formulation on Iraq by suggesting an alternative course in 2005 and 
2006 (Herspring 2010, 95-96; Woodward 2008). In contrast to the DOD’s combat heavy strategy seeking 
an active destruction of the insurgents and an early withdrawal of US forces, Rice promoted a Clear, 
Hold, Build strategy heavily based on best practices of prior counterinsurgency operations: Clear areas 
from insurgent control, hold them securely, and build durable institutions (Ucko 2009, 74). 
312 (1) Traditional challenges based on conventional military power were decreasingly likely and the 
challenge to which the US was the least vulnerable, because of its superior conventional capabilities; (2) 
The challenge of unconventional and irregular attacks were considered more likely, but of moderate risk 
for the US; (3) Disruptive challenges caused by states acquiring breakthrough capabilities are of low 
likelihood and unknown in their impact on US security; (4) The increasingly likely catastrophic attacks by 
weapons of mass destruction or comparable effects on high-value targets were treated as the greatest 
threat, since they would result in an unacceptable level of damage. 
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1.5-MRC high end requirement,
313
 but significantly upgraded the role of irregular 
operations, including counterinsurgency and stability operations. The Navy and Air 
Force should maintain its focus on conventional challenges, whereas the ground forces 
should extend their capabilities to include irregular warfare. By rebranding the GWOT 
as ‘the Long War’, the QDR made it clear that the latter kind of operations would 
occupy the Pentagon for some time.  
Yet, observers were puzzled that the QDR included no significant implications for the 
force planning based on the threat analysis (Korb 2006). To be sure, in accordance with 
the transformation vision, the review put more weight on SOF, UAVs and long-range 
strike capabilities. But overall transformation was clearly the loser in the review and 
O’Hanlon (2006) argued that the most telling aspect of the QDR was its consistency 
with earlier reviews: “For all the talk of revolution and radical change, for all the 
specific new initiatives under Mr. Rumsfeld and his predecessors, we have reached a 
certain degree of consensus and stability in post-Cold War defense policy reviews.” 
Indeed, while the review process began as an ambitious attempt to restructure the 
military and make good for the missed chance in 2001, it was increasingly boiled down 
to a “budget-cut drill” (Ratnam 2005; Henry 2005).  
Neither Congress nor societal stake holders were involved in the process and there is 
good reason to argue that the OSD’s lack of capacity and interest determined the 
stability in the end (Ucko 2009, 85). Occupied with the ongoing operations, Rumsfeld 
was much less involved in the process than in 2001, leaving most writing to the OSD 
and the Joint Staff. The civilian control of the review process was further disrupted by a 
change of leadership, as Gordon England took over from Wolfowitz in May 2005.
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Hence, the political actors were in no position to seriously challenge the Services’ 
conservatism and did not try so (Ratnam 2005). Ryan Henry, principal undersecretary 
for policy, who played a leading role during the review argued: “I think the QDR was as 
strong as it could be and still have everybody signing up to it.” (in Graham 2009, 579) 
The signs for the armed forces had not fundamentally changed: Their weapon programs 
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 To be sure, the 2006 QDR departed from the complicated 1-4-2-1 framework and replaced it by only 
three missions: Homeland defense, war on terror/irregular warfare, and conventional campaigns. But the 
requirements within these missions did not significantly differ from the previous concept. 
314 Consultation with lawmakers during the review process was also limited causing the latter to initiate 
their own review (Flournoy 2006, 78-79). 
311 
 
continued to dominate the budget despite the growing burden on the DOD.
315
 Although 
the Army could hope for additional money and especially increased troop levels from a 
stronger emphasis on irregular warfare, the generals were not willing to give in on their 
weapon programs. Even more than the Army, the Navy and Air Force feared that a 
more decisive turn to either transformation or irregular warfare might disrupt their 
modernization programs given the rising war costs and soaring federal deficits. 
Continuous ambivalence seemed the best of many bad options.  
Comments from all sides were biting: “This is Rumsfeld’s ultimate surrender: the 
concession that, fundamentally, all’s well.” (Kaplan 2006a) HASC chairman Hunter (R-
CA) complained that the QDR was largely budget driven and reached conclusions with 
regard to force structure and a weapon acquisition, which contradicted its strategic 
findings (in HASC 2006a, 1-2). Ranking Democrat Ike Skelton (MO) agreed with 
Hunter: “I am struck by an enormous disconnect between what we seek to do and the 
means we plan to use to accomplish it.” (in HASC 2006a, 62-63) Moreover, although 
the Services endorsed the QDR’s recommendation (Graham 2009, 579), retired senior 
Army officers vocally articulated their dissatisfaction with the QDR’s outcome. From 
their point of view, the QDR again proved Rumsfeld’s ignorance with regard to the 
ground forces’ needs. In the New York Times, retired Maj. General Paul Eaton (2006) 
called for the resignation of Rumsfeld arguing that he “has shown himself incompetent 
strategically, operationally and tactically.” According to Eaton, the QDR clearly 
revealed that the Defense Secretary “fails to understand the nature of protracted 
counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq.” In a series of public statements which were soon 
termed the ‘Revolt of the Generals’, other retired officers echoed the complaints and 
recommended Rumsfeld’s resignation (Bacon 2006; Kaplan 2006b). Marine Lieut. 
General Greg Newbold (2006), who had retired in opposition to the Iraq war plan 
among other things in late 2002, accused the political leaders, especially the OSD, in the 
                                                             
315 Critics accused the Pentagon to finance shortfalls in the regular budgets through the supplemental 
appropriations for the GWOT in order to avoid painful program decisions. Since the distinction between 
war-related and regular programs is blurry, critics suspected that the Services used supplemental funds to 
cross-finance regular acquisition programs and personnel costs. By issuing ambivalent directives, the 
OSD even assisted these activities (Testimony of Steven Kosiak in SBC 2007, 99). Since supplemental 
appropriations were not subject to the same extensive executive and congressional review process, 
lawmakers repeatedly complained that this undercut congressional oversight and demanded the inclusion 
of war costs in the regular budget requests (e.g. SASC 2005, 184-285; SBC 2007, 79-80). Moreover, 
critics argued that the routine of two parallel budget cycles, the steady, regular PPBES and the quick 
supplemental funding, had undermined the DOD’s planning and budget discipline (Testimony of Gordon 
Adams in SBC 2007, 109-112). 
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Time magazine of successive policy failures with regard to Iraq, including distortion of 
intelligence, disruptive micromanagement, alienation of international allies, and the 
denial of an insurgency. David Ignatius (2006) reported that according to an active 
Army officer’s guess 75 percent of the Army officers wanted the Defense Secretary to 
leave. Yet, Bush settled the issue by expressing full confidence in Rumsfeld in the 
middle of April (Ruttenberg/Mazzetti 2006).  
Congress took surprisingly little notice of this political turmoil. Although many experts 
expected cuts in the regular budget due to rising deficits, the national defense request 
for FY 2007 asked for $463 billion including almost $22 billion for the DOE and other 
defense related activities, a real growth of 3.6 percent over the previous FY (Kosiak 
2006). Reflecting moderate rebalancing efforts as outlined in the QDR, the budget 
added funding for new initiatives improving irregular warfare capabilities, such as 
increased SOF and UAVs, and again provided the Army with the biggest increase, 
although again not for personnel (Tyson 2006). It seems that SOF and UAV were 
particularly attractive, since they played an important role in the transformation vision 
and were at the same time valuable assets for the current counterinsurgency operations. 
Analysts speculated that “[t]he Pentagon probably reasoned that members of Congress 
would be reluctant to make significant cuts (…) with midterm elections near.” (Merle 
2006) Indeed, lawmakers saw again little incentive to seriously challenge the 
administration on defense, as the Republicans again sought to play the national security 
card during the upcoming election campaign. To be sure, Republican fiscal hawks, 
concerned about the federal deficit, also made sure that any congressional attempts to 
add new spending items in the defense budget would result in a fight (Fagan 2006). But 
the budget was passed with little changes prior to the midterm elections (Hurt/Fagan 
2006).  
By the fall of 2006, public frustration over the Iraq War finally hit the Republicans, 
which lost their majorities in both congressional chambers. The success of the 
Democrats put further pressure on the Bush administration and especially Rumsfeld. 
Already in August, the Army had refused to submit its POM for FY 2008 to the OSD, 
arguing that its granted money share would not suffice to meet its obligations 
(Cockburn 2007, 218). As a confession of his loosening grip on the DOD, Rumsfeld 
allowed Schoomaker to make the Army’s case directly to the OMB (Shanker/Cloud 
2006). Within the Pentagon, this step was seen as reflecting not only the reality of 
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Army’s unmet needs, but also the Defense Secretary’s unwillingness to risk conflict 
with the Service and its supporters. Two months later and only days prior to the 
election, the editorials in the widely read Army Times, Navy Times, and Air Force 
Times called for the Secretary to go, an unprecedented expression of military discontent 
(Kaplan 2006c). With the Services close to open disobedience and Iraq as the major 
cause for electoral defeat, Bush, who had backed Rumsfeld for a long time, had no 
choice but to accept the Defense Secretary’s resignation few days after the election 
(New York Times 2006). 
Rumsfeld’s successor Gates was welcomed by lawmakers and military officials with 
relief. He was considered an “anti-Rumsfeld”, more pragmatic, cautious, and 
approachable than his predecessor (Kaplan 2008). Gates departed not only in style but 
also in substance from his predecessor’s course. To be sure, the new defense secretary 
continued the military buildup and the DOD budget request for FY 2008 was more the 8 
percent larger than in FY 2007 (Kosiak 2007). The Washington Post (2007) predicted: 
“The reality that the budget reflects is that US defense spending will have to return in 
the years ahead to its historic level of 5 percent of GDP (…). That’s because the 
American role in heading off threats in an increasingly disorderly world will not change 
soon, and because the military faces the need to replace aging tanks, planes and ships 
with 21
st
-century systems.” But Gates put the current counterinsurgency efforts more 
squarely into the focus of military preparations. Together with the regular budget, the 
administration requested $141.7 billion in supplemental funding for the wars which rose 
to almost $190 billion during the year. R&D was reduced while especially the 
procurement and O&M accounts were increased. Moreover, a surge of additional 
ground forces to Iraq was taking shape by the end of 2006. At the same time, Gates kept 
the Services’ weapons programs untouched for the moment. Hence, a further potential 
transformation was the major victim of Gates’ stronger turn to irregular warfare.316  
                                                             
316 The Navy and Air Force were nonetheless unhappy with the continuous relative fiscal emphasis on the 
Army and the Marine Corps (Tyson 2007). But with approximately 160,000 US ground forces tied down 
in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and preparations for a surge, there were few 
options to claim funding from the Army. The Navy and Air Force therefore resorted to making their own 
case for additional funding (e.g. Deptula 2007). As Lt. Col. Peter Huggins (2007) from the Air University 
argued in the Washington Times: “Zero-sum arguments (…) overlook the other choice of increasing the 
defense budget.” But with large deficits and Democratic majorities in Congress, their efforts were of 
limited success. At the same time, the Democrats had their own troubles with the defense budget. During 
the campaign, they had promised to push for a withdrawal from Iraq, but now they were afraid of getting 
politically punished for using the budget to force the administration to end the war (Scarborough 2006). 
Indeed, the budget met many of their demands, including an extension of active duty personnel and 
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Summary 
The transition after 2001 in many ways resembled the buildup during the early 1950s. 
Even more clearly than after the outbreak of the Korean War, society and Congress 
rallied behind the President and stopped to actively question the military policy after 
9/11. And the inflow of resources again allowed the political actors to evade the 
showdown with the military actors. Yet in contrast to the Truman administration, in 
which the major civil-military conflict ran along budgetary lines, the cleavage in the 
Bush administration along different qualitative preferences was only temporarily 
bridged. Public approval and the soaring defense funds allowed the administration to 
engage in a difficult balancing act of pursuing transformation, the less innovative 
modernization and GWOT at the same time. Hence, after failing to overcome the 
resistance of the status quo forces in the Services, Congress and society, the 
administration sought to meet all demands after 9/11. Yet, by 2003 it became apparent 
that the DOD could not have everything: The Iraq War showed the progress in weapons 
acquisition but the subsequent occupation revealed the limitations in the organization 
and doctrine dimensions. While this caused rapidly growing dissatisfaction among 
Democratic voters, the public confirmed Bush during the election in 2004 and thus 
missed the most obvious opportunity to actively give the transition another direction. At 
the same time, the conflict between OSD and Services inevitably returned with the 
growing fiscal needs of the GWOT. But occupied with the Iraq situation, the political 
actors failed to create an effective leverage and transformation was the major victim of 
this battle. Only transformation programs which had an obvious overlap with the current 
missions, such as UAVs and SOFs, made noteworthy progress. Overall, stability clearly 
outbalanced innovative steps.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
additional funding for restocking equipment. Thus, in the end, they shrank away from seriously 
challenging the budget and made only minor adjustments (Kaplan 2007). 
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6.2.2. Military organization 
6.2.2.1. Builddown 
Service interests versus reserve interests 
Force level reductions were an inevitable part of the defense downsizing after the Cold 
War. And as in the budget dimension, the early decisions made during the Base Force 
preparations proved most consequential for the subsequent course of the transition. 
Early on, Powell concluded that significant but well defined cuts in conventional forces 
very unavoidable. Forward deployment could be significantly reduced at the same time, 
since the demise of the Soviet Union and progress in arms control agreements
317
 would 
increase warning time. Against this backdrop, the Army was to shrink from 18 to 10-12 
divisions resulting in a troop reduction of 31 percent. The Marine Corps were to be 
reduced by 24 to 37 percent. Powell was uncertain about the Air Force cuts, but the 
Navy’s 551 ships should be decreased to 400 ships with a reduction in active duty 
personnel of 32 percent. Overall, the uniformed military personnel of 3.3 million 
including reserve components should be reduced to 2.6 million by 1996. Although the 
final Base Force Plan slightly departed from Powell’s ideas, the CJCS clearly provided 
the central guidance for the reorganization. When he first presented the final plan in fall 
1989 and spring 1990, it was still very close to the CJCS’ view: It aimed at 18 Army 
divisions (including 6 reserve), 13 Navy carrier groups (including 2 reserve) and 26 
tactical fighter wings (including 11 reserve) by the end of FY 1995 (Ippolito 1994, 64; 
Jaffe 1993; Snider 1993b).
318
 The shrinking force structure would lead to personnel 
reductions in the active force of more than 400,000 and reduce the number of troops in 
foreign countries. 
Although the CJCS had evidently very proportional cuts in mind and the final Base 
Force Plan’s 2-MTW standard aimed at still substantial postwar forces,319 the first 
                                                             
317 The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe slowly took shape during 1989. 
318 The plan was then slightly adjusted to 20 Army divisions (including 8 reserve), 4 Marine divisions 
(including 1 reserve), 12 Navy carrier groups (including 1 reserve) by 1997 (Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 
2001, xxvii; McCormick 1998, 29). 
319 Despite the proportionality of the Base Force Plan, interservice conflicts quickly revived with the 
prospect of shrinking resources. Considering that air power would play a major role in forward defense, 
the Air Force heavily attacked the Navy’s aircraft carriers. Air Force officers claimed that the Navy’s 
aircraft carriers are vulnerable to missile attacks and Secretary Rice argued the“[j]ust eight B-2s can 
match the daily ordnance capability of a carrier.” (in Thompson 1990) Retired Air Force Secretary Verne 
Orr further told an audience: “I don’t think there is a military force better prepared to fight the last war 
than the United States Navy.” (in Thompson 1990) The Navy countered by arguing that its radars could 
easily defeat the B-2’s stealth technology. A second conflict emerged between the Army and the Marine 
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reactions of the Services, which had not been involved in the early planning, were 
skeptical to openly negative. The Army Generals Maxwell R. Thurman, who had 
executed the successful Panama Operation Just Cause as Southern Command CINC in 
December 1989, and Edwin H. Burba Jr., Forces Command CINC, expressed 
skepticism regarding the abolition of a threat-based force planning and argued that the 
planning was disproportionately driven by budget needs instead of CINC requirements. 
They argued that without an underlying strategy, force planning was pure speculation. 
More in line with Cheney, the Service Chiefs argued that Powell’s plan was based on a 
too positive picture of the Soviet transition and voiced resistance to substantial cuts. 
They had had already a hard time planning along Cheney’s earlier guideline of 2 percent 
annual reductions, responding with “a mixture of resistance, resignation and, in some 
cases, creativity.” (Tyler 1990) Hence, when Powell told a reporter of the Washington 
Post in May 1990 that 20 to 25 percent reduction in defense expenditures and force size 
were possible he was strongly criticized by Cheney and the Service Chiefs (Powell 
1995, 440, 454; Smith 1990). The Services considered the force structure cuts as too 
far-reaching and the CJCS’ attempts to make the Chiefs comply with the even further 
cuts in the Base Force was “like fitting a size-ten foot into a size-eight shoe.” 
(Woodward 1991. 231) 
But with the growing congressional pressure on the budget and an increasing support 
for the plan from the OSD, the Services started to see the Base Force as a fence to clear-
cutting and their resistance melted. In a first response to the plans, the Army Chief 
Vuono voiced fears that the Base Force reduction would fracture the force. Between 
1987 and 1990, the Army had conducted three force structure reviews on its own which 
concluded that a 14-division active force including forward deployment was the 
minimum requirement by 1996.
320
 But as the congressional cuts in the FY 1991 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Corps with the latter complaining that the Army was increasingly duplicating the Marines’ capabilities to 
save its relevance after the Cold War. While the Army emphasized its rapid response ability through 
airborne forces, the Marines highlighted the vulnerability of airborne forces and thus indicated the 
superiority of seaborne troops (Gordon 1990a; 1990c). Concerned about losing ground relative to the 
Army, Alfred Gray, Commandant of the Marine Corps, vehemently opposed reductions of the Marines to 
Powell’s Base Force levels. In the end, Powell adjusted the force levels for the Marines to 159,000. This 
remained the only concession and the Marine Corps were the only branch, which escaped its share of the 
reduction (Friedman 2009, 78-79). 
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 The Antaeus study between 1987 and 1989 focused on force reduction in Europe and concluded that 
these should be minimal. Quicksilver 1 and 2 succeeded Antaeus and built the basis for the Army’s POM 
development. The goal was to protect force structure in reducing costs of R&D and modernization 
programs (Lewis/Roll/Mayer 1992, 37-42). Even prior to the Base Force Plan, Army and Air Force 
leaders had heavily opposed the departure from forward presence (Jaffe 1993). While the National 
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threatened to even result in 10 divisions, Vuono agreed to settle for the Base Force’s 12 
divisions. The Navy planning in early 1990 was also above the Base Force estimates 
and the admirals had a hard time accepting the loss of 2 aircraft carriers, 20 percent cut 
in attack submarines, 20 percent drop in personnel and a goal of 451 rather than its 
earlier projection of 488 ships (Friedman 2009, 79; Labs 2006, 5). They voiced doubts 
about the success of the Russian reforms and argued that the reduction in forces would 
put large scale missions at risk and reduced permanent forward presence. But like 
Vuono, CNO Frank Kelso took a more pragmatic stance accepting the Base Force in a 
sequence of discussions during 1990 against the backdrop of congressional attacks. The 
Air Force was the least reluctant branch. Resting on quality rather than quantity, only 
slight adjustments were necessary to bring the flyers’ force planning in line with the 
Base Force Plan.  
The plan was fully accepted within the DOD by fall 1990 and the force projections, 
which Bush sent to Congress in February 1991, were very close to the Base Force Plan 
of 1.6 million active duty personnel (Jaffe 1993, 449). Yet, driven by societal special 
interests, lawmakers agreed not on all elements of the plan. They readily backed 
reductions in overseas forces and bases, which took some pressure from many 
threatened homeland bases in various constituencies (Engelberg 1990). Hence, the 
forces based in Europe were almost cut in half between FY 1990 and FY 1993, 
dropping by 143,000 (Perry 1995). And the forces based in East Asia were reduced by 
one-fifth, approximately 20,000 troops (Kane 2006). At the same time, the still 
substantial force levels in active duty forces soon came under pressure, as Congress 
moved in protection of the reserve forces. The DOD expected the National Guard and 
the reserve forces to carry at least their fair share of 20 to 25 percent in personnel 
reductions (SASC 1991, 129; Pasztor 1991). Given the strategic shift from total war to 
rapid response, the Services considered the post-Cold War relevance of reserve forces 
as limited since they would require time consuming training before deployment.
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Military Strategy of 1989 adopted an alternative and more flexible concept of forward defense, forward 
presence was not fully abandoned and remained the Army’s starting point for potential adaptations during 
the expected builddown period. 
321 The reservists’ performance during Desert Storm was subject to major controversy. The Services only 
reluctantly requested reserve forces voicing doubts about the reservists’ training and fighting abilities 
(Pasztor 1991; Wood 1991; Applebome 1991). Congress questioned the reluctant use of reservists and put 
pressure on the DOD to stop the neglect of reserve components. In the end, reservists were deployed in 
substantial numbers to the Gulf, but few were assigned to combat duty. After the war, reservists voiced 
frustration over having been treated as second class soldiers and suspected that many officials in the DOD 
wanted them to fail. Indeed, Cheney concluded that National Guard units could probably not be mobilized 
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Furthermore, a participation of the reserve components in the builddown would not only 
maintain the balance between active and reserve elements, but also allow passing some 
costs of the transition. Yet, Powell (1995, 550) recalled: “When we tried to cut back to 
sensible levels, however, we had our heads handed to us by the National Guard and 
Reserve associations and their congressional supporters.”  
The NGA, other reserve groups and spontaneously organized reservists started to lobby 
for the survival of reserve units and against the reduced combat role of reserve units in 
the Base Force. Even before the Base Force Plan emerged, lawmakers made clear that 
they would not accept disproportional cuts in the National Guard and reserves during 
the transition. HASC member Patricia Schroeder (D-CO) argued in early 1990: “I think 
deeper cuts must come in active forces and the reserves ought to be strengthened.” (in 
Engelberg 1990) And in 1991, Congress allowed only for much smaller reductions than 
Cheney’s request to take the first step in reducing the National Guard and reserves by 
almost 250,000 over five years (Scarborough 1991). The Defense Secretary complained 
to no avail that “[w]e end up with force structure that we don’t have a mission for.” (in 
Schmitt 1991a) Lawmakers continued to protect the reserve forces in 1992, putting 
additional pressure on the active force levels. After the Vietnam War, the Services had 
intentionally interlocked the active and reserve forces’ means to create public support 
for the armed forces in wars that required the call up of reserve elements (Shanker 
2003a). This heightened importance of the reservists together with their societal 
relevance strongly backfired now. Gordon Adams, director of the Defense Budget 
Project, commented on the congressional action: “The reserves are built into the 
American political system. They’re just not an armed force, they’re a political force.” 
(in Scarborough 1991)  
Given congressional intervention, the reductions in the active duty forces turned out less 
proportional than initially sought for. Whereas the Army and the Air Force, whose 
number of B-2 bombers was severely cut by congressional action, were to drop 30 and 
24 percent respectively from its 1989 personnel strength, the Navy and Marine Corps 
should lose only some 14 and 13 percent respectively. Yet the naval forces’ relative 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as early as hoped and thus implicitly put their relevance for the new missions in doubt. In contrast, 
lawmakers and members of reserve groups praised the performance of reservists during Desert Storm. 
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share of the overall active duty personnel increased only very moderately and the armed 
forces remained very much unchanged.
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The continuation of the 2-MRC standard 
With Clinton moving to the White House, the Services prepared for a renewed round of 
force reductions. Not only had the Democratic President announced to cut an additional 
200,000 troops from the Base Force, but Aspin suggested a reduced force structure over 
the Base Force during his last year in Congress and his confirmation hearings 
(Grunzinger 1996, 6). And the BUR shortly seemed to follow through with the far-
reaching reductions. Aspin’s initially favored win-hold-win force planning option 
required only 10 active Army divisions, 10 carrier battle groups and 13 active fighter 
wings (Grunzinger 1996, 8). While this again was hardly a far-reaching departure from 
earlier organization, especially the Navy organized opposition against the win-hold-win 
option. The admirals were willing to sharply reduce their fleet from 450 under the Base 
Force to 340 ships, but vehemently resisted the cut of two carrier groups and the 
inherent implicit growth of Air Force relevance (Lancaster 1993a; Morrison 1993, 
2162). Without backup from the White House and pressured by the Services, 
congressional defense hawks, the press, and US allies, the BUR left the win-win 
standard in place (Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 2001, xxvii; Gellman/Lancaster 1993; 
Armstrong 1993). Hence, its force structure adjustments remained limited. The naval 
forces were again the relative winners. Although the Navy faced the largest personnel 
cuts of 18.5 percent between FY 1994 and FY 1998, it lost only one active carrier group 
relative to the Base Force resulting in 11 active groups and 346 ships (Labs 2006, 5; 
Cohen 1999). The Marine Corps was even strengthened by increasing its target active 
strength to 174,000. The Army lost two active divisions, but was least affect with regard 
                                                             
322 Early attempts to create additional savings through the consolidation of the unified commands failed 
for various reasons. With regard to plans to reorganize the commands on a functional basis, a study of the 
CJCS’s office concluded: “A functional UCP [Unified Command Plan] reorganization would have cut 
deeply into what the Services saw as their traditional prerogatives.” (Cole et al. 2003, 99) A consolidation 
of the geographic commands failed for three reasons: First, the DOD feared to create an all-powerful 
commander, who might destabilize the power balance within the DOD. Second, diplomatic considerations 
and personal ties in allied countries prevented a reduction of structure. Third, the Services protected the 
status quo. Senator Nunn (1996, 64) complained in fall 1996: “Seven years after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, DOD remains burdened by a Cold War UCP.” 
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to the personnel reductions.
323
 And the Air Force was reduced by two active fighter 
wings, yet slightly increased its active bomber fleet from 181 in the Base Force to 184 
in the BUR.  
During the review process, the Joint Staff again touched the reserve force issue, arguing 
that there was hardly a military need for more than 15 of the current 47 National Guard 
brigades (Gellman 1993d). But the Clinton administration drew conclusions from 
Cheney’s unsuccessful attempt to cut the reserves head-on (Schmitt 1993d). Since he 
could not win a showdown with the National Guard, Aspin made a deal with key 
players, including the National Guard, the NGA and lawmakers, to agree on a cut of 
almost 100,000 reservists. Wary with regard to the other’s relevance, the National 
Guard accepted a cut of 10 brigades, a 13 percent reduction in personnel, in exchange 
for the assurance that Army Reserve would be cut by 26 percent. Moreover, the 
National Guard would concentrate combat and combat-support function, whereas the 
Army Reserve would be focused on combat service support.
324
 Unsurprisingly, the 
Army Reserve Association strongly opposed the plan. But as an active Army officer 
argued: “We own the Reserve, so it’s a lot easier to screw those guys than the National 
Guard.” (in Gellman 1993d) 
Despite the reductions and a more active deployment of reservists in peacekeeping 
missions during the coming years, the DOD continued to complain about the oversized 
National Guard. With growing fiscal pressures on the active duty forces, the Pentagon 
tried to cut eight National Guard combat divisions, which were considered unnecessary, 
in 1995. Of the divisions’ personnel, 60,000 troops should be converted to support units 
and 50,000 positions eliminated (Doubler 2003, 362-364). Suspecting the Army to see 
the National Guard as a peer competitor for scarce resources rather than a partner, the 
NGA and its congressional allies fought back. Edward Philbin, director of the NGA, 
reminded Perry in late 1995: “Since significant elements of the eight National Guard 
divisions are located in 25 states, which control 363 electoral votes, the precipitous 
restructuring could very well affect the 1996 elections.” (in Schmitt 1995d) In the end, 
                                                             
323 Yet Defense Secretary William Perry directed the Army in May 1995 to cut additional 20,000 troops 
from its BUR troop level goal in order to free money for modernization projects. 
324
 The coming years saw an extensive migration of heavy equipment, especially artillery, from the active 
duty Army to the National Guard by mutual consent. The Army leaders were determined to maintain as 
much of its heavy equipment as possible, but the budget cuts made many units unaffordable. Therefore, 
they arranged with the National Guard to outsource large proportions of its artillery requirements. Hence, 
the Army good ‘lighter’, whereas the National Guard got ‘heavier’. 
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the Army partially backed down and accepted the National Guard’s plan to convert the 
equivalent of 4 combat divisions into support units. 
In 1997, the DOD prepared for the last military review during the Clinton tenure. Right 
from the start, Cohen sought no fundamental reorganization, but rather hoped to realign 
strategy and force structure with the budgets and reverse the money drain from the 
modernization accounts. In other words, the major attempt was to find a sustainable 
balance between current and future strategic needs. Yet, even this limited objective was 
only partly achieved. While Air Force Chief Fogleman hoped for a shift from the large 
2-MRC force structure towards a smaller force combined with the push for 
modernization and RMA thinking, the other Services were skeptical of a future-looking 
posture, which failed to provide sufficient means for the numerous current deployments 
and threats (Kohn 2001, 12). Thus, when the Defense Secretary sought to cut two Army 
divisions, the latter successfully fought back, arguing that further cuts in active duty 
forces would irresponsibly stretch thin the ground forces (Scarborough 2004, 120). In 
the end, force structure changes were marginal and reductions in personnel levels until 
FY 2003 had some significance (Larson/Orletsky/Leuschner 2001, 95). The Air Force 
carried the largest share of these reduction loosing 26,900 men and one active fighter 
wing (Trask/Goldberg 1997, 128). The Navy and the Army lost 18,000 and 15,000 
personnel respectively. Moreover the Navy fleet goal was further reduced from 346 to a 
number between 305 to 317 ships, causing heavy resistance among the admirals (Labs 
2006, 6; Keeter 2000). They warned that the Navy’s force structure was insufficient to 
meet 2-MRC and increased the risk for sailors. Yet, the Clinton administration was not 
willing to give up its small success. 
Once again the National Guard evaded deep reductions. According to the QDR, the 
Army National Guard and Army Reserve were to lose 45,000 more troops, with 38,000 
coming from the National Guard (Doubler 2003, 362-366; Landay 1997). Yet, the 
supporters of the Guard resisted, arguing that it would be cheaper to cut more active-
duty Army units and maintain the reserve units. Although the most prominent advocate 
of the National Guard, G.V. Montgomery (D-MS), had retired from Congress in 1996, 
they were still able to postpone a large share of the cuts after tense negotiations over the 
size and the allocations of the cuts. Until 2000, the Army Reserve, which had taken the 
major share of earlier cuts, would lose 3,000 troops and the National Guard 17,000 
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troops. The implementation of the remaining 25,000 reductions was first postponed for 
reconsideration in later years and finally dropped.
325
  
 
Summary 
By the end of Clinton’s tenure, Leebaert (2003, 615) concluded with regard to the 
Services: “[T]hese institutions have remained largely as they were during the Cold War: 
mostly reactive, highly compartmentalized, and inwardly focused on their own 
missions.” (Leebaert 2003, 615) Indeed, the armed forces strongly dominated the 
organization dimension within the Bush and Clinton administration. Political actors 
proved unable and unwilling to seriously challenge the proportionality as well as the 
organizational stability of the force, backed by the 2-MRC standard. Major changes, 
such as the reduced reliance on forward deployment or the Army’s reduction in heavy 
equipment, were largely initiated by military actors early on. They were based on a 
thoughtful reading of international and fiscal realities rather than societal demands. 
Only the reserve associations, especially the NGA, had an active impact within the 
organization dimension. With the help of Capitol Hill, they proved even more effective 
than the Services and were able to protect their turf at the expense of the Services. A 
comparison with the active duty Army reveals the effectiveness of the Army National 
Guard’s supporters during the transition: While the Army personnel dropped by more 
than 35 percent between 1990 and 1998, to 484,000, the Army National Guard shrank 
only by 20.7 percent, to slightly more than 360,000 (OSD 2008; Doubler 2003, 302, 
345). Since the status quo powers in the DOD and in society foreclosed any far-reaching 
changes, stability strongly dominated the dimension. The deadlock in the organization 
dimension contributed to the general readiness problem and put additional pressure on 
the acquisition account, undermining the public’s preference for technology rather than 
personnel.  
 
 
 
                                                             
325 In December 1999, the DOD announced that the 25,000 troop reductions would be deferred, due to 
increasing concerns over military readiness (Doubler 2003, 367) 
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6.2.2.2. Buildup 
Efforts for force structure transformation 
The armed forces became significantly smaller during the 1990s, but remained 
traditionally organized, as neither the RMA vision nor the demands for irregular 
operations made and impact on the organization dimension (Sapolsky/Rittenhouse 
Green/Friedman 2009, 12). The incoming administration sought to challenge this status 
quo, making the size of the forces an early battleground. In its campaign for lighter, 
faster and technologically advanced units, the OSD considered the current force 
structure as outdated and thus as a feasible bill-payer for transformation.  
Rumsfeld and the transformers first challenged the traditional force structure during the 
strategic review process in 2001, but immediately ran into resistance from the Services 
backed by Congress. While the military actors agreed to the reduced force planning 
standard of approximately 1.5-MRC, they opposed any possible implications for the 
personnel and force structure. When rumors emerged that the OSD’s review groups 
sought to terminate the Navy’s new large carrier, the heart of the Navy’s force structure, 
a retired naval flyer responded: “Anybody who thinks the small carrier is comparable to 
a larger carrier has to have their heads in the sand.” (in Scarborough 2001a) And John 
Warner (R-VA), in whose state the current carrier was built, issues a clear warning to 
the DOD that he would not support a shift to smaller platforms. Meanwhile, the Army 
officials fought the OSD’s attempt to cut two Army divisions (Scarborough 2004, 118-
125). Rumsfeld disliked Shinseki’s three-tiered reactive transformation approach, which 
responded to past requirements rather than future challenges. Transformers argued that 
the armed forces should skip a generation of weapons rather than conservatively 
maintain large legacy forces to fence against unlikely military challenges. In the 
Secretary’s eyes, the ground forces were still more concerned with troop numbers than 
transformation technology (Herspring 2010, 79). The Army leaders rebutted the OSD’s 
arguments by highlighting their numerous international commitments, which made it 
irresponsible to trade current risk for future capabilities. In July, Shinseki, supported by 
Army Secretary White, testified before the HASC that “given today’s mission profile, 
the Army is too small for the mission load it is carrying, under-resourced for the size 
that it is.” (HASC 2001, 622) The Army’s complaints were picked up by 82 members of 
Congress, who urged Rumsfeld in a letter to refrain from cutting the active Army force 
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below the current level (Adams 2006, 99; Isenberg/Eland 2002, 6). Having already a 
conflict with the Democrats over the missile defense program, Rumsfeld refrained 
engage in a second battle with Capitol Hill (Ricks 2001f). In August, the New York 
Times reported that “Rumsfeld is moving away from issuing specific orders to the 
armed services on how large or small their forces should be.” (Shanker 2001) The final 
2001 QDR did not contain plans to cut the aircraft carriers, Army divisions or any other 
force structure elements. 
 
The GWOT and manpower shortage 
While 9/11 provided the administration with additional leverage and thus might have 
raised the chances to overcome Service resistance, the GWOT undermined the 
transformers’ argument of a strategic pause and soon moved attention to the present 
military risks and requirements.
326
 Initially, the war efforts were regarded as a 
successful test of transformation, which stressed the feasibility and efficiency of the 
transformers’ vision. Rumsfeld used the Afghanistan operation as a first showcase for 
transformation. While Franks, Commander of Central Command, initially 
recommended a ground force of more than two divisions, the final plan called for only 
about 1,000 US troops, mostly SOF, in hostile territory supported by local forces and 
sea- and airborne long-range fire (Scarborough 2004, 29-31). The pattern was repeated 
in planning for the Iraq War with the OSD pressuring the commanders to significantly 
reduce ground forces and include SOF (Cordesman 2008; Woodward 2002b). 
Rumsfeld, who did not bow to any criticism of his war planning,
327
 was proved right as 
the impressive victory in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the superiority of partially 
transformed US forces. Yet, the reality of the Iraq War’s aftermath revealed the 
limitations of transformation and put a heavy burden on ground forces (Jackson/Long 
                                                             
326 The Office of Force Transformation is a case in point of the changing dynamics: It was established as 
institutional backbone of the Pentagon’s transformation efforts shortly after 9/11. The office was a 
personal initiative of the Defense Secretary, who sought to create additional impetus for transformation. 
Under its director Arthur Cebrowski, the Office of Force Transformation coordinated the implementation 
of NCW and published or contributed to documents including the important Transformation Planning 
Guidance of 2003 (DOD 2003a). Yet, with the growing concerns over the war situation and the departure 
of Cebrowski in 2005, the influence of the office diminished. In 2006, shortly before Rumsfeld’s 
resignation, it was dissolved and its components integrated in different OSD offices (Rogin 2006). 
327 Against the backdrop of the ongoing Afghanistan mission, critics questioned whether the US military 
had sufficient troops and equipment to meet the demands for this second conflict (Tyson 2002). In 
addition, commentators worried that the war would leave not enough capabilities to respond to an 
emergency, e.g. on the Korean peninsula (Richter 2003). 
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2009, 146-147). The permanent occupation duties in a highly unstable environment 
soon strained the armed forces worse than during the Clinton years.  
 
FY Troops in 
Afghanistan 
Troops in  
Iraq 
Total Change 
2002 5,200 0 5,200 - 
2003 10,400 67,700 78,100 +1402% 
2004 15,200 130,600 145,800 +87% 
2005 19,100 143,800 162,900 +12% 
2006 20,400 141,100 161,500 -1% 
2007 23,700 148,300 172,000 +7% 
2008 30,100 157,800 187,900 +9% 
 
Table 6.3: Average monthly troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, FY 2002-2008 (Belasco 2009b, 9)
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In April 2003, seven to eight Navy aircraft carriers and a high percentage of the Air 
Force’s transportation capabilities were involved in the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. 
Sixty-seven percent of the Marine Corps’ operating forces were forward-deployed 
mostly in Iraq. And four of the Army’s ten divisions and some additional combat units 
were tied in Iraq and Afghanistan with most of three other divisions based in Germany 
and Korea. By fall, the CBO (2003) predicted that the Army would be unable to sustain 
its occupation forces beyond summer 2004 based on actual rotation planning. After 
Bush had warned against overdeployment of reservists shortly after his inauguration 
(Myers 2001a), the DOD was forced to call growing numbers of Reserve and National 
Guard units to service. In January 2003, 150,000 reserve troops from all branches were 
on active duty (Adams 2006, 139, 197). Less than two years later, a GAO report 
(2004b) estimated that more than 335,000 reserve component members had been called 
to active duty and General James Helmly, head of the Army Reserve, warned Army 
                                                             
328 Troops in neighboring countries and on ships, which supported the missions, are excluded. 
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Chief Schoomaker that his branch “is rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken’ force.” (in 
Graham 2005a; see also Scarborough 2004, 162)
329
  
As the limitations of replacing people with technology as promoted by the transformers 
and often practiced by the Services themselves became painfully evident, ground force 
personnel gained a new relevance. Even Schoomaker, an outspoken transformation 
supporter, testified during his nomination hearings in July 2003: “I do need to have time 
to formally assess this, but (…) I’m going to tell you that intuitively I think we need 
more people.” (SASC 2003b, 377) In fact, when the new Army Chief took over in 
summer 2003, 70 percent of the Army’s combat strength was at war, preparing for or 
returning from deployment (Adams 2006, 181). Yet, Rumsfeld and the US commanding 
general in Iraq Casey resisted any substantial expansion of active-duty forces and 
additional force deployments to Iraq. While both feared that additional deployments 
would take healthy reform pressure from the Iraqi authorities and delay the buildup of 
Iraq’s own forces, the OSD was also worried that an increase in troops would distract 
money from the transformation efforts and undermine its credibility (Adams 2006, 166-
167): “[T]he large military presence was a direct, visible challenge – even an insult – to 
the secretary’s theory of a military defined by discrete lethal, quick successes.” 
(Woodward 2008, 63)  
In November 2003, the DOD announced that the occupation forces would be reduced to 
about 100,000 by May 2004. Yet, since the situation in Iraq did not stabilize, the 
announcements of troop reductions only contributed to the perception of a continuous 
neglect of the real situation. With increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, Rumsfeld 
approved a temporary Army increase of 30,000 in January 2004 to meet the immediate 
needs in Iraq (Graham 2004).
330
 With the public backing Bush rather than his 
challenger, who had proposed an extension of active-duty troops by 40,000 in the fall 
elections (Sapolsky/Rittenhouse Green/Friedman 2009, 12), Congress and outside 
experts stepped up their criticism. Columnist Jack Kelly wrote: “On the substantive 
                                                             
329 In fact, the armed forces heavily relied on reserve forces, since they had moved vital capabilities for 
counterinsurgency operation to the reserves after Vietnam, showing their distaste for irregular conflicts 
(Shanker 2003a). Thus, almost all of the Army’s civil affairs personnel and more than two-thirds of its 
military police battalions were in the reserves. Moreover, reservists were vital to staff intelligence centers. 
As many of the reservists reached their two-year maximum call-up limit as arranged in Bush’s 
mobilization order, the military was increasingly forced to rely on Navy and Air Force personnel, 
reservists with voluntarily extended duty, and private contractors for vital support jobs (Schmitt/Cloud 
2005). 
330 Rumsfeld acted under emergency authorization granted by Congress after 9/11.  
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level, I don’t think Rummy ‘gets’ ground warfare. Still, he persists in trying to fight the 
war on terror with too few troops. (…) Army officers think Rumsfeld has it in for 
them.” (Kelly 2005; see also Boot 2005) In fact, the insurgency in Iraq had escalated 
“into a war of attrition that produced ten times as many Coalition casualties as the fight 
to topple the regime.” (Cordesman 2008, 1)  
 
Force structure changes 
Until summer 2006, Schoomaker backed Rumsfeld most of the time by arguing against 
permanent troop level increases. In contrast to previous Army Chiefs, he was more 
willing to relinquish personnel for the sake of transformation and searched for 
alternative solutions to the temporary shortage (Jackson 2009, 62). Therefore, the Army 
leadership tried to generate troops by outsourcing administrative elements in order to 
increase combat personnel and shifted forces from field artillery, air defense, engineer 
and armor to more urgent tasks such as military police and special operations forces 
(Adams 2006, 182-183). Moreover, the Army Chief announced a drastic reorganization 
of the Army force structure in fall 2003: Very much like Macgregor’s suggestions 
during the 1990s, the division as the major building block was replaced by the 
brigade.
331
 The Army hoped that this restructuring would create twofold improvements: 
(1) The new force structure would ease the strain on the ground forces, by providing 
more flexibility and increase the combat power of the active force by at least 30 percent 
(Feickert 2007, 2). (2) Schoomaker made clear that this reorganization was advancing 
Army transformation and reflected the Army’s new “joint and expeditionary mindset.” 
(in HASC 2004b, 116) Hence, the new structure around infantry, medium and heavy 
Brigade Combat Teams should prove more deployable than the previous division 
structure. It organized the forces in a modular fashion, allowing for an easy combination 
of force elements to meet different operational requirements for regular and irregular 
warfare. Furthermore, the brigades’ components would be connected by digital network 
technology as tested by the Army’s Force XXI project during the 1990s. Thus, the 
                                                             
331 The Army planned to reorganize its ten active divisions consisting of 33 brigades to 43 Combat 
Brigade Teams by the end of 2006 (HASC 2004, 119). After the Army announced personnel increases in 
2007, the force structure was extended to 48 active and 28 National Guard Combat Brigade Teams 
(Feickert 2007, 3). The Army Reserve and National Guard are also reorganized with a little time lag. 
While modularization is still going on, growing costs for the reorganization raised concerns that force 
structure reform and the ambitious transformation programs would overburden the Army budget (Feickert 
2007, 8-9). 
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modularization sought to substitute maneuver components by advanced C
4
ISR 
capabilities. Support elements, which were previously organized on the division level, 
became an integrated part of the new brigades.
332
 These measures did not relax the 
personnel shortage in the short run, however.  
Already prior to the Army reorganization, the Navy introduced a new force structure 
also with the intention to improve its expeditionary capabilities (Labs 2006, 1-3). Its 19 
strike groups were reorganized in 37 smaller strike groups, including 12 carrier strike 
groups. While the new carrier groups became less capable for high-sea battle, including 
only three rather than six surface combatants, the Navy’s amphibious component and 
thus its ability to enforce access became more robust. Amphibious ships, which 
previously operated autonomously, were integrated in expeditionary strike groups each 
including three surface combatants and an attack submarine.
333
 The reorganization also 
functioned as a vehicle to extend the own forces. But while the admirals argued that 375 
ships rather than the current 310 ships would be necessary to fully implement the 
reorganization, they soon concluded that it had insufficient resources to realize the 
extension. And the OSD resisted all calls to increase the Navy’s acquisition funding, 
despite congressional pressure on the Pentagon to increase the number of ships built and 
thereby secure the naval industrial base (Cortes 2004). On the one hand, Rumsfeld and 
even some senior admirals argued that the overall capabilities were more important than 
the number of ships. Since there was no doubt that the much smaller Navy in the new 
century was more capable than the much larger force of the late Cold War, there was no 
reason to buy more ships. On the other hand, from a transformational point of view, 
more ships were welcome, but not the highly expensive multi-purpose legacy systems. 
Rather, the Office of Force Transformation argued for a much larger fleet based on 
smaller and cheaper ships. Hence, the transformers hoped that the limited budgets 
provided an incentive to acquire cheaper ships. Yet, the Navy reacted by reducing its 
                                                             
332 While losing one of its former three maneuver battalions, each brigade gained a reconnaissance and 
command unit making it more independent in operations. Organic reconnaissance and command 
structures should serve as force multipliers and offset the reduced number of combat troops. In order to 
maintain conventional combat power, support brigades such as aviation, artillery or logistics were 
created. These could be added to modules, resembling in many aspects former divisions. 
333 In 2006, CNO Mullen initiated the creation of the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) to 
further strengthen the naval forces’ role in the GWOT and extend the Navy capabilities “from blue water 
to green and brown water environments” (NECC 2010; see also Friedman 2009, 89). The new Navy 
Command concentrates previously disparate Navy capabilities for “operations in the near-cost, inshore 
and riparian environments to include irregular warfare and other shaping missions that secure strategic 
access and global freedom of action.” (NECC 2010) 
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planning numbers to a fleet between 260 and 325 ships rather than turning to cheaper 
and more numerous ships.  
The 2005 QDR did little to adjust the force structure discrepancies. Thus, while the 
review promised a more extensive reorientation of ground forces towards irregular 
missions, the Pentagon did not fundamentally alter the armed forces structure. Arguably 
the most significant change with regard to the personnel was the increase in Special 
Operations Forces by one-third. Moreover, the 2006 QDR at least indicated support for 
a fleet increase above the current 290 ships and the Navy formulated a requirement of 
313 ships in 2006. But since the Navy did not depart from its expensive modernization 
programs, most experts agreed that the 313-ship proposal was unrealistic given likely 
cost overruns. Thus, the CBO argued that the Navy was heading towards a much 
smaller force unless the acquisition funds were increased or much cheaper ships 
produced (Labs 2006; O’Rourke 2009a). In 2008, Kaeser/Cordesman (2008, 4) warned: 
“The Navy’s procurement policy is in serious disarray, and is creating situation where 
the most serious threat to the US Navy is now the US Navy.” The QDR’s silence with 
regard to the Army personnel caused considerable irritations within Congress and strong 
criticism from defense experts: The Pentagon neither planned to expand the regular 
Army troops nor made the temporary manpower increases permanent. In early 2006, the 
DOD even shortly considered reducing the authorized strength of the strained Army 
National Guard by 20,000 (Pear 2006). As Korb testified: “It is like we haven’t been 
through this, you know, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” (in HASC 2006a, 51)  
While a large debate on the occupation strategy was taking shape within the 
administration throughout 2006, troop increases were continuously rejected. Only after 
the mid-term election defeat, Bush publically changed course. He told the press in late 
December that he was “inclined to believe that we do need to increase our troops” and 
that he considered a surge in troops for Iraq to decide the pending conflict (Baker 
2006a).
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 Since a surge of 20,000 additional troops into Iraq would only be sustainable 
                                                             
334 The idea to temporarily increase the troops in Iraq by up to 30,000 troops was controversially debated 
for some time among the political and administrative actors. While the Democrats called for a timetable 
for withdrawal and were largely skeptical with regard to a surge, Republicans in Congress, such as John 
McCain (R-AZ) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), supported the policy. Within the administration, many 
political actors were also supporting the temporary troop increase, but the Service Chiefs were concerned 
that a short-term surge would not positively affect the situation in Iraq (Baker 2006b). During a SASC 
hearing in November, John Abizaid, the CENTCOM COCOM, clearly opposed a troop level increase for 
Iraq (SASC 2006, 119). Yet, Bush made clear that he would not leave the decision to the military leaders 
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with a larger Army, he ordered Gates to develop a plan for troop level increases. During 
the previous days, the designated chairman of the HASC committee, Ike Skelton (D-
MO), had again warned of an urgent need to strengthen the forces and Schoomaker had 
told Congress that the active-duty Army “will break” under the current war burden 
(Baker 2006a). The Army Chief sought not only to make the earlier troop increases of 
30,000 permanent, but also to add between 20,000 and 40,000 additional soldiers. Gates 
responded in January 2007, announcing plans to expand the active forces by 92,000 for 
the next five years, including 65,000 troops for the Army
335
 and 27,000 troops for the 
Marine Corps (Scarborough 2007). The plans were warmly welcomed by both parties in 
Congress. In late 2008, the Pentagon issued a directive to further raise the capabilities 
for irregular warfare including further increases in regular personnel and SOF (Tyson 
2008). 
 
The rise of Special Operation Forces 
During the whole transition, the story of SOF was fundamentally contrary to the regular 
ground forces. The former experienced a major promotion in the war on terror 
developing from a marginalized community to a ‘fifth Service’ after 2001 
(Jackson/Long 2009; Brown 2006; Scarborough 2004, 8-28).
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 Rumsfeld considered 
them the perfect means to deal with dispersed and impenetrable terrorist networks and 
sought to make SOF the spearhead in fighting global terrorism. In the eyes of the OSD, 
they were the ideal instrument for this borderless conflict with no official declarations 
of war and against an enemy blended in civil societies. Bryan D. Brown, deputy 
commander of SOCOM, told the SASC in 2003 that SOF can “address transnational 
and asymmetric threats”, since they are “operating ‘in the seam’ between peace and 
war.” (in Pincus/Morgan 2003) They can provide vital intelligence, surgical strikes and 
serve as culturally sophisticated “forward-deployed warrior-diplomats” to allies. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and announced a temporary increase of 20,000 troops as part of a new Iraq strategy in 
January(Shanker/Cloud 2007). 
335 A significant share of Army’s expansion was achieved by making the temporary force increases of 
2004 permanent. 
336
 SOF had played only a minor role during the mostly conventional stand-off in the Cold War. The 
consolidation of Special Forces in a functional command in the late 1980s after the Desert One debacle in 
1980 did initially little to change this situation. After the Cold War, legal, political and strategic concerns 
prevented the Clinton administration from extensively using commando forces. Especially after the failed 
Mogadishu operation in 1993, the deployment of SOF was considered a risky gamble. 
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(Brown 2006, 42)
337
 Beyond penetrating terrorist networks, transformers considered 
SOF also as highly suited for network-centric warfare. Technological developments, 
especially PGMs, GPS, and satellite communications, had greatly enhanced their value 
for high-intensity conflicts, in which SOF could operate with little footprint on the 
ground and provide accurate targeting data for long-range fire power (Jackson/Long 
2009, 137). Successfully fulfilling this role during the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, they 
earned high marks by the Pentagon (Scarborough 2004, 10). CJCS Myers wrote to the 
SASC: “Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated the overall maturation of US Special 
Operations Forces, especially SOF integration with precision airpower.” (SASC 2003b, 
329) Congress shared the regard for SOF approving a budget increase of 37 percent for 
the SOCOM in FY 2004 (Pincus 2003). A significant share of the money should be 
used to increase the SOF personnel to 49,000 including reserve by the end of 2004. 
Overall, the funding for special operations tripled between 2001 and 2007 and SOCOM 
reached a troop strength of 54,000 (Feickert 2009a, 1).  
 
Summary 
After the organization dimension was dominated by military actors within the 
administration during the 1990s, the civilians set out to gain control of the renewed 
transition even against the resistance of the Services. But although the GWOT raised the 
administration’s political leverage, it also provided a powerful counterweight to the 
administration’s push for a leaner and more technologically advanced force. In the end, 
the changes in the regular force structures were limited. Only the reorganization of the 
Navy and the Army, both focusing on a more flexible and deployable force structure, 
was an innovative turn towards transformation. The most dynamic change occurred 
with regard to the SOF, although their weight in the overall DOD remained limited. 
Special operation forces had the great advantage of being an important asset for 
irregular operations and network-centric warfare alike and were therefore aggressively 
                                                             
337 Therefore, the Pentagon successively extended SOCOM’s role and competencies. Rumsfeld issued a 
directive in 2002 providing special operations commanders the authority to plan and executive missions 
with little bureaucratic interference. In January 2003, the Defense Secretary told the press that in-theater 
SOF would have the authority to independently plan and implement hunt-and-kill missions. In the FY 
2005 Authorization Act, Congress granted SOFs the authority to spend money to pay informants and 
recruit foreign paramilitaries reducing their reliance on the CIA and increasing the DOD’s role in 
clandestine missions (Jehl/Schmitt 2005). Furthermore, SOCOM turned from a supporting to a supported 
command in 2004: It gained the leading role in the GWOT, planning and executing operations in 
cooperation with and with support from other regional commands (Davis 2010, 29; Brown 2006, 39). 
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pushed by political actors. Societal demands did hardly participate in the developments. 
The one strong demand, the extension of personnel, was for a long time met only with 
regard to SOF, which hardly affected the deteriorating situation in Iraq. And it is not 
even apparent that the public played an active role in influencing this outcome. Public 
preferences exercised a direct influence only very late into the transition by punishing 
the Republicans for the situation in Iraq in the elections 2006. Although the preparations 
of a new strategy were on the way for some time, the election was the last ingredient for 
the administration to change course and allow for the expansion of ground forces. Since 
the reserve forces were in high demand, the special interest groups had little reason to 
influence the political process and hardly appeared in debates. 
 
6.2.3. Weapons acquisition 
6.2.3.1. Builddown 
The failure of early reform attempts 
Weapons acquisition soon turned out to be the most contentious field of military policy 
during the transition of the 1990s. Since many systems had been replaced during the 
Reagan buildup and the force reductions made less equipment necessary, a so-called 
‘procurement holiday’ seemed feasible (O’Hanlon 1997). At the same time, the 
transition offered the perfect opportunity to renew the armed forces by dropping 
unpromising or unnecessary projects and strengthening path breaking innovations.  
Especially the supporters of a RMA advocated a radical break with the Cold War past 
and acquisition of revolutionary capabilities to skip one generation of technology during 
the upcoming strategic pause.
338
 Since this latest military revolution followed the social 
and economic information revolution, many of the new technologies, such as electronics 
and communication technologies, were readily available dual-use products. This 
fostered concerns that opponents would be able to exploit their revolutionary potential 
prior to or more consequential than the US and thus end the latter’s military dominance 
(e.g. Stavridis 1997; JCS 1996, 10-11). Even if other actors failed to achieve a RMA, an 
evolutionary approach would offer opponents time to adjust and therefore undermine 
                                                             
338 While its conceptual masterminds from the ONA initially rather aimed at providing analytical depth 
for current strategic developments, the RMA was reformulated as a call for rapid action after Desert 
Storm. 
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the impact of surprise, frustrating the revolutionary effect. An independent survey 
group, which was established by the Air Force to analyze its performance in Desert 
Storm, summed up the challenge for the RMA advocates: „The ingredients for a 
transformation of war may well have become visible in the Gulf War, but if a revolution 
is to occur someone will have to make it.” (Keaney/Cohen 1993, 251)  
But while all actors agreed that a strong defense, technological leadership and a capable 
industrial base should be maintained in order to avoid bottlenecks as during the Korean 
War, the RMA and even a substantial modernization got stuck in the conglomerate of 
various special interests for stability. The administration’s attempts to separate next-
generation and legacy programs were complicated by the Service’s attempts to save 
their projects. And more decisively, Congress, freed of the necessities of the block 
confrontation, heavily intervened in the administration’s acquisition priorities (Stockton 
1995, 242). While some disagreements between the administration and Congress were 
based on different strategic perspectives or party politics, many congressional decisions 
were guided by lawmakers’ desire to protect constituency-based defense industry and 
labor (Halperin/Lomasney 1999, 85). The economic relevance of weapon systems 
caused not only a competition between the administration and Congress, but also pitted 
lawmakers against each other, as “Congressmen wanted cuts in defense spending but 
not in their districts.” (Garber/Williams 1994, 185-186) Especially the constituencies of 
powerful lawmakers fared well in this struggle for resources.
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Already in 1989, the incoming Defense Secretary Cheney recommended some weapon 
programs for termination in order to absorb defense budget cuts. Among the Pentagon’s 
termination list, the Navy’s F-14D and the Marines’ V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft stuck out. 
Aspin and Nunn supported by the Northrop Corporation, which correctly feared that any 
shifts in the budget would come to the expense of its controversial B-2 bomber 
program, fought to uphold the administration’s request in Congress (Wilson 1989a). But 
the manufacturers of the threatened programs quickly moved in protection of their 
                                                             
339 Hartung (1999), analyzing the distribution of prime contracts by state and district between 1986 and 
1996, concluded that states with congressmen in the defense committees fared better than the national 
average in terms of Pentagon contracts. The biggest winner in percentage of defense dollars, Idaho (+58.9 
percent), West Virginia (+48.8 percent), South Carolina (+47 percent) and Virginia (+43.9 percent), had 
significantly more representatives in defense authorization or appropriation committees than the biggest 
losers, Arkansas (-78.8 percent), New York (-73.1 percent), Kansas (-69.8 percent) and Minnesota (-69.2 
percent). It is generally difficult to assess whether congressmen join defense committees because of the 
importance of defense for their constituencies or whether the significance of defense economy in these 
areas is the result of their efforts, but there is at least some evidence for the latter relationship. 
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systems. The Grumman Corporation called for sparing the F-14D from termination: 
“We’re going to make sure that everyone who has a vote in Congress knows our side of 
the story.” (in Stevens 1989) And Boeing and Bell Helicopter joined a lobbying 
coalition with the Marine Corps and even labor unions and subcontractors in order to 
save the V-22 Osprey (Berke 1990). The companies’ cries for help found rapid response 
in Congress. Fearing layoffs of up to 5,000 people, lawmakers of New York got in 
position “for a protracted, six-month battle” to help Grumman (Thomas Downey (D-
NY) in Schmitt 1989) At the same time, congressmen from Texas and Pennsylvania, 
where the V-22 was made, launched a furious campaign to save the Marine Corps’ 
aircraft.  
Aspin suffered a serious blow when the HASC narrowly defeated the administration’s 
request and completely turned its priorities around (Stockton 1995, 248-249; Moore 
1989a). The committee decided to continue the F-14D and V-22 with the NMD, 
strategic missiles and the B-2 as bill-payers. While the administration had proposed cuts 
and delays over the Reagan plans for the latter programs, especially support for a 
strategic missile defense, Reagan’s major defense policy legacy, was a Republican duty. 
Hence, Republicans inside and outside Congress bitterly opposed the HASC’s NMD 
cuts, which went significantly beyond Bush’s request (Wilson 1989b; Almond 1989).340 
Moreover, Northrop and the Air Force quickly staged a public promotion campaign for 
the previously little known B-2 project, including television commercials and press 
releases. They also revealed a list of subcontractors in 46 states, indicating that 
reductions would threaten “tens of thousands” of jobs (Moore 1989b). But the 
congressional supporters of a renewed reversal of priorities proved unable to change the 
HASC recommendations on the House floor (135 Cong. Rec., July 26, 1989, H16347-
16389; Kenworthy 1989). Not only were the B-2 and the missile defense bedeviled by 
technological problems and cost overruns, they were also not in full production or only 
in early development respectively. Hence, fewer jobs were at stake than in the well-
established conventional weapons productions. As an analyst at Prudential Bache 
Securities argued: “Congress will take as much money as it can out of the new programs 
to keep the old programs in production, because they want to keep people in their 
districts employed.” (in Stevenson 1990)  
                                                             
340 Since the NMD program was executed by an agency within the OSD rather than by a Service, the 
armed forces were not moving in support of the program (Adams/Williams 2010, 239-240).  
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Nunn (D-GA) called the House decision “not rational.” (in Kenworthy 1989) Since he 
was able to largely protect the administration’s request in the Senate, the issue of 
conventional versus strategic programs went to conference. Lawmakers resorted to 
logrolling here and thus negated an early reorientation in weapons acquisition: While 
the House was able to uphold the continuation of the F-14 and V-22, the Senate restored 
most of the House’s cuts in strategic programs (Halperin/Lomasney 1999, 89; Gordon 
1989; Almond 1989). During the House debate on the conference report, ranking 
minority member William L. Dickinson (R-AL) attacked the Democrats for demanding 
savings and protecting acquisition programs at the same time: “The House not only 
refused to make the tough decisions, but it refused to pass the buck, and let the 
executive branch make them.” (135 Cong. Rec., November 9, 1989, H28197)  
But the status quo rapidly came under pressure, as Cheney presented a new hit list of 
weapon systems for FY 1991 with the Marine Corps’ V-22 again ranked on top (Moore 
1990a; Bedard 1989). At the same time, funds for the Brilliant Pebbles
341
 NMD 
program, the B-2 and the strategic missile programs MX and Midgetman were 
increased. Yet, already during the deliberation for the defense budget resolutions, the 
Democrats agreed to set other priorities and focus on the strategic programs to realize 
additional savings (Rasky 1990). Although the Pentagon, especially SAC, some 
lawmakers had fought to keep pressure from the strategic programs, congressional 
majorities still considered reductions in these projects as the strategic least damaging 
and politically most feasible road to savings. Under mounting congressional pressure, 
Cheney proposed to cut the B-2 overall procurement number from 132 to 75 and to 
delay and reduce the production of the Navy’s and Air Force’s next-generation tactical 
planes (Moore/Tyler 1990b). Nonetheless, after Congress had reduced the overall 
spending, a senior aide in the HASC predicted that the conflict over the distribution of 
the scarce resource in the authorization bill would become a “blood bath.” (Moore 
1990b) Indeed, the House voted to cancel the B-2 project altogether and shifted the 
money to continue conventional programs including the V-22 despite an even more 
furious campaign by the Air Force and Northrop and the threat of a presidential veto. 
Yet, since the Senate followed the administration’s request much closer once again, the 
                                                             
341 Brilliant Pebbles was a concept based on a system of small space-based missile interceptors, which 
appeared technologically more feasible and less expensive than Reagan’s earlier missile defense plans. 
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conference preserved funding for major conventional as well as strategic programs 
(Dewar 1990b).  
After two years of far-reaching blockade in the acquisition process, major changes 
occurred in 1991. In January, Cheney canceled the development of the A-12 stealth 
tactical support plane after considerable technical problems and cost overruns were 
revealed (Gold 1991; Auerbach 1991).
342
 The largest program termination in DOD 
history dealt the Navy a heavy blow and caused strong discontent among the Navy 
flyers. But Cheney was able to uphold his decision, given its relatively small expected 
impact on defense jobs and the very obvious problems in the program.
343
 Moreover, 
after the START treaty in summer and Bush’s announcement of nuclear force 
reductions in fall, the already eroding congressional support for the B-2 finally tipped 
against the bomber (Stevenson 1991; Schmitt 1991b). Congress decided in late 1991 to 
stop the B-2 production after 15 planes, yet provided $1.8 billion to keep the production 
line open in case of a later need for production (Scarborough 1991; Grier 1991). The 
money freed was used to continue upgrading F-14 fighters and producing M-1 tanks, 
which the administration wanted to end.
344
  
The Air Force staged only halfhearted opposition to the end of the B-2, as it faced 
challenges to its most important advanced fighter development program, later 
designated F-22, which was awarded to Lockheed in April 1991. The airplane, 
developed by the Lockheed team, had powerful allies in Congress from the beginning. 
Lockheed had moved from California to Georgia only recently, due to cheaper wages 
and the opportunity to pick up additional political support (Vartabedian 1990). Hence, 
the F-22 was to be built in Nunn’s home state and Gingrich’s district. While the former 
always denied being motivated by parochial interests, Gingrich openly supported the 
fighter program. Against this backdrop, the F-22 was not seriously considered for 
termination. But numerous critical voices concerning the strategic relevance and 
                                                             
342 The Navy had initially planned to procure 858 of these planes including 238 for the Marines to replace 
its aging A-6 planes. In addition, the Air Force wanted to buy 400 A-12s. Under mounting pressure for 
budget cuts, Cheney had suggested to cut the 238 planes for the Marines and delay the Air Force 
procurement for 5 years already in early 1990 (Moore/Tyler 1990b). 
343 The economic impact turned out not that small, however. 5,000 people at McDonnell Aircraft 
Corporation and 2,000 people at General Dynamics were laid off as an immediate consequence (Office of 
Technology Assessment 1992, 16). 
344 Although Cheney sought to terminate the production lines of the Army’s M-1 tanks and Apache 
helicopter in 1990, as suggested in the Base Force Plan, both program upgrades were continued with the 
help of Congress.  
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economy of the program appeared nonetheless. Even before the full development 
contract for the replacement of the F-15 was announced, the CBO (1991) warned that 
the fighter would bust the budget in the long run. And the New York Times (1991) 
commented: “The Air Force is acting as if it were about to cash in a war dividend.” The 
newspaper further questioned the strategic necessity of a fighter against the backdrop of 
a declining Red Army. Air Force officials quickly moved to protect the flyers’ most 
prestigious project. Gen. Ralston, director of the fighter acquisition argued: “We can 
afford it, and it’s absolutely crucial to our force structure that we obtain air superiority.” 
(Gellman 1991a; see also Rice 1991) In this context, the termination of the B-2 
dispelled some unwelcome questions regarding the Air Force’s long-term acquisition 
budgets. 
In 1992, the positive developments in the Soviet Union and the enthusiasm over the 
armed forces’ performance in Desert Storm shortly seemed to turn the tide within the 
administration towards a more decisive transition and possibly even a RMA. Impressed 
by the victory in Iraq, Cheney told lawmakers: “This war demonstrated dramatically the 
new possibilities of what has been called the military-technological revolution in 
warfare.” (SASC 1992b, 20) And in his State of the Union Address, Bush (1992) 
announced the reduction of strategic forces including the final termination of the B-2 
after 20 planes. Although this was 5 planes more than Congress had approved, the 
administration was confident that Congress would go along, since Californian 
Democrats and the Air Force had persuaded Aspin and other lawmakers that the 
additional production would costs only $2.6 billion more. More importantly, this 
provided Northrop a soft landing (Schmitt 1993b).  
The B-2 was only the first victim, as the administration turned to reduce its strategic 
forces. The Navy’s Seawolf submarine was the next program in focus of the Pentagon’s 
budget cutters. The highly expensive successor of the Los Angeles class attack 
submarines, initially designed to hunt Soviet submarines, was hard to justify after the 
Cold War. Therefore, the administration decided in its FY 1993 request to terminate the 
program after only one submarine and wait for the smaller and cheaper successor of the 
Seawolf with production beginning in 1998. Yet, lawmakers again obstructed the 
administration’s ambitions. As soon as first reports of the cancelation appeared, 
lawmakers from Connecticut and Rhode Island, where the Seawolf was being built, 
rallied to protect the program. As Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) claimed: “The issue is larger 
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than a single program or company. It’s the entire defense industry in Connecticut.” (in 
Gruson 1992) Indeed, Connecticut’s Electric Boat, a division of General Dynamics with 
22,000 employees in Connecticut and Rhode Island, warned that the cancelation of the 
Seawolf project might force the company to shut down. Thus, the company engaged in 
an all-out lobbying effort: “Electronic Boat is not going to lie down and die. We’re 
going to fight.” (in Judson 1992) It argued that continuing two already approved $2 
billion Seawolf submarines, which the administration wanted them to rescind, would 
bridge the time until the new submarine would go in production and thus save the 
submarine industry (Schmitt 1992b).  
The prospects for the campaign were particularly promising in 1992, since lawmakers 
stepped up their efforts to maintain defense jobs in an election year. Especially the 
Democrats considered job protection through defense as inevitable, since the budget 
agreement prevented the transfer of money to domestic accounts, which might help to 
offset the job losses in the defense industry. In the end, Congress saved funding for one 
and partial funding for the second already approved Seawolf submarines. In addition, it 
further funded the last B-2 bombers, new F-16 fighters, and again restored spending for 
the V-22 and upgrades for M-1 tanks and F-14 planes.
345
 The F-22 program was 
continued despite concerns that the tactical plane programs would become unaffordable 
in the near future (Ricks 1992).
346
 Only the NMD was severely cut back in FY 1993. A 
defense contractor lobbyist commented on the outcome: “We were the fortunate 
beneficiaries of a quadrennial event known as the presidential election.” (in Pearlstein 
1992) But Ann Markusen, an outside expert, complained that lawmakers had 
“demonstrated the country’s paralysis over the peace dividend.” (Markusen 1992) 
Indeed, no substantial departure from the Cold War weapons acquisition and certainly 
no turn towards a RMA was achieved during Bush’s tenure.  
 
 
                                                             
345 In order to save the F-14 upgrades, General Dynamics had sent a letter to each member of Congress 
with a map showing the amount of money going to each congressional district and the number of 
subcontractors in each district (Uchitelle 1992b). As George Hochbrueckner (D-NY), one of the F-14’s 
advocates, argued: “If you want to develop political support, it pays to spread the work around.” (in May 
1989) 
346 The F-22 competed with the Navy’s advanced F/A-18 project, the successor of the canceled A-12, 
called AX, and the Multirole Fighter program, a replacement for the F-16. 
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Budget pressures and political capitulation 
The incoming Clinton administration budget cuts put additional pressure on acquisition 
accounts, since the DOD was repeatedly forced to redirect modernization funding in 
order to meet readiness and deployment needs. 
 
FYDP 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1995 43.3 48.4 49.8 57.1 60.1   
1996  39.4 43.5 51.4 54.2 62.3 67.3 
1997   39.9 45.5 50.5 57.7 60.1 
1998    42.6 50.7 57 60.7 
1999     48.7 54.1 61.3 
2000      53 61.8 
2001       60.3 
Change   -9 - 10.9 - 14.5 - 11.4 - 9.3 - 7 
 
Table 6.4: Reductions over planned procurement funding in billion USD in Future Years Defense 
Plans 1995-2001 (GAO 2000, 20) 
 
But as with the force structure, the administration’s initial review made only limited 
adjustments to the acquisition portfolio. Dismissing the Brilliant Pebbles program, the 
administration severely cut the NMD, reducing it to a mere technology development 
program (Clinton/Gore 1992, 134). But the Pentagon readily admitted that other BUR 
decisions were motivated as much by protecting America as by protecting jobs and the 
industrial base (Schmitt 1993c). Hence, the review concluded Electronic Boat should 
build the third Seawolf to stay in business and thereafter start building the new 
submarine class. Newport News, the other submarine producer, should be sustained by 
aircraft carrier construction instead. In the tactical fighter field, the F-22 and the F/A-
18E/F were continued, although at a lower rate and with growing unit costs. Moreover, 
the BUR consolidated two other early stage tactical airplane projects into the Joint 
Advanced Strike Technology Program to develop common components for future 
aircraft. A year later, the program was transferred to become the multi-purpose Joint 
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Strike Fighter, the third big tactical aircraft program with initial plans to build at least 
2,916 planes for the Air Force and the naval forces in the new century (Mutch 1995).  
After the reluctant BUR, RMA supporters gained new hope when Perry took over from 
Aspin. Already in 1991, Perry had emphasized the significance of the interaction of 
superior technologies, which he later coined the system-of-systems (Perry 1991; 1994). 
In January 1994, now as Deputy Defense Secretary, he formed a group to coordinate 
RMA projects within the Department, analyze its potential, and frame future steps to 
embrace the revolution. As Secretary of Defense, Perry worked with the CJCS 
Shalikashvili to accelerate RMA thinking within the Pentagon.
347
 They brought Admiral 
Bill Owens to the Joint Staff to promote the RMA concept among the Services.
348
 As 
Vice CJCS between 1994 and 1996, Owens became the central and most articulate 
proponent of steps to accelerate the RMA by 10 to 15 years (Owens 2002; 2000; 1995). 
He advocated the system-of-systems concept and promoted RMA as a way to sustain 
the superior military position without lifting the budget constraints (Owens 2000; 
Blaker 1997a): While maintaining a smaller version of the Cold War force at decreased 
budgets would result sooner or later in a breakdown, implementation of RMA concepts 
would form a cheaper and more lethal force (Macgregor 2000; Blaker 1997b). Owens 
and other RMA supporters promoted a clear emphasis on R&D to improve C
4
ISR, 
precision technologies and system integration, thereby discriminating weapons systems, 
which did not fit into the system-of-systems framework. Heavy armored ground forces, 
aircraft carriers, submarines and tactical aircraft should be deemphasized, while small, 
fast, dispersed and integrated platforms should become more prominent. Yet, with 
budget constraints strangling modernization and lacking interest by the White House 
and the Services, the RMA supporters failed to make a large impact on weapons 
acquisition (Harris 1994a).  
Many senior military officers met the RMA concept with cautiousness. While 
acknowledging the impact of new technology in Desert Storm and future warfare, they 
considered the war as a confirmation of their state-of-the-art capabilities rather than a 
                                                             
347 Mandated with promoting jointness, the CJCS and the Joint Staff supported RMA thinking early on 
(e.g. see the extensive discussions on RMA in Joint Force Quarterly during the 1990s). 
348 Prior to his assignment at the JCS, Owens had gained attention by trying to foster inter-service 
understanding through temporal exchange of officers (Lederman 1999, 94). Perry and Shalikashvili liked 
the promoter of more jointness and RMA and brought him to the Joint Staff to continue his reform efforts 
for the whole DOD (Owens 2000, 171-177). Once in place, Owens fought for his goals with strong ONA 
support. He used the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, a joint body to assist the JCS in analyzing 
joint requirements, to direct the acquisition process towards RMA. 
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reason to turn things around. As Krepinevich (1999, 98) complained: “What is missing 
is a sense of urgency.” Furthermore, since the RMA advocates wanted to offset the 
costs for the RMA by terminating non-revolutionary programs, the Services feared for 
their major weapon projects (Owens 2002, 211; Maddrell 2003). To make things worse, 
the RMA threatened to break the carefully arranged budget shares and roles of the 
branches. Especially the Army opposed ideas to offset troops by technology and reduce 
the ground forces to target location and postwar stabilization. Army Chief Reimer 
(1996) called for balanced capabilities, warning that “[t]he United States has relied on 
technological silver bullets in the past, sometimes with disastrous effects.” With no 
serious military threat in sight, numerous small scale missions at hand, and some 
expensive high profile modernization programs under pressure, there was little incentive 
to redirect resources to accelerate a revolution with uncertain costs and outcome 
(Freeberg 1999). Hence, when Owens first sought to impact the defense posture by 
affecting the budget process in 1994, the Services protested, claiming that he was 
disrupting the planning process and unduly expanding the Joint Staff’s power (Graham 
1994). 
Meanwhile, the few changes approved by the Democratic Congress during the Bush 
years came under renewed political pressure after the Republican’s electoral victory in 
1994. Soon after the elections, both chambers started to push for additional spending on 
NMD in the FY 1996 defense budget. The House GOP even cut final funding for the 
third Seawolf and instead granted money for the continuation of the B-2 bomber as “a 
symbol defining the direction of their conservative revolution.” (Graham 1996a; see 
also Landay 1995) Yet, in the Senate, John Warner (R-VA) was able to broker a deal, 
which kept the Seawolf in the budget: Electronic Boat would be allowed to build the 
Seawolf and the first submarine of the new class, whereas Newport News in Warner’s 
home state would build the second submarine in the new class. Lieberman (D-CT) 
assured with relief: “If this package goes though, the [Electronic Boat] yard in Groton 
will be secure and alive for a long time.” (in Schmitt 1995b) Although the political 
majorities had changed, the final bill resembled the logrolling of prior years: It included 
funding for the third Seawolf and $493 million to start extending the B-2 fleet by 
another 20 planes (Morgan 1995). Yet, Perry made it immediately clear: “I’m not 
supporting, and the president is not supporting, funding that $30 billion for the next 20 
B-2s.” (in Graham 1996a) Moreover, while the White House was only able to convince 
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the Republicans to reduce the additional funding for NMD in the defense appropriation 
bill, Clinton successfully vetoed the authorization bill which would have required the 
administration to deploy a missile defense system by 2003 (Purdum 1995).
349
  
In successive years, the Republicans continued to push for additional defense funding, 
but as Steven Bosniak, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary 
Assessments, argued: “Essentially, they’re just adding more of the same. There’s no 
significant new defense posture in these add-ons, except in the area of missile defense.” 
(in Graham 1996b) Despite departing economic philosophies, the Republican majority 
continued the Democrats’ practice of providing support for their constituencies (Sack 
1997). For example, Lott pushed additional funding for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers 
and other ships, which were built by Ingalls Shipbuilding in his hometown 
Pascagoula.
350
 His efforts for the Ingalls Shipyeard put him in competition with Maine's 
two senators, William Cohen and Olympia Snowe, who successfully fought for 
congressional funding for additional Arleigh Burke destroyers built at Maine-based 
Bath Iron Works in FY 1996 and FY 1997 (Foote 1997b; Priest 1995).
351
 Gingrich (R-
GA) continuously advocated the Lockheed’s products including the F-22, the C-5 and 
C-130J transport planes (Uchitelle 1995).
352
  
 
 
                                                             
349 After further, largely unsuccessful Republican attempts to accelerate NMD, North Korea’s successful 
ballistic missile test in 1998 and the final report of the bipartisan committee chaired by Donald Rumsfeld 
to assess the missile threat increased the pressure on the administration (Rotfeld 2001; Schmitt 1998; 
Rumsfeld et al. 1998). Although the JCS told lawmakers that they disagreed with the committee’s 
assessment and recommendations, Congress acted in May 1999 (Shelton 2010, 404-406). It passed the 
National Missile Defense Act, signaling American determination to build a missile defense system as 
soon as technologically feasible. 
350 With the help of Thad Cochran (R-MS), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Lott 
threatened to keep the Navy budget for FY 2000 from passing the Senate if the Navy did not get a down 
payment of $500 million to start the construction of a $1.5 billion LHD-8 helicopter carrier at the Ingalls 
Shipyard (Weiner 1999). As the Navy, which would have preferred to spend the money on other projects, 
estimated much less money for the start of the program, Lott’s aides pushed the admirals to increase their 
estimate to at least $375 million and testify in favor of the program (Morgan/Eilperin 1999). 
351 Snowe is a good example of the balancing act lawmakers were making: In her first speech as Senator 
in 1995, she expressed a strong preference for a balanced budget. At the same time, she fought to keep the 
flow of defense dollars going, arguing that “[w]e all fight for things we think are important.” (in Fritsch 
1995) 
352 Gingrich caused some anger when he tried to get $480 million funding in the FY 1999 defense budget 
to buy eight new C-130 cargo planes (Akers 1998). Against the opposition of the Pentagon which had 
requested money for only one C-130, Congress finally earmarked $475 million to fund seven planes 
(Cottle 1998). In fact, FY 1999 marked the 23rd year in which Congress added C-130 planes to the Air 
Force request. The new planes are often assigned to Air National Guard units, creating what a senior 
Pentagon official described as “a triangle of the Guard, Lockheed and politicians.” (in Pincus 1998) 
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The failure of RMA 
The impact of the RMA during these political struggles remained limited. To be sure, 
lawmakers held the first hearing explicitly dealing with RMA in May 1995, voicing 
strong interest in the vision (SASC 1995). And the Navy leadership introduced the 
Arsenal Ship project in 1996, which had strong support of DOD’s Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and RMA advocates (Friedman 2009, 82). 
Designed to carry as much as 500 cruise missiles and equipped with electronic 
processing and communication equipment, the stealth ship promised to provide the kind 
of long-range fire power, the RMA supporters called for. Yet, the support for RMA was 
still languid at best. The Arsenal ship ran into early internal opposition especially from 
the Navy’s surface community, which feared an unwelcome competition for its 
destroyer and aircraft carrier fleet. As Krepinevich argued: “The arsenal ship is the same 
challenge to aircraft carriers as the first carrier was in the 1920’s to battleships.” (in 
Schmitt 1995c) More fundamentally, the Navy and the Air Force were concerned that 
the arsenal ship may disadvantageously change the status quo with regard to long-range 
strike missions (Rhodes 1999). Concerned over the future of the shipyards in their 
constituencies, lawmakers soon joined the opposition. After the death of CNO Borda, 
the arsenal ship’s main advocate within the Navy, the program took an early end. 
Congress largely eliminated the project’s funding in FY 1998 and backed the less 
revolutionary SC-21 development program for a new generation of surface vessels 
including a new destroyer and cruiser class instead. 
When Cohen succeeded Perry and Vice CJCS Owens retired in 1997, apparently 
frustrated by the strong Service resistance, the RMA was further degraded.
353
 While the 
DOD rhetorically embraced the RMA concept, it pursued an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary way towards its realization (O’Hanlon 2001, 302). Thus, Cohen (1997, iv) 
acknowledged in his report of the QDR 1997: “The information revolution is creating a 
Revolution in Military Affairs that will fundamentally change the way US forces fight.” 
But weapons acquisition remained stable, regardless of budget pressures and criticism 
                                                             
353 The significantly decreased importance of the ONA under the new Defense Secretary, who rarely 
requested its strategic advice, is a clear indicator for this shift in focus (Maddrell 2003). Cohen even tried 
to transfer the ONA to the National Defense University (Lemann 2001). 
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of programs (Gertler 2009, 8).
354
 Especially the tactical airplanes continued to take fire. 
Cindy Williams of the CBO summed the major arguments against the extensive fighter 
programs: “[N]o other country's fighter fleet comes close to that of the United States in 
either numbers or capability, nor does it seem likely that any country will be able to 
challenge us, either with their fighter fleets or their air defenses, for the foreseeable 
future.” (in House Subcommittee Military Research and Development/Subcommittee on 
Military Procurement 1996, 6) Moreover, the CBO, the GAO, and outside experts 
questioned the affordability of the programs and warned of technical problems and cost 
overruns (Kitfield 1999b; CBO 1997).
355
 But with the federal deficit curtailed, Congress 
continued to finance these programs with strong economic impact. As a congressional 
staff member said: “The F/A-18E/F appeals to California, Missouri and, to a lesser 
extent, Massachusetts. The F-22 appeals to Texas, Georgia and Washington State. And 
the Joint Strike Fighter appeals to nearly everyone, because no one knows yet who's 
going to win the contracts.” (in Graham 1996c)  
The congressionally mandated National Defense Panel, which questioned the tactical 
airplane acquisition and called for an aggressive transformation, did not change the 
status quo (Blaker 1997b). Lawmakers voiced diffuse support for the RMA, which 
would guarantee continuous global military leadership, reduce the risk for soldiers and 
make the force overall more efficient. But with no serious threat and a focus on 
domestic needs, Congress saw no reason to pressure the DOD for a more aggressive 
embracement of RMA thinking. Adams (2006, 50) argued that one of the few lasting 
effects of the National Defense Panel was “the enshrinement of the term 
‘transformation’, meaning to capitalize on the new RMA technologies (…). From that 
time onwards, any service initiative hoping to receive serious consideration had to be 
clearly labeled as part of transformation.” Indeed, the Services started to put all 
programs in the context of the RMA even if their transformational potential was often 
doubtable.
356
 Williams (2001, 3) concluded in 2001: “In short, the ‘revolution in 
                                                             
354 In fact, the QDR took decisions, which even reduced RMA central capabilities, such as cutting the 
procurement of Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircrafts from 19 to 13 
(Cohen 1997). 
355 A Joint Estimating Team of representatives from the Air Force, DOD, and industry estimated in 1997 
that the F-22 development program would exceed Air Force estimates by $1.86 billion and production 
costs by as much as $13 billion. In response, Congress imposed overall cost ceilings of $18.6 billion for 
development and $43.4 billion for production in 1998 (Kitfield 1999a).  
356 For example, former Air Force Chief Fogleman confidently claimed in 1997: “There are only two 
revolutionary weapon systems in the entire DOD budget: the F-22 and the airborne laser.” (Kohn 2001, 
15) And the fighter’s stealth technology and advanced communications indeed resembled demands of 
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military affairs’ may have won the war of rhetoric, but it has lost the war for dollars.” 
And Owens (2002, 211) concluded with regard to the 1990s: “In retrospect, we made 
less progress than we had hoped.”357 
 
Summary 
The preferences for the status quo strongly constrained any substantial efforts to 
innovate in the weapons acquisition during the 1990s. Neither the end of the Cold War 
and the subsequent strategic pause nor the alternative RMA vision nor the growing 
incongruence in the defense planning resulted in a departure from prior acquisition 
patterns. To be fair, some small programs were cut and especially the terminations of 
the B-2 and Seawolf after extended political conflicts were no small decisions. But they 
made way for programs which assured an evolutionary course and departed little from 
the qualitative status quo. Besides the Services, the defense economy exercised a strong 
direct influence on Congress. Especially their economic weight in a difficult economic 
situation proved a highly effective means to protect the status quo. 
 
6.2.3.2. Buildup 
Transformation and the persistence of modernization projects 
After the evolutionary modernization course of the 1990s, Bush wanted “to move 
beyond marginal improvement to harness new technologies that will support a new 
strategy.” (in Sanger 2001) Already during the nomination hearings, Rumsfeld had 
suggested two ways to achieve this goal (SASC 2001a, 28): (1) Leapfrog from one 
generation of technology into a new one; (2) Upgrade existing platforms with 
electronics which results in decisively improved capabilities. Although the ambitions of 
the transformers never aimed at transforming more than a proportion of the force, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
RMA advocates. Yet, a short range air superiority fighter contradicted the RMA’s emphasis on 
asymmetry through long-range precision fire. Moreover, RMA supporters argued that the enormous funds 
for the complex F-22 could be spent more wisely on a range of many small, simple, and interconnected 
systems along the system-of-systems concept. 
357 The arguably most RMA-relevant progress was achieved with regard to precision guided munitions. 
Most observers were impressed by the potential of precision guided munitions and the Air Force reasoned 
that this technology could bolster its promise of strategic bombing. Therefore, the JDAM program made 
good progress. 
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continuous substantial acquisition of legacy programs did not fit into their vision of 
future warfare. The current force was capable of limited network-centric warfare, but 
the transformers sought to create a future force vastly different from the current force 
and fully able to implement NCW.  
Since Bush initially refused to significantly raise defense budgets except for the priority 
NMD project,
358
 transformation inevitably implied the termination of evolutionary 
programs. Already in 2000, the Project for the New American Century (PNAC 2000, v) 
had recommended to cancel “roadblock” programs: The Joint Strike Fighter, the new 
aircraft carrier class, and the Crusader howitzer system should become bill payers for 
transformation efforts. Other outside experts additionally questioned the value of the F-
22, the last Nimitz-class carrier, the DD-21 destroyer, the Comanche helicopter and the 
V-22 (Dao 2001a). Most of these systems were highly expensive, highly complex to use 
and maintain, of dubious strategic value, and often delayed by years. Cebrowski and the 
transformers called for a stronger emphasis on smaller, faster, less complex, more 
connected and numerous theater units instead. They favored machines over manpower, 
unmanned system over manned systems and long-range bombers over short-range 
fighters.  
Against this backdrop, Rumsfeld’s initial strategic review had the intention to scrutinize 
weapon programs and identify the systems to be canceled for lacking relevance in the 
future force (Kitfield 2001b). But all early attempts to identify bill payers for 
transformation ran in insurmountable resistance from the military leaders and 
lawmakers. Especially the latter continued to pursue ambivalent positions. On the one 
hand, Congress shared the popular support for new technology, which was reinforced 
by the air campaign over Kosovo in 1999 (Dombrowski/Gholz 2006, 146-148). As 
SASC Chairman Warner made clear: “The American people are looking to the future 
for less and less risk to our people and the likelihood that other military operations will 
avoid casualties. I think that is unrealistic, but nevertheless it is a direction in which our 
country seems to be thinking. Thus, increased technological advancements will help 
achieve those goals.” (SASC 2000a, 5) Therefore, Congress legislated in 2000 that one-
                                                             
358 Nuclear weapon development also gained new popularity under Bush. But the administration’s plan to 
develop Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators, so-called bunker busters, spurred strong criticism. In spring 
2004, the final report of a panel of the National Research Council, which was mandated by Congress in 
the FY 2003 defense authorization act, concluded that the use of these weapons could cause fallout, 
killing large numbers of civilians (Broad 2005). Thus, Congress denied funding for the program in FY 
2004 and after (Pincus 2005). 
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third of the operational deep-strike aircraft and one-third of the ground combat vehicles 
must be unmanned by 2010 and 2015 respectively (146 Cong. Rec., October 6, 2000, 
H21366).  
On the other hand, while there was only a diffuse constituency existing for military 
reform, there was “a clear bloc against change, consisting of members of Congress who 
worry that bases and weapons plants in their districts could be closed.” (Ricks 2001c) 
An iron triangle resisted attempts to cancel the V-22, one of the OSD’s early candidates 
for termination (Dao 2001c). After a crash of two aircrafts had left 23 Marines dead in 
2000, the Osprey was at a temporary stop for safety reasons. Yet, despite this and 
numerous other problems as well as cost overruns, a coalition of the industry, Marine 
Corps leaders, and congressmen, led by representative Weldon (R-PA), sustained 
funding.
359
 Furthermore, when the strategic review began, the Army’s heavy Crusader 
artillery system was on top of the transformers’ termination list (Myers 2001b; Dao 
2001c). The OMB and OSD left little doubt that they considered the $9-$11 billion 
Crusader outdated, which the Army sought together with the Comanche helicopter as 
vital enhancement for its legacy force (Cockburn 2007, 154; Tiboni 2003; Shanker/Dao 
2002a; 2002b).
360
 But they proved unable to overcome joint resistance from the Army, 
Congress and United Defense, the Crusader’s producer.  
The Army’s protection of the Crusader was not purely a turf war. There was also a 
widespread concern among Army officers that they would lack capabilities, if a threat 
emerged in the period before transformed forces were fully operational or if the risky 
transformation completely backfired (Kaplan 2003c). The course of the new Gerald R. 
Ford class of aircraft carriers to replace the Nimitz class is another case in which 
military prudence outbalanced revolutionary ambitions (Dombrowski/Ross 2003, 117). 
Although the new carrier was initiated as a very transformational project, the admirals, 
concerned over technological risks, increasingly reduced its revolutionary value. Only 
                                                             
359 In 2007, the first V-22 units joined the force. With a cost growth of 186 percent over the initial 
estimates and numerous accidents, opponents still argued that the Osprey was unreliable and too 
expensive to purchase in large numbers (GAO 2009, 9). But the Pentagon planned to buy 458 units 
mostly for the Marine Corps for $50.5 billion (Merle 2007). 
360
 Ironically, the Army’s previous turn to transformation in order to defend its shares had undercut its 
advocacy for the legacy system. The attempt to maintain an improved current force while moving towards 
a future force made trade-offs between the force development stages inevitable (GAO 2001). Even prior 
to Rumsfeld’s cutting attempts, the Army had reduced the procurement numbers for the Crusader from 
1,138 to 480. 
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pressure from OSD caused the Navy to incorporate some emerging technologies in the 
new carrier, but a transformative impact is unlikely.  
The vagueness of the transformation concept thereby helped the Services in their 
protection of the status quo. As Kagan (2006, 311) argued: “At the end of the day, 
something is ‘transformational’ if someone says it is, and not otherwise.” Hence, all 
Services fought for the life-saving transformation tab for their programs. When retired 
Air Force general McCarthy, who chaired the OSD’s review panel for weapon 
programs, announced that he considered the Navy’s DD-21 destroyer program to be not 
“truly transformational”, lawmakers from Mississippi and Maine quickly organized 
resistance (in Dao 2001c). Ingalls Shipyard and Bath Iron Works, which competed for 
the development contract, regarded the next-generation destroyer with unit costs of 
$750 million as vital for their future. Soon, they found a sympathetic member of the 
OSD review panel, retired admiral Arthur, who countered: “I certainly consider DD-21 
to be transformational.” Within days, McCarthy was forced to clarifying that he was not 
suggesting canceling or delaying the program. Thus, while the administration’s FY 
2003 request terminated the DD-21, its major elements were continued in the DD-X 
program, to design a series of smaller, faster, cheaper and more transformational surface 
vessels. Nonetheless, Dombrowski and Ross (2003, 117) concluded with regard to the 
Navy’s efforts: “For the Navy, it seems that thus far transformation means business as 
usual – incremental, evolutionary changes (…). There is no evident generation-
skipping.” The same held true for the Air Force and in parts for the Army, which 
wanted evolution and revolution at the same time. 
The Services’ strong preferences for stability and risk-aversion left the OSD with only 
two feasible options to realize transformation: Either to seek a politically risky 
showdown with the Services and lawmakers or evade tough decisions by significantly 
increasing defense budgets, allowing for transformation on top of the evolutionary 
programs. In the end, 9/11 decided the course. The GWOT opened the flood gates for 
defense spending and allowed for a limited and temporary coexistence of legacy 
programs and transformation. Hence, the FY 2003 provided increased financing for 
some of the administration’s favored programs, including the NMD program, which 
gained the second increase after FY 2002 and was successively increased to over $10 
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billion in FY 2005 (Adams/Williams 2010, 240-241; Graham 2002).
361
 Additionally, 
the budget included funds for advanced PGMs, communication and surveillance means, 
and the conversion of four Trident ballistic missile submarines to carry conventional 
cruise missiles (Vickers 2002). But the traditional programs continued to take the vast 
share of the acquisition budgets. For example, while $700 million of the increased R&D 
account were invested in the development of UAVs, the three tactical fighter programs 
gained $4.5 billion (Kosiak 2002, 14). Moreover, Vickers (2002) calculated that short-
range tactical fighters gained 20 times the spending of long-range bombers. And the 
funding for manned systems exceeded the funding for unmanned systems by more than 
12 to 1.  
 
The Crusader controversy 
There was little doubt that the growing costs of the legacy programs would push 
transformation aside sooner or later. The problem would be further amplified if public 
support for the defense buildup could not be sustained over a long time. Hence, 
Rumsfeld could not afford to give up his attempt to terminate unnecessary programs. In 
2002, the OSD started a second attack on the Crusader program. While the FY 2003 
budget request still provided money for the Crusader and DOD representatives testified 
in favor of the program in March, Rumsfeld suddenly canceled the program. The 
surprised Army begged for reconsideration and Wolfowitz directed Army Secretary 
White to prepare a study providing new arguments to save the Crusader from 
termination. Yet, on May 8, only a week into the 30 days period to prepare the study, 
the Defense Secretary announced the definite cancelation of the program. The furious 
Army leaders and United Defense reacted by rallying support for the program among 
lawmakers and the public (Tiboni 2003; Dao 2002b). Retired Army Chief Gordon 
                                                             
361 Senator Levin and other Democrats repeatedly challenged the NMD program. But 9/11 put the critics 
in a defensive position. Thus, Levin quickly withdrew his attempt to cut more than $1 billion for NMD 
from the FY 2002 and cleared the way for the pending bill after the attacks. In early 2002, he revealed 
during the hearings that none of the Chiefs had been informed on the NMD funding for FY 2003. This 
provided munitions for the critics, who argued that the President’s project was neither based on sound 
military considerations nor wanted by the branches. The Democrats in the SASC successively voted to 
transfer $812 million from missile defense to shipbuilding (Dao 2002b). In turn, the House approved 
more money than the administration had requested for NMD (Scarborough 2002). As in prior cases, the 
conference negotiated an agreement with the administration, which kept the money for shipbuilding and 
still reinserted the money for missile defense (Dewar 2002). In 2004, the administration deployed first 
elements of the system in Alaska and the Missile Defense Agency began limited defensive operations of 
its ballistic missile defense system.  
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Sullivan (2002) publically defended the Crusader in a Washington Post article and 
General Shinseki testified before the Senate that there was a genuine need for advanced 
organic indirect firepower (SASC 2002, 84). He warned that the cancelation increased 
the risk for ground troops. The Army even provided talking points in protection of the 
program for allies at Capitol Hill (Rumsfeld 2011, 652; Graham 2009, 332). Rumsfeld 
(2002) was forced to defend the cancelation in a New York Times article arguing “that 
we must forgo a system originally designed for a different strategic context to make 
room for more promising technologies that can accelerate the transformation of future 
warfare.” The Army shot back by reporting to Congress that replacement of the 
inconsiderately cut capability would cost $18-$24 billion over the next 14 years (Tiboni 
2003).  
Initially, it looked like the Crusader could indeed be saved, as SASC and little later the 
HASC voted to keep money for the Crusader in the FY 2003 defense authorization bill 
(Dao 2002a). Lawmakers were not enthusiastic about the OSD’s latest maneuver and 
Carl Levin, who set up hearings in the SASC, made clear that he neither welcomed 
“what appears to have been a zig-zag ad hoc decision-making process” nor approved 
DOD’s sidelining of Congress in this matter (SASC 2002, 3-4). Especially Senator 
James Inhofe (R) from Oklahoma, where the Crusader was to be manufactured, 
complained that the military leaders were barely informed or consulted prior to this 
decision and DOD therefore failed to reach a mature decision (SASC 2002, 11-13). But 
Congress backed down, after the White House warned Congress that an overriding of 
Rumsfeld’s decision would cause the President to veto the bill. Few lawmakers had 
enough political stakes in the program to risk a showdown with the popular 
administration. The OSD’s victory remained incomplete, however, since Congress 
redirected parts of the money freed towards development of a successive howitzer 
system rather than PGM’s as intended by Rumsfeld (Rumsfeld 2011, 651; Talmadge 
2006, 16; Scarborough 2002). Moreover, the termination came at high political costs. 
As one Pentagon official argued: “We were basically told by the White House after 
Crusader, ‘OK, you killed one. Don’t try it again; it’s too painful for us.” (in Graham 
2009, 333) 
Rumsfeld was infuriated by the whole episode and especially the Army’s aggressive 
attempt to save the system, which he considered an act close to insubordination and 
irreparably damaged his already strained relationships with the Army leadership 
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(Rumsfeld 2011, 652). Already prior to the high tide of the Crusader conflict, the name 
of the Army Vice Chief Jack Keane as Shinseki’s successor was leaked to the press 
(Graham 2009, 329; Cockburn 2007, 155). Although the causation leading to this 
revelation is not fully clear and Rumsfeld denies any participation (Rumsfeld 2011 
455), the leak, fourteen months before the end of Shinseki’s tenure, strongly weakened 
the obstructive Army chief in the conflict over transformation and the Crusader. Few 
months before Shinseki’s term ended, White was fired for his “narrow focus on and 
advocacy for the institutional interests of single service.” (Rumsfeld 2011, 652) When 
the Army Chief finally left, the vice chief and about a dozen two- and three-star 
generals retired with him, thus showing the tensions between the OSD and the Army 
(Scarborough 2004, 142). The subsequent appointment of retired General Peter 
Schoomaker, a strong supporter of transformation and former SOF commander, rather 
than Keane as Shinseki’s successor was seen by many as “a slap at the Army's serving 
‘conventional’ generals.” (Isby 2003; see also Kaplan 2003b) The new Army Chief 
indeed tried to speed up the transformation by cutting the interim step out of Shinseki’s 
three-tiered approach. At the same time, he deemphasized the emphasis on key enabling 
technologies and put new weight on implementing organizational change. As a 
Rumsfeld man, Shoomaker had a frosty reception within the Army, but was able to 
create increasing support for his reform agenda. 
In early 2004, the OSD achieved an easier termination success: The Army’s second 
major acquisition program to enhance the legacy force, the Comanche helicopter, shared 
the Crusader’s fate (Merle 2004). Schoomaker announced the termination of the 
program which had suffered multiple program problems and rising costs and had 
increasingly become a burden since its start in 1983 (Loeb 2002). While lawmakers 
from Connecticut reacted angrily, the termination was not seriously challenged. Indeed, 
the Army leadership wanted this termination, since its budget was heavily strained by 
the transformation programs and the Middle East deployment. And although the 
Comanche’s producers, Boeing and Sikorsky Aircraft, were disappointed by the 
decision, the economic damage was limited (Schneider 2004). The Army planned to 
invest the money freed in additional procurement of Apache helicopters, built by 
Boeing, and Black Hawk helicopters, manufactured by Sikorsky.  
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Transformation in an impasse 
Neither the two terminations nor the annual budget growth did end the transformers’ 
problems. Indeed, the OSD remained caught between three trends which increasingly 
strangled transformation efforts:  
(1) The persistence and growing costs of the legacy programs threatened to outgrow all 
other efforts. Already in 2003, defense industry groups and defense hawks inside and 
outside Capitol Hill warned that the budget increases were not large enough to sustain 
the current acquisition activity (Loeb 2003a). And while legacy and transformational 
programs alike struggled with cost overruns, the former continued to clearly outbalance 
the latter (Ricks/White 2004). Transformation proponents outside and inside the 
Pentagon complained in particular that still too many resources went into the manned 
tactical fighter programs rather than into long-range bombers, UAVs and space assets 
(Merle 2005; Bolkcom 2006). Already the initial strategic review in 2001 considered 
cutting the F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter, due to lacking strategic relevance and 
enormous costs (Isenberg/Eland 2002, 6). The GWOT further demonstrated the 
limitations of short-range airplanes, which are heavily dependent on suitable forward 
bases. During the hearings for FY 2005, HASC chairman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) told 
the Air Force Secretary Roche that “it is counterintuitive that, as we have lost basing 
and we have these big spaces to travel, our modernization program has on the average 
encompassed acquisition of aircraft with shorter and shorter legs – that is, almost no 
bombers; in fact, no bombers; lots of fighters.” (HASC 2004a, 494) With $690 million 
in development cost overruns and still no plane produced 10 years after full 
development was initiated, the Air Force F-22 took the bulk of the criticism. But 
Rumsfeld’s attempt to cancel the program ran into a huge campaign to save the F-22 
(Cordesman/Kaeser 2008, 13-18).
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 With 1,000 suppliers in 42 states, the Raptor had 
gained considerable economic and political weight and Congress preferred to keep the 
                                                             
362 The Air Force advanced the ground attack capabilities of the fighter to meet the criticism of strategic 
irrelevance despite a resulting overlap with the JSF’s capabilities (Merle 2005). Furthermore, based on 
suggestions by Lockheed Martin, the Air Force briefly considered the acquisition of a bomber version of 
the Raptor to meet the calls for long-range bombers (Bolkcom 2004).The initial idea for this plane 
designated FB-22 came from Lockheed Martin, which conducted an in-house study on the feasibility of a 
bomber version. Such a solution would allow the Air Force to protect the F-22 project and still meet the 
demand for long-range capabilities. With additional range and more bomb-carrying capacity, the FB-22 
should serve as an interim bomber until a new bomber generation could be fielded around 2037. Critics 
argued that the range and payload of the hybrid plane would still be significantly below the current 
bombers. The Air Force did not push the FB-22 beyond the conceptual stage, but the considerations 
helped nonetheless to calm the fears of a bomber gap. 
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program untouched. Hence, the OSD was only able to reduce the numbers of planned F-
22 procurements to 183, but failed to terminate the program (Wayne 2006).
363
 The other 
major fighter programs, the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the 
procurement of the F/A-18E/F, faced less opposition (Gertler 2009; Cordesman/Kaeser 
2008, 19-25). Cost overruns of about one third for each program were moderate in 
comparison to the F-22. Hence, procurement numbers, especially of the F-35, were 
reduced, but the programs not fundamentally questioned (GAO 2009, 9).
364
 With the 
dominance of the fighter programs, the need for bombers was marginalized. By 2009, 
long-range bombers accounted for only 6 percent of the Air Force fleet and only 1 
percent of the attack forces were able “to penetrate heavily defended, deep inland 
targets.” (Ehrhard 2009, 15) 
(2) The growing difficulties in the GWOT created a strong incentive to refocus on the 
current needs and put the strategic vision of transformation in doubt. Weeks before the 
Iraq invasion, John Spratt (D-SC) summed up the coming dilemma: “[Y]ou see right 
now, in today’s world that you have got to have a legacy force that can fight. You can’t 
take a transformed force over there yet.” (HBC 2003, 62) Thus, although the war efforts 
were financed through supplemental accounts and had little direct impact on the 
acquisition funding, the Service leaders as well as Congress became more reluctant to 
take a risk with regard to military acquisition. Moreover, the counterinsurgency raised 
fundamental questions about whether the transformers’ vision suited the most likely 
future battlefield (Talmadge 2006, 16-17). For example, there were doubts that the light 
and mobile Stryker vehicle, one of the Army’s two remaining major acquisition 
projects, was suitable for deployment in irregular operations. The Army had ordered 
2,131 comparatively cheap and light off-the-shelf Stryker vehicles over six years in 
2000, to become the nucleus of its interim force (Adams 2006, 128; Shanker 2003b). 
Yet, when Shinseki unveiled the first US manufactured Stryker in April 2002, tests 
showed that it neither provided protection against heavy machine-gun fire nor met the 
weight requirements for C-130 airlifts. After rumors of a cancelation of the Stryker 
program circulated within the DOD in summer 2002, a Pentagon paper in fall suggested 
cutting the number of Stryker brigades in half. A hard fought compromise in November 
                                                             
363 The first F/A-22s were declared operational in 2005. In 2009, the GAO (2009, 9) calculated an overall 
195 percent cost growth from the initial program estimates. 
364 The Navy decided in 2003 to reduce its procurement from 1,089 to 680 F-35s, reducing the overall 
procurement numbers to 2500. Additional planes are expected to be purchased by several US allies. 
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reestablished the original 6 brigades, but did not end the Stryker’s problems. GAO 
reports (2003a; 2004a) in successive years warned that the deployment of Stryker 
brigades within 4 days as initially proposed by Army Chief Shinseki was highly 
unrealistic and many considered the Stryker as completely unsuitable for Iraq, as it 
remained vulnerable to heavy machine gun fire and rocket-propelled grenades.
365
 SASC 
chairman Warner (R-VA) complained that the Stryker turned out to be “a somewhat 
better-than-average armored truck and less deployable than some of the tracked vehicles 
it was to replace.” (in Adams 2006, 195-196)  
(3) Transformation struggled with its own ambitions, as virtually all major 
transformation programs ran into severe technological problems and cost overruns. The 
Future Combat System, the second remaining major Army program, went clearly too far 
in pushing for transformational capabilities (Feickert 2009b). Although the FCS had 
strong political backing by Rumsfeld, soaring costs and questions of technological 
feasibility put the program under considerable pressure (Weiner 2005). After prototype 
development was launched in 2000, the Army hoped to start with engineering and 
manufacturing development in 2006 and having the first unit ready for combat in 2010 
(Tiboni 2004; Adams 2006, 74-75). Right from the start, the GAO (2001; 2003b, 2) 
warned that the Army was overly optimistic with regard to the technologies, 
development schedules and cost estimates. In fact, the estimated costs of $91.4 billion 
in 2003 increased to more than $200 billion by 2006 and the FCS dominated the Army’s 
entire acquisition budget for the coming years (Kaeser/Cordesman 2009, 2). In 2004, 
after the GAO issued another critical report on the FCS, the Army announced that it 
would equip soldiers with four FCS components by 2008 and three more by 2012, but 
the first full system would not be ready before 2014 (Tiboni 2004). A major downside 
was an estimated additional cost of 25 percent due to the delay. But the program 
involved more than 550 contractors and subcontractors in 41 states by the time and was 
continued despite the cost overruns and technological problems (Klein 2007). Davis 
(2010, 27) concluded in hindsight: “That such a flawed concept was approved for 
                                                             
365 When US forces invaded Iraq, no Stryker brigade was ready to participate due to development delays 
and numerous technical difficulties (O’Reilly 2003). The first Stryker brigade, finally deployed to Iraq in 
later summer, highlighted the difficult trade-off between mobility and armor. The Stryker faced 
survivability problems without additional passive protection systems, which in turn pushed its weight 
above the C-130 lifting capacities and reduced its overall flexibility (Adams 2006, 175). Nonetheless, the 
Stryker proved less vulnerable than the light Humvee and was faster and more silent than the heavier M2 
Bradley. 
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development is still seen by many inside the defense community as a failure of civilian 
leadership – essentially a fiasco.”366 
The Navy fared hardly better (Kaeser/Cordesman 2008). Its major development 
program resulting from the DD(X) project, the DDG-1000 Zumwalt class destroyer, 
took a difficult course. Although the program’s transformational value was dubious in 
parts, the Navy hoped to develop a radical different type of stealthy destroyer to 
enhance expeditionary capabilities by creating additional fire support. Yet, the 
ambitious project came under early fire by Congress and military experts who criticized 
a bad cost-benefit ratio (Gugliotta 2004; Labs 2003, xiv-xv). Indeed, the unit costs 
doubled between 2001 and 2006, while the planned procurement numbers dropped from 
32 to 7.
367
 In 2008, the GAO (2008, 69) reported that critical technologies for the DDG-
1000 were not available or would reach maturity only after their installation on the ship. 
As additional analyses warned that the new destroyer was vulnerable to a range of 
missiles, Navy decided to cancel the Zumwalt-class program after only two ships and to 
resume procurement of the older but much cheaper Arleigh-Burke-class destroyer 
(Smith/Nakashima 2009).
368
  
The admirals’ most innovative new weapon platform, the littoral combat ship, did not 
only expand the Navy’s capabilities by its focus on the littoral, it also reflected the 
transformational call for less sophisticated and relatively cheap modular dual-use 
platforms (Montgomery 2006).
369
 Given the support of the civil and military 
leadership
370
 and the program’s dual-use nature, the littoral combat ship program made 
                                                             
366 Defense Secretary Gates put additional pressure on the Army to cut components of the FCS in 2009. 
The Army responded by announcing a program overhaul. It canceled the light armored ground vehicle 
planned to replace the heavy tanks and troop transporters (Hedgpeth 2009). 
367 The CBO argued that the Navy’s cost projections were still too optimistic and estimated average unit 
costs of $3.8 billion, a billion more than the Navy plan (Labs 2006, 18-19). 
368 The DOD finally agreed to build a third destroyer under pressure from a group of lawmakers, who 
threatened to cut all funding for surface ships if the decision was not reversed. 
369 In contrast to the Navy’s other multi-purpose ships, the LCS is a focused-mission ship, which can be 
equipped with different modular packages to perform one mission at a time. 
370 The intellectual foundations for littoral ships were already laid in the late 1980s and 1990s by 
Cebrowski and other progressive naval thinkers (Long/Johnson 2007). They argued that vessels operating 
in littoral areas faced higher risks, such as mines, small boats with anti-ship missiles. Therefore, the loss 
of one of the large multi-purpose ships would not only cause disproportional economic costs but also a 
heavy tactical damage. Hughes and Cebrowski promoted a so-called Streetfighter force based on a class 
of small, cheap, fast, and networked class of largely unmanned ships, which would interact on a modular 
basis (Long/Johnson 2007). Hence, the overall combat power would suffer little from the destruction of 
one ship. Friedman (2009, 87) argued that the OSD and Cebrowski had probably forced the project on the 
Navy, which was concerned that the LCS would distract resources from its favorite systems (Morgan 
2003). Yet, the Navy leaders soon saw the low-budget LCSs as the only option to increase the size of the 
fleet against the backdrop of growing budget pressures, the GWOT, and demands for transformation 
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initially good progress. When prototype construction began in 2004, the Navy hoped for 
a rapid development and procurement process and planned to buy 55 LCSs, accounting 
for about 18 percent of the Navy’s force structure (O’Rourke 2010, 3; Cloud 2005). Yet, 
as the costs for the first two ships almost tripled between 2004 and 2007, the Navy 
canceled the four successive ships scheduled for FY 2006 and FY 2007 (O’Rourke 
2010, 36). Moreover, since the LCS was sought as much for its contribution to the Navy 
size as for its transformational impact, the Navy was not ambitious to stay within the 
initial parameters. Thus, critics argued that the Littoral Combat Ships moved 
increasingly towards other conventional Navy vessels. The final product is significantly 
larger and more expensive than hoped for and planned to replace frigates and mine 
hunters, which the Navy will retire by 2015.  
Only the development of unmanned systems is a decisive innovation and clear success 
for the transformation. Indeed, drones had a major advantage over other transformation 
programs: Their value for the GWOT was clearly evident. Hence, UAVs gained 
immediate relevance and enormous popularity as means for reconnaissance and 
surveillance but also air strikes (Grant 2005, 47; Brzezinski 2003).
371
 After initial 
skepticism, the success of the Air Force’s drones Predator and Global Hawk over 
Afghanistan inspired the other branches to develop their own drones for the so-called 
“dull, dirty and dangerous” missions (OSD 2005b, 1). Senator Warner (R-VA) observed 
with some surprise: “For a long time, the only thing most generals could agree on was 
that they didn’t want any unmanned vehicles. Now everyone wants as many as they can 
get.” (in Duhigg 2007) Numerous systems of different sizes, specifications and 
operational environments entered development and operations. Besides some ground 
and water drones, especially UAV acquisition was booming. The funding for UAV’s 
increased from $360 million in 2001 to $2.3 billion in 2005 and the armed forces 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(Work 2003, 47). Thus, while the CNOs Clark and Mullen would have preferred additional multi-purpose 
ships, they acted as vocal advocates of the only fiscally and politically feasible ship. 
371 During the 1990s, the development of UAVs had made only slow progress. Although the naval forces 
and the Army successfully used Pioneer drones for reconnaissance and surveillance missions in Desert 
Storm and RMA supporters strongly endorsed this kind of platforms, the Services showed little interest to 
accelerate UAV development (for the history of UAVs in the DOD see Ehrhard 2000). To be sure, the 
Predator UAV, developed by DARPA, was tested as an experimental program over Bosnia in 1994-1995 
(O’Hanlon 2003). Initially operated by Army and CIA personnel, which sought to develop organic 
reconnaissance means, Air Force chief Fogelman personally intervened to make the Predator an Air Force 
system (Weiner 2009, 113). After a year-long battle with the Army, the Air Force succeeded and Predator 
development was transferred to the flyers. But this conflict over the Predator did not indicate the 
breakthrough of UAVs within the DOD. In contrast, the potential of UAVs was still hardly understood by 
the Services, which devoted comparatively little attention to the program (Wheatley 2006, 53-55). 
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operated over 1,200 small UAVs and over 200 tactical and theater UAVs by 2005 
(HASC 2006b, 4).
372
 The Services’ efforts resulted in as many as 19 different 
operational UAV systems and 17 UAV development programs. Political and military 
actors soon started to call for a central coordination of the UAV acquisition and 
deployment to avoid duplication, waste and accidents (Scarborough 2005; Grant 2005). 
Curt Weldon (R-PA) warned during hearings on the UAV programs that there was no 
way to “justify 35 to 40 different UAV programs” to the taxpayer (in HASC 2006b, 2).  
Efforts to achieve greater efficiency were complicated by interservice competition 
resembling earlier struggles over supposedly seminal technologies, however (Duhigg 
2007). Attempts by Air Force Chief Jumper to end the “tribal jealousies” by making the 
Air Force the executive agent for UAVs failed (in Dudney 2005, 2). Instead, the 
Pentagon decided to establish a Joint Center for Excellence under the command of an 
Army general and issued a UAV roadmap to provide additional guidance for the 
Services (OSD 2005b). While this constituted a significant progress, it did not end the 
Service competition for UAVs (Grant 2007).
373
 At the same time, the UAV 
development did not escape the competition with other major acquisition programs. 
Hence, the ‘crown jewel’ of UAV development, the joint Unmanned Combat Air 
System to develop a family of unmanned tactical fighter, bombers and spy planes, was 
named for termination in the QDR 2006 (Rumsfeld 2006, 46; Scarborough 2005). The 
money freed was redirected in a long-range strategic bomber to be fielded in 2018. 
Thus, one potential transformation program was cannibalized for another. In budgetary 
terms, drone development remained a relative small effort. And the Pentagon made 
clear early on that it would not be able to reach the congressionally mandated goal of 
one-third unmanned aircraft anytime soon (Klein 2002, 109). 
Overall transformation remained limited. Byron K. Callan, a military industry analyst, 
commented against the backdrop of the FY 2004 request: “The most interesting thing 
about this administration and Pentagon is that there has been a lot of talk, but action 
only at the margin.” (in Wayne 2002) And despite increased efforts in UAV, PGM, and 
                                                             
372 Major systems were the Air Force’s Predator and Global Hawk, the naval forces’ Pioneer, and the 
Army’s Hunter and Shadow (Dudney 2005, 2). 
373
 Especially the Army and the Air Force continued to battle over the responsibility for medium- and 
high-altitude UAVs. The Air Force questioned the Army’s acquisition of upgraded Predator drones, 
called Warrior, and called for a consolidation under Air Force control. Yet, the Army was distrustful of 
the Air Force’s assurance that it would provide the surveillance for all branches and pushed for organic 
UAVs.  
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C
4ISR technologies, Kosiak (2006, 6) argued that the administration’s transformation 
efforts, “appear to fall short in a number of important respects.” A renewed chance to 
change the acquisition course was missed during the 2006 QDR (Ratnam 2005; Kitfield 
2005). The Washington Post commented on the outcome of the QDR: “The signature 
effort of Rumsfeld’s historic tenure – his ‘transformation’ of the world’s most powerful 
military – melted away under the cover of the imposing Quadrennial Defense Review.” 
(Von Drehle 2006) While the Army had made steps towards transformation and got 
stuck in technological problems and the requirements of the GWOT, the Air Force had 
resisted far-reaching steps from the start. And looking at the overall balance of Navy’s 
transformation efforts, HASC ranking Republican Hunter (R-CA) told the naval leaders 
in late 2007: “You have had the opportunity to embrace transformation and you have 
chosen not to.” (in HASC 2007, 3) 
 
Summary 
By the end of Bush’s presidency, the DOD’s acquisition process was in a precarious 
situation. Besides the general doubts whether the new systems were of much use in 
future conflicts, most major systems struggled with technological difficulties and faced 
significant cost overruns (Hunter in HASC 2007, 3). The planned weapon acquisition 
investments had doubled from $750 billion to almost $1.5 trillion between 2001 and 
2007. Flournoy and Brimley (2008, 68) argued in 2008 that the Air Force budget is “on 
the verge of being broken”, due to its modernization program. Overburdened by 
constant deployments and soaring expenses in all accounts, the Air Force’s readiness 
dropped by 17 percent between 2001 and 2007 and the flyers warned of a situation 
“worse than the hollow force.” (Scully 2007) The Navy’s acquisition policy was also 
“in serious disarray” as there was little hope that the admirals’ would be able to finance 
their programs in the long run (Kaeser/Cordesman 2008, 2) For the Army, it remained 
uncertain whether it could sustain the FCS’ funding and whether the resulting means 
would prove valuable on the battlefield. Kaeser and Cordesman (2008, 27) concluded: 
“In retrospect, one wonders if trying to rush forward to use technology to try to solve all 
military problems on the basis of requirements tailored more to the legacy of the Cold 
War than an era of irregular warfare did not do the entire process of US force planning 
more harm than good.” 
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While the GWOT and the exaggerated ambitions of the transformers clearly influenced 
this ambivalent outcome, direct societal influence again contributed by providing legacy 
programs with a high level of persistency. The OSD proved rarely able to overcome the 
Services’ stability bias backed by the defense economy and its supporters in Congress. 
Hence, even in a war situation, the change of major programs that have reached a 
certain economic relevance and is therefore based on a large number of societal stake 
holders implies considerable political costs. While this secures the defense industrial 
base and provides for gradual modernization, it strongly reduces the leverage for 
strategic adjustments and makes innovation unlikely. 
 
6.2.4. Military doctrine & Service mission statement 
6.2.4.1. Builddown 
Recurring interservice conflicts and jointness 
By the end of the Cold War, the military forces looked back at 40 years of doctrine & 
mission statement formulation with increasingly sophisticated, more or less plausible 
answers to the Soviet threat. Fighting the Warsaw Pact and its agents had defined 
Service preparations and to a large extent justified their existence. Against this 
backdrop, the changing international environment and the successive transition brought 
issues that had been mostly settled for a long time back to the fore and forced the 
Services to fundamentally rethink their purpose.  
The explosive issue of roles and missions, which had hardly been touched since the 
1950s, returned to the agenda. Already the Goldwater-Nichols-Act had provided the 
CJCS with more authority to promote joint thinking and develop joint doctrine in order 
to improve cross Service cooperation, reduce duplications and create a more efficient 
military force. Yet hardly any progress with regard to improved jointness had been 
achieved by the end of the Cold War. Although the successful operations in Panama and 
Iraq were praised as examples of improved jointness, the Service leaders preferred to 
emphasize their superior contribution rather than joint efforts. Against the backdrop of 
the upcoming transition, no branch was willing to concede advantages to the other 
Services. In summer 1992, Nunn forcefully raised the roles and missions issue by 
starting an attack on what he considered numerous duplications and lacking jointness 
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within the military (Lancaster 1992). The Georgia Senator criticized unclear 
responsibilities and called on Powell to address these questions in his next roles and 
missions report. He questioned whether it was truly efficient that each Service had its 
own air force rather than consolidating the resources in one branch. The political 
pressure for more jointness continued to mount, as Clinton picked up Nunn’s complaint 
during the election campaign (Gordon 1992): “We have four separate air forces – one 
each for the Marines, Army, Navy and Air Force. (…) Both the Army and Marines have 
light infantry divisions. (…) We can reduce redundancies, save billions of dollars, and 
get better teamwork.” (in Gellman1993) 
CJCS Powell, who worked within the DOD to improve joint thinking,
374
 picked up the 
political actors’ calls, but it soon turned out that the issue had not lost its explosiveness. 
When CJCS Powell circulated the modestly ambitious first draft for his triennial Report 
on Assignment of Roles and Missions in December 1992, it caused heated internal 
debates with the military leaders, which opposed Powell’s reform suggestions as too 
far-reaching. As in previous builddowns, the branches were eager to protect their shares 
and the CJCS was forced to drop numerous suggestions to find an acceptable 
compromise (Gordon 1993a; New York Times 1993). The recommendations to 
consolidate all space operations under the Air Force, to transfer the Air Force Special 
Operations helicopters to the Army, and to consolidate the C-130 transport fleet under 
Air Force and Marine Corps command were dropped. Moreover, rather than giving the 
Navy the responsibility to provide all air support for the Marines, the final report made 
close air support a primary function of all four Services.  
Nunn commented on the report: “I think there are two Colin Powell reports. Phase one 
report really was what I think he believed and phase two was what he compromised in 
order to get it through the chiefs.” (in Chiarelli 1993, 77) While the report fell clearly 
short of the expectations, the Clinton administration, already deep in the battle over the 
ban of homosexuals, refrained from further pushing into the armed forces most sacred 
field (Gellman 1993a). But Congress was not willing to give up and directed the 
establishment of an independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) in its FY 
1994 Defense Authorization Act. The commission was instructed to “review (…) the 
                                                             
374 Powell instituted Joint Force Quarterly magazine to support joint thinking and sought a joint doctrine 
going beyond AirLand Battle in 1993 (Adams 2006, 32; Lederman 1999, 103). Furthermore, the Atlantic 
Command was assigned the role of supervising joint training and cooperation in 1993 and renamed to 
Joint Forces Command in 1999. 
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appropriateness (…) of the current allocations of roles, missions, and functions among 
the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make 
recommendations for change.” (CORM 1995, ES-1) In its final report CORM refrained 
from suggesting formal changes to the Key West assignments, but emphasized the 
importance of jointness for military operations. Thus, the report recommended “that the 
Chairman of the JCS propose a unified vision for joint operations to the Secretary of 
Defense (…); integrate support to CINCs (…); improve joint doctrine development.” 
(CORM 1995, ES-3)  
With the CORM recommendations, jointness became a political imperative and DOD 
picked up the call. After fierce Service parochialism had previously prevented far-
reaching joint doctrine, Shalikashvili, in cooperation with the Joint Chiefs and CINCs, 
developed the Joint Vision 2010 document, published in 1996 (JCS 1996; Link 1996). 
Joint Vision was formulated as the “conceptual template (…) to achieve new levels of 
effectiveness in joint warfighting.” (JCS 1996, 1) Relying strongly on early RMA 
thinking, it outlined four operational concepts to turn information superiority in military 
effects: (1) ‘Dominant maneuver’ sought to control battlespace and time through 
synchronized joint capabilities; (2) ‘Precision engagement’ called for a most efficient 
connection between target identification, information processing, effect generation and 
evaluation; (3) ‘Full-dimensional protection’ was concerned with proactively denying 
future opponents’ opportunities for action by harnessing the enhanced awareness and 
control of the battlespace; (4) ‘Focused logistics’ finally sought to provide fast, 
responsive, flexible, and precise logistics for all kind of operations. The joint 
application of these four concepts with adequate forces would provide full spectrum 
dominance for the US forces.  
Joint Vision 2010 and its quite similar successor Joint Vision 2020
375
 in 2000 were 
widely considered milestones in the conceptual formulation of jointness and RMA 
thinking beyond technology (Shelton 2010, 269). But supporters of joint thinking had 
much reason to complain: “Parochialism, not cooperation, remains the watchword 
despite the common deference to jointness.” (Macgregor 2000, 18, see also Owens 
2000, 152-164) Indeed, while the Services publically praised the joint vision and 
                                                             
375 Apart from the schedule, Joint Vision 2020 largely confirmed Joint Vision 2010. While strategic 
analysis in Joint Vision 2020 put more weight on the risk of asymmetric responses to the US forces’ full 
spectrum dominance, it implicitly continued to assume regular conflicts. 
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refrained from publications, which would have made an impression of parochialism, the 
Services neither agreed on the nature of further joint doctrine nor retreated from 
parochial claims in order to support effective jointness (Lovelace/Young 1996, 98).
376
 
Putting the joint vision in a Service perspective, each branch was quick in “portraying 
itself as the dominant force and first among equals.” (Adams 2006, 43) And each 
Service produced its own vision document on the basis of the joint vision’s conceptual 
template, which emphasized its indispensable contribution to national defense (DOA 
1996; DOAF 1996). Macgregor (2000, 20) complained that “Joint Vision 2010 and 
Joint Vision 2020 are simply bumper stickers for single-service programs and do not 
prevent competing service requirements from dominating joint integration efforts.”  
 
The Navy’s turn to an expeditionary mission 
At the same time, the struggle for joint doctrine spurred the formulation of Service 
doctrines. Since joint doctrine should flow from Service doctrine, each branch was 
eager to provide a clear and convincing picture of its contribution to be taken into 
account during joint doctrine formulation (Fogleman 1996, 40). On a more general 
level, the Services were well aware that a clear vision of the future mission and a 
convincing rationale for the own capabilities would be necessary to secure shares of the 
decreasing budget and protect programs from termination. With the likelihood of total 
war decreasing, all Services pushed into the mission of Desert Storm-like regional 
conflicts, which emerged as the high-end operations in the new threat environment. 
Given the disappearance of the geographical focus of war planning and the emergence 
of an undisputed American command of the commons, sea, air and space, the Services 
were particularly eager to highlight their contributions to operations penetrating hostile 
territory everywhere on very short notice. Therefore, they elaborated ways to exploit the 
command of the commons to rapidly overcome anti-access and area denial strategies 
                                                             
376 The process of joint doctrine formulation contributed to its lacking cohesive force: The Joint Staff 
delegated the drafting of doctrine to a lead Service, which could shape the development process in its 
interests. Regardless of the actual amount of parochialism within the final product, the other Services 
were highly suspicious and felt unobligated by these ‘joint’ products. Even the Joint Staff was included in 
the tribal thinking. Thus, an article in the Air Force’s Airpower Journal stated: “Given that the four 
services provide the officers who make up the joint staff, it should not be a surprise that joint doctrine is 
no better than Navy, Army, and Marine Corps doctrine when it comes to recognizing how air power can 
dominate the conduct of war.” (Bingham 1991) Since no branch was willing to compromise on its claims 
and suspected the other Services to work for their own advantages, an effective allocation of 
responsibilities was virtually impossible.  
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and succeed in these contested zones. The concepts outlined in Joint Vision thereby 
provided all Services with guidance towards a more RMA inspired thinking towards the 
end of the decade. But while the branches developed sophisticated conventional answers 
to the expeditionary challenge, the competing doctrine formulations failed to adapt to 
the numerous unconventional, low-intensity operations, which characterized most of its 
activity in the first post-Cold War decade.  
Not unlike in the post-World War II situation, early reorientation was imperative for the 
Navy. Its Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, which planned for a sea and air war with 
Soviet forces and strategic attacks, rapidly lost relevance by 1990 (Friedman 2009, 78-
79). Goldwater-Nichols had granted more autonomy to the CINCs in selecting their 
forces and therefore introduced a new element of competition in the DOD. The Navy 
painfully experienced this shift during Desert Storm, when General Schwarzkopf 
predominantly relied on the Air Force instead of naval aviation for ground attacks 
(Owens 2000, 165; Wolfe 1995, 40). The Navy responded to its apparent relevance 
problem by defining a new niche for itself. Beginning with its white paper ‘…From the 
Sea’ in 1992, the Navy turned from maritime to littoral operations and the Marines 
Corps from land-based to sea-based power projection (Hattendorf 2005; Tritten 1995a). 
To have a strong stance in the role and missions debates, the naval forces picked an 
extensive definition of the littoral region. It included “areas adjacent to the oceans and 
seas that are within direct control of and vulnerable to the striking power of sea-based 
forces.” (DON 1994b, preface) With the focus on the littoral, capabilities for global 
forward presence, inland power projection, and operations in coastal area-denial 
environments moved to the center. At the same time, it implied a revitalization of the 
naval forces’ operational partnership. As Work (2003, 32) said: “[T]he Navy had to 
once again think of the Marines as part of the battle fleet’s main battery, and about 
reallocating assets to support them. (…) [T]he Marines had to rediscover the art of 
large, sea-based operations not reliant on land-based ports and airfields.”  
Implementation of this far-reaching refocusing within the DON was far from easy. 
Tritten (1995a, 113), academic advisor to the Navy’s Doctrine Division, warned: 
“Shifting from open-ocean operations to joint littoral warfare will be as traumatic as 
moving from battleships to carriers.” Therefore, ‘…From the Sea’ announced the 
establishment of a Naval Doctrine Command to support the changes by formulating 
doctrine for the Navy and the Marine Corps. The new command soon produced the 
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naval forces’ first ever written capstone doctrine Naval Warfare, which transferred the 
strategic vision of ‘…From the Sea’ in doctrine (DON 1994a; Barr 1994, 6).377 Naval 
Warfare was a balancing act of careful reorientation towards a brown water Navy and 
assertion of the naval forces’ history, traditions and enduring identity. Although the 
Navy leaders made sure that the new focus did neither imply an abandonment of prior 
missions nor a significant departure from the existing force posture, suspicions within 
the organization were strong and especially Navy traditionalists disliked the departure 
from the distance-strike Navy (Hoffman 2008, 6). Therefore, the Naval Warfare 
doctrine sought a reconcilable language and renewed command of the sea and the 
related focus on high sea battle as the Navy’s major concerns.  
Moreover, the Navy published ‘Forward …From the Sea’, which succeeded the 1992 
White Paper in 1994 (DON 1994b). The new White Paper did not depart from the 
importance of the new expeditionary role, but created more of a balance by reinforcing 
the crucial role of forward presence missions.
378
 While allied forward bases were 
readily available during the Cold War, the availability of secure land bases became a 
crucial issue in the new approach of global power projection. The Navy pointed out its 
major advantage over the other Services in this new situation, since its vessels could 
serve as swimming bases, permanently present in approximation to critical regions 
without needing foreign permission. This forward presence would provide stability in 
deterring aggression and rapid response options if a conflict emerged. 
 
The Army between high-intensity and low-intensity operations 
The Army found itself in an ambivalent situation by the beginning of the transition 
(Jackson 2009). On the one hand, its focus on a Soviet attack on Europe became 
obsolete. More than the other Services, the Army had concentrated its efforts on this 
                                                             
377 The U.S. Marine Corps (1996) issued the concept paper Operational Maneuver from the Sea 
discussing the implications of ‘…From the Sea’ for the Marines. The paper clearly placed the Marine 
Corps in the context of littoral warfare: “The centerpiece of out preparations for the future is an approach 
to expeditionary, littoral and amphibious warfare.” (U.S. Marine Corps 1996 ,5) In a move to embrace the 
RMA, Operational Maneuver from the Sea departed from the traditional task of securing bridge heads for 
troops and supply. Instead, it called for the Marines to bypass the beach or at least significantly reduce the 
buildup phases and rapidly move against centers of gravity. 
378 ‘Forward …from the Sea’ also spelled out the Navy’s contribution across the spectrum of conflicts 
after the Cold War in more detail, but contributed little additional aspects. Friedman (2009, 81) argued 
that “Clinton’s Secretary of Navy, John Dalton wanted a strategy document not written under a 
Republican, however similar to the last strategy.” 
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single scenario formalized in the AirLand Battle doctrine, which had guided its 
revitalization after Vietnam (for a critic see Bolger 1989). The dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the growing importance of MOOTW put this earlier focus in doubt. On the 
other hand, from the Army point of view, AirLand Battle doctrine was successfully 
executed in Grenada 1983, in Panama 1989, and most prominently in Iraq 1991.
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Hence, military victory seemed to confirm the AirLand Battle doctrine’s concepts 
beyond the Cold War scenario (Scales 1993, 12-15, 24-27). In fact, Desert Storm 
marked for many officers the final relief from its self-doubts since Vietnam and was 
thus a watershed for the Army. The incentive to maintain this successful and important 
doctrine was strong. Hence, Army Chief Sullivan’s attempts to foster substantial Army 
reform through doctrinal innovation did not produce the hoped for results. To be sure, 
the 1993 FM 100-5 met the changed political focus by extending the scope of 
operations to all kinds of contingencies including MOOTW. But despite the adjustments 
and the rhetoric commitment that ground forces should be able to conduct all kinds of 
missions there is little doubt that MOOTW remained an appendage to forward presence 
and technology-heavy conventional war in the tradition of AirLand Battle. In contrast to 
the Navy’s conception of forward presence, the Army argued that only land force 
deployment could provide credible deterrence for aggressors and thus regional stability 
(Rhodes 1999).  
Desert Storm rather than Restore Hope or any other low-intensity operation became the 
model for further force preparation. The plan to turn boxers into decathletes was highly 
ambitious to begin with and other factors further encouraged a continuous conventional 
focus: (1) There existed strong concerns within the Army of corrupting the basic Army 
purpose and stance in the resource battles by overemphasizing MOOTW (Schook 
1997). These operations did neither fulfill the conditions outlined in the Weinberger-
Powell-Doctrine nor match the operational guidelines in the AirLand Battle Doctrine 
and were therefore unattractive for the ground forces. Moreover, low-intensity, low-tech 
operations were hardly suited to hold one’s own in the budget battles. Hence, a stronger 
commitment to MOOTW could have threatened the Army’s position vis-à-vis the other 
Services in claiming the major role in regional conflicts.  
                                                             
379 There is considerable doubt, however, that the Army’s performance in Grenada and Panama indeed 
resembled AirLand Battle doctrine (Kretchik 2001, 206, 213). 
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(2) The collapse of the mission in Somalia had two conflicting effects on Army 
thinking. On the one hand, it proved the increased importance of MOOTW and the need 
for a more distinct treatment of them in doctrine (e.g. Duffield 1999, 44-45). The 1993 
FM 100-5 seemed too unspecific and inflexible for the missions of the 1990s, which 
blurred the distinction between war and operations other than war (Kretchik 2001). 
Therefore, preparations for a new doctrine started in 1995 under the new Army Chief 
Reimer. But internal quarrels and changing supervisors prevented the publication of a 
new manual for the rest of the decade. On the other hand and more importantly, the 
political pressure on the Army to prepare for MOOTW decreased. After the Somalia 
disaster, the Democrats’ enthusiasm for assertive multilateralism significantly cooled 
down and the government became much more cautious of ground troop deployment for 
MOOTW (Dobbins 2007, 147-149). Like the Weinberger-Powell-Doctrine, Clinton’s 
Presidential Decision Directives 25 in early 1994 tied US peacekeeping contributions to 
numerous demanding conditions including public and congressional support (White 
House 1994; MacFarlane 2002, 61-62; Ucko 2009, 49). With these severe political 
restrictions, which limited MOOTW to only the lowest risk military involvements, the 
pressure for the Army to treat these missions as requiring specific preparations 
vanished: It was always more prudent to prepare for the high-end of the conflict 
spectrum. Hence, the Army wrote about and conducted MOOTW, but focused most of 
its efforts on the preparation of conventional war.
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At the same time, the Army sought to become more of an expeditionary force. It had 
learned from the Iraq War that strategic responsiveness on a truly global scale could 
only be achieved by improved mobility.
381
 Therefore, already the 1993 FM 100-5 
admitted the dependence on transport capabilities and highlighted Service 
interdependence stronger than prior doctrine. By the second half of the decade, new 
technologies and the RMA promises were tested in order to create a more agile and 
                                                             
380 The Marine Corps spent more efforts on low-intensity operations. With support from Commandant of 
the Marine Corps Krulak, the Marines initiated the program Urban Warrior, experimenting combat 
operations, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief in an urban environment. Krulak (1999, 79) argued that 
“the threat in the early years of the next century will not be the ‘son of Desert Storm’ – it will be the 
‘stepchild of Chechnya’.” Nonetheless, the Marines’ focus remained on conventional operations from the 
sea. 
381 Especially the slow deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia prior to Desert Storm revealed a limited 
mobility. During the initial six month of preparation and before heavy equipment arrived in significant 
numbers, US forces were highly vulnerable to potential Iraqi attacks. As long as war planning focused on 
the East-West-frontier, the limited mobility could be offset by forward presence of heavy forces in 
Europe and Korea. But the new regional focus demanded the ability to project capabilities in every region 
with little prior warning. 
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leaner response force. Army Chief Reimer initiated the Army After Next (AAN) 
program, linking the short-term adaption of new technologies tested in the Force XXI 
project to a long-term vision of Army warfare between 2020 and 2025. The program 
sought to develop insights for future operational concepts and force requirements by 
studies and war games. AAN again highlighted the strategic mobility as a major 
weakness in the force posture. In 1997, Major General Robert Scales, who led the AAN 
program, concluded: “If the Army is to remain relevant to the security needs of the 
nation we must begin now to accelerate the speed with which we can project legitimate, 
powerful and balanced forces to threatened regions overseas.” (Scales 2001, xxii) 
Hence, he recommended the reorganization of the ground forces in leaner and thus more 
easily deployable units. By exploiting the promises of RMA technology, these brigade-
size forces would still be highly sustainable and lethal in theater. As an anchor against 
the slide towards becoming a MOOTW force, this AAN vision, which centrally 
contributed to Shinseki’s objective force vision in 1999, clearly focused on 
conventional operation requirements (Jackson 2009, 49-50).  
 
The Air Force’s claim for the rapid response mission 
The Army’s claim for major regional conflicts put it in conflict with the Air Force. In 
the eyes of most senior Air Force officers, Desert Storm had not only confirmed the 
Basic Aerospace Doctrine of 1984, but also demonstrated the significance, even 
dominance, of air power in future warfare (Bingham 1991). Arguably in response to the 
Army’s AirLand Battle Doctrine, the Air Force had published the White Paper ‘Global 
Reach – Global Power’ claiming an independent role of air power after the Cold War 
already in 1990 (Faulkenberry 1996). The underlying strategic vision in ‘Global Reach 
– Global Power’ strongly differed from the other Services’ assumptions of stability 
through forward deployment or presence. As the conditions for forces in or close to the 
theater were in many places unfavorable, the Air Force argued, the US should shape the 
environment through long-distance involvement based on superior aerial technology 
rather than through surface forces (Rhodes 1999).  
But the aviation branch was well aware that many considered the Army’s AirLand 
Battle Doctrine, emphasizing a supportive rather than an independent role for air power, 
as instructive for Desert Storm (Kretchik 2001, 218). Therefore, the Air force leaders 
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reacted angrily when General Schwarzkopf argued after Desert Storm that air power 
played a major role in the early stages but less so in the later stages of the operation in 
which the ground forces were more important (Grant 2003, 31). A few weeks later, Air 
Force Chief McPeak confidently declared: “My private conviction is that this is the first 
time in history that a field army has been defeated by airpower.” (in Dudney 1991) 
Leaders of the ground forces understood McPeak’s words as a clear message: “The joint 
atmosphere displayed in Southwest Asia has faded; the gloves are off.” (Keiser 1991, 
30) Army Chief Reimer responded that “this idea that airpower will win the war is 
historically suspect.” He instead referred to AirLand Doctrine thinking: “You need to 
quickly synchronize your forces, get your force on the ground, and take advantage of 
what each service brings to the fight, and then go after the enemy and wrap things up as 
quick as you can.” (in Kitfield 1998)  
In 1992, the Air Force reacted to the changing international situation and the experience 
in Desert Storm with the release of a new Basic Aerospace Doctrine (DOAF 1992). In 
the eyes of the Air Force generals, inconsistent doctrinal development and an artificial 
dichotomy between strategic airpower, equaling nuclear deterrence, and tactical 
airpower, equaling close air support, had obstructed the full potential of air power in 
conventional warfare (Fogleman 1996, 41). The new doctrine should close this gap and 
clearly establish the flyers’ relevance for the post-Cold War missions. Responding to 
criticism to earlier doctrines, AFM 1-1 was much more analytical in character included 
an extensive part of historical and systematic justifications. It also incorporated 
considerations on the relevance of space for the first time in Air Force doctrine. The 
manual stressed the superiority of aviation for the outcome of conventional wars and the 
implicit unwillingness to subordinate to surface forces. Especially due to effective use 
of stealth and precision guided munitions, air power could play a much more decisive 
role in future warfare.  
The so-called halt phase strategy/doctrine during the Clinton administration offered 
further chance for the flyers’ to increase its relevance (Grossman 2001; Kitfield 1998). 
The halt phase strategy emphasized the role of airpower in the early stages of a conflict, 
in which the lacking mobility of ground forces was most problematic. Instead of waiting 
for sufficient ground forces to arrive in the theater, air power could be used on to deny 
opponents early strategic gains. The halt phase had played a first important role in 
Aspin’s unsuccessful win-hold-win force planning standard, in which air power should 
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buy the time in the second MRC until sufficient ground forces were available. But even 
in a 2-MRC standard, the halt phase strategy was attractive, since there was 
considerable doubt that the US had the logistical capabilities to deploy troops and 
equipment for two parallel conflicts. Furthermore, the Air Force argued that the strategy 
generally promised a quick way to end enemy aggression with little risk for the own 
forces. The aviators were confident that they could largely destroy an enemy force and 
thus independently decide a war during its early stages. Again, the Army met these 
promises with considerable skepticism (Tilford 1998). The struggle between the two 
branches grew so tense by the middle of the 1990s that Army Chief Reimer and Air 
Force Chief Fogleman felt obliged to publish a joint article titled “Joint Warfare and the 
Army-Air Force Team” (Reimer/Fogleman 1996). The article asserted that the two 
branches were “natural partners” and promised further cooperation. But in its first 
sentence the authors made clear: “Cooperation does not imply that we have identical 
views on every issue, nor that we should be combined.” (Reimer/Fogleman 1996, 10)  
 
Summary 
Evidently, the Service doctrine formulation was strongly driven by the desire to find the 
most beneficial autonomous position in a changing international environment and 
decreasing budgets. To this end, all Service developed quite innovative answers, 
including an increasing reliance on RMA concepts. The dominance and even autonomy 
of the Services in the doctrine dimension is clearly evident not only from the failure to 
improve jointness and exploit potential synergies but also from the strong focus on 
conventional warfare. Indeed, political actors intervened only punctually and with 
dubious impact in the Services efforts. Thus, political pressure contributed to a more 
sophisticated joint framework, but the Services commitment to jointness remained 
limited. More obvious is the impact of Clinton’s raised casualty-sensitivity after the 
Somalia operation, although it reduced rather than increased political influence. Societal 
influence was not evident at all. Even the impact of a general influence biased in favor 
of conventional casualty-sensitive warfare is speculative.  
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6.2.4.2. Buildup 
Transformation and jointness  
The Bush administration’s push for transformation did not confine itself to the military 
organization and weapons acquisition. Transformers also sought to make an impact on 
the doctrine dimension, which put the Services in an ambivalent position. On the one 
hand, transformation of the Services’ individual doctrines could build on the 
foundations of the 1990s and faced little resistances. Already by the late 1990s, RMA 
concepts had found increasing way into the doctrinal thinking of all branches. The Air 
Force’s Air Force 2025 project, the Army’s Force XXI and Army After Next projects, 
the Navy’s NCW and Streetfighter concepts, and the overarching framework in Joint 
Vision 2010 and 2020 picked up various aspects of RMA. Since transformation 
promoted a “hyperconventional image for the U.S. armed forces” based on technologies 
and concepts to quickly find and destroy targets (Ucko 2009, 59), transformation 
implied little departure from prior doctrinal trajectory. 
On the other hand, however, the OSD’s renewed push for jointness and interoperability 
was met by Service mistrust. In its most radical form, the transformers envisioned the 
complete abandonment of Service participation in operational missions. The latter 
would only provide joint task force building blocks in their respective primary function 
and leave the conduct of operations to fully joint commandos (Macgregor 2002). But 
even lesser issues, which touched the balance between the Services, resulted in conflict. 
When the Joint Staff circulated a draft for a new joint operations doctrine in February 
2001, the Army and Air Force clashed. The draft’s careful formulation that a “possible 
halt phase is necessary when decisive combat operations are required to terminate 
aggression and achieve US objectives” caused Army resistance (in Grossman 2001, 35). 
While the 1997 QDR had referred to the halt phase doctrine and some CINCs had 
started to include halt phases in their war plans, the Army had not given up its 
opposition. An airpower supporter sarcastically commented on the Army position: 
“What they can’t win in real life, they try to win in doctrine.” (in Grossman 2001, 36) In 
turn, the Air Force, which feared that the joint publication without reference to a halt 
phase would underrate the air force contribution, was unwilling to agree on any 
document without a halt phase formulation. The final Joint Publication 3-0 in fall 
contained only a very watered-down reference to the halt phase: “Rapid application of 
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joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the adversary’s initial 
aggression and to deny the initial objectives.” (JCS 2001, III-20)  
The continuous distrust between the Services had consequences during the early 
operations of the GWOT, when the quality of coordination of the branches was 
mediocre (Grant 2003). Especially Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in March 2002 
was widely seen as an example of bad cooperation. Chiarelli (2007, 15) even wrote that 
“the performance of our military in the numerous interventions since the (…) 
[Goldwater-Nichols-Act] was passed appears, if we assess it honestly, to have been 
‘disjointed’.” Only the need to cooperate more effectively to counter the insurgency in 
Iraq seems to have improved operational jointness (Fischer 2006). Yet, problems in 
joint operations persisted. In 2008, a HASC created Panel on Roles and Missions (2008, 
21-22) identified two central deficits in the doctrine dimension: “The first is the 
efficient preparation for and management of joint operations, and second, the operations 
and activities that are critical, but which the Military Departments do not consider to be 
core missions.” 
 
The ground forces’ turn to counterinsurgency doctrine 
The latter issue aimed at the ground forces and particularly the Army’s efforts to adapt 
to the irregular battlefield. Indeed, the Army passed through a difficult process of 
doctrinal adjustment during the GWOT. It entered the new century with an unchanged 
claim to conduct conventional warfare missions. Its capstone doctrine ‘FM 1: The 
Army’ opened with a telling quotation of T.R. Fehrenbach: “[Y]ou may fly over a land 
forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clear of life – but if you 
desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the 
ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.” 
(DOA 2001a, 1) However, after the GWOT had started with transformational, but 
inherently conventional wars, the US ground forces soon found themselves in an 
insurgency environment, which they were not ready to deal with (Krepinevich 2008). 
While the Army’s most recent FM 3-0 in summer 2001 had paid some attention to the 
experiences of the 1990s and put more weight on stability and support operations, its 
focus remained on war fighting and regular combat tasks. In fact, the Bush 
administration’s disregard for state-building and commitment to transformation 
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reinforced this focus on high intensity operations. Ironically, the Iraq War initially 
pushed the transformation efforts even further, because the rapid toppling of the Iraqi 
regime was considered a verification of transformation (Kagan 2006, 288). 
Concentration of forces, holding of ground, and low technology engagements run 
counter to this vision.  
Hence, in 2003, the generals knew little about the emerging form of irregular warfare 
and how to succeed in it. While all branches had prepared for conventional war, the 
ground forces paid the highest prize for this one-sidedness and faced the most urgent 
need to adapt. The emerging doctrinal innovation is a clear example of innovation 
within an organization under pressure. With the administration pushing for 
transformation and unwilling to publically concede fundamental difficulties in Iraq, 
neither the public nor Congress provided effective pressure for innovation. Instead, the 
ground forces, facing a deteriorating situation with rising numbers of casualties, soon 
started to develop responses on the ground (Nagl 2007). After realizing the magnitude 
of their deficits in the field of counterinsurgency, the Army and Marine Corps hastily 
issued Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22 in October 2004 (DOA 2004). The manual 
emphasized the need for an integration of military and civilian operations and the vital 
role of civil population’s support. But this first counterinsurgency doctrine since 1986 
was only intended to provide a short-term bridge until a full replacement would be 
formulated.  
But as the civil leadership regarded the insurgency as a temporary problem, more 
comprehensive thinking on COIN doctrine only slowly gained foothold. The situation 
changed in late 2005, when it became increasingly clear that the insurgency would not 
disappear anytime soon without new measures (Ucko 2009, 73-75; Krepinevich 2005). 
About the same time, the OSD issued Directive 3000.05 making stability operations one 
of DOD’s core military missions. Against this backdrop, reports from 
counterinsurgency practitioners and theorists, including H.R. McMaster, John Nagl, 
Peter Chiarelli (2007), and Patrick Michaelis, gained increasing momentum within the 
DOD. Lt. General David Petraeus, who had acquired experiences in COIN during his 
tenure in Iraq, became a particular important figure within the emerging 
counterinsurgency community. Petraeus initiated a complete rewriting of ground forces 
counterinsurgency doctrine in close cooperation with Marine Corps Lt. General James 
Mattis. After a year of drafting and broad deliberation among the growing COIN 
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community, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, was released in December 2006 (DOA/DON 
2006).  
The doctrine, which was well received by military experts and field officers, strongly 
departed from the principles of conventional warfighting. In fact, it marked an attack 
not only on the Iraq strategy but more generally on the ‘old’ Army, still preparing and 
fighting along the traditional American Way of War based on the Weinberger-Powell 
doctrine (Ucko 2009, 112; Ollivant 2008, 358). FM 3-24 acknowledged the complexity 
of COIN operations including numerous paradoxes, which commanders face in their 
efforts to gain legitimacy, the main objective in counterinsurgency operations. For 
example, the manual argued for closer contact and trust-building measures with the 
populace, framed in the paradox that “sometimes, the more you protect your force, the 
less secure you may be.” (DOA/DON 2006, 1-27) Population security, economic 
development, and good governance are named as vital conditions to deprive insurgents 
of public support and defeat them. Against this backdrop, the doctrine emphasizes that 
success requires good intelligence, constant learning and adaption. Military power 
provides only a supporting but limited and at times counterproductive means. At the 
same time, the manual argued that most counterinsurgency operations required 
numerous troops ready to perform combat and non-combat tasks for a long period of 
time. 
Publication of FM 3-24 coincided with the electoral defeat of the Republicans in 
Congress, Rumsfeld’s departure and Bush’s successive turn to a new Iraq strategy. And 
with the promotion of Petraeus to the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq, COIN 
doctrine gained an early chance to prove its value (Ucko 2009, 114). As the situation in 
Iraq indeed slowly improved under Petraeus’ command, the counterinsurgency 
advocates within the DOD were strengthened and Defense Secretary increasingly 
embraced their ideas (Kaplan 2008). In fall 2007, Gates (2007) told the Association of 
the US Army: “We can expect that asymmetric warfare will remain the mainstay of the 
contemporary battlefield for some time. (…) One of the challenges facing the Army will 
be how to incorporate the latest in technology without losing sight of the human and 
cultural dimensions of the irregular battlefield.” Accordingly, the 2008 revision of FM 
3-0 replaced the separation of high-intensity operations and low-intensity operations 
with a continuous spectrum of overlapping operational requirements (DOA 2008). The 
manual emphasized the need for stability and reconstruction considerations throughout 
374 
 
all military operations. It argued that full-spectrum operations required the capacity to 
simultaneously conduct offensive, defensive, stability, and civil-support operations.  
But there remain doubts whether the balance between preparations for regular and 
irregular operations has shifted for long, as critics warned that the sudden 
counterinsurgency hype might displace the ground forces conventional warfighting 
capabilities. Indeed, a number of senior military leaders, including Petraeus’ 
predecessor in Iraq and later Army Chief George Casey, former Army Chief 
Schoomaker, and CJCS Michael Mullen warned in late 2007 that an excessive 
preparation for irregular warfare may leave the US unprepared for conventional 
challenges (Munoz 2007). Moreover, a parallel shift in focus in the organization and 
weapons acquisition dimensions remained limited. In the same line, Ucko (2009, 173) 
concluded after reviewing the impact of COIN doctrine on training, force structure and 
acquisition projects: “So far the COIN community has struggled to displace traditional 
preoccupations and entrenched interests; to a large extent old think has prevailed.” 
 
The Air Force between COIN and conventional rapid response 
While the ground forces’ doctrine formulation heavily turned towards irregular warfare, 
the other branches departed only modestly from their conventional focus. In fact, the 
flyers and sailors had only a minor supporting role in irregular warfare, which heavily 
rests on ‘boots on the ground’ and a light footprint. FM 3-24 stated with regard to the 
capabilities particularly relevant for COIN operations: “All are found in the Army; most 
are found in the Marine Corps. To a limited degree, they are also found in the Air Force 
and Navy.” (DOA/DON 2006, 2-5) Therefore, the Navy and the Air Force largely 
continued to focus on their preparations for conventional war, but nonetheless sought to 
highlight their contribution to the increasingly important COIN operations.  
Air Force Chief Jumper (2001) strongly promoted the flyers’ Global Strike Task Force 
built around the stealthy F-22 and B-2, which would provide the capabilities to strike 
targets over a long-distance and with little preparation time.
382
 In close succession of the 
                                                             
382 The Air Force organized its planning in the new century around seven concepts of operations: (1) 
Global Strike Task Force; (2) Global Response Task Force; (3) Global Mobility Task Force; (4) Nuclear 
Response Task Force; (5) Expeditionary Air and Space Force; (6) Homeland Security Task Force; (7) 
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earlier doctrinal thinking and the requirements formulated during the 1990s, the Global 
Strike Task Force would be the flyers’ “contribution to the nation’s kick-down-the-door 
force.” (Jumper 2001, 29) The Air Force’s Basic Doctrine in 2003 reinforced similar 
themes. From the flyers’ point of view, the numerous conflicts since the end of the Cold 
War, including the transformational wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, had proved its 
strategic significance and its basic doctrine confidently stated: “[T]he more recent 
history of air and space power application (…) has proven that air and space power can 
be a dominant and frequently the decisive element of combat in modern warfare.” 
(DOAF 2003, 16)
383
 In this situation, the sudden prominence of COIN operations was 
unwelcome from the Air Force’s point of view (Haendschke 2008). While Air Force 
advocates argued that “[a]irpower can do far more than destroy a particular target”, the 
importance of air power was largely reduced to tactical levels in these operations (Read 
2005).  
But the flyers were unwilling to leave all credit for COIN to the ground forces and 
sought to highlight their contribution. In an implicit response to the ground forces’ 
doctrine, General Peck contended that COIN “doesn’t always have to be about having 
lots of ‘boots on the ground’.” (in Harrison 2007) And the publication of an Air Force 
doctrine on irregular warfare in 2007 made clear that air power had a role in COIN 
operations (DOAF 2007). It contended that the Air Force must be prepared to provide 
capabilities to simultaneously conduct traditional and irregular operations. Especially 
advanced technologies provided the Air Force with a claim in COIN operations. Thus, 
air power advocates emphasized the impact of PGMs, which enabled the flyers’ to strike 
targets with little collateral damage (Haendschke 2008; Dunlap 2008). They also 
highlighted the “game changing” impact of drones, providing persistent ISR 
capabilities, which are crucial for COIN operations (Dunlap 2008, 57). At the same 
time, the focus of the preparations remained on conventional tasks in accordance with 
the 2006 QDR’s separation of tasks, most prominently the potential rise of China to a 
peer competitor (e.g. Halloran 2007; Rumsfeld 2006, 29-32; Grant 2006). 
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ISR Task Force. Each concept of operation resembles one task the flyers might be asked to 
perform and identifies the necessary capabilities to accomplish the mission. 
383 The Air Force’s assessment is not undisputed. E.g. Correll (2003) argues that the Air Force played a 
decisive role in defeating the Iraqi Army but failed to finally shut down or defeat the regime during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (see also Peters 2003). 
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The Navy’s return to high-sea control 
The same holds for the Navy, which continued to emphasize its expeditionary 
capabilities. The administration’s push for transformation and a more proactive 
intervention policy in the GWOT made the naval forces’ focus on forward presence, 
seabased power projection and expeditionary capabilities more relevant than ever. In its 
mission statement, Naval Power 21 in 2002, the naval forces promised four returns on 
investment: Command of the seas; US sovereign power overseas; assured access; and 
enabling transformation of the joint force (Work 2003, 29; DON 2002) Especially the 
promise to assure seabased access worldwide for military operations went clearly 
beyond prior commitments to power projection and was a formidable challenge, which 
guided naval forces’ preparations. The Marines Corps adopted the Expeditionary 
Maneuver Warfare capstone concept, focusing on rapid power projection worldwide 
against critical points in the littoral and beyond (DON 2001). It was designed to match 
the Navy’s Sea Basing, one of three major concepts outlined in its conceptual vision Sea 
Power 21 (Clark 2002).
384
 Sea Basing should provide afloat command and control 
structures and supply logistics to support missions ashore reducing the importance of 
overseas bases for all Services. 
Thus, the Navy basically confirmed its vision of the 1990s by adding further 
specification. The ambitious expeditionary focus provided the Marines and the Navy 
with strong arguments to back its claims in the conflict over acquisition funding and 
with regard to their shares in the GWOT (Peck 2003). As Admiral Clark (2002) argued: 
“As enemy access to weapons of mass destruction grows, and the availability of 
overseas bases declines, it is compelling both militarily and politically to reduce the 
vulnerability of U.S. forces through expanded use of secure, mobile, networked sea 
bases.” Thus, Naval Power 21 and the related transformation path for connected, faster 
and more flexible expeditionary capabilities might be seen “as a bid to assert 
Departmental preeminence in this new joint expeditionary era.” (Work 2003, 48) Yet, 
the irregular warfare changed the situation and softened the doctrinal interaction 
between the naval forces: While the Marine Corps got heavily involved in land-based 
                                                             
384 Sea Power 21 outlined Sea Basing together with Sea Strike, the ability to project fire power from the 
sea, and Sea Shield, forward defense for the homeland and US forces, connected by the integrated 
ForceNet framework. 
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COIN operations and COIN doctrine formulation, the Navy’s purpose remained more 
focused on conventional tasks.  
In 2006, CNO Mullen initiated a process to develop a comprehensive strategic 
perspective on naval power in the current world in cooperation with the Marine Corps 
and the Coast Guard. The new strategic concept, published in 2007, reinforced the close 
cooperation of the naval forces (Work/Tol 2008). Moreover, it highlighted again the 
concept of forward presence providing the ability to improve diplomatic and military 
relations and conduct proactive operations to maintain global stability (DON 2007). But 
it said little on the naval forces contribution to the ongoing operations in the GWOT and 
failed to identify the most pressing threats and operational challenges for the naval 
forces. Since it lacked clear priorities with regard to threats and force structure 
decisions, defense experts criticized the strategy for being “all things to all people.” 
(Pendley 2008, 61; see also Till 2008) Others argued that the new strategy was only an 
attempt to provide a belated justification for increasing the current 278-ship fleet to 313 
ships during the next 30 years against the backdrop of growing budget pressures and a 
shortage of responsibilities for the Navy in the current environment (Erwin 2007). 
During HASC hearings on the Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower, Gene 
Taylor (D-MS) told the admirals: “It is a nice, pretty slick brochure, but at the end of the 
day it really didn’t do very much for our country.” (in HASC 2007, 32) Thus, the 
Navy’s future trajectory remained open, including contributions to the GWOT as well 
as preparations in response to the Chinese buildup of anti-access capabilities (O’Rourke 
2009b).  
 
Summary 
As during the 1990s, the Services’ doctrine formulation was largely driven by their 
desire to secure shares in the changing environment. In this context, the political actors’ 
push for transformation was only successful in areas in which the adaption costs for the 
Services were small. The most important influence on doctrinal formulation was the 
situation in Iraq, which threatened to result in organizational failure. The ground forces 
turn to COIN doctrine is a clear response to the inability to succeed along conventional 
lines. The political actors’ preferences for transformation posed a negative influence on 
this development and innovation became only possible after the administration’s 
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resistance to a strategic change melted. Society, highly polarized on Iraq, contributed to 
the administration’s changing course by 2006 and thus indirectly influenced the 
innovation. 
 
6.3. Summary 
In line with the theoretical expectations, the influence of special interest groups after the 
Cold War strongly exceeded their relevance after World War II.  
During the 1990s, they acted as powerful defenders of the status quo, whereas the very 
weak public demands turned out insignificant. Especially the weapons acquisition and 
to a lesser degree the organization dimension were shaped by direct influences of 
special interests. To be sure, societal demands were not the only factors leading to 
stability: Constrained by uncertainty, disinterest and inconsistencies, the political actors 
were rarely able to overcome the Services’ resistance to far-reaching change. Cohen 
(2000, 41) therefore concludes: “The Defense Department in 2000 closely resembles its 
predecessor of a decade ago (…).American strategy still relies on a Cold War-derived 
understanding of military power and fails to focus on the challenges of the new century 
(…). Meanwhile American technology – impressive as it is – also still follows Cold 
War paths.” (Cohen 2000, 41)  
Special interests only contributed to the limited changes in the budget dimension in 
minor ways, while military actors played the largest role in preventing qualitative 
change.
385
 To be sure, societal and political pressures realized a peace dividend, 
although its appropriateness remained subject to debate.
386
 But society and the political 
                                                             
385 For the overall budget, Karol (2009, 153) concludes that “congressional voting on defense issues is not 
explainable by local economic interests.” (emphasis in the original) Indeed, partisan positions dominated 
parochial economic considerations in many decisions (for a discussion see Fordham 2008).But the case 
study shows that there are occasions where the protection of the defense industry affected the voting 
outcome.  
386 The realization of a peace dividend is undeniable (Scarborough 1998a), but whether the reduction were 
appropriate in response to the changing international situation is a matter of perspective (Gold 2000; 
Moore 1995, 30) Some analysts argue that further cuts would have been possible (e.g. Korb 2001; 
Gholz/Press/Sapolsky 1997). According to this perspective, the 2-MRC planning was excessive and the 
US forces have failed to adapt to the post-Cold War world. Others saw the adjustments under Bush and 
Clinton as largely appropriate without denying some mistakes in their execution (e.g. O’Hanlon 2002; 
Ravenal 2000; Cohen 1995). While the high-end planning scenario indeed seemed unlikely, it was not 
impossible and therefore planning had to account for it. A third group complained that the cuts left the US 
irresponsibly weak (Kagan/Fautua 1997; Tonelson 1993). The force structure reductions resulted in a 
force, which was unable to meet international contingencies. Evidently, assessments were not free of 
379 
 
actors failed to provide a clear direction for the transition. In fact, the push for budget 
cuts and simultaneous indifference and inconsistency with regard to the course of the 
transition resulted in several inconsistencies: The budget did not suffice to meet the 
objective of 2-MRCs which was largely set and defended by military actors. This 
funding gap together with numerous small operations soon put pressure on the forces’ 
readiness and the modernization accounts. Neither the administration nor Congress was 
able to realign national defense, since the status quo powers dominated the proponents 
of change in virtually all areas. In the end, only a renewed expansion of the defense 
budget proved politically feasible. O’Hanlon’s (2002, 1) assessment of the transition is 
certainly right: “The US has chosen to retain a substantial global military capability.” 
Neither the numerous low-intensity operations of the 1990s nor the RMA vision kept up 
with the vested interests in society and the administration.  
G.W. Bush came to the White House with the ambition to cut the Gordian knot of the 
1990s without significantly raising the budgets or weakening the armed forces. But 
despite a strong push for civil authority within the DOD, the new administration soon 
learned that the status quo powers in society, Congress and the DOD itself were strong 
indeed. Only the GWOT saved the OSD from an early showdown with an uncertain 
outcome. At the same time, rather than strengthening the influence of common 
preferences, the war on terror marginalized society and Congress in the budget and 
organization dimension as both rallied behind the administration. Even as the war got 
soon out of hand, the polarized public did not agree on decisive action earlier than 2006, 
when the situation in Iraq strongly contributed to the electoral defeat of the 
Republicans. The electoral defeat contributed to the administration’s changing course, 
which resulted not only in an expansion of personnel but also freed the way for an 
implementation of the ground forces’ COIN doctrine. Prior to 2006, only special 
interests in the dimension of weapons acquisition exercised direct influence by 
obstructing a departure from the status quo. This resistance to change together with the 
administration’s ambition to transform the forces and the growing needs of the GWOT 
resulted in a renewed crisis of the military policy by the end of Bush’s buildup.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
partisan divisions: Analysts from the American Enterprise Institute or the Heritage Foundation were much 
more critical with regard to a large peace dividend than students from the Brookings Institution or the 
Center for American Progress. 
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While the costs of weapon systems drained the life out of the Services, a far-reaching 
transformation has never taken off (Tomes 2009, 168; for a less critical assessment see 
O’Hanlon 2007). At the same time, the adjustment to irregular warfare is far from 
complete and it is not sure whether it will succeed at all. Indeed, the most powerful 
military power on the planet has maneuvered itself into a very difficult situation and 
defense experts even warned of a “defense meltdown” (Wheeler 2008). 
A far-reaching inability to innovate becomes evident in the transition after 9/11. After 
an aggressive start, transformation ran into insurmountable resistance from the Services, 
lawmakers and special interest groups. At the same time, counterinsurgency had a very 
slow start and thus also failed to make an impact in time.  
Relevant questions 1990-1998 2001-2007 
WHO IS DOMINATING THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE DIMENSION OF… 
…military budget? 
Military actors/Political 
actors 
Political actors 
(administration) 
…military organization? Military actors 
Political actors 
(administration) 
…weapons acquisition? Military actors 
Military actors / Political 
actors 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
Military actors Military actors 
WHAT IS THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIETAL DEMANDS ON MILITARY INNOVATION IN THE DIMENSION 
OF… 
…military budget? 
Indirect influence 
(stability in weapons 
acquisition) 
No influence 
…military organization? 
Direct influence 
(stability in reserve) 
No influence / direct 
influence (expansion of 
personnel after 2006) 
…weapons acquisition? 
Direct influence 
(stability) 
Direct influence 
(stability) 
…military doctrine & Service 
mission statement? 
No influence / (general 
influence) 
No influence / indirect 
influence (COIN 
doctrine after 2006) 
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7. CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis started out with the questions whether (1) there are patterns of 
innovation in US military policy during periods of military transition and (2) what 
influence societal demands had in causing these patterns. A theory based on a liberal 
bottom-up framework was developed and systematically tested with the means of 
structured, focused comparison in order to answer these questions. In conclusion, it is 
now possible to sum up the findings, answer the initial questions, discuss strengths and 
weaknesses of the chosen approach and reflect on the implications for the research field 
and further research. 
 
7.1. Findings 
7.1.1. Patterns of military innovation during periods of transition 
The first question can be answered affirmative: Yes, there are patterns of military 
innovation during the investigated periods of military transition. But these patterns are 
less clear-cut than students of military innovation may hope for. The sample includes 
neither periods of full stability nor periods of innovation in which all dimensions of 
military policy experience a substantial change. Moreover, depending on the dimension 
of military policy and the indicator used, the findings vary considerably. Only the 
synopses of the indicators in the budget, organization and weapons acquisition 
dimensions reveal two clear patterns across the cases: (1) The post-Cold War periods 
were more prone to stability than the post-World War II periods. This is most clear-cut 
in the budget and weapons acquisition dimension. (2) Among the proximate cases, the 
buildup periods proved to be relatively more prone to innovation than the builddown 
periods. 
Huntington (1961, 284-341) argues that three broad innovations characterized the first 
ten years after World War II: The central turn to strategic deterrence based on air atomic 
power, the commitment to European defense and the decision to build a continental 
defense. While Huntington sees almost all of the vital steps leading to these innovations 
in the buildup period, the case studies show that already the transition during the late 
1940s set the course for the turn to air atomic power. Indeed, there was a clear will to 
place the military forces on a new foundation early after the war, although the general 
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direction of the change remained in limbo. This is most apparent in the dynamic but 
volatile budget dimension with annually changing priorities. Despite the lack of a 
comprehensive course, innovations in the weapons acquisition and organization 
dimension were vital preconditions for the successive turn strategic deterrence. The 
push for jet powered airplanes and missiles as well as the rejection of UMT and the 
buildup of a strong reserve characterized the late 1940s.  
During the subsequent buildup, the US fully realized what had emerged only vaguely in 
previous years. Although the findings are not as clear-cut as expected, the transition of 
the early 1950s turned out to be the most innovative period of the four cases under 
investigation. The Truman administration’s decision to focus on thermonuclear 
weapons and its shift from occupation to permanent forward deployment were vital 
steps towards strategic deterrence and European defense. At the same time, an 
unintended prioritization of air power was taking place between 1951 and 1953. This 
provided the foundation for Eisenhower’s explicit turn to strategic deterrence based on 
air atomic power. With the New Look’s commitment to massive retaliation, continental 
defense and European defense by the end of the Korean War, the post-World War II 
military establishment reached a first point of culmination.  
In contrast, stability was the prevalent feature of the two transitions after the Cold War. 
To be sure, several broad innovative efforts were undertaken: The shift from forward 
deployment to global rapid response was arguably the most important qualitative 
change after the Cold War. Other innovation paths include the turn from strategic to 
conventional means, from mechanized mass forces to digitalized network forces, and 
from high-intensity to low-intensity operations. But the realization of all these changes 
was slow and remained piecemeal. Especially during the first post-Cold War decade, the 
status quo clearly outbalanced innovations. The Service distributions in the budget and 
organization dimension and the patterns of weapons acquisition show virtually no 
relevant qualitative changes. The persistence of the force posture was so strong that the 
quantitative reductions and the qualitative stability quickly resulted in inconsistencies 
bedeviling the national defense for most of the 1990s. Although some decreases in the 
strategic assets and forward deployments were realized, the turn to conventional rapid 
response capabilities made only slow progress. Only the budget distribution of 
categories and the force structure patterns were moderately affected. While these 
changes should not be underrated, the steps remained cautious and the national defense 
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had only partly adjusted to the new world situation by the end of the century. Neither 
the RMA nor low-intensity operations left a significant footprint regarding the force 
posture of the 1990s. With regard to military reform, Korb (2007) called the 1990s “the 
lost decade.” 
In 2001, transformation emerged as a powerful template, which helped to realize 
slightly more innovation. But the requirements for low-intensity means since 2002 and 
the persistency of legacy programs have obstructed a consistent transition.
387
 Only those 
parts of the transformation, which also had an immediate utility for the GWOT and did 
not displace legacy programs, proceeded. Thus, the C3, Intel & Space and SOF budget 
programs disproportionally grew. In the organization dimension, especially the 
reorganization of the Army’s and Navy’s force structure towards smaller units with 
more emphasis on rapid response sticks out as innovation. Moreover, the termination of 
the Army’s Crusader and the Comanche programs as well as the moderately increased 
funding for drones and C
4
ISR capabilities indicate a moderate departure from the 
weapons acquisition patterns since the late 1980s. Yet, traditional programs with 
dubious strategic relevance continued dominating the weapons acquisition dimension 
and the Services were still strongly organized and equipped for conventional warfare. 
By 2008, the efforts to keep legacy programs, transform the forces, and fight the GWOT 
at the same time threatened to overburden national defense.  
The dimension of military doctrine & mission statements systematically departs from 
these patterns: Innovation in this dimension is more common during builddowns and 
there is no difference between the post-World War II and post-Cold War cases. Thus, all 
Services sought to define a new role for themselves in the new environment emerging 
after the wars. While the armed forces considered the next war would be another total 
war resembling World War II, the innovative activity is less pronounced after 1945. 
Only the Navy had a strong incentive to innovate, since the Soviet Union in contrast to 
the World War II adversaries was almost exclusively a land power. After the Cold War, 
the US emerged as sole superpower without a peer competitor in sight. This 
fundamentally different environment fostered strong Service activity in the doctrine & 
mission statement dimension.  
                                                             
387 The Service distribution of the budget and personnel did only change in response to the war 
requirements and indicate no genuine innovation. 
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While adjustments were made during the builddown periods, the buildups were more 
prone to stability. On the one hand, this may seen comprehensible, since new mission 
statements had been formulated during the previous builddown periods to be prepared 
for possible contingencies. In this light, the wars can be seen as tests of the current 
doctrine rather than an incentive to reformulate it. On the other hand, given that neither 
the Korean War nor the GWOT resembled scenarios central to prior Service 
preparations, the lacking doctrinal innovation is rather surprising and an indicator for 
inertia in this dimension. Only the Army innovated more or less strongly during 
mobilization periods. Since ground forces bore the major brunt of the wars, they had 
arguably the strongest incentive to adjust during and after the wars. Especially the 
Army’s strong innovation after 9/11 clearly stemmed from the growing fear of 
organizational breakdown during the Iraq operation.  
 
7.1.2. Societal influence on patterns of military innovation 
All findings with regard to the dependent variable are generally in line with the 
proposed theory: As the number of groups with stakes tied to the course of military 
policy increased during the Cold War, the post-Cold War cases were more prone to 
stability. Moreover, according to the theory, societal influence is only relevant for those 
dimensions of military policy in which societal actors are aware of the issues and have 
an interest in. This can explain the systematic departure of the doctrine dimension. But 
the in-depth case study analysis shows that societal influence is more complex than 
assumed. Especially the equal weighting of common and special interests turned out 
inaccurate.  
Bearing the limitations of available data in mind, the case studies confirm earlier 
findings in the line with the research on public opinion and military policy: Public 
opinion continuously articulated preferences, which were consistent within and across 
dimensions of military policy and rationally responded to international and domestic 
incentives within the bounds of available information (Wlezien 1995; Hartley/Russett 
1992; Page/Shapiro 1992). After World War II, the public committed itself to an air 
atomic power option earlier than most political actors and more consistent than 
Truman’s early approach. Indeed, despite moral reservations, air atomic power seemed 
to be a highly cost efficient way to protect the nation especially before the US 
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monopoly was broken. In contrast, the 1990s held few international threats and were 
marked by a far-reaching public indifference. The public wanted less defense spending, 
but did not care too much about the force posture. This changed with the election in 
2000, during which Bush’s campaign issue of military transformation was met by public 
support. The public preferences got more specific after 9/11, when majorities voiced 
preferences for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities over conventional 
means. Again, given the nature of the new threat, these preferences were highly rational. 
Hence, the assumption that individuals with common economic preferences prefer 
military innovation, if a) new means, which promise more efficiency, are available or b) 
if the emergence of new challenges and threats reduces the efficiency of prior 
preparations, is backed by the empirical evidence. 
But early students of public opinion were nonetheless right in warning of overrating the 
public political influence in military affairs (Lippmann 1925). With limited resources 
and most of the time concerned with other issues more relevant for one’s own 
wellbeing, the public hardly acted upon its preferences in military policy. There are only 
three situations in which the public clearly exercised an active and direct influence: The 
demobilization after World War II and elections in 1952 and 2006 respectively, in 
which the incumbent party was punished for unsatisfactory military preparations.
388
 In 
all cases the public intervention resulted in significant changes in the military policy 
partially contributing to the observed pattern of relatively stronger changes during 
buildup periods. In all other situations, the public represents merely a passive influence.  
This does not imply that the public was insignificant for political decisions beyond these 
two incidents. Given the public’s latent potential to exercise decisive influence through 
elections, political actors considered the public preferences in some cases even when the 
latter did not actively pursue their implementation. They anticipated the public position 
or addressed the public in order to acquire legitimacy for political decisions. State actors 
even took positions, which they considered to meet the public’s ideational mindset, 
when the public opinion was indifferent or unspecific. E.g. the Truman administration 
stretched out the buildup during the early 1950s out of fear of a future public backlash 
and Bush felt bound to realize transformation, even though other issues proved more 
                                                             
388 To be sure, the state of the respective war overlaid the issue of military preparations in both cases. But 
since the former is the ultimate test for the later, it is hard to separate the two and indeed both elections 
resulted in a changing course in the war strategy as well as in military policy. 
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important during the 2000 election. In addition, Congress addressed the public during 
the revolt of the admirals and felt obliged to further drones to meet the assumed public 
casualty aversion after 2000. However, the public influence based on few active 
interventions and a constant potential influence based on the latent chance of active 
intervention has two important weaknesses.  
First, the political incentives to pick up the preferences for innovation were limited, 
since the threat of timely punishment for defection was small. The threshold for the 
public to turn active was very high and public interventions belatedly followed after the 
failure of military preparations in war rather than after the decisions for military 
preparations. Indeed, individuals turned out very patient and accepted military policy 
running counter to their own preferences even in times of significant national security 
concerns. Contrary to the theoretical expectations, the emergence of a very real threat 
was not enough for the public to care more about the implementation of its military 
policy preferences.
389
 Rather, the administration’s freedom of action even increased as 
the public and Congress rallied behind the commander-in-chief during times of danger. 
This is an additional aspect contributing to the stronger innovativeness during buildup 
periods: The rally-around-the-flag-effect temporarily boosted the administration’s 
leverage to implement policy initiatives. Only when the latter turned out incapable of 
avoiding a very costly situation, the public got active. The indifference in situations 
with low threat perception and the rally-effect in situations with high threat perception 
confined active public influence to very few situations. This reduces not only the value 
of the public as an agent of foresighted innovation. It also implies that political actors 
have little reason to expect prompt punishment for taking unpopular decisions or for 
ignoring common preferences. As assumed, political actors were indeed reluctant to 
pick up weak or inconsistent societal demands which offered no clear returns. 
Yet, the case studies show that innovation in contrast to stability needs active supporters 
to be successful. Therefore, many innovative initiatives never gained traction or were 
preempted by military actors’ activities early on. All innovative initiatives during the 
national defense reviews after the Cold War suffered from this problem. The hurdles for 
an influence of common preferences for innovation were additionally raised by the 
                                                             
389 The relationship between a low threat perception and weak interest in military policy is evident in both 
builddowns, however. Especially during the 1990s, there is a clear correlation between low threat 
perception and indifference with regard to military preparations. 
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divided military policy competences. The support of one branch of government was of 
no use, if policy initiatives found no backing in the other branch. The UMT legislation 
during the post-World War II years, the early turn to airpower or the transformation 
efforts under Rumsfeld are examples in which largely innovation failed despite the 
support of one branch. Only active public intervention and to a lesser extent rally-effects 
were strong enough to create a temporary unity of political actors. Hence, while the 
public’s active interventions had a strong impact, but the latent support for innovation 
was often not sufficient to achieve change.  
Second, the passive form of influence was easily trumped by more active and specific 
influences. In other words, the public was not interested in operating the wheel, even 
though it hit the emergency brake when national defense dangerously got off track. This 
allowed other groups more concerned with the course of military policy to take the 
driver’s seat most of the time. The case studies show that special interest groups 
exercised an asymmetrically strong influence on military preparations. In cases of 
inconsistencies between common and parochial preferences, the latter always 
succeeded. As assumed, actors with special interests preferred military innovation only 
if it translated into benefits specific to the actor. Yet, with the exception of the nuclear 
scientists during the decision to develop thermonuclear weapons, all relevant special 
interest groups benefited from different aspects of the status quo and thus resisted 
substantial change. Especially the existence of a large defense economy turned out as a 
powerful stability factor. The unchecked consolidation of the defense industry after the 
Cold War and the continuous demand for highly complex systems, which require high 
specialization, pushed their weight even further.  
In particular after the Cold War, special interest groups played a crucial role in 
defending the status quo often in accordance with the military forces but sometimes also 
in opposition to Service preferences. As has been demonstrated for other fields of policy 
before (Tsebelis 2002), this analysis shows that the American separation of powers 
made it rather easy to obstruct innovation in the military policy, since it was usually 
sufficient to successfully influence one branch of government in order to foreclose or 
distort change. In spite of their only regional weight, special interest groups proved 
highly successful in influencing members of Congress.
390
 Some military programs were 
                                                             
390 The strong partisan polarization had surprisingly little influence on these mechanisms. With regard to 
defense spending, Karol (2009, 162) argues that “defense policy is distinctive in its grouplessness.” 
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spread across the country and thus had relevance for a large number of lawmakers. 
Other programs touched only the constituencies of few congressmen, but were 
nonetheless protected by logrolling coalitions. Therefore, the congressional protection 
of the defense economy and National Guard strongly constrained innovation after the 
Cold War.  
In sum, the case studies show that the assumptions concerning the interplay of common 
and specific preferences proved wrong. While the interplay of common and special 
demands created indeed distinct societal demands for periods of transition, the strength 
of societal demands for military innovation in a dimension of military policy hardly 
depended on the strength of the common preferences or their consistency with parochial 
preferences. Rather, the existence of parochial preferences in a dimension of military 
policy strongly dominated the societal influence. Hence, not the public preferences for 
efficiency but the existence of relevant special interest groups was the defining factor in 
explaining the societal influence on military innovation. With few special interests 
related to military policy after World War II, the state actors were only constrained by 
the latent public preferences, which did not inevitably lead to innovation but had a 
supportive influence. With a growing number of societal actors benefitting from 
military policy, the persistency of the field increased significantly and the public 
influence was reduced to the fields without special interests and the occasional 
activation of the emergency brake. Therefore, the second question can be answered as 
follows: With a growing societal relevance of military policy, the relationship between 
societal demands and military innovation shifted from latent influence for loosely 
confined political support for innovation to active influence for strongly confined 
political support for stability. Only when military preparations resulted in decisive 
costs, common preferences for innovation exercised strong influence.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Hence, while there are nonpartisan special interest groups concerned with private goods, there are no 
party constituencies which generally constrain the party positions on military policy.  
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7.1.3. Sources of innovation beyond societal demands 
As argued above, strong societal pushes for innovation are rare. In most cases, common 
preferences are not strong enough by themselves to create a sufficiently relevant 
political incentive for political actors to pick up the preferences even against Service 
resistances. Moreover, common preferences are increasingly outdone by actors pursuing 
vested interests. Considering the many obstacles to innovation, the obvious question is 
why many innovations were realized after all. Based on the case studies three answers 
can be singled out:  
(1) Some innovations created win-win situations or at least no costs for the stake 
holders. E.g. the decision for European defense promised additional resources for the 
Services, political gains for the administration, no costs for the majority in Congress, 
and no relevant costs for societal actors. And the push for UAVs promised additional 
relevance and a useful means in the GWOT for the Services, transformation for the 
administration, and reduced risk of casualties without compromising the defense 
industry for Congress.  
(2) Rally-around-the-flag effects or strong public approval can increase the President’s 
leverage to implement innovation even against resistance within the government. After 
the strong public response to the derailed military efforts in Korea in the 1952 elections 
and with a Republican majority in Congress, Eisenhower was able to implement the 
New Look more or less unchanged over the vocal resistance of the Army. Yet, the 
failure to implement far-reaching transformation despite strong public approval after 
9/11 shows that the President’s leverage is not unlimited. Especially in dimensions of 
military policy, which were further detached from the public awareness, status quo 
actors prevailed at least in parts.  
(3) Innovation proved most successful when it was initiated by the Services themselves. 
While branches often proved to be powerful obstacles to change, they had two major 
incentives to launch or support innovations: First, the fear of becoming obsolete or 
being punished for inflexibility in the future drove innovation and change. Hence, the 
findings clearly support the argument by Sapolsky and Coté that military innovation is 
spurred by Service competition for scarce resources (Sapolsky 2000, 38). This is most 
evident in the doctrine & mission statement dimension, in which no direct societal 
demands existed and the Services faced the least political constraints. Aware of the 
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strategic and the political environment, each Service adjusted largely autonomously to 
the changing conditions in order to maintain its strategic relevance and as a means to 
hold its own in the political conflicts over resources and programs.
391
 Interservice 
conflicts also drove the push for missiles and strategic bombers after World War II and 
the interest in UAVs after 9/11. Second, the fear of organizational failure fostered 
innovation. The Army’s doctrine innovation after the difficulties in Iraq is the most 
outstanding example of this mechanism. Together with the public interventions in the 
face of military failure and the raised leverage of the President in times of security 
crisis, this fear of failure is the third factor explaining the relatively stronger 
innovativeness during buildup periods.  
Societal demands have a conditional influence on innovation attempts initiated by the 
Services, since they positively or negatively affect the innovation program’s political 
support. Thus, some innovations, e.g. the supercarrier, failed due to lacking political 
support, which was justified by reference to societal preferences. The UMT proposal or 
the arsenal ship also failed at least in parts due to inconsistent or dismissive societal 
demands. In other cases, e.g. the ground forces’ COIN doctrine, societal demands made 
innovation possible by breaking political resistance within the administration.  
 
7.2. Theoretical reflections 
The analysis’ major theoretical contribution to the field of military policy is its 
successful exposure of the interaction of domestic factors for the explanation of military 
policy. Rather than testing the relevance of a singular factor relative to other 
explanations, the chosen theory goes a step further and highlights the conditions under 
which different factors play a more or less important role in affecting an outcome. 
Hence, the strength of this theory is its incorporation rather than the discrimination of 
factors. 
The broad liberal foundation proved particularly suited for incorporating different 
theoretical threads into a systematic and consistent theory. On a horizontal axis, the 
                                                             
391 Since public preferences are more influential on the defense spending than on the quality of defense, 
the public’s preferences for more or less spending can be seen as an indirect influence on military 
innovation. Especially shrinking budgets stimulate Service competition. Yet, the studies show that the 
quantitative change is neither necessary nor sufficient to realize innovation. 
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liberal framework allowed incorporating the competing assumptions of the follow-on 
imperative and the democratic peace theory with regard to societal participation in a 
meaningful way. This clearly extended the understanding of the causal relevance of 
various factors for the relationship between societal preference formations and military 
policy. On a vertical axis, the framework allowed conceptualizing the crucial nexus 
between societal demands and military innovation, lacking in the Governmental Politics 
approach as well as various government-centered theories on military innovation. While 
these latter approaches provide powerful tools to explain the civil-military relations and 
the political process, the theory at hand contributes the underlying causality by shedding 
light on the competing domestic influences affecting the state actors’ preferences. At the 
same time, the integration of assumptions from the Governmental Politics approach 
proved to be a valuable extension of Moravcsik’s very parsimonious society-state-
relationship, especially in dimensions and during periods with little or only weak 
societal interest articulations.  
Indeed, the specification of the transmission belt was central in avoiding false 
conclusions with regard to the causal weight of societal influence. The analysis shows 
that there were situations in which societal demands and policy outcome matched, but 
were not related by causality. E.g. the congressional turn to air power by 1948 matched 
the public preferences but was strongly caused by the Finletter Report rather than the 
public demand. The further specification of the liberal transmission belt by the 
assumption of a double principal-agent-relationship and the acknowledgement of state 
actor preferences beyond representation helped to avoid false conclusions here. The 
opening of the state further helped to identify the changeover from policy dimensions 
more dominated by domestic factors and a broad political process to dimensions more 
dominated by international factors and little political process. While the evidence 
refutes claims for either a purely external or a fully internal domination of military 
policy, the analysis shows that the composition of the influences varies across 
dimensions of military policy. E.g. preferences in the budget dimension were often 
driven by domestic considerations, although the assessment of a more or less strong 
security threat remained relevant. In contrast, the military actors’ preferences in the 
doctrine dimension were strongly informed by changes in the international environment, 
but did not fail to account for domestic factors.  
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While the proposed theory clearly contributes to a more advanced understanding of 
military innovation, certain limitations must be acknowledged. The most apparent 
weakness is its unidirectional bottom-up perspective which strongly constrains the 
researchers’ scope for the identification of potential societal influences. In policy fields 
with more relevance for the public and a higher density of special interest groups, this 
simplification seems justified. In fact, the case studies show that even in military policy 
the most relevant and effective forms of influence were active forms. But especially in 
the absence of strong interest groups, important nuances are lost within a unidirectional 
perspective. The public’s passive influence based on its latent sanctions potential can 
hardly be taken into full account without leaving the theoretical framework. Thus, the 
case studies show that it is not uncommon for state actors to try to actively create public 
support top down in order to further their political goals. The bottom-up perspective is 
blind for mechanisms like these in which society is responding rather than acting. In the 
field of military policy, which is characterized by a high level of uncertainty and 
monopolization of information, the potential for top-down manipulation of societal 
demands by providing or withholding information seems particularly strong. 
The principal-agent-theory in contrast to the liberal framework clearly sees the agent’s 
information advantage (Laffont 2003; Laffont/Martimort 2002). While the information 
advantage does not necessarily imply an active use by the agent, manipulation of the 
principal is clearly taken into sight. While agency slack due to non-compliance or 
unspecific preferences is in line with the liberal framework, the potential of active 
manipulation of societal preferences is excluded by the unidirectional bottom-up 
framework.
392
  
A second weakness is the relatively vague analytical role of ideas in the theory. Since 
the liberal framework itself is unclear with regard to the interplay of interests and ideas, 
the latter factor gained little causal weight in the theory at hand. Ideas were 
conceptualized as roadmaps constraining the scope of feasible preferences. Yet, the case 
studies cast some doubts on this limited treatment of ideas. In some cases, the Service 
persistence even at the risk of costs can hardly be explained from a purely material point 
of view. It seems more appropriate to give non-material factors equal causal weight to 
material factors. The desire to protect what Halperin (1971, 76) calls the ‘military 
                                                             
392 For a theoretical discussion of the problem of manipulation in the liberal paradigm see Hils 2007. 
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essence’ or Builder (1989) describes as Service personalities is as important as the 
autonomy or resources. An account of ideas and interests on an equal analytical level is 
far from trivial, however, since one has to systematically clear their interaction and 
relevance for the actors’ preferences in different settings. 
 
7.3. Implications for further research 
The study provides a critical contribution to the theoretical debate on democracy and 
security. It confirms the cost-sensitivity of the public, which is of central causal weight 
in the democratic peace literature. Yet, the analysis also shows that this is rarely 
sufficient to affect military preparations. In order for these common preferences to gain 
influence, individuals need the information and the incentive to take according political 
action. In most cases, however, either other issues dominate the individuals’ agenda or 
the public refrains from challenging the commander-in-chief. This is no theoretical 
problem in itself, since political actors can still act in anticipation of public 
interventions, a situation which indeed occurs (see also Schörnig 2008, 16-20). But 
when special interest groups are taken into account, the argument that public cost-
sensitivity drives military policy is hard to defend. Since the active demands by special 
interest groups constitute a strong and timely incentive for political actors to act 
responsive, the latent common preferences lose relevance. The influence of special 
interests functions as a powerful intervening variable, which displaces the preferences 
for efficiency. Hence, with growing societal stakes in military policy, the argument of 
societal cost-sensitivity loses causal weight. Kurth’s (1973) follow-on imperative 
provides a better account for the functioning of the society-state-nexus in these 
situations.  
In addition, even without special interest groups, the reach of societal influence is 
clearly limited. With growing requirements for expert knowledge, the societal relevance 
decreases in line with the political influence, whereas the influence of the military 
forces grows proportionally. One has to be careful not to confuse the causal relevance of 
different factors in these situations. Innovations promising greater efficiency are not 
necessarily a response to societal demands, since increased military efficiency is also a 
strong argument in the interservice conflicts (see also Evangelista/Reppy 2008, 169-
173). E.g. the permanent claim of the Air Force that it can achieve strategic goals with 
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less efforts and risks than the other branches is rarely tied to societal demands. Hence, 
the study casts twofold doubts on the applicability of assumptions from the democratic 
peace literature for the explanation of military preparations. 
Beyond the debate on democracy and security, the study provides a new direction to the 
research on military innovation and change. After considering international influences 
and especially the institutions and processes within the government (Grissom 2006), the 
analysis shows that there is considerable value in systematically taking societal 
demands into account. Thus, this analysis adds a further domestic aspect besides 
Evangelista’s (1988) emphasis on the economic structure. While many studies on 
military innovations start out with the implicit understanding that military actors do not 
function as perfect agents (e.g. Rosen 1991), the quality of the political actors’ agency is 
hardly questioned. This analysis preliminary fills this gap showing that political actors 
are neither free to pursue their individual interests nor perfect agents of society.  
Yet, further research is necessary to confirm these findings. Especially synchronic 
comparisons and the influence of further intervening variables seem to be promising 
next steps. Qualitative comparisons like the one at hand always face the problem that 
Lijphart (1971, 685) simply called “many variables, small number of cases.” Hence, one 
has to be careful with regard to the degree to which the results of case study analysis 
can be generalized (King/Keohane/Verba 1994). Of the eight cases identified as periods 
of transition after World War II, only four cases were analyzed in depth. Given the 
small population, this is a strong sample. But it was chosen with the intention to reduce 
the number of confounding variables and thus it cannot be taken for granted that these 
excluded factors have an influence on the relationship between societal demands and 
military innovation. Since the public intervened only in cases of military failure, there is 
especially good reason to expect transitions after military defeat to differ from the 
observed pattern.  
Moreover, one has to be careful in drawing conclusions beyond the US case. Hence, it 
remains unclear what the finding of a decreasing likelihood of military innovation over 
time implies for the US innovativeness relative to other political systems. It seems 
indeed unlikely that the US democracy is less innovative than other democracies or non-
democracies. It is largely accepted that the economic and political organization of 
democracies favors them over non-democracies with regard to their ability to produce 
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technological progress.
393
 Moreover, the case studies show that other characteristics of 
democracies beyond the public representation, especially professional Services, which 
accept the civil authority and compete for resources, are of vital importance for 
innovation. In addition, although active public participation is mostly confined to 
situations of military failure, it nonetheless provides an ultimate corrective that lacks in 
authoritarian regimes. But only symmetrical comparisons can help to shed light on the 
relative relevance of these factors for the military innovativeness of political systems.  
 
7.4. Conclusion 
This study helps to explain why the United States had and arguably still have trouble to 
find a consistent response to the new strategic and technological challenges after the 
Cold War. Referring to Huntington’s (1961) description of the military policy as Janus-
faced, it seems that with a growing relevance of the look into the state, the look into the 
international system loses relevance. Due to a growing societal economic relevance of 
military policy, the political costs to move outside the box have significantly increased. 
Iraq is not the only example, in which opponents of the US have exploited this 
predictability of the US armed forces by creative counterstrategies and tactics.  
In this context, democracy and societal representation turns out to be mixed blessing. 
The opportunity of societal participation by it itself does not guarantee a symmetrical 
representation and an efficient national defense. Since not all actors are equally 
interested and have equal resources to participate in the field of military preparations, 
policy outcomes are often suboptimal for the silent majority. The great advantage of 
democracy is, however, that it never fully forecloses the chance of participation and 
policy correction. Elections offer the opportunity to leave a costly path and evade dead 
ends. Hence, democracy holds the ultimate ability to cut the Gordian knot of its own 
making. 
  
                                                             
393 Evangelista (1988) highlights the advantage of the pluralist capitalist system with open competition, 
which is closely tied to democratic systems. Although the major argument of innovation through 
competition loses weight with the growing monopolization of the defense market, the economic 
prosperity still favors democracies, especially the US, over other systems. In 2008, the US spent $80 
billion for R&D, whereas China, the currently most likely competitor, spent $6.6 billion (IISS 2010, 22, 
392). Even if most of this money is spent for evolutionary improvements, the military technical leadership 
of the US is undisputed and is likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future. 
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